U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney yesterday reiterated disputed claims about prewar Iraq’s connections to al-Qaeda and its efforts to develop mobile biological weapons facilities (AFP photo/Stephen Jaffe). Cheney Stands By Charges of Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links and Mobile Iraqi BW Facilities U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney said once again yesterday that there had been a connection between prewar Iraq and al-Qaeda and that the discovery of two mobile trailers in Iraq demonstrated the existence of an Iraqi biological weapons program — claims that have been heavily disputed, at times by senior Bush administration officials (see GSN, Jan. 21)...Full Story

Lugar Concerned About U.S. Follow-Through on Russian CW Destruction By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) yesterday expressed concern about the United States honoring its commitment to help build a major chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia through the U.S. Defense Department’s Cooperative Threat Reduction program...Full Story

“Covert” Nature of Past Nuclear Efforts May Have Led to Smuggling, Musharraf Says In a CNN interview today, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf blamed any possible nuclear proliferation by Pakistani scientists in part on the past covert nature of Pakistan’s nuclear program (see GSN, Jan. 22)...Full Story

U.S. States Fail to Provide Federal Security Funds to Cities, Say Mayors By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — U.S. states are failing to provide most of the country’s cities with funds from the largest federal grant program for terrorism response, despite a federal rule requiring states to “pass through” most of the funds promptly, a mayors’ group said yesterday in a new survey...Full Story

	Friday, January 23, 2004

U.S. States Fail to Provide Federal Security Funds to Cities, Say Mayors By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — U.S. states are failing to provide most of the country’s cities with funds from the largest federal grant program for terrorism response, despite a federal rule requiring states to “pass through” most of the funds promptly, a mayors’ group said yesterday in a new survey. The mayors’ survey was the latest shot fired in a longstanding skirmish between states and cities over control of federal money for WMD- and terrorism-related equipment and training (see GSN, Dec. 19, 2003). “Homeland security money went to the states by Federal Express but came to the cities by Pony Express. This report is a national call for improving the system, and we look forward to sharing these findings with the Department of Homeland Security and Congress,” said U.S. Conference of Mayors President James Garner, who is mayor of Hempstead, N.Y. The report’s release at a Conference of Mayors meeting here highlighted continuing state-local tensions over the funds on a day when President George W. Bush vowed to present Congress with a budget including $30 billion for homeland security, “almost three times the amount that we were spending prior to Sept. 11, 2001.” Bush told a New Mexico audience, “I can’t tell you how pleased I am with the coordination now between the federal government, the state government and local governments for preparing our homeland.” In an address delivered this morning at the mayors’ meeting, though, the president appeared to back away from yesterday’s optimistic assessment. The former Texas governor said mayors have told him that federal money has become “stuck” at the state level and promised to help resolve the problem. “We’ll work with the mayors to make sure it gets unstuck. … I’m not interested in pointing fingers. I’m interested in making the system work better,” Bush said. The mayors said 76 percent of cities have received no money from the Homeland Security Department’s $1.3 billion first responder program and $200 million critical infrastructure program. The numbers, based on a survey of 215 cities in all 50 states and Puerto Rico, were a slight improvement on a related Conference of Mayors survey five months ago, which indicated 90 percent of cities had received no funds. States were required to allocate 80 percent of the funds within 45 days of receiving grants — by Aug. 1 of last year, at the latest. The mayors’ survey gives at best an indirect indication of states’ compliance with the “pass-through” requirement, which pertains to the portion of the money that states have doled out, not to the percentage of cities that have benefited. In addition, 58 percent of cities said their homeland security programs could benefit by funds received by other jurisdictions, usually county governments. National Emergency Management Association Executive Director Trina Hembree, whose group represents state emergency management agencies, questioned the mayors’ focus on the percentage of cities that have received funds. “It is misleading. ... There is no requirement that every city receive funding,” Hembree said. “It’s our belief and knowledge, through extensive surveying and communication with the states, that, indeed, they are meeting all of the deadlines being set by Congress to distribute the funding,” Hembree said. Because funding is limited, she said, states are allocating much of the grant money to regional coordinating bodies, meaning that city governments may never directly control the funds. Hembree pointed to another federal program, the Urban Area Security Initiative, as evidence that the needs of cities are not being ignored. The program is designed to ensure that the 30 largest U.S. cities receive direct federal payments for homeland security, demonstrating, according to Hembree, that “there is that recognition of the need for some of the money to go to the larger cities.” In the Conference of Mayors survey, 46 percent of cities said they have not been involved in state planning for use of Urban Area Security Initiative money. Hembree said Congress demands that states submit needs assessments and closely regulate how homeland security grant money is spent. Responding to Garner’s charge that states receive money at “Federal Express” speed but pay it out at “Pony Express” speed, Hembree said, “It’s certainly not Federal Express. It’s a 12-step, red-tape, bureaucratic process that certainly DHS is trying to address.” “We’re not here to say that [the mayors are] wrong. We just think there needs to be a better understanding globally of the grants process,” Hembree said. Back to top

Cheney Stands By Charges of Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links and Mobile Iraqi BW Facilities U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney said once again yesterday that there had been a connection between prewar Iraq and al-Qaeda and that the discovery of two mobile trailers in Iraq demonstrated the existence of an Iraqi biological weapons program — claims that have been heavily disputed, at times by senior Bush administration officials (see GSN, Jan. 21). In an interview with National Public Radio, Cheney said there was “overwhelming evidence” of a “connection” between al-Qaeda and the regime of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.  “I am very confident that there was an established relationship there,” he said (see GSN, Jan. 15). Cheney’s comments yesterday, however, appear to contradict those recently made by other senior Bush administration officials, according to the Los Angeles Times. For example, Secretary of State Colin Powell said this month that he had “not seen smoking-gun, concrete evidence” of connections between Iraq and al-Qaeda (see GSN, Jan. 9). In addition, members of Congress also challenged Cheney’s claim. “There’s nothing I have seen or read that backs [Cheney] up,” said Senator John “Jay” Rockefeller (D-W.Va.), the top Democrat on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Rockefeller also described Cheney’s comments as “perplexing.” Cheney also said yesterday that the discovery last year of mobile trailers in Iraq supported the Bush administration’s prewar claims that Iraq possessed WMD programs (see GSN, Sept. 15, 2003). “We’ve found a couple of semi-trailers at this point which we believe were in fact part of (a WMD) program,” Cheney said. “I would deem that conclusive evidence, if you will, that he did in fact have programs for weapons of mass destruction,” he added. An interim report by chief U.S. weapons inspector in Iraq David Kay, however, said that “we have not yet been able to corroborate the existence of a mobile (biological weapons) production effort” (see GSN, Oct. 3, 2003).  In a television interview aired last night, Kay said the first disclosures of the vehicle findings were “premature and embarrassing.” “I wish that news hadn’t come out,” Kay said, calling the release of the information a “fiasco” (Greg Miller, Los Angeles Times, Jan. 23). During his interview, Cheney suggested that weapons of mass destruction could still be discovered in Iraq, according to the Washington Post. “We still don’t know the whole extent of what they did have. It’s going to take some additional considerable period of time in order to look in all the cubbyholes and ammo dumps and all the places in Iraq where you’d expect to find something like that,” he said (Milbank/Pincus, Washington Post, Jan. 23). British Intelligence Officials Continue to Defend Prewar Iraq Dossier Meanwhile, British intelligence officials continue to support a September 2002 dossier on prewar Iraqi WMD efforts, according to the London Times (see GSN, Dec. 8, 2003). According to British officials, members of the Cabinet Office Joint Intelligence Committee have said that the dossier was an accurate assessment of the state of Iraq’s WMD programs at the time it was published. They also said that the six-month period between the dossier’s publishing and the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom could have given Iraq the time to hide or destroy WMD-related materials. They also said, however, that British intelligence chiefs were unlikely to participate in future dossiers prepared for public release (Michael Evans, London Times, Jan. 23). Back to top       Destroying Enemy WMD Sites in Wartime Is No Easy Task, Official Says By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The accurate bombing of enemy chemical and biological weapons sites during combat without disastrously dispersing the deadly agents is a difficult task that may exceed current U.S. capabilities, but is not necessarily insurmountable, a senior U.S. official said Wednesday. In a candid speech to industry representatives and military personnel, Stephen Younger, director of the U.S. Defense Department’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency, detailed various challenges the United States faces in attacking WMD facilities, targets he considers to contain the greatest threats to U.S. security. “Weapons of mass destruction are the only serious military threats to the United States today,” he said, and described the complex problem of targeting them while weighing the various factors such as knowledge of the target, probability of success given certain types of weapons, and the potential collateral damage. “How do we nullify any advantage that they would accrue in acquiring weapons of mass destruction?” he said. You might “have to be able to do it quickly from the time of decision. This [may be] a very high-value target, identified in real time. National decision authority may be involved in real time, [ordering to] take out that target and do it now,” he said. Younger’s agency in particular is at the forefront of efforts to develop these capabilities, complemented by other elements of the military seeking so-called “Global Strike” capabilities to enable U.S. forces to quickly neutralize any target almost any place on the planet.  With respect to Global Strike, “We are moving into a time where if we know where a target is and we have some basic characterizes of the target, we will be able to destroy that target anywhere on the planet,” he said. “This does not involve magic technologies. It applies the application of technologies that either exist today or with very high confidence are in development today,” he said. Intelligence Many key capabilities needed for solving the chemical and biological weapon challenge, however, require much more work, he said.  Having excellent intelligence is the “single most important determinant of future battle success” and perhaps the biggest hurdle to overcome, according to Younger. “The problem is, where are the targets?” he said. “When you talk to Gen. [Leon] LaPorte, [commander] of the United States forces in Korea, the problem he says is there are literally thousands of buried structures within walking distance of the DMZ and North Korea. What do they contain?  If there were a conflict in North Korea, what is the priority sequencing of targets? What’s inside?  So intelligence becomes the critical enabler of battle success for the future,” Younger said. The solution is to do a better job of human intelligence gathering, he said. “There are some things you are just not going to see from space,” he said. Acute Intelligence In addition to location, particular knowledge of the storage facility and the type of agent stored there are also important, Younger said. Penetrating and then detonating munitions accurately, for instance, can be affected by wind speed, munitions velocities and soil conditions, he said. For buried facilities, intelligence is needed on the surrounding soil, whether it is frozen for instance, or wet, or contains rocks, he said. “What kind of rocks? That’s the kind of detail that you need to know if you’re going to put one of these penetrators in with high precision and then you’re going to penetrate some concrete when you get through,” he said. Knowledge of the adversary’s building methods and materials also needs to be known and tested against, he said. “If you build one of these [test] bunkers with good hard U.S. concrete, and good hard U.S. steel, and you put good hard U.S. blast doors in, and you demonstrate you can destroy that target, don’t be too comfortable,” he said. “Because if the adversary is using porous concrete, and bad steel, and crummy blast doors, and they’re open instead of closed, you may get a different effect on the adversary’s target than you want. You may release a lot more stuff, or you may not achieve the other military objective that you want,” he said. “Until you’ve done a test of this weapon, you’ve got a theory, you haven’t got a weapon. You have to go out and demonstrate it against as high a fidelity target as you can possibly get,” he added. Planning Tools Having excellent planning tools for calculating the ideal weapon configuration for achieving a particular military objective in a particular situation also is necessary, Younger said. “How are you going to employ this weapon? What is the release altitude, what is the impact velocity? If you have multiple weapons hitting the same target, what is the timing between that?” Younger said. “What is the timing for release, what is the timing for impact, what’s the timing for detonation? What is the effect you achieve from the first weapon? Are you going to levelize the surface so that you get better penetration for the second weapon? Are you going to complete the collapse [with] the second weapon that you achieved from the first weapon?” he continued. “If you don’t have a planning tool, you don’t have a weapon,” he said. Tailoring Weapons Once it is determined what capability is preferred, actually producing that “tailored” weapon is a challenge. “What’s the effect that you want to achieve based on the target you want to destroy?” Younger said. “Do you want a high pressure pulse, followed by a lot of shrapnel, followed by a thermal pulse? Do you want minimum amounts of shrapnel? … What sort of molecules will do that for you? Do you want conventional high explosives, do you want fuel air. Do you want a thermobaric mixture?  Do you want exotic metal loading?” “Do you want a carbon composite case to minimize metal shrapnel, a steel case to maximize shrapnel? Do you want to score that to achieve shrapnel sizes? What is the sequence of those effects?  Do you want multiple detonators? Do you want to protect one part of the weapon while the other part is detonating?” he said.  The military is farthest along in addressing the explosives end of things, he said. “Seldom has weapons design been as exciting as it is today in being able to design a new weapon to achieve a specific military effect. We’re being able to shoot further, longer-range, we’re being able to shoot faster, to get there quicker, we’re being able to penetrate further, into shallow buried targets, and sometimes into exceptionally hard targets,” he said. CBW Tailoring More difficult, however, is destroying protected chemical and biological weapons facilities while minimizing the release of the agents through containment and incineration, he said. Failure could cost thousands of lives to nearby civilians, he said.  “These are niche targets, weapons of mass destruction targets, hardened and deeply buried targets. They tend not to build many of them the same way. So it’s not a case of, ‘Well I’ve got a class of weapons that I can apply to that class of targets so I can get assured destruction every time,”” he said. Tailoring weapons for such targets can be a matter of minimizing collateral damage to dozens as opposed to thousands of people, he said. If a bunker containing 12 kilograms of dry anthrax were struck and 90 percent of it was contained, thousands of fatalities might ensue, he said. If 99 percent were contained, dozens of people might die. We “want to get into the ballpark of 99-percent containment, 99.9-percent containment. This is a tall order, this is a tough problem, but I think that we can do this in some cases if we understand the target well enough,” he said. Ideally, you would want to avoid fatalities, “but that might not be possible,” he said. “So where are the break points, what are you willing to accept if this is a high-value targets and you know that if you don’t eliminate this target you are going to have serious problem in the very near future, so it’s not an option to leave that target there?” he said. For especially hardened, more deeply buried targets that conventional munitions may not reach, he said, penetrating nuclear munitions may be an option. “We don’t need nuclear [weapons] to achieve most of our military objectives,” he said, but said, “There is a role for nuclear weapons in telling an adversary, ‘If you think you can hide in that space, guess again, because if there is a sufficiently serious threat to the United States, we will destroy that,’” he said.  “If it is a supreme national interest to the United States, that’s why we have those things,” he said. Combat Assessment Lastly, reliable, near-real-time damage assessment of a target is important, Younger said, so forces know whether the target needs to be struck again or whether nearby U.S. forces need to don protective suits. A solution possibly preferable to sending U.S. special operations forces into the area to report, would be to jettison sensors from munitions just before and attack which could instantly report back evidence of an agent release, he said. “There are a variety of ways you can do that. We’re not there yet.  We’ve made amazing progress in the explosive part of the weapon. We have a lot of work to do on the sensor part,” he said. The challenge is not impossible, he said. “We’ve done things like this before, [using systems] that can sustain high-G environments, scatter all across the desert floor, report back … but we haven’t done it in terms of a complete package,” he said. Younger suggested cost could be a factor there. “If it costs a billion dollars, you’re not going to deploy it. So having reasonable costs for these systems makes them deployable in the field,” he said. Back to top       House Democrats Seek Congressional Inquiry Into CIA Leak By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives this week sought to launch a congressional inquiry into the leak of a CIA operative’s identity, a day after a call by a group of former CIA employees for greater congressional involvement in the matter (see GSN, Jan. 7). The Justice Department is investigating the leak of the identity and CIA status of the wife of former U.S. Ambassador Joseph Wilson. In a New York Times commentary last summer, Wilson criticized some of the evidence offered by the Bush administration to justify the invasion of Iraq. Soon after Wilson released his criticism, his wife’s name and status as a CIA operative was made public in a column by Robert Novak. Wilson has alleged that the leak of his wife’s identity was meant as an intimidation tactic by the Bush administration. On Wednesday, Representative Rush Holt (D-N.J.) introduced a resolution of inquiry, which would request the president and other Cabinet officials to provide all documents related to the leak, such as telephone and e-mail records, to the House of Representatives. In the past, the process of considering a resolution of inquiry has prodded the executive branch to provide information even though the resolution ultimately failed to pass the House, according to a Holt fact sheet. The Justice Department yesterday refused to comment on the resolution. Although the resolution was cosponsored only by other Democrats, some Republican House members have privately voiced support, according to Holt’s office. Steven Aftergood, director of the Federation of American Scientists’ Project on Government Secrecy, said yesterday, though, that the resolution was likely to receive little support “since the current Congress is so deferential to the White House.” He also said that he doubted the Bush administration would voluntarily provide documents related to the investigation. Instead, Aftergood said, the resolution is probably intended as a “political signal” to the administration that “congressional interest in this matter remains strong, and that some kind of response will have to be forthcoming.” Holt, a member of the House intelligence panel, said Wednesday on the House floor that the resolution of inquiry was the “best tool at the disposal of the House” to determine how the leak occurred and who was responsible, according to the Congressional Record. He also criticized senior Bush administration and intelligence officials for a lack of “public outrage” over the leak. “They should be standing in solidarity with [those] Americans who serve in our intelligence community, and they should be speaking out against those who would presume to unilaterally decide whose identity should be made public. Their silence is deplorable,” Holt said. In the Senate, Senator Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) yesterday sent a letter to Deputy Attorney General James Comey requesting that Comey report to Congress on how well the White House is cooperating with the Justice Department’s leak investigation. Comey is serving as acting attorney general in the case following the decision made by Attorney General John Ashcroft in late December to recuse himself from the investigation (see GSN, Dec. 31, 2003). “The investigation has been underway for four months now and we have received no meaningful reports regarding the progress you are making. I realize there are limitations on information that can be disclosed regarding an ongoing criminal investigation, but, as we have discussed, a prosecutor has the responsibility to assure public confidence in criminal investigations, especially those of such a serious nature,” wrote Schumer, who has been a strong advocate of the leak investigation. This week’s actions by members of the Congress follows a letter sent Tuesday to senior House members by a group of 10 former CIA analysts and case officers calling for a congressional investigation into the leak. “The disclosure … was an unprecedented and shameful event in American history and, in our professional judgment, has damaged U.S. national security,” says the letter, which was sent to Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert (R-Ill.) and other top House members. The former CIA officers wrote that a congressional inquiry into the leak was needed to “send an unambiguous message that intelligence officers tasked with collecting or analyzing intelligence must never be turned into political punching bags.” Holt’s office said yesterday that the former CIA officers’ letter and Holt’s resolution of inquiry were unrelated Back to top       U.S. Military Base in Greece Prepares to Respond to WMD Attack on 2004 Olympics A U.S. military base on the Greek island of Crete is stockpiling medical equipment for use if terrorists conduct a WMD attack on the 2004 Olympics in Athens, the Associated Press reported yesterday (see GSN, Jan. 14). In the event of an attack involving biological, chemical or radiological agents, the Souda Bay Naval Base could establish decontamination sites and field hospitals within a few hours, said base commander Capt. Stephen Sale. “The goal is to reduce the risk and increase the capability to respond,” Sale said (Miron Varouhakis, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, Jan. 22). The Greek newspaper To Vima reported today that the Athens subway system is set to purchase 150 portable radiation detectors and a central chemical detection system, according to Agence France-Presse. The Athens Metro also plans to purchase other security devices for the Olympics, including identification devices for its employees and 80 explosion-resistant garbage cans (Agence France-Presse, Jan. 23). Greek military and security forces are scheduled to hold exercises Feb. 6-8 to simulate a hostage situation at sea and a terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction, according to the Associated Press. A larger security exercise currently set to be held in March is expected to also include U.S. military personnel (Varouhakis, Associated Press). Back to top       British Government Discloses New Antiterrorism Measures The British government yesterday revealed several new measures intended to help prevent and respond to a possible terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction, according to the London Guardian (see GSN, Sept. 8, 2003). For example, the British National Health Service has begun providing hospitals and ambulance crews with radiation detectors, and has also stockpiled personal protective gear and has dispatched 360 mobile decontamination units throughout the United Kingdom. In addition, physicians will soon be issued a reference card to help identify patients who might have been exposed to biological or chemical agents, as well as the appropriate treatment. The antiterrorism measures were disclosed in response to a report released by the House of Commons science and technology committee last fall, the Guardian reported (Meikle/Muir, London Guardian, Jan. 23).  Back to top

“Covert” Nature of Past Nuclear Efforts May Have Led to Smuggling, Musharraf Says In a CNN interview today, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf blamed any possible nuclear proliferation by Pakistani scientists in part on the past covert nature of Pakistan’s nuclear program (see GSN, Jan. 22). According to Musharraf, the previous secret nature of Pakistan’s nuclear program resulted in “a lot of authority and autonomy” given to the scientists and organizations involved. He also said that this was no longer the case. “If some of the irresponsible got involved and misused capabilities that is really a pity and that is what happened. So now that it [Pakistan’s nuclear capability] is overt, there is total custodial control and checks and balances introduced. It is not a possibility any more,” he said. Musharraf reiterated that any possible nuclear proliferation activities by Pakistani scientists occurred without the involvement of the government or the military, denying recent media reports that the former head of the Pakistani army authorized nuclear cooperation with Iran in the late 1980s. “This I know: There is no official of the state or government involved at all,” he said. Musharraf said that Pakistan’s investigation into the nuclear proliferation allegations is expected to be completed soon, “in a few weeks in fact.” He also promised that those found to have been involved in such activities would be punished. “Based on the result of investigation we will move against violators because they are enemies of the state,” Musharraf said. Even though those scientists involved in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program have been hailed for their efforts, Musharraf rejected that he would suffer political fallout from the investigation. “There won’t be any problem,” Musharraf said. “There are vested interests who want to undermine my authority, my position, the government’s position and cast us in a bad light — that we are some kind of rubber stamp of the U.S.. This is not the reality,” he added. Musharraf also said that while Pakistan is investigating allegations that its scientists were possibly involved in the spread of nuclear-related technologies, the problem was not Pakistan’s alone. “There is an underworld which is getting uncovered. An underworld of individuals and maybe some organizations and factories involved in the manufacture of refined items,” he said. “I would like to say there are European countries and individuals involved so let it not be said that there were only Pakistanis involved,” Musharraf added (CNN.com, Jan. 23). Back to top       Translation Issues Muddy U.S. Assertion That North Korea Confessed to Uranium Enrichment Program A major point of contention between the United States and North Korea could be the result of an inaccurate translation from Korean to English, a U.S. nonproliferation expert who recently returned from North Korea said yesterday (see GSN, Jan. 21). Tensions surrounding North Korea’s nuclear activities escalated following U.S.-North Korean talks in October 2002, when U.S. officials said North Korea admitted to having a uranium enrichment program (see GSN, Oct. 17, 2002). North Korea publicly denied admitting such activities, but it has claimed to possess a nuclear deterrent (see GSN, Jan. 22). Two weeks ago, North Korean officials again denied having any uranium enrichment ambitions, telling a visiting unofficial U.S. delegation that they had no program, equipment or expertise, Kyodo News Service reported today. The officials gave a member of the delegation, retired Stanford University professor John Lewis, a Korean-language transcript of the disputed 2002 meeting which Lewis had translated after returning to the United States. The transcript does not contain an explicit North Korean admission, according to an interview Lewis gave to Kyodo News, but it does quote North Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju as saying, “We are entitled to have a nuclear program.” Then Kang added, “We have a weapon more powerful than that.” The transcript further records U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly asking if Kang meant to say that Pyongyang was pursuing a uranium enrichment program, but Kang only responded, “It’s up to you to think about this. We will not take the trouble to interpret this for you” (Kyodo News Service/BBC Monitoring, Jan. 23). Suggesting that the U.S. interpretation may have stemmed from a faulty translation, Lewis said there is “a small difference between ‘to have’ and ‘entitled to have’” in the Korean language. Kelly has defended the U.S. claim, saying that the U.S. assertion that North Korea has a uranium enrichment facility is based on intelligence sources, not the disputed admission by Kang (Associated Press/Baltimore Sun, Jan. 22). “I remain convinced by that conversation that a uranium enrichment program was admitted,” he said yesterday following a meeting with South Korean and Japanese officials to coordinate their North Korea policy. “But I knew that before. We weren’t asking for such an admission [at the 2002 meeting] and it was surprising only in terms of tactics. This is information that we’re very strongly convinced about, and so we’ll study what’s being said [about the possible translation problem], but I don’t envision any change in existing policies,” he said (U.S. Department of State release, Jan. 22). Back to top       IAEA Refutes Charge That Iran Is Still Acquiring Nuclear Equipment Responding to media reports yesterday, International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said yesterday that his agency has not seen signs that Iran was continuing to seek uranium enrichment components (see GSN, Jan. 22). “We haven’t seen recent indications that they are still procuring,” ElBaradei said While Iran agreed last year to suspend its uranium enrichment program, there has been increasing concern among Western nations that Tehran is on partially adhering to its pledge by not enriching any uranium but continuing to acquire equipment (NDTV.com, Jan. 23). According to ElBaradei, his agency has seen no evidence that Iran has obtained uranium enrichment technologies abroad, and the agency is now working to determine if Iran has produced such equipment domestically. “We are working with them to verify the suspension of all enrichment activities and I think we are making good progress and I hope we will continue to be able to make further progress,” ElBaradei said (BBC News, Jan. 23). Back to top       Central Asian States Set to Move Forward on Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in March By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — Efforts to create a nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Asia appear set to move forward in March, when the five countries in the region are scheduled to meet to finalize a common position on the zone treaty, a senior U.N. disarmament official said yesterday (see GSN, Oct. 7, 2003). Representatives from the five Central Asian states — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan — were previously scheduled to meet last fall in the Uzbek capital of Tashkent to develop a common response to comments to the zone treaty’s text offered by the nuclear weapons states. That meeting, however, was postponed because of lingering differences among the five Central Asian states. Tsutomu Ishiguri, director of the U.N. Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, told Global Security Newswire yesterday that the five Central Asian states have now agreed to meet in March in Tashkent. “This is good news,” Ishiguri said. The March meeting could help move forward the zone’s creation, which was previously expected to have been accomplished by October 2002. Prior to that, the five Central Asian states had envisioned signing the zone treaty in April 2002. The five declared nuclear weapons states cannot prevent the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Asia, but they have been invited to sign a treaty protocol saying they agree to respect the zone. Ishiguri said that he hoped the March meeting would also result in a joint statement issued by the five Central Asian states expressing a renewed commitment to signing the treaty and calling on the five nuclear weapons-states to support it. He also said that he hoped a “breakthrough” in the zone creation process occurred before the next review conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, scheduled to be held next year. Back to top       Brazilian Nuclear Minister Steps Down A senior Brazilian official who recently made some contentious comments about Brazil’s nuclear policies resigned Wednesday as part of a political reshuffling of the Brazilian president’s Cabinet. Science and Technology Minister Roberto Amaral stepped down as President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva began to rework his Cabinet ahead of pending municipal elections. Amaral “was very nationalist in his stance,” said political analyst Rodrigo Amorim, adding, “Lula didn’t like his administration.” Amaral recently spoke out against Brazil submitting to more intrusive international nuclear inspections (see GSN, Dec. 29, 2003), and oversaw Brazil’s effort to establish a uranium enrichment capability that could provide more nuclear fuel than Brazilian power plants need and could create nuclear weapon-grade materials (see GSN, Oct. 7, 2003). In January 2003, Amaral suggested that Brazil should consider acquiring nuclear weapon expertise, but his comments were quickly reversed by Lula (see GSN, Jan. 14, 2003; Reuters, Jan. 23). Despite the change in personnel, Brazil’s nuclear plans are unlikely to change, said Amaral’s successor, Eduardo Campos, the leader of Amaral’s Brazilian Socialist Party in the lower house of Congress. Those policies are made by the government and not by the minister himself, Campos said (JB Agencia/Yahoo!Noticias, Jan. 22, GSN translation). Back to top       “Apparent” Safety Violations Found After Fire at U.S. Nuclear Weapons Plant U.S. Energy Department investigators have blamed an April 2003 fire at the Y-12 nuclear weapons plant in Oak Ridge, Tenn., on “apparent violations” of safety requirements, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, July 30, 2003). The Energy Department’s Office of Enforcement reported its initial findings in a letter and report sent last month to Dennis Ruddy, the head of contractor BWXT, which operates the plant. In the report, investigators said that the uranium test that resulted in the fire had been improperly designed and not fully reviewed. They also said that there had been problems with workplace controls, according to AP. BWXT officials had a chance to address the department’s findings in a meeting yesterday with Energy Department officials, according to the Associated Press.  Company spokesman Bill Wilburn refused to comment yesterday on the Energy Department’s findings (Associated Press/WATE.com, Jan. 23) Back to top

Scientists Urge New Pentagon Agency to Restore Flagging Biological Defense Efforts Saying that current U.S. military efforts to develop treatments and vaccines for potential biological weapon agents have “dismal prospects for successful results,” a group of top U.S. scientists yesterday urged the U.S. Defense Department to establish a new agency to consolidate the Pentagon’s multiple biological defense programs (see GSN, June 2, 2003; Vernon Loeb, Washington Post, Jan. 23). The recommendation was issued in a congressionally mandated study by the Institute of Medicine and the National Research Council that expresses concern about a growing biological weapons threat to U.S. forces and inadequate Pentagon planning for that risk. “The biodefense efforts of the Department of Defense are poorly organized to develop and license vaccines, therapeutic drugs and antitoxins to protect members of the armed forces against biological warfare agents,” the study’s executive summary says. “These efforts are characterized by fragmentation of responsibility and authority, changing strategies that have resulted in lost time and expertise, and a lack of financial commitment commensurate with the requirements of program goals,” it adds (Robert Schlesinger, Boston Globe, Jan. 23). “This serious situation exists despite declarations by presidents, secretaries of defense, congressional committees, and advisory groups that biological warfare poses a significant threat” to U.S. forces, the study says, expressing concern that “advances in bioengineering will make possible the rapid introduction of new biological threats that may prove even more challenging to counter than the already serious threats posed by naturally occurring organisms.” So far, the study says, the Pentagon has provided vaccines only against anthrax and smallpox, both of which are subject to safety controversies (see GSN, Jan. 9). “No licensed vaccines are available against botulism, plague, tularemia or the viral hemorrhagic fevers, although vaccines against all of these are under development,” the study says. To accelerate the fielding of new vaccines and treatments, the study recommends that Congress create a new Medical Biodefense Agency that should receive more funding than current Pentagon efforts. The study suggests annual $100 million increases until a $600 million annually is achieved by the end of the decade. The Pentagon issued a statement responding to the study in which it concurred with many of study’s recommendations and said it had already moved to consolidate its chemical-biological defense program, create a “military vaccine office” and improve its collaboration with other agencies (Loeb, Washington Post). “The Department of Defense is evaluating the recommendations of the … report. We generally agree with many of them,” the statement said. “We are committed to doing what is required to ensure protection of the health and well-being of our troops,” it added (Schlesinger, Boston Globe). Back to top       British Vaccine Facility Plans Taking Shape British plans are advancing to create a new facility to rapidly produce vaccines during emergencies, the British Home Office disclosed yesterday. A report released last fall by the House of Commons science and technology committee recommended the facility as part of a set of broader suggestions to improve counterterrorism measures, according the Financial Times. According to the Home Office, officials have completed a business plan for the facility and a larger strategic plan would be ready by April. Currently, the United Kingdom has three public and private firms to conduct vaccine research and production, a capability that is widely regarded as insufficient, the Financial Times reported (see related GSN story, today). Whether the new center, estimated to cost more than $90 million, would be based at a private or government facility remains to be determined (Huband/Cookson, Financial Times, Jan. 23). Back to top

Lugar Concerned About U.S. Follow-Through on Russian CW Destruction By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) yesterday expressed concern about the United States honoring its commitment to help build a major chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia through the U.S. Defense Department’s Cooperative Threat Reduction program. Funding has lagged, he said, because “some members of Congress were not in favor of any of the money being involved with chemical weapons.” “They see nuclear weapons as the real threat, chemical weapons as a bridge too far,” he said. Lugar spoke at a press conference yesterday after a meeting with representatives from seven other countries and the European Union that are contributing to construction of a destruction facility at Shchuchye to discuss the status of the project and their funding commitments. Though not explicitly, the meeting also was intended to demonstrate the importance other countries attach to the project with the hope of encouraging strong congressional support this year, a participant said afterward. “It’s important for the United States to see confirmation that there is common interest abroad in supporting this project, that we are all on the same line,” said Benedict de Cerjat, the deputy chief of mission for the Embassy of Switzerland. In attendance were representatives from Canada, the Czech Republic, Italy, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the European Union. U.S. Commitment The United States has promised to contribute $540 million, of the estimated $1 billion needed to build the Shchuchye facility, through its threat reduction programs. So far less than $100 million of that has been spent, Lugar said. The goal for beginning destruction activity is in 2005. Russia has pledged to spend $2 billion on chemical weapons destruction and nuclear submarine dismantlement. The other parties have committed at least $64 million specifically to the Shchuchye effort, Lugar said. “It is the primarily the Russians and the United States. Other [countries] will contribute with smaller amounts, but smaller amounts may be also important, because it shows there is a general commitment,” said Cerjat. The Shchuchye project is a major one for the threat reduction program, which receives approximately $430 million a year from Congress for securing nuclear, chemical, biological and missile weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union. Approximately $500 million more is spent annually by the Energy and State departments largely to deal with Russian nuclear weapon materials. Learning Curve Cited House Armed Services Committee Chairman Duncan Hunter (R-Calif.) in particular has criticized spending threat reduction money on non-nuclear projects. Hunter’s committee authorizes threat reduction funding on the House side. Lugar said legislators are growing in appreciation for the potential dangers of chemical weapons proliferation. “All of us have been going to school, the educational curve has been substantial and so in due course we have seen the dangers of chemical weapons,” he said. “This is something that takes time, fortunately we’ve had some time,” he said. The Russian facility currently stores more than 2 million artillery rounds and warheads filled with the nerve agents sarin, soman and VX. The weapons must be destroyed to fulfill Russia’s obligation to the Chemical Weapons Convention. “I have visited Shchuchye on two occasions and am convinced that the weapons stored there must be dismantled quickly and safely,” he said during his closed-door meeting with the representatives. His remarks were released afterward. The Pentagon’s inspector general last month reported several risks to the effort, including that Russia may not use the facility to full capacity, that it could rescind land allocation for the facility, or that operation could be suspended or terminated because of environmental laws (see GSN, Jan. 13). Pentagon officials have said the more extreme risks are not likely, as they could cause Russia to run far afoul of Chemical Weapons Convention schedules for eliminating the weapons. Briefed by the Pentagon, Lugar said at the meeting the issues were being addressed. “I was pleased to learn that the Nunn-Lugar program and our Russian partners have been working for some months to resolve the issues raised by the inspector general,” he said, referring to the original sponsors of threat reduction legislation, former Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and himself. “It is clear that our efforts to protect the United States from weapons of mass destruction entail risks, but the greater risk is to do nothing to address this clear and present danger associated with the nuclear, chemical and biological weapons arsenals of the former Soviet Union,” he said. [EDITOR’S NOTE: Sam Nunn is chief executive officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative and Richard Lugar serves on the NTI board.  NTI is the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by National Journal Group.]   Back to top

Brazilian Rocket Program Hampered by Lack of Funds, Poor Management Brazil’s efforts to develop an indigenous rocket system for use in satellite launches has come under fire for a lack of necessary funding and poor management by the military, the New York Times reported today (see GSN, Dec. 29, 2003). The flaws in Brazil’s rocket program were demonstrated during an incident in late August, when 21 top Brazilian scientists and technicians were killed when a rocket exploded on its launch pad at a military-controlled base, according to the Times. Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva later pledged that Brazil would