Libya has provided U.N. inspectors with drawings of a nuclear weapon, the International Atomic Energy Agency said Friday (see GSN, Jan. 22). “We have put those drawings under our seal, and they are secure,” IAEA spokesman Mark Gwozdecky said. A diplomat said the drawings were of a device similar to a nuclear warhead, describing it as “a device that goes boom, which can be put on a missile or can be put into a bomb form.” The diplomat also said that the significance of the drawings is that “it’s the first time anyone has acknowledged” Libya’s intention to develop nuclear weapons (George Jahn, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, Jan. 23). Senior U.S. officials have said that the United States may take possession of uranium enrichment centrifuges and other materials from Libya’s nuclear weapons program as soon as next week, Reuters reported Saturday. Libyan nuclear weapons-related documents were sent back to the United States Friday, according to Reuters. Libyan centrifuges, uranium hexafluoride and other related equipment “are in the next round, probably next week,” a U.S. official said. “We’re trying to get the most proliferation-sensitive stuff out early,” the official said. “We’re going to take the stuff out (of Libya). We’re going to have it in the United States. We’re going to own it, the nuclear stuff,” a second U.S. official said (Carol Giacomo, Reuters, Jan. 24). According to diplomats and experts, the current investigation into Libya’s nuclear weapons efforts has revealed that Tripoli was aided by a nuclear “international supermarket” that provided weapons designs, technical advice and necessary materials and components, according to the Washington Post. The network, which is also believed to have been used by Iran for its nuclear program, is far larger than anything previously seen and has gone undetected by Western intelligence agencies, officials said. Some investigators believe that components for Libyan centrifuges were produced in factories established solely to build illicit nuclear components, according to the Post. U.S. and IAEA officials are investigating one such site in Malaysia, with that government’s cooperation, officials said. They also said that the Malaysian site has been visited by U.S. officials in the past two weeks. “A moral barrier has been breached,” said a Europe-based diplomat familiar with the Libya investigation. “Always, in the past, what we saw were single states, acting in their interests, looking to make nuclear weapons. Now we have atomic bomb factories,” the diplomat said. A U.S. official said Libya is prepared to increase its cooperation by providing its suppliers and delivery routes. “They seem to have no issues or problems with this. They’ve seen the light. Having said that, it’s ‘trust but verify,’” the official said (Warrick/Slevin, Washington Post, Jan. 24). In an interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel published today, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said that Libya’s attempts to develop nuclear weapons showed that “it’s obvious that the international export controls have completely failed in recent years” (Ian Traynor, London Guardian, Jan. 26). “All of what we saw [in Libya] was a result of the Wal-Mart of private sector proliferation,” he said (Landler/Sanger, New York Times, Jan. 24). “A nuclear black market has emerged, driven by fantastic cleverness. Designs are drawn in one country, centrifuges are produced in another, they are then shipped via a third country and there is no clarity about the end user,” ElBaradei said. “Expert nuclear businessmen, unscrupulous firms, and perhaps also state bodies are involved. Libya and Iran made extensive use of this network,” he said (Traynor, London Guardian). U.S. Lawmakers Arrive in LibyaMeanwhile, two delegations of U.S. lawmakers arrived in Libya over the weekend, according to Reuters. Yesterday, a seven-member delegation headed by Representative Curt Weldon (R-Pa.) arrived in Tripoli. Weldon told the Libyan officials that met his delegation that “we want to be friends,” Reuters reported. “We are here to take a message back to the American people that our visit has been very positive,” Weldon said in an interview. In addition, a separate delegation headed by Representative Tom Lantos (D-Calif.) arrived in Libya Saturday (Jonathan Wright, Reuters/Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan. 26).
Pakistani investigators have determined that at least two nuclear scientists, including the man behind Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, provided unauthorized assistance to Iran’s nuclear weapons program in the late 1980s, the Washington Post reported Saturday (see GSN, Jan. 23). According to senior Pakistani officials, one of the two scientists is Abdul Qadeer Khan, acknowledged as the “father” of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. The second is Mohammed Farooq, a high-ranking manager at the A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories, Pakistan’s main nuclear weapons facility. The scientists are believed to have aided Iran through a secret agreement that was supposed to be limited to the sharing of peaceful nuclear technology, officials said (Lancaster/Khan, Washington Post, Jan. 24). Pakistani officials said yesterday that Khan’s real estate holdings, along with his and other scientists’ bank accounts, are being investigated. A leading Pakistani newspaper has reported that investigators have found that millions of dollars were deposited in two scientists’ United Arab Emirates-based bank accounts as nuclear-related equipment arrived in Iran, according to the New York Times. “Investigators are looking into all dimensions, including financial dimensions,” a senior Pakistani official said, adding that offshore accounts “are part of the investigation” (David Rohde, New York Times, Jan. 26). Some investigators have recommended that Farooq, who has been in custody since late November, be charged with violating the Official Secrets Act, which carries a possible prison term, officials said. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf was expected to determine whether to pursue charges against either scientist, or possibly others, when he returned from an international summit held over the weekend, according to the Washington Post. “A legal examination of the probe is underway, but it seems that Dr. Farooq will be charged with violating the Official Secrets Act,” a senior intelligence official said (Lancaster/Khan, Washington Post). Pakistani Interior and Narcotics Control Minister Faisal Saleh Hayyat said today that legal action would be taken against any scientist who was found to have been involved in unauthorized nuclear transfers. “Some people tried to give a bad name to Pakistan for the sake of their personal interests. … It is our national duty to unmask them,” Hayyat said. “We will take legal action against them ... so that it becomes an example for others and no patriotic Pakistani should even think of selling out Pakistan,” he said (Sheikh Sabir, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, Jan. 26). An aide to Musharraf has said, though, that a public trial of Khan or Farooq could be potentially embarrassing, especially if the military is implicated in any proliferation activities. “Any trial of a nuclear scientist — particularly any gesture of public disgrace for A.Q. Khan from the government — will open a Pandora’s box," the aide said. “Bygones are bygones, let’s move forward — this is what the president believes in these crucial moments,” the aide said (Washington Post). Meanwhile, Musharraf himself reiterated Friday that any possible transfers occurred without the involvement of the Pakistani government. “These are individuals and our investigation has concluded that no government of Pakistan — and I don’t have a soft spot for the governments of (former prime ministers) Benazir (Bhutto) and Nawaz (Sharif) — sanctioned or authorized anyone to proliferate,” Musharraf said in an interview with the Washington Post. Musharraf also said that Pakistan had implemented a number of controls to prevent any further opportunities of unauthorized nuclear transfers. “We are a nuclear and a missile state. And there are total custodial controls and an intelligence organization and a number of rings around our establishment to ensure prevention of any leakage. There is no question of leakages any more from our side,” he said (Washington Post, Jan. 25).
By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — A former top U.S. Air Force commander yesterday criticized Bush administration directed programs for developing new nuclear weapons for destroying bunkers and chemical and biological weapons (see GSN, Nov. 24, 2003). Retired Gen. Charles Horner, who commanded the North American Aerospace Defense Command and the U.S. Space Command and was in charge of all allied air assets during the 1991 Gulf War, said nuclear weapons are only useful as city-destroying war deterrents, and otherwise have “little utility.” He spoke at a conference here sponsored by the Nuclear Policy Research Institute. Horner expressed concern that plans for researching and developing such weapons could help legitimize them and potentially lead to a president considering their use. “Even thinking about doing such [using them in war fighting] legitimizes the use of nuclear weapons,” which undermines efforts to discourage their proliferation globally, he said. Horner said he is concerned that current polices may be legitimizing the weapons in the eyes of young U.S. military officers today. “The problem for me is young people thinking nuclear weapons are a usable form of force,” he said. “Insane”Horner, who once commanded all U.S. land-based ballistic missiles, is no pacifist. Many of his views are not aligned with the arms control “peace” community. He favors, for instance, aggressively developing national ballistic missile defenses as well as establishing a U.S. ability to dominate space militarily, both controversial initiatives of the Bush administration. Horner began his career as a fighter pilot with the Air Force when fighter aircraft had a prominent nuclear role. “I’ll tell you, as I sat alert with a nuclear weapon, I always wondered whether I would carry out my mission or not, because, I thought it was quite frankly insane,” he said. On the other hand, he said, he understood the importance of having the capability ready “in order to deter war.” Horner said his thinking was solidified during the 1991 war. He noted U.S. officials had suggested to Iraq that the United States would use nuclear weapons in response to an Iraqi chemical or biological weapons attack. “We used ambiguity with regard to the use of our Cold War arsenal as to what our response would be,” he said. “I knew that we had no such plans to do so nor would we do so, because that would be dysfunctional,” he said. At the time, he said, Horner called in a targeting expert to demonstrate for him how many nuclear weapons would be needed to destroy an Iraqi armored division in the desert and how many to destroy Baghdad. In the first case, “it took a huge amount of nuclear weapons,” in the latter, it would be “much easier.” “And then I realized that nuclear weapons are only good for taking out cities, they’re not good for war fighting. They have little or no utility for war fighting” and would bring a “horrible political cost” for any U.S. president ordering their use in that way, he said. “So from the inside, I discovered nuclear weapons are very dysfunctional for the things we are trying to do,” he said. The Danger of OptionsAlso appearing on a panel with Horner was Bruce Blair, president of the Center for Defense Information, who said that since the Cold War, at least on paper, conditions appear to have loosened for possible U.S. or Russian use of nuclear weapons in combat. He said that has made the possibility of their use more likely. “Over time, during the Bush and Clinton administrations there has been an erosion of restraint in the policy arena, on paper, and I think that does have a significant operational effect on the likelihood of a president considering their use,” he said. Horner said that that “danger” exists, but so far remains more possibility than reality. “I don’t believe it’s the case, but I do believe it’s the danger. See, I’m on the inside, I see no evidence of operationalizing nuclear weapons, but there is discussion about their utility and their legitimacy and I think that is exactly the wrong way to go,” he said. Conventional Weapons Were Used Against WMD Sites in 1991During the Gulf War, allied pilots attacked Iraqi nuclear, biological and chemical facilities with conventional weapons and struck about half of Iraq’s research, development and production capabilities, Horner said. Inspectors found the rest after the war, he said. Iraq’s chemical weapons themselves were “just too widespread to attack,” he said, so attacks focused on storage areas near front-line forces to prevent their potential use. He said officials learned later that Iraq was unwilling to use such weapons because U.S. troops had better protective equipment than Iraqi forces did and that they were likely to suffer more. “Deterrence against weapons of mass destruction in large measure comes down to how much money you are willing to put into your military defenses,” he said. U.S. military officials were faced with a more difficult challenge of what to do about Iraq’s suspected stores of biological agents, including anthrax and botulism, he said. “Little was known about it because our CIA was keeping those secrets very closely held,” he said. At issue was whether to attack the stores and “risk of annihilation of everything on the Arabian Peninsula or allow the Iraqis the option to use them against U.S. forces.” “There was no good answer,” Horner said, but the decision was made to attack them. After the war, he said he concluded the Iraqis had unilaterally destroyed their stockpiles out of concern that they would be attacked and dispersed.
Russia plans to develop and deploy more multiple-warhead ICBMs to maintain its strategic nuclear force levels as its existing single-warhead missiles become obsolete over time, Jane’s Defense Weekly reported this week (see GSN, Dec. 18, 2003). Russia’s strategic missile forces are expected to be cut from 15 to 10 divisions by 2008, according to the Armed Forces General Staff, and mobile, multiple-warhead ICBMs are planned to replace some of the retiring systems (see GSN, Dec. 18, 2002). In particular, initial Russian plans call for deploying three divisions of road-mobile, four-to-six-warhead Topol-M missiles, the first of which is expected to begin to be deployed later this year, a general staff official said. “Every 2 1/2 years we plan to deploy a new regiment armed with a mobile Topol-M,” he said. The missile will carry missile defense countermeasures that will ensure a 90-percent kill probability, the official said (see GSN, Mar. 28, 2002). So far, Russia has deployed only single-warhead, silo-based Topol-Ms at a rate of about six per year for a current total of 34 missiles deployed at the Tatishchevo missile base, according to Jane’s (see GSN, Dec. 30, 2003). Ultimately, the plans call for the new version of the Topol-M to gradually replace Russia’s arsenal of more than 340 single-warhead, silo-based SS-25 missiles, according to Jane’s. Looking further into the future, Russia intends this year to begin development of a new 10-warhead, liquid-fueled ICBM. Development of this missile-defense-resistant missile is expected to take 10 to 15 years, Jane’s reported (Nikolai Novichkov, Jane’s Defense Weekly, Jan. 28).
U.S. House Armed Services Committee Chairman Duncan Hunter (R-Calif.) indicated last week that he would continue to make the U.S. acquisition of long-range strategic bombers a high priority, according to Aerospace Daily (see GSN, Jan. 22). Hunter said that the purchase of additional bombers continues to be among the “most pressing needs” of the U.S. military. Such bombers could be additional nuclear-capable B-2s or variants, Hunter said, adding that other options, such as a bomber version of the F/A-22 Raptor were also being considered (see GSN, June 4, 2003; Marc Selinger, Aerospace Daily, Jan. 26). According to U.S. Air Force Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Michael Moseley, the Air Force will continue to focus on improving its existing bombers — the B-1, B-2 and B-52 (Robert Wall, Aviation Week & Space Technology, Jan. 26).
Senior U.S. officials have said that the Bush administration is considering ways to modify the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty regime to deny non-nuclear states access to enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, Reuters reported yesterday (see GSN, Jan. 7). The proposal is intended to close an apparent loophole in the NPT that allows countries of concern to legally obtain components capable of being used in a nuclear weapons program, according to Reuters. U.S. officials said that the proposal is in early discussions, but may be formally advanced during the next Group of Eight summit, scheduled to be held in the United States in June. “A lot of people have been talking about that and we’re considering it — cutting off enrichment and reprocessing technology to close the loophole while guaranteeing them (non-nuclear states) access to fuel,” a U.S. official said. “Guaranteeing these states access to (nuclear) fuel has its own risks, but it’s better than allowing them to have enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. ... We may well do that in the G8 context,” the official said (Carol Giacomo, Reuters, Jan. 25). In an interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel published today, International Atomic Energy Agency Director Mohamed ElBaradei also called for nuclear fuel production facilities to be placed under international control (see GSN, Nov. 4, 2003). “Over the past 35 years, the NPT has brought us much success, but this is not continuing,” ElBaradei said. “We should put all facilities all over the world that produce weapons-grade material, such as highly enriched uranium or plutonium, under multinational control,” he said. ElBaradei also defended his agency in the wake of Iranian and Libyan disclosures of clandestine nuclear activities that had eluded IAEA detection. “It is true that Tehran and Tripoli had deceived our authority in the past,” he said. “However, I believe we would have discovered it if these two states had started to pursue their programs on a large scale,” ElBaradei added. In addition, he warned of an increasing risk of a nuclear conflict — a risk that calls for improved nonproliferation controls. “The danger has never been greater than today. A nuclear war is getting closer, if we do not agree on a new international control system,” ElBaradei said. “We are working as a fire brigade, but if the fires multiply as much as they do at present, then we must check all security installations in the common home and finally make them fireproof,” he added (Der Spiegel/BBC Monitoring, Jan. 26).
The U.S. Defense Department could “in the very near term” arm U.S. ICBMs with conventional warheads, Defense Threat Reduction Agency Director Stephen Younger said last week (see GSN, Sept. 26, 2003). “We are able to generate those weapons today,” Younger said. “I’m not talking about 10-year development cycles. I’m talking 90 days,” he said. Some military officials have recommended the missile conversion concept, arguing that conventionally armed long-range missiles would give the United States the ability to strike enemies rapidly from a great distance. Such proposals, however, have come under fire from arms control advocates who have argued that such an approach would stretch or break arms control treaties, according to Defense Daily. There are also concerns that a U.S. launch of a conventionally armed ICBM could be misinterpreted by other nations as a nuclear attack, according to Defense Daily. Younger, however, discounted such concerns, saying they could be alleviated by communications and diplomacy. “Give us an 800 number,” Younger said. “We will call you up shortly after the launch. … This is not an insurmountable problem,” he said (Amy Butler, Defense Daily, Jan. 26).
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