By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — A potential deal between three major European countries and Iran to suspend uranium enrichment activities in exchange for economic benefits is a key step in negotiations over Tehran’s nuclear program, but Washington must become involved ultimately to resolve the dispute, U.S. experts said yesterday (see related GSN story, today). Such a deal is the most promising approach available for ending Iran’s suspected pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, said Robert Einhorn, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former senior Clinton administration official. “For me, the negotiated solution seems the best of available options,” he said, of a preliminary agreement announced by Iran this week with the United Kingdom, France and Germany, collectively dubbed the EU 3. Inadequate intelligence on the location of Iranian nuclear facilities would block military strikes, Einhorn said, and “regime change in my view is wishful thinking and not a strategy.” Suspension of Iran’s uranium enrichment could become a positive first step toward negotiations resulting in a strategic decision by Iran to abandon suspected pursuit of nuclear weapons, Einhorn said, speaking at a televised “Workshop on Iran’s Nuclear Program,” hosted by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the Hoover Institution of Stanford University. It would “have to remain in place until an acceptable long-term solution to the issue was reached,” he said. Persuading Iran to abandon pursuit of nuclear weapons, however, in the end would require bringing the United States to the negotiating table to conclude a deal that would allow Iran to maintain some form of civil nuclear energy program and lead to better relations, Einhorn said. While Iraqi WMD capabilities primarily motivated the Iranian nuclear weapons program during the 1980s, “now the chief security factor motivating Iran’s nuclear weapons [program] … I think is the perceived military and political threat coming from the United States,” he said. “In [the] absence of improvement in U.S.-Iran bilateral relations, I think it’s hard to imagine Iran genuinely [being] willing to make that strategic decision to give up nuclear weapons,” he said. Larry Diamond, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, praised the approach outlined by Einhorn as “the most realistic and hopeful scenario, with a combination of carrots and sticks and global negotiations, for holding the line that I think anyone has articulated frankly.” The Proposed DealThe European proposal would be conducted in two phases, according to Einhorn: interim suspension of Iranian enrichment and other fuel-cycle activities, verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and negotiations toward a permanent deal to end Iranian fuel-cycle work. In exchange, the three nations would not refer the matter of Iranian activities to the U.N. Security Council and would resume talks on a trade agreement. Iran, on the other hand, presumably would like to pursue enrichment and other fuel-cycle activities under IAEA verification, Einhorn said. “So to induce the Iranians to change that view and come to terms with a permanent ban, the EU 3 are prepared to … recognize Iran’s right to have a nuclear power program, support Russia’s completion of the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, provide an assurance that Iran would have guaranteed access at market prices to reactor fuel supplies, and not object to Iran’s acquisition of a light-water nuclear research reactor,” he said. Also, the countries would engage in enhanced cooperation with Iran over economic issues, engage in a political and security dialogue, and support its membership in the World Trade Organization, he said. Iran Buying Time, Skeptics SaySome experts attending the workshop expressed skepticism that Iran could be convinced to abandon its suspected pursuit of nuclear weapons and said Tehran may be seeking to buy time and avoid a major confrontation over its activities as it works toward a capability. Estimates for an Iranian nuclear weapons capability ranged from one to four years, according to Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, to three to five years, according to David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security. “If we conclude that this latest EU deal is going to be airtight and the Iranians will not find some way to challenge some of the interpretations or find loopholes then I think we are being a little bit naive,” said Greg Giles, a senior director with Hicks and Associates, speaking from the audience. Agreeing to the suspension could help Iran covertly move toward a nuclear capability unchecked, he said. “You’re running the risk of really playing into the hands of a determined cabal that really wants nuclear weapons.” Sokolski said that if Iran were permitted to possess light-water reactors under construction with Russian assistance at Bushehr — as is proposed in the potential deal — it could divert lightly enriched uranium for production of nuclear weapons. “The [non]proliferation advantages of light-water reactors I don’t think are as clear cut as our diplomats have argued over the years,” he said, citing a study published by his center last month. “The conclusions of this study were that we need to kind of reassess light-water reactors in making international deals, particularly with countries that are troublesome,” he said. However, a higher standard of international monitoring measures could be imposed, such as real time human and camera surveillance of storage areas for the fresh and spent fuel at light-water reactors, Sokolski said. Einhorn said he believed Iran would continue to pursue nuclear weapons clandestinely, even during a suspension of acknowledged uranium enrichment activities. He said though, a suspension could “make it much more difficult to pursue a covert program without detection,” by eliminating a legitimate justification for seeking nuclear technology on the international market, while negotiations on an end to such activities take place. Most of the experts agreed that the United States would need to be a part of any deal involving Iranian renunciation of nuclear weapons. So far, however, the administration “has essentially rejected idea of direct negotiations with the Iranians,” said Geoffrey Kemp, director of regional and strategic programs at the Nixon Center. “At this point in time, the U.S. government has outsourced policy on Iranian nuclear issues to the European Union because of good luck in the Bush administration and a hell of a mess in Iraq,” he said. “If [we’re] really serious about nonproliferation, then we need to engage with regimes we don’t like,” Einhorn said.
By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The second administration of U.S. President George W. Bush should step up efforts to resolve entrenched and possibly worsening WMD threats in Russia and North Korea, conservative policy experts said here yesterday (see GSN, Oct. 29). One American Enterprise Institute scholar said Bush should draw on his personal relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin to head off proliferation and terrorism risks in Russia, while another called for sweeping changes in the “reactive,” “passive-aggressive” U.S. policy on North Korea. As Putin seeks more centralization of authority in Russia, resulting instability in the country could endanger U.S.-Russian goals on nonproliferation and other matters, said the institute’s Russian studies director, Leon Aron. Speaking as part of an institute panel on U.S. foreign policy in the second Bush term, Aron said Putin’s drive to reduce through consolidation the number of Russian provinces and republics could provoke unrest or even secessions, particularly in regions with a majority Muslim population. Putin practices a “plebiscitarian authoritarianism,” Aron said, with the government’s authority based on the “leader’s personal popularity.” That approach, along with widespread corruption, economic troubles and the threat of new terrorist attacks, has weakened the government, said Aron. As a result, new terrorist attacks — possibly against chemical, nuclear or electric plants — are more likely to occur and are perceived as likely to succeed, he said. “It is a prescription for disaster. There’s no other way to put it,” Aron said. “Our most effective tool is the reportedly very high esteem in which President Putin holds President Bush,” he added. “President Bush ought to alert President Putin to the dangers that are inherent in the current policy.” Another institute expert, Nicholas Eberstadt, suggested during the same discussion that the Bush administration should review its military options for dealing with the North Korean nuclear crisis (see GSN, Nov. 9). The administration has so far had clear “attitudes” about North Korea but no “policy to translate … attitudes into coherent and consistent action,” he said. Washington has been “reactive” and “passive-aggressive” toward Pyongyang, and the North Korea crisis has worsened over the past four years, said Eberstadt, who has written several books on the Koreas. North Korea will remain a problem until it has a new leader, Eberstadt said, and it will not be persuaded to give up its suspected nuclear-weapon program through economic benefits or negotiations. “If North Korea could have been talked or bribed out of its nuclear programs, probably during the famine we would have had a better chance than today,” Eberstadt said. North Korea is still heavily dependent on international food aid, but its food-security status has improved in the past few years. Eberstadt said his first hope for the new Bush administration is “regime change at the State Department,” a wish that appears likely to come true with the reportedly imminent departure of Secretary of State Colin Powell. Eberstadt also called for a clear definition of what would constitute success or failure in North Korea; a bid to persuade China to “take a little bit more ownership of the problem and of the process,” rather than maintaining an ambiguous position between North Korea and the countries seeking to disarm Pyongyang; greater European participation in the process; and a serious examination of the “nondiplomatic instruments at our disposal,” a move Eberstadt said would increase the chance of diplomatic success.
British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw confirmed yesterday that light-water reactor technology is included in negotiations on a package aimed at persuading Iran to suspend suspected nuclear weapons efforts (see GSN, Nov. 9). The preliminary agreement with Tehran was “designed to give us confidence that Iran is not developing the most sensitive nuclear technologies, while we seek to agree [to] long-term arrangements for Iran’s nuclear power programs,” Straw told Parliament. Asked by a Parliament member about reports that the agreement would involve providing assistance for an Iranian civilian nuclear program, Straw replied, “There have indeed been discussions at informal level about the provision of technology in that regard.” (Agence France-Presse/SpaceWar.com, Nov. 9). If Iran wishes the preliminary agreement to appear in the next report on its activities by the International Atomic Energy Agency, it must immediately inform the agency in writing that it will suspend its uranium enrichment program, Western diplomats told Reuters yesterday. “Iran needs to send a letter … stating that it will suspend enrichment on such-and-such a date,” a Western diplomat said. “Iran has been told that the IAEA needs this letter by [today] if it is going to be in the report,” the diplomat said yesterday, referring to IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei’s forthcoming report on his agency’s inspections in Iran. Several diplomats in Vienna said ElBaradei promised Tehran a positive report if talks with the European powers went well, according to Reuters. If Iran accepts the deal, according to one EU diplomat, the United States would be unlikely to push for Iran’s referral to the Security Council at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting scheduled for Nov. 25. “The U.S. is aware of the odds of getting a referral if we have an agreement. It won’t play Don Quixote,” he said (Louis Charbonneau, Reuters, Nov. 9). Nevertheless, the Bush administration is “very skeptical of Iran’s good faith in these negotiations,” said Assistant Secretary of State for arms control Stephen Rademaker. “We do not expect Iran to comply over the long-term with any commitment not to develop nuclear weapons,” he added. Washington has, however, “told our European allies that we will not stand in the way of their effort to come to some diplomatic understanding with Iran.” “We have made clear that our view is that Iran is seriously embarked on an effort to develop nuclear weapons in violation of Iran’s obligations as a non-nuclear weapons state under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,” Rademaker said (Agence France-Presse/EUBusiness.com, Nov. 9). Meanwhile, an Iranian official said Tehran would withdraw from the treaty and continue its nuclear work if threatened or pressured by Western nations, Reuters reported. “If they start to pressure or threaten us, then we will put aside the treaty and go underground,” the semi-official Mehr news agency quoted Sirus Naseri, a member of the Iranian negotiating team, as saying. “In that case, after one or two years, America and the EU will send mediators to talk to us and find a solution,” he said (Reuters, Nov. 10). Elsewhere, Germany Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer said he was optimistic about negotiations with Tehran, and does not anticipate military action against Iran, the Associated Press reported. “If Iran goes down the road of good sense and cooperation, if it also becomes more democratic, it could become the big winner in a new Middle East,” he told the German weekly Stern. “I don’t see us getting into an Iraq-like confrontation immediately here,” Fischer added. “I think it is clear to all involved that war is not an option.” (Associated Press, Nov. 10).
France is expected to award contracts worth $1.55 billion this year for the first set of replacements for its submarine-launched nuclear missiles, the French defense procurement agency DGA announced yesterday (see GSN, Jan. 7). The French government has spent nearly $3.6 billion on development of the new M-51 missile, according to Reuters. The M-51 is scheduled to replace the existing M-45 missile on French submarines in 2010. Approximately 20 percent of France’s annual defense equipment budget is spent on its nuclear arsenal, according to Reuters (Reuters, Nov. 9).
The United States and Indonesia reached a bilateral agreement Monday on nuclear safeguards and security, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration announced (see GSN, May 5). NNSA deputy chief Paul Longsworth and Azhar Djaloeis, chairman of the Indonesian Nuclear Regulatory Agency, signed the agreement at the 2004 Asia-Pacific Nuclear Safeguards and Security Conference in Sydney. The agreement would help increase U.S.-Indonesian cooperation in several areas of nuclear nonproliferation, such as assessments of potential threats to nuclear facilities and security upgrades needed to counter those threats. “This is an important step in nonproliferation efforts worldwide,” said Longsworth. “It is essential that we have international cooperation to prevent nuclear materials from getting in the wrong hands, and I look forward to continuing an already positive relationship with Indonesia” (U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration release/Yahoo!News, Nov. 9).
The Pakistani Supreme Court today dismissed a petition seeking to free former top nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan from home detention, according to the Associated Press (see GSN, Nov. 4). Khan’s friend Hussam-ul Haq filed the request, claiming that Khan was in poor health, AP reported. The court dismissed the petition after receiving a letter from Khan, in which he said he was being “looked after very well” and that he had not asked anyone to file the court petition. Khan’s lawyer said he withdrew the petition based on the scientist’s “extreme desire and wish.” “Since we withdrew the petition, the court dismissed it,” attorney Mohammed Ikram Chaudhry said (Munir Ahmad, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, No. 10).
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov yesterday bumped heads over the correct terminology to describe Russian ICBMs, according to RIA Novosti (see GSN, Nov. 3). During a meeting of government officials, Ivanov told Putin that the first test launch of the SS-18 Satan ICBM would be held by the end of the year. Ivanov was using the NATO term for the missile, but Putin told him to refer to the ICBM by its Russian designation — the RS-20. “Let them call it Satan in the West,” Putin said. The Russian Strategic Missile Forces plan to conduct two additional tests this year, involving RS-20 and Topol-M ballistic missiles, Ivanov said. He also said the Russian Navy plans to conduct another missile test by the end of the year (RIA Novosti, Nov. 9).
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