A sensor-laden gate at the Security Assessment and Training Center in Sergiev Posad, northeast of Moscow, was built with U.S. funds to assess different technologies for improving security at Russian nuclear weapons sites (DOD Photo). Security Staff Improvements Needed at Russian Nuclear Sites, Study Finds By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — Efforts to heighten security at Russian nuclear sites should place an emphasis on improving site personnel, rather than only on physical protection measures, according to a report released this week by a U.S. think tank (see GSN, Oct. 29)...Full Story

United States Extends Program to Recover Spent Fuel From Foreign Research Reactors By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The U.S. Energy Department has decided to extend a program to take back U.S.-origin spent fuel from foreign research reactors to keep the material out of the hands of those seeking to develop nuclear weapons, according to a notice published yesterday in the Federal Register (see GSN, Dec. 16, 2003)...Full Story

CWC Members Approve Libya Plant Conversion By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — A conference of Chemical Weapons Convention parties today approved Libya’s proposal to convert its former chemical weapons production facility at Rabta into a pharmaceutical plant (see GSN, Oct. 15)...Full Story

	Thursday, December 2, 2004

U.S. States Hurry to Implement New Federal Response System Over Next 10 Months By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire BALTIMORE — U.S. states have embarked on intense campaigns to implement new federally mandated WMD- and terrorism-response practices by a deadline of next October, according to state officials and federal documentation (see GSN, Nov. 16). U.S. President George W. Bush ordered last year that federal antiterrorism funds be made contingent “beginning in fiscal year 2005” — the 12-month period that began Oct. 1 — on states’ implementation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS). A recent Homeland Security Department letter to states indicates the deadline has effectively been pushed back a year, however, and some state emergency leaders said at a convention here yesterday that they are just beginning to train personnel around their states to use the new system. “Everyone is very focused on the implementation of NIMS,” Executive Director Trina Sheets of the National Emergency Management Association said today in a telephone interview. Bush ordered the creation of the management system and the associated National Response Plan in a February 2003 directive, and the Homeland Security Department issued the system in March of this year. Together, they lay out a uniform national approach and a clear chain of command for managing natural disasters and terrorist attacks, including WMD incidents. In a Sept. 8 letter to governors, Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge laid out a list of “minimum FY 2005 NIMS compliance requirements” — incorporating the new system into existing training programs, using current federal grants in ways appropriate to the system, aiding municipalities in adopting the system — but said grants would not be conditional on meeting the requirements until fiscal 2006. “In order to receive FY 2006 preparedness funding, the minimum FY 2005 compliance requirements described above must be met,” he wrote. Sheets said Ridge’s letter means “there are no financial strings attached in ’05.” States are required only to be “working toward” the requirements during this fiscal year, she said. Notwithstanding Ridge’s letter, top emergency-response officials from around the United States complained later in September to a House of Representatives subcommittee that deadlines under the incident-management system were too short (see GSN, Sept. 30). In presentations yesterday at the Mid-Atlantic All Hazards Forum here, several state officials cited implementation of the new system as a top priority but indicated key aspects of the effort were just beginning. West Virginia Military Affairs and Public Safety Secretary Christine Farris Morris said her state is about to start training emergency personnel around the state in the system, while Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency Plans Bureau Director Evelyn Fisher cited training as one of several priorities for her state over the coming year. Sheets said the “time frames are fairly short” but that emergency responders — many of whom already use the Incident Command System, on which the new national system is based — are not starting from scratch in implementing the new program, unlike some workers in health care and other affected fields. Sheets’ group found earlier this year that 37 states were already offering Incident Command System training. She added that today is the deadline for responses to a new survey by the association seeking to determine whether states will reach full National Incident Management System compliance in fiscal 2005 or fiscal 2006. Ridge wrote in his letter that states and other affected entities, such as territories and tribes, should try “to the maximum extent possible … to achieve full NIMS implementation and institutionalization across the entire response system during FY 2005.” He acknowledged, though, that Bush’s directive “established ambitious deadlines for NIMS adoption and implementation.” As a result, he wrote, “FY 2005 is a start-up year for NIMS implementation.” Sheets said her conversations with state officials have suggested most states will be compliant with the new system in time for next October’s deadline. “I would expect the vast majority are going to be compliant — not to say it won’t be difficult, because it will, given the short time frames,” she said. Back to top

Security Staff Improvements Needed at Russian Nuclear Sites, Study Finds By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — Efforts to heighten security at Russian nuclear sites should place an emphasis on improving site personnel, rather than only on physical protection measures, according to a report released this week by a U.S. think tank (see GSN, Oct. 29). The University of Georgia Center for International Trade and Security study calls for the development of an improved “security culture” among Russian nuclear site personnel and officials to better recognize the threat posed by terrorists seeking to steal Russian nuclear weapons and materials. To date, though, billions of dollars have been spent instead on hardware-based security measures, such as the installation of new fencing and alarm systems, the report says.  “Hardware by itself does not produce security; people do,” it says. The report paints a bleak picture of the security culture at most Russian nuclear sites, citing incidents such as guards ignoring alarms and midlevel managers disabling security systems. Among the factors cited for the problems are “poor management and motivation,” increased corruption and other lingering negative effects of Russia’s rocky post-Soviet transition, and the poor enforcement of poorly written nuclear security-related regulations. The report also partially attributes poor security at Russian nuclear sites to several cultural factors lingering from the Soviet era, such as lack of personal responsibility stemming from the collectivism of the communist system and a “scapegoat mentality” that refuses to see systematic flaws. There has long been concern over the vulnerability of Russian nuclear warheads and materials to theft and diversion. Russian officials have often stated, though, that their sites are secure. In September, Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency Director Alexander Rumyantsev reportedly claimed that over the past 25 years, thieves had only been able to obtain “tens of grams” of weapon-grade materials and that the missing material had since been recovered (see GSN, Sept. 16). There are signs, though, that recent terrorist attacks within Russia have “really shook people up” regarding the need for improved security, said Matthew Bunn, senior research associate at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He noted Moscow’s move to increase guards at some Russian nuclear facilities following an attack on a school in the southern town of Beslan in September. One of the priorities, Bunn said, is the need to counter a sense of “complacency” among Russian nuclear site personnel. “Ninety-nine percent of nuclear security personnel will not see a real attack at their facility,” he said. Bunn was one of several experts who reviewed the report before it was released. Among the report’s recommendations to improve the security culture in Russia is a call for Moscow to spend more of its own resources on security improvements, rather than having other nations supply the funding. Such a move, the report says, “would send a positive signal to the personnel who operate these sites.” The report also calls for increased training for senior site managers, which could include simulations. Bunn said this week that such training should “grab you in the gut,” noting a training program for U.S. Navy personnel that includes being required to listen to a recording for several minutes of a disabled submarine being crushed underwater. In addition, improved personnel incentive systems are needed to help attract young and well-educated Russians to work at nuclear sites, the report says. It also recommends increased independent monitoring. Back to top       United States Extends Program to Recover Spent Fuel From Foreign Research Reactors By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The U.S. Energy Department has decided to extend a program to take back U.S.-origin spent fuel from foreign research reactors to keep the material out of the hands of those seeking to develop nuclear weapons, according to a notice published yesterday in the Federal Register (see GSN, Dec. 16, 2003). Under the 1996 acceptance program, the Energy Department had agreed to receive 22,700 U.S.-origin spent-fuel elements loaded into foreign research reactors before 2006. Research reactor operators were given until 2009 to ship the spent fuel back to the United States to allow the material to cool enough to be safely transported. One of the main purposes of the program was to encourage foreign research reactors to convert to the use of low-enriched uranium fuel, which is more difficult to use for nuclear weapons. Material eligible to be returned through the program includes highly enriched and low-enriched fuel from research reactors that had converted to LEU use or were doing so when the program began, as well as from reactors that agreed to convert to LEU use when they were technically able to do so. According to yesterday’s notice, the department has decided to extend the acceptance program for an additional 10 years. The department will accept U.S.-origin spent fuel elements loaded until mid-May 2016, and research reactor operators will have until mid-May 2019 to ship the material to the United States for final disposal. In its notice, the Energy Department noted that as the acceptance program reached its initial deadline, only about 35 percent of the eligible material had been returned. The department noted delays in the development of new LEU fuel for those foreign research reactors unable to use existing types as a factor in its decision to extend the program (see GSN, Aug. 2).  The acceptance program is part of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which the Energy Department launched in May. The initiative seeks to recover all U.S.-origin research reactor spent fuel within a decade, as well as to repatriate fresh and spent Russian-origin research reactor fuel by 2010 (see GSN, Nov. 23). Supporters of an extension have said it could encourage Russia to accept spent fuel it provided to foreign research reactors during the Cold War. While Russia has accepted from several foreign research reactors supplies of fresh HEU fuel it previously delivered, it has yet to accept spent fuel shipments, citing the need to conduct environmental assessments. The Energy Department also announced in its notice yesterday that an Australian research reactor set to be commissioned next year will be eligible to return spent LEU fuel through the program. The reactor is set to replace one using HEU fuel that is to be decommissioned in 2006. The planned Australian reactor is set to use a new type of LEU fuel that can be disposed of at non-U.S. facilities, according to the Energy Department. Delays in the development of such fuel, however, would mean the reactor will have to use existing LEU fuel until 2012, mandating its need to be included in the U.S. acceptance program. The department has estimated the spent fuel to be created through the use of existing LEU fuel at the planned reactor would only contribute a small additional amount, about 96 elements, to the total material eligible to be returned. Back to top       U.N. Nuclear Watchdog Seeks Access to Iranian Military Sites, Diplomats Say The International Atomic Energy Agency is seeking permission to send inspectors to two Iranian military facilities that could house nuclear weapons work, the New York Times reported today (see GSN, Dec. 1). Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei has repeatedly but so far unsuccessfully asked Iran for access to the sites, he said yesterday. “We are following every credible piece of information,” he said. “We still have work to do, a lot of work,” he added, estimating that it would take at least two years for his agency to resolve all outstanding questions about Iran’s nuclear program, assuming full cooperation from Tehran. “We’re not rushing,” he said. “It takes time.” A member of the Iranian negotiating delegation said Iran had no obligation to open the military sites to inspectors. “There is nothing required for us to do,” he said. “They should have evidence that there are nuclear activities, not just ‘We heard from someone that there is dual-use equipment that we want to see.’” Intelligence indicates the Parchin military complex, one of the sites the agency has requested to visit, may be used for testing conventional high explosives of a type used to detonate nuclear weapons, inspectors said. That could explain U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s disclosure two weeks ago of intelligence about Iran’s alleged attempt to manufacture a missile compatible with a nuclear warhead (see GSN, Nov. 18). Iran’s long-range missiles were partially developed at Parchin, said a European diplomat who is dealing with the Iranian government on nuclear issues. Satellite photographs and other evidence indicate that some of its explosives work is now related to nuclear arms development, according to the diplomat. “If you go for nuclear weapons development, you need those places at a fairly early stage of your program,” he said Procurement records obtained by inspectors indicate that the Iranian military ordered suspect equipment — some of which could be used for uranium enrichment centrifuges — for the Lavizan II site in northeastern Tehran, the second site of interest to the agency, the Times reported.   “We believe it’s related to enrichment and uranium conversion,” the European diplomat said of the equipment. “It’s something they need to explain for us.” He called the equipment orders “a little bit of everything” short of actual centrifuges, according to the Times. “But when you combine them all together, it looks like a shopping list for an enrichment program,” he added (New York Times, Dec. 2). The U.N. nuclear watchdog only has the right to visit nuclear sites, Reuters reported, while access to other facilities must be negotiated. “The IAEA simply has no authority to go to sites that are not declared nuclear sites,” said a diplomat close to the IAEA inspections process. “If a country has a strategy for hiding its nuclear program, then the Additional Protocol is of little use,” a U.N. diplomat said, adding that the agency could not have determined that Libya had a nuclear arms program without the cooperation of Muammar Qadhafi. He added that if Iran was hiding a nuclear weapons program, the agency was unlikely to find it without additional inspection authority. The IAEA inspection process was damaged this week when France, Germany and the United Kingdom — during talks on suspending Iranian uranium enrichment work — relented to demands that Tehran only be required to grant access to suspect sites “in accordance with the Additional Protocol.” The original version of the draft European resolution called for “unrestricted access,” weapons experts and diplomats said. “It was a terrible blow to this effort to find these potential nuclear weapons sites,” said David Albright, a former U.N. arms inspector and head of the Institute for Science and International Security (Louis Charbonneau, Reuters, Dec. 2). Meanwhile, the United States has obtained intelligence indicating that Iran has been developing a missile re-entry vehicle containing a small nuclear warhead for its Shahab missiles, U.S. officials told the Washington Times. Iran’s nuclear warhead program includes the basic “physics package” for fitting a nuclear bomb inside the nose cone of a missile, the officials said. The warhead is based on an Iranian design rather than one supplied by the group formerly led by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, they added. “They are moving ahead with a design for a warhead,” one official said. The information was not obtained from an Iranian opposition group, the officials said (Bill Gertz, Washington Times, Dec. 2). The Iranian leadership may have come to believe that the benefits of obtaining a nuclear weapon now outweigh the drawbacks, the Christian Science Monitor reported. “They’ve been attacked by (weapons of mass destruction) in the past and the international community not only did nothing, but turned a blind eye,” said Rob Malley, director of the International Crisis Group’s Middle East and North Africa project. “They’re in a regional environment where other countries have nuclear capacity, and they’re surrounded by countries with a strong U.S. military presence, so they feel finding their own independent means of deterrent is critical.” Prestige also likely plays a role in any calculations about obtaining nuclear weapons. “They see themselves as the France or Great Britain of the Persian Gulf,” Malley said. “They feel they should have the bomb.” Retired U.S. Air Force Col. Sam Gardiner recently conducted a simulation of U.S. military options against Iran and concluded that the use of force would not be effective. “The thing I think people don’t realize is how much leverage the Iranians have over us right now,” said Gardiner. “We have limited military options particularly when we’re in Iraq. Iran has the leverage to make things go very badly for us there” (Dan Murphy, Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 2). Back to top       Rwanda Ratifies Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Rwanda on Tuesday signed and ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, bringing the number of signatories to 174 (see GSN, Oct. 1). Fifty-one African nations have signed the treaty, with 27 of those countries also ratifying the pact. To date, 120 countries have ratified the agreement, including 33 of the 44 nations whose ratifications are necessary for the treaty to enter into force (Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization release, Dec. 1). Back to top       U.S. Energy Department Opens Competition for Los Alamos National Laboratory Management Contract The U.S. Energy Department’s National Nuclear Security Administration yesterday issued a draft request for proposals for a five-year contract to run the Los Alamos nuclear weapons laboratory in New Mexico, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Nov. 18). “The vision is we want world-class science, enabled by excellent operations, and really, really good business management,” said Tyler Przybylek, chairman of the board of NNSA officials who will evaluate proposals. The agency is expected to collect comments from prospective applicants for 30 days and then allow 60 days for submission of final proposals. The new contractor, scheduled to be selected next summer, would begin work on Oct. 1, 2005 (Erica Werner, Associated Press/SanLuisObispo.com, Dec. 2). Back to top       Russia Will Not Lease Ballistic Missile Submarines to India, Defense Minister Says Russia has no plans to lease ballistic missile submarines to India, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said yesterday (see GSN, Oct. 22). India, though, may choose to “upgrade” the conventional submarines Russia is set to deliver, he added (Interfax/BBC Worldwide Monitoring, Dec. 1). Back to top

University of Michigan Medical School Receives $5.9 Million for Anthrax Research The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases has awarded $5.9 million to the University of Michigan Medical School for research on a new anthrax vaccine, the Associated Press reported yesterday (see GSN, Dec. 1). The school was chosen as one of seven federally funded Biodefense Proteomics Research Centers. Researchers hope to develop a vaccine that costs less and requires fewer inoculations than the existing treatment, which consists of six injections over 18 months and yearly maintenance shots that cost $100 each, AP reported. Much remains unknown about anthrax, said Philip Hanna, center co-director and an assistant professor of microbiology and immunology. “People die very rapidly, sometimes within days of showing the first symptoms,” Hanna told The Ann Arbor News. “We don’t understand what makes it such an efficient pathogen.” Michigan researchers are developing the first comprehensive inventory of the genes and proteins active in the bacterium during the stages of infection, according to AP. “How (the pathogen) evades the immune system is still a big mystery,” Hanna said (Associated Press/Detroit Free Press, Dec. 1). Back to top

CWC Members Approve Libya Plant Conversion By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — A conference of Chemical Weapons Convention parties today approved Libya’s proposal to convert its former chemical weapons production facility at Rabta into a pharmaceutical plant (see GSN, Oct. 15). Libya joined the treaty last February and soon after began destroying chemical weapons stores and capabilities. It additionally has sought approval, with U.S. support, to convert the facility to enable production of low-cost vaccines and medicines to treat diseases such as AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis in Africa. In a first crucial step, the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in October endorsed a technical change to the treaty that would allow late joiners such as Libya to convert facilities instead of destroying them. The initial deadline for all conversions to take place was April 29, 2003, six years after the treaty entered into force. Libya’s detailed plan for conversion and verification by the organization is meant to assure member states that the facility will retain no specialized military equipment and will be used only for peaceful purposes, said OPCW spokesman Peter Kaiser.  “When you enter into this conversion process, you’re entering into a very complex and protracted process of continual measures to produce confidence and also to certify compliance so there’s no question whatsoever in the minds of any of the states parties involved,” he said. Kaiser said the facility would be “checked and rechecked systematically by the organization” over a 10-year period to ensure the plant’s configuration of technology, equipment and process flow has been changed “to make sure it will be entirely peaceful.” He attributed the rapid progress of Libya’s destruction and conversion of its chemical weapons capabilities since joining the treaty to Tripoli’s initiative, along with support by other member states and the OPCW secretariat. “In less then 10 months they’ve actually run the gamut of compliance and confidence-building measures that other countries have sometimes taken five years for,” he said. Back to top       President Bush Waives Congressional Conditions on Russian Chemical Weapons Disposal Aid U.S. President George W. Bush this week waived conditions placed by Congress on U.S. aid to Russian chemical weapons destruction efforts (see GSN, Nov. 19). The waiver, which applies through the end of 2005, will clear the way for U.S. funding for a chemical weapons destruction plant Russia is constructing near the town of Shchuchye. The aid is provided through the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which seeks to secure and dispose of Soviet-era weapons of mass destruction (U.S. State Department release, Dec. 1). Back to top

Canada Still Considering Missile Defense Cooperation Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin gave no indication yesterday regarding whether his country would join U.S. missile defense efforts, according to Agence France-Presse (see GSN, Dec. 1). “Whatever we decide,” said Martin, “it will be in Canada’s interests. We are a sovereign nation and we will make our own decisions on our airspace.” The issue was a topic of discussion this week during a visit to Canada by U.S. President George W. Bush. During a yesterday speech in Halifax, Bush expressed his “hope” that Canada would join the United States in missile defense cooperation. Canada is opposed, though, to “the weaponization of space,” Martin said (Agence France-Presse/SpaceWar.com, Dec. 1). Citing conversations with Bush, Secretary of State Colin Powell and national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, Canadian lawmaker Jack Layton said yesterday that he believes the United States plans to place weapons in space as part of its missile defense efforts. “It is now crystal clear that this involves weapons in space. I have heard it directly from the people responsible, both outgoing and incoming, and from a discussion with the president of the United States. So this idea that you can be against weapons in space but for missile defense is simply false,” Layton said (CanWest News Service, Dec. 2).   Back to top

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