U.S. President George W. Bush spoke yesterday at the National Defense University and called for new measures to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons (AFP photo/Tim Sloan). Bush Proposes Nuclear Nonproliferation Initiatives By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — U.S. President George W. Bush yesterday proposed seven new international initiatives for curbing nuclear proliferation, including a potentially controversial one that would restrict the supply of nuclear fuel-making equipment, even to countries with no weapons programs (see GSN, Feb. 11)...Full Story

House Committee Finds No Sign of Misuse of Prewar Iraq Intelligence The U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has determined that there is no evidence that senior Bush administration officials distorted information on Iraqi WMD efforts to bolster the case for war, the Washington Times reported today...Full Story

Undisclosed Nuclear Equipment Designs Found in Iran, Diplomats Say International inspectors have discovered an undisclosed design for uranium enrichment centrifuges in Iran, raising questions about Tehran’s commitment to making its nuclear programs completely transparent, the Financial Times reported today (see GSN, Feb. 10)...Full Story

	Thursday, February 12, 2004

Local, State Officials Square Off Over Response Grants By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire BALTIMORE — In remarks that prompted a scornful rebuke from a state official, the mayor of this key U.S. port city blasted the Bush administration yesterday for favoring states over cities in doling out dwindling grant money for WMD and terrorism response (see GSN, Jan. 23). “Why are we sending first-responder dollars to secondary-responding levels of government?” Democratic Mayor Martin O’Malley asked at a homeland security industry meeting. O’Malley’s comments and the ensuing remarks of a top Maryland state homeland security official mirrored an often rancorous national debate over how to fund local improvements in terrorism preparedness. Bush presented Congress last week with a fiscal 2005 budget request that includes $3.6 billion, or about $600 million less than estimated spending for fiscal 2004, for the Homeland Security Department’s Office for Domestic Preparedness, the main federal grant-giving office for state and local terrorism response efforts. Although Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge said last year that he expected the office’s budget to grow to more than $7 billion annually over the short term, he told senators this week that more than half the money allocated in the past two years has not yet been disbursed. In a speech to state emergency managers this morning, House Select Committee on Homeland Security Chairman Christopher Cox (R-Calif.) estimated the unspent allocations at $5.5 billion, saying, “This $5.5 billion bottleneck is unacceptable.” Such remarks are likely to fuel state-local tensions over control of the funds, which in recent months have led Bush to issue a directive reaffirming the primacy of the states (see GSN, Dec. 18, 2003) and the U.S. Conference of Mayors to report that grant money is bogged down in state capitals. Rich Cooper, a business liaison in the Homeland Security Department, yesterday questioned the validity of the mayors’ study, noting that it was based on only 215 of the country’s 17,000 local governments. He said the department “is working to encourage the states to get those funds to first responders” but defended the integrity of state homeland security officials. “There isn’t a state homeland security director that’s interested in sitting on funds and keeping them out of the hands of first responders,” Cooper said. O’Malley, however, sharply criticized both the proposed cut for the Office for Domestic Preparedness ― “You can’t do this on the cheap,” he said ― and the preponderant role of the states in doling out the grants. He derided a federal requirement that states allocate 80 percent of homeland security grant money to localities within 45 days, calling the arrangement a “20 percent skim-off” based on an arbitrary “legislative compromise.” “When citizens call 911, it doesn’t ring at the statehouse. It doesn’t ring in Washington, D.C. It rings at local governments. … [States] don’t have the constitutional responsibility to command those frontline troops. … For better or worse, mayors and county executives are the commanders of those front-line troops,” O’Malley said. Speaking a few minutes later, Maryland Republican Governor Robert Ehrlich’s homeland security director heaped scorn on the notion of bypassing the states in passing out the grants. “The states,” Dennis Schrader said, “share power with the federal government. That’s the whole basis of our democracy. ... You can’t deal with 17,000 jurisdictions. It’s actually absurd to even think that that’s possible.” Schrader added that “the suburbanization of America” has made state involvement more important, as the states participate in coordinating efforts over multijurisdictional regions. O’Malley praised the Bush administration for an increase in one area of the Office for Domestic Preparedness budget: the Urban Area Security Initiative, which provides grants to major cities. O’Malley called for more payments that bypass state governments. Criticizing the administration for playing a tax-cutting “shell game” and neglecting homeland security needs, though, O’Malley laid out what he called urgent, underfunded priorities for cities: local intelligence networks that “gather information, share it instantly and work together”; an integrated terrorist watch list that police around the country can consult; metropolitan biosurveillance systems; local terrorism vulnerability assessments; upgraded local emergency response plans; appropriate training, equipment and inoculations for first responders; and interoperable, redundant emergency communication systems. Since the Sept. 11, 2001, al-Qaeda attacks on the United States, O’Malley said, homeland security has become “a greatly underfunded local mandate.” Although some state officials have charged that cities are unable to fruitfully use all the grant money that is available, O’Malley said, “We can absorb it [grant money] a heck of a lot more quickly than they’re sending it to us.” Schrader said the Office for Domestic Preparedness grant process is generally misunderstood by the cities, which he said are in need of state instruction on the matter. Local governments, the Maryland official said, fail to understand that the federal funds are meant as “reimbursement” to cities that have already incurred costs related to homeland security. “Every local jurisdiction has anticipation cash flow” that should be used initially for such purposes, Schrader said. Speaking with Global Security Newswire after the meeting, Cooper regretted the current state of the grant debate. Critics of the Office for Domestic Preparedness budget cut are engaging in “stovepiping” of priorities rather than focusing on the big picture, he said. “Throwing stones at each other isn’t going to help anybody,” Cooper said. Organized by the new Homeland Security Leadership Alliance, yesterday’s meeting brought together government officials and representatives of businesses seeking both to protect their critical infrastructure and to obtain contracts with the Homeland Security Department. The alliance said more meetings will follow at locations around the country. Back to top

House Committee Finds No Sign of Misuse of Prewar Iraq Intelligence The U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has determined that there is no evidence that senior Bush administration officials distorted information on Iraqi WMD efforts to bolster the case for war, the Washington Times reported today. Committee Chairman Porter Goss (R-Fla.) said there is “absolutely no evidence that the intelligence was manipulated, distorted or in any way shaped or morphed to suit a preordained purpose.” Goss also said that the most important issue raised by the committee’s inquiry into prewar intelligence on Iraq was the inaccuracy of that intelligence. “The answer, I think, probably is because we didn’t have enough dots on the table for the analysts to draw a clear enough picture for our policy-makers,” he said (Guy Taylor, Washington Times, Feb. 12). In addition, Goss criticized former U.S. President Bill Clinton and his administration for reducing intelligence assets during the 1990s. He also said that Clinton himself rarely met with intelligence officials and was not “particularly engaged” on the subject (Pauline Jelinek, Associated Press/San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 12). The Senate intelligence committee, meanwhile, is considering expanding the scope of its own inquiry into prewar intelligence on Iraq to consider the White House’s use of intelligence in making the case for war, according to congressional sources. The topic was discussed yesterday during a closed committee meeting. Among those involved in the discussion was Senator Charles Hagel (R-Neb.), who sources said was considering whether to back an expanded inquiry. An aide to a committee Democrat said a series of negotiations were underway. “There are groups all over the place meeting, and deals being brokered right and left,” the aide said (Greg Miller, Los Angeles Times, Feb. 12). CIA Modifies Methods Officials said yesterday that CIA Director George Tenet has ordered an end to an agency practice of withholding from analysts details about clandestine agents who provide information. The changes were ordered after an internal review found several occasions where analysts believed that Iraqi WMD information had been confirmed by multiple sources, when it had only come from a single source, said CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence Jami Miscik. “We are not brushing aside the agency’s duty to protect sources and methods, but barriers to sharing information must be removed,” Miscik said in a speech to CIA analysts, a copy of which was obtained by the Washington Post. “Analysts can no longer be put in a position of making a judgment on a critical issue without a full and comprehensive understanding of the source’s access to the information on which they are reporting,” Miscik said (Walter Pincus, Washington Post, Feb. 12). A senior official said yesterday that the reliability of all of the sources cited by Secretary of State Colin Powell in his presentation on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction to the U.N. Security Council last year is being reviewed. Former chief U.S. weapons inspector in Iraq David Kay has said that there are indications that the opposition groups Iraqi National Congress and Iraqi National Accord were infiltrated by agents of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein prior to the war. Kay also has said that some of the sources cited by U.S. intelligence reports could turn out to be Hussein agents. Kay and U.S. officials have detailed two possible reasons why Hussein might have infiltrated opposition groups to plant misleading stories about his WMD efforts, according to Newsweek. One is that the agents were used to plant stories of continued WMD programs to deter enemies both inside and outside Iraq. A second theory is that Hussein sent agents to plant false WMD claims with the expectation that they would reach the United States and later be passed on to U.N. weapons inspectors, who would then discover they were not true, and thereby discredit Washington (Isikoff/Hosenball, Newsweek, Feb. 11). Powell Says He Was Surprised Weapons Were Not Found Meanwhile, Powell told the House International Relations Committee yesterday that he was “surprised” that weapons of mass destruction have not been found in Iraq, but continued to defend the war. “We presented what we believed the truth to be at the time,” Powell said. “The reason we told you there were stockpiles there because we believed it to be true. … We were surprised when they did not turn up,” he added (Barry Schweid, Associated Press/Boston Globe, Feb. 12). Prewar Study Predicted Difficult WMD Search According to USA Today, a classified U.S. intelligence study prepared three months before the Iraq war predicted difficulties in searching for alleged Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. The study cited several factors that would hinder the search, including guerilla warfare, looting and dishonest Iraqi officials. “Locating a program that from its conception has been driven by denial and deception imperatives is no small task,” the study says. “Prolonged insecurity with fractional violence and guerilla forces still at large would be the worst outcome for finding Saddam’s WMD arsenal,” it adds (John Diamond, USA Today, Feb. 12). CIA Offers Reward for WMD Information The CIA today posted a notice on its Web site calling for information from Iraqis on Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction and related programs in exchange for a reward. The agency promises “strict confidentiality” for those who provide information (CIA release, Feb. 12). Back to top       Bush Officials Contend Iraq Invasion was Preventive, Citing Alleged “Intent” and “Capabilities” By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — Over the past two weeks, senior Bush administration officials appeared to have abandoned one of their principal justifications for the Iraq invasion last year: the idea that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction that required the United States to conduct an urgent, pre-emptive war. Instead, various officials including President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell have reasserted another previously given rationale: that the invasion was justified as a preventive action because former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had “intent” and latent “capabilities” for threatening the United States in the future. In a Feb. 2 statement justifying the attack, Bush said, “We do know that Saddam Hussein had the intent and capabilities to cause great harm. We know he was a danger.” Echoing that statement, Vice President Dick Cheney said in a Feb. 7 speech, “We know that Saddam had the capability to produce weapons of mass destruction. … We know that Saddam Hussein had the intent to arm his regime with weapons of mass destruction. … There is no question that America did the right thing in Iraq.” Testifying before Congress yesterday, Powell expanded the administration’s argument, arguing that even though Iraq apparently lacked any weapons or active programs, its suspected intent to acquire them someday and its capability to do so equated to a threat. “We had to look at it in terms of a threat that is gotten to by an examination of the intent of an opponent and the capability that opponent has. You put those two together and it equals a threat,” he said. Those and similar statements coincide with recently revealed intelligence community conclusions that Iraq probably did not possess such weapons before the war and was not an “imminent” threat even with suspected weapons. While critics charge the administration had overstated Iraqi capabilities based on the intelligence, and is now shifting its justification, officials have maintained they never said the war was justified to pre-empt an imminent threat and had in fact previously argued that the invasion would be a preventive measure.  Regardless of the administration’s prior rationale, however, the current emphasis on a “preventive war” justification has fueled further public debate over whether the invasion was justified, with critics saying that prevention is no more valid a rationale than the administration’s pre-emption case. “President Bush said that his decision to go to war with Iraq when he did was because Saddam Hussein had ‘the ability to make weapons.’ This is a far cry from what the president and his administration told the American people throughout 2002, ” said Democratic presidential candidate front-runner Senator John Kerry (Mass.) in a statement reported Monday by the New York Times. “I don’t think that’s any justification whatever for attacking a country,” said arms control expert Jonathan Dean of the Union of Concerned Scientists. Problems with Preventive War The concept of “preventive war” is distinct from that of “pre-emption” in that it is intended to address a predicted threat, as opposed to a demonstrably imminent threat. Application of either rationale, however, can pose difficulties. Preventive war is not considered legal under customary international law and could be used as a pretext for naked aggression, experts said. “Military attack on another state in the absence of an imminent threat is widely considered to be aggression,” wrote Carnegie Endowment for International Peace nonproliferation expert George Perkovich in a Feb. 2 commentary in the Washington Times. After World War II, former German leaders on trial argued that Nazi leader Adolf Hitler’s decision to invade Norway and Denmark was justified as preventive, said Dean. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan in a major address last year criticized the rationale. “My concern is that, if it were to be adopted, it could set precedents that resulted in a proliferation of unilateral and lawless use of force, with or without justification,” he said. The pre-emption justification on the other hand — which might draw stronger domestic support and international legitimacy — requires definitive evidence of an imminent threat to be considered legal, a difficult challenge in the face of authoritarian regimes and the secrecy of terrorist groups, administration officials have said. While some officials still hold out the prospect of finding weapons, the pre-emptive justification for Iraq apparently was arguably undercut by reports of no chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or active programs by U.S. inspectors last October and more recently in congressional testimony late last month by their former leader David Kay. The most they could report was evidence of “weapons of mass destruction-related program-related activities,” a phrase repeated by Bush in his 2004 State of the Union address and ridiculed by critics. Preventive War Was Urged Perhaps even more damaging to the pre-emption case than Kay’s testimony, experts said, was CIA Director George Tenet’s statement last week that the intelligence community “never said there was an imminent threat,” even though it suspected that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons. With that phrase, Dean said, the intelligence community “was drawing a line between their reports and what the administration made of them. The administration added the dimension of immediacy and urgency.” Administration officials now maintain they never called Iraq an imminent threat. “I think, if I might remind you, that in my language I called it ‘a grave and gathering threat,’ but I don’t want to get into word contests,” Bush said in an interview on Meet the Press last weekend. Moreover, the administration did, as it turns out, make a preventive war case prior to the conflict, prompting the rationale to be dubbed the Bush Doctrine. In a “National Security Strategy” document released in September 2002, in particular, the administration argued for expanding the definition of pre-emption to include preventive war against states suspected of developing chemical, biological or nuclear weapons and with alleged terrorist ties. Preventive war should be justifiable, the document argued, to counter the possibility that a state with such weapons might share the capability with terrorists that could attack the United States without presenting evidence of an imminent threat. “Our enemies are seeking weapons of mass destruction. America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed,” it said. Speeches by Bush and other officials also argued a preventive justification for attacking Iraq specifically, including a key presidential address days before the invasion. “We are now acting because the risks of inaction would be far greater. In one year, or five years, the power of Iraq to inflict harm on all free nations would be multiplied many times over,” Bush said. So Apparently Was Pre-Emption That speech like many others, however, also conveyed a sense of immediacy to the alleged Iraqi threat, in particular by citing with certainty the existence of banned weapons. “Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised,” Bush said. “The danger is clear: Using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country or any other,” he said. Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.), at a recent hearing with Kay, cited an August 2002 Cheney statement that “there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies and against us.” “What the president referred to as a ‘word contest’ regarding the threat from Iraq is, in fact, his attempt to change the rationale for going to war and rewrite the history of what has occurred,” said Center for American Progress President John Podesta in a recent statement. Officials “purposely never said that Iraq posed an ‘imminent’ threat, although they used rhetoric to convey that immediate military action was necessary,” said Perkovich in his Washington Times piece. In light of Tenet’s statement, administration officials probably knew there was no intelligence case for pre-emptive war, but they nevertheless implied an urgent threat, says Lawrence Korb of the Center for American Progress. “They were sending all kinds of messages,” he said. Powell himself, on the other hand, appeared to acknowledge the prominence of the pre-emption rationale in his thinking when he said this month that he might not have supported the war had he known Iraq possessed no banned weapons stockpiles. “It was the stockpile … that made it more of a real and present danger and threat to the region and the world. The absence of a stockpile changes the political calculus. It changes the answer you get,” he told the Washington Post (see GSN, Feb. 3, 2004).                   Today’s Message Top administration officials now are stressing the preventive case, saying Iraqi “intentions” and “capabilities” indicated Iraq would one day attack the United States with weapons of mass destruction. “The right thing was done. … I think it was clear that this was a regime with intent, capability, and it was a risk the president felt strongly we could not take,” Powell said on Feb. 3. Bush reiterated the preventive war justification during the Sunday interview, saying Kay “did report to the American people that Saddam had the capacity to make weapons. Saddam Hussein was dangerous with weapons. I believe it is essential that when we see a threat we deal with those threats before they become imminent. It’s too late if they become imminent.” UCS expert Dean said even though administration officials are stressing the preventive war justification it will not likely be used to justify an attack on another country soon. “My view is that you’re not going to get the American electorate to back the costs, human and material costs, for the invasion of another country on the idea that they might have WMD,” he said. Kerry, along with the other top Democratic candidates, indicated opposition to the prevention rationale in responses to a questionnaire last fall. “I support the right of pre-emption in the face of an imminent threat, but the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive war is a dangerous departure from the time tested principles of American foreign policy that have kept us safe,” he wrote. Back to top       U.S. Needs to Improve Certain Export Control Measures, GAO Says By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The U.S. Commerce Department needs to improve its procedures for ensuring that dual-use exports are being properly used, congressional auditors said in a report released yesterday (see GSN, Oct. 21, 2003). Dual-use exports are items that can be used in civilian and conventional military applications, as well as to develop weapons of mass destruction. From fiscal 2000 to fiscal 2002, the department approved more than 26,000 export licenses for dual-use items, with almost 30 percent of those licenses involving exports to countries of proliferation concern to the United States, such as China and India, according to the U.S. General Accounting Office report.  To ensure that dual-use exports are being properly used and not diverted to other purposes, the Commerce Department sends personnel to foreign companies to conduct a post-shipment verification (PSV) check to verify the use and location of the item. The GAO found, however, that only a small number of dual-use export licenses were subject to PSV inspections, according to the report. It says that from fiscal 2000 to fiscal 2002, PSVs were conducted on only 6 percent of 7680 dual-use licenses approved for companies in countries of concern. Concerns about the possible misuse of dual-use exports have risen as more details are learned about an international nuclear black market recently outed by the confession of a top Pakistani nuclear scientist. For example, recent reports have described a shipment of centrifuge components from a Malaysian-based company that were ultimately diverted to Libya for suspected use in Tripoli’s nuclear program. In its report, the GAO criticized the department’s procedures for having several flaws that reduced the effectiveness of the PSV checks. The report says that 36 percent of companies in countries of concern reported that U.S. officials did not ask them about compliance with export license conditions during PSV inspections. In addition, 75 percent of the officials that conducted PSV checks between 2000 to 2002 reported they lacked technical training in a number of technologies that accounted for almost 90 percent of the checks conducted, the report says. The report also notes that some countries of concern, “most notably China,” limit access to facilities where dual-use items are shipped, hindering PSV inspections. Last fall, Undersecretary of Commerce for Industry and Security Kenneth Juster highlighted U.S. concerns over China’s reluctance to fully cooperate with on-site inspections during a speech before the Update 2003 Export Controls and Policy Conference in Washington. “Although we have made some progress with the Chinese in this area, much more needs to be done in order to have an effective system in place.  Without further progress, our ability to license exports to certain Chinese companies will decrease,” Juster said. In its report, the GAO made several recommendations to improve the PSV inspection process, including improved technical training for department personnel conducting the checks and ensuring that they assess compliance with license conditions. The report says the department “generally agreed” with the recommendation and that the department has already begun to implement similar measures. Back to top       Proliferation Concerns Could Damage EU-Syria Trade Agreement A demand by the European Union for Syria to fully comply with its nonproliferation obligations could wreck a trade agreement reached late last year, the Financial Times reported today (see GSN, Jan. 7). The EU has included in the agreement a “conditionality” clause that states Syria must comply with its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty commitments and other nonproliferation obligations, according to the Times. A lack of Syrian compliance could lead to the agreement being suspended, a EU diplomat said. The nonproliferation clause states that Syria should “work towards” implementing its nonproliferation obligations, the Times reported. Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, though, want the clause in the trade agreement to reflect one agreed by EU foreign ministers in November to be included in agreements with other countries. That clause says countries should “take steps” to fulfill nonproliferation obligations. “It is more concrete, but the sentiment is the same,” a diplomat said (Judy Dempsey, Financial Times, Feb. 12). Back to top       Powell Praises Libyan Openness on WMD Programs U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell yesterday praised Libya’s progress in opening its WMD program to U.S. and international inspectors (see GSN, Feb. 11). When asked by members of the House International Relations Committee about Libya’s performance so far, Powell said, “The answer is very, very well.” “I had to sort of retrain myself and some of the old-timers on my staff that this is not like the Soviet Union, where we were pulling (weapons information) out of them,” Powell said. The Libyans “are pushing it at us,” he added (David Sands, Washington Times, Feb. 12). Back to top

Bush Proposes Nuclear Nonproliferation Initiatives By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — U.S. President George W. Bush yesterday proposed seven new international initiatives for curbing nuclear proliferation, including a potentially controversial one that would restrict the supply of nuclear fuel-making equipment, even to countries with no weapons programs (see GSN, Feb. 11). The president’s recommendations, delivered at the National Defense University here, received mixed praise from experts who described them as constructive and ambitious, but also as incomplete. “It’s a good first step, but it is going to require a great deal of follow up to be more than an exercise in rhetoric,” said Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Some experts said the proposals would require an unprecedented amount of diplomatic engagement from the administration, potentially hampering current U.S. nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policies. The president’s approach is “do-as-I-say, not-as-I-do,” said the Arms Control Association in a statement, noting that the Bush administration has not increased funding for nonproliferation programs, has funded research on new nuclear weapons capabilities, and is reconsidering a proposed international ban on producing nuclear weapons materials that it previously supported. Bush said the proposals would “strengthen the world’s efforts to stop the spread of deadly weapons.” “There is a consensus among nations that proliferation cannot be tolerated. Yet this consensus means little unless it is translated into action,” he said. Curbing Nuclear Fuel Technology One of Bush’s recommendations is particularly ripe for controversy, experts said. In proposing to block the supply of nuclear material production technology to countries that currently do not have such capability, Bush’s plan could be an effective nonproliferation measure, the experts said. However, the proposal potentially clashes with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which guarantees access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes in exchange for forgoing nuclear weapons, and therefore could be difficult to implement, experts said. Access to such technology ostensibly for peaceful purposes has allowed some nations to illicitly develop nuclear technology. The “loophole,” Bush said, has enabled North Korea and Iran to “produce nuclear material that can be used to build bombs under the cover of civilian nuclear programs.” Under Bush’s proposal, the 40-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group of countries with nuclear technologies would refuse to sell enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to any state that does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants. A White House spokesman said in a Web site discussion following the speech that the proposal should not conflict with the NPT bargain. “The president noted today that activities such as enrichment and            reprocessing are not necessary for a country that only seeks to harness nuclear energy for peaceful reasons,” said deputy national security adviser for communications Jim Wilkinson. Bush said leading nuclear exporters “should ensure that states have reliable access at reasonable cost to fuel for civilian reactors.” Other Proposals Bush’s other recommendations were: *         Requiring that all countries sign the Additional Protocol to their International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreements, a measure that would expand the agency’s authority to investigate nuclear activities. Those unsigned by next year would also be barred by the Nuclear Suppliers Group from receiving equipment for their civilian nuclear programs. Bush also encouraged the U.S. Senate to quickly grant its approval of the U.S. Additional Protocol, a step required before Bush can ratify the agreement (see GSN, Jan. 29); *         Expanding the Proliferation Security Initiative, a U.S.-led, 11-country effort to intercept suspected WMD cargo shipments. Bush said yesterday that Canada, Singapore and Norway are also joining the effort (see GSN, Dec. 18, 2003); *         Passing a U.S.-proposed U.N. Security Council resolution requiring that all states criminalize proliferation, enact strict export controls, and secure sensitive materials within their borders. That resolution has been circulating among Security Council members since December and has gone through several revisions by the United States as well as proposed changes by other council members, especially Russia and China. Neither country is supportive of the draft. Earlier this month, the president of the council for February, Ambassador Wang Guangya of China, said he did not expect the council to take up the draft this month (see GSN, Dec. 17, 2003). *         Expanding the membership and financial commitments of the Group of Eight Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, a group of countries that supports weapons destruction in former Soviet states (see GSN, Nov. 14, 2003). *         Creating a special international committee on safeguards and verification to improve the IAEA’s ability to monitor and enforce compliance with nuclear nonproliferation obligations; and *         Prohibiting states under investigation by the IAEA from serving on the agency’s Board of Governors or on the new special committee. Credibility Joseph Cirincione of the Carnegie Endowment said many of Bush’s proposals were not new, having been made by other governments, independent experts and the leading Democratic presidential candidates. “It’s a sign of good leadership that the president has decided to adopt these ideas,” he said. Robert Einhorn, a senior adviser at CSIS, said nearly all of Bush’s recommendations would depend on winning the support of other countries — a task that he said would require a change in the administration’s attitude toward diplomacy. “That will require the administration not only to engage in sustained diplomatic heavy lifting, but also to show a readiness to adjust its own positions to meet the requirements of others — something it has often been reluctant to do in the counterproliferation area,” he said. Experts said Bush may lack credibility regarding his recommendation to expand global nonproliferation aid, citing a decrease in U.S. military fiscal 2005 budget request for nonproliferation activites in former Soviet states. Molly Pickett of the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation said other countries might criticize Bush for seeking nonproliferation measures abroad while refusing to destroy nuclear warheads in the U.S. arsenal. “Such a failure of U.S. leadership only leads other nuclear and non-nuclear states alike to pursue advanced weapons technology,” said. Pakistan In his speech, Bush highlighted U.S. nuclear proliferation concerns by citing recent disclosures of an extensive nuclear proliferation network involving top Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, who recently said he supplied nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya without his government’s permission. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf later pardoned Khan (see related GSN story, today). Khan “led an extensive international network for the proliferation of nuclear technology and know-how,” Bush said, which he characterized as a “criminal enterprise.” Independent U.S. experts have long suspected Pakistan of trading its nuclear weapons technology for advanced missile capabilities and cash. Carnegie’s Cirincione criticized Bush for not assigning blame to the Pakistani government for the proliferation. “The president in his speech seemed to portray the international black market as headed up solely by Pakistani individuals, particularly A.Q. Khan. It is inconceivable that Khan operated without the knowledge and support of Pakistan’s military and intelligence officials,” Cirincione said. Editor’s Note: GSN correspondent Jim Wurst contributed to this report from U.N. headquarters in New York. Back to top       Undisclosed Nuclear Equipment Designs Found in Iran, Diplomats Say International inspectors have discovered an undisclosed design for uranium enrichment centrifuges in Iran, raising questions about Tehran’s commitment to making its nuclear programs completely transparent, the Financial Times reported today (see GSN, Feb. 10). In November, Iran submitted a description of its nuclear activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency, revealing an extensive history of illicit nuclear acquisitions. Denying an interest in nuclear weapons, Iranian officials said the declaration provided a comprehensive picture of Iran’s efforts to build an indigenous nuclear power program. Working with the Iranian documents, agency officials have unearthed a network of illegal nuclear suppliers, culminating recently in the confession of top Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan that he supplied nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea (see related GSN story, today; Roula Khalaf, Financial Times, Feb. 12). The centrifuge design found by agency personnel in Iran appears to match one provided by Khan to Libya, which recently disclosed its own nuclear ambitions and has turned over nuclear equipment and documentation to the United States, according to diplomats cited by the Associated Press today (see GSN, Feb. 9). “Coming up with them [the designs in Iran] is an example of real good inspector work,” said one diplomat, describing how agency inspectors found the documents without Iran’s cooperation. “They took information and put it together and put something in front of them [Iranian officials] that they can’t deny,” the diplomat added. Iran has not yet formally explained the failure to disclose the design. “They’ll probably say it’s an oversight,” said one diplomat (Associated Press, CNN.com, Feb. 12). Western officials said the discovery would be included in report by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei to be submitted to the agency’s Board of Governors next month. Another issue that remains in dispute is whether Iran is adhering to its pledge to suspend uranium enrichment activities. While it has apparently not enriched any uranium since making the pledge late last year, Iran has continued to assemble enrichment centrifuges. European officials and ElBaradei have held talks with Iranian officials on the issue, but have so far been unable to persuade Iran to suspend all enrichment-related activities (Financial Times). Meanwhile, U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton said today that there is “no doubt” Iran continues to seek nuclear weapons. “They have not yet, in our judgment, complied even with the commitments they made in October to suspend their uranium enrichment activities,” he said (Reuters, Feb. 12). Back to top       ElBaradei Calls for New Nuclear Nonproliferation Measures Following a nuclear nonproliferation speech yesterday by U.S. President George W. Bush, International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei today outlined several new measures intended to strengthen nuclear nonproliferation efforts (see related GSN story, today). He laid out his nonproliferation measures in a commentary in today’s New York Times. The IAEA head wrote that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the linchpin of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime for more than 30 years, “must be tailored to fit 21st-century realities.” To do so, ElBaradei called for improved controls over the export of nuclear materials. He criticized the current mechanism, the 40-member Nuclear Suppliers Group, describing its as a limited and nonbinding “gentlemen’s agreement.” Instead, according to ElBaradei, treaty-based export controls should be created, and efforts to assist others in proliferation should be criminalized. ElBaradei also called for all U.N. members to sign Additional Protocols to their IAEA safeguards agreements, which would give the agency the authority to conduct more intrusive monitoring of countries’ nuclear activities. In addition, no country should be allowed to withdraw from the NPT, such as when North Korea announced its treaty withdrawal in early 2003, according to ElBaradei. “Any nation invoking this escape clause is almost certainly a threat to international peace and security,” he wrote. “At a minimum,” ElBaradei wrote, the withdraw of any country from the treaty should prompt an automatic U.N. Security Council review. In addition, ElBaradei reiterated his proposal to place enrichment and reprocessing activities under multinational control, and called for renewed negotiations on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, which would ban the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons. The five nuclear weapons states — China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States — should also develop a “clear road map” for total nuclear disarmament, he said. ElBaradei said his measures should be considered at the next NPT Review Conference, set to be held next year, “if the global community is serious about bringing nuclear proliferation to a halt” (Mohamed ElBaradei, New York Times, Feb. 12). Back to top       Nuclear Black Market Involved Businessmen Used by Pakistani Program, Officials Say U.S. officials have said an international nuclear black market disclosed by a top Pakistani nuclear scientist involved European businessmen who were investigated in the 1980s for providing nuclear technology to Pakistan, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, Feb. 11). Senior U.S. intelligence officials and outside experts said that several of the European businessmen used by Pakistan as middlemen during the development of its nuclear program are also believed to have aided Iran and Libya. One of the businessmen was Dutch national Henk Slebos, a friend of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist who confessed to the network, AP reported. Slebos was convicted in the Netherlands in 1985 for attempting to sell equipment to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program (Matt Kelley, Associated Press/Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 12). Meanwhile, the list of countries being investigated by the International Atomic Energy Agency for ties to the nuclear black market continues to grow, according to diplomats. So far, the list includes: *         Austria, where a firm is being investigated for providing magnets that could be used in uranium enrichment centrifuges; *         Belgium, where at least one company is suspected of having transferred nuclear equipment to Iran; *         China, suspected with providing Iran with nuclear-related materials and other items; *         Japan, where one company is being investigated for providing uranium enrichment-related equipment to Iran; *         South Africa, where several scientists from Pretoria’s apartheid-era nuclear weapons program are believed to have provided expertise without government approval; *         Spain, where one or two companies are being investigated for providing minor equipment to Libya’s nuclear program and *         the United Arab Emirates, the location of Gulf Technical Industries LLC, which is suspected of being the headquarters of the nuclear black market (Reuters, Feb. 11). Malaysia today promised to provide the United States with information learned in the investigation of a local company that produced centrifuge components that were seized last year en route to Libya. A senior Malaysian official said, though, that U.S. President George W. Bush exaggerated Malaysia’s role in the nuclear black market during a speech on nuclear proliferation yesterday. “He’s overblown Malaysia’s role in this, the role of Malaysian companies in this,” the official said. “Making Malaysia the central conduit to this is misleading,” the official added (Patrick McDowell, Associated Press, Feb. 12). In South Korea, the government there plans to refer a local trading company for prosecution for violating South Korean export control laws by sending balancing machines to Libya in 2002, according to the Korea Times (Korea Times, Feb. 12). Back to top       Pakistan Defends Continued Detention of Nuclear Scientists Pakistan has defended the continued detention of six scientists and officials in its nuclear weapons program as necessary to prevent the further leak of nuclear technology, Agence France-Presse reported today (see related GSN story, today). The six men, all of whom worked at the Khan Research Laboratories, Pakistan’s main nuclear weapons facility, were detained as part of Pakistan’s internal probe into unauthorized nuclear proliferation. The detainees have been identified as KRL scientists Mohammad Farooq, Nazir Ahmed and Neseemuddin and retired military officers Islam ul-Haq, Sajawal Khan Malik and Iqbal Tajwar, according to AFP. In statements submitted to the Lahore High Court, where the families of the detainees are seeking their release, the Pakistani government has said the six men needed to continue to be detained to prevent further nuclear transfers. Government statements accuse the detainees of being responsible for “directly or indirectly passing onto foreign countries and individuals secret codes, nuclear materials, substances, machinery, equipment, components, information, documents, sketches, plans, models, articles and notes etc” (Agence France-Presse/Khaleej Times, Feb. 12). Back to top       United States to Fund Romanian Research Reactor Conversion The United States has agreed to help fund efforts to convert a Romanian research reactor to use low-enriched uranium fuel, Xinhua News Agency reported today (see GSN, Sept. 22, 2003).  The Romanian National Commission on Nuclear Activities Control announced yesterday that Romania and the United States have also signed technical and financial assistance agreements on providing physical security systems at several Romanian nuclear research facilities (Xinhua News Agency, Feb. 12). Back to top       North Korea Turns to Network of Nuclear Suppliers in Wake of Pakistani Cutoff Although help from Pakistan has apparently ended, North Korea can turn to other parts of its illicit suppliers’ network to continue its efforts to acquire nuclear technology, a senior Bush administration official said yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 10). The former head of Pakistan’s nuclear program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, formally confessed this month to supplying nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea without his government’s permission (see GSN, Feb. 5), and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has vowed to end smuggling activities in his country. North Korea, however, receives nuclear support from companies across Europe and Asia, the official said, probably without the permission or knowledge of their governments. North Korea is seeking to build a uranium enrichment facility and is specifically seeking to acquire rotors for gas centrifuges, used to amass weapon-grade isotopes of uranium, the official said. Many companies have expressed interest in dealing with North Korea, the official said, but he declined to identify them or their home nations (Barry Schweid, Associated Press/Kansas City Star, Feb. 11). Back to top

U.S. Army to Retrain Anniston Workers Following Sarin Incident The U.S. Army said this week that it would retrain workers at the Anniston, Ala., chemical weapons incinerator in response to an incident last week when two workers were exposed to trace amounts of sarin, according to the Associated Press (see GSN, Feb. 6). Last week, workers wearing protective equipment failed to properly clean up after being inside part of the incinerator plant where sarin was present, according to Army project manager Tim Garrett. As the workers left the area, an alarm indicated the presence of sarin in an observation corridor. The incident ultimately resulted in a 20-hour shut down of the incinerator. Officials have reviewed videotapes of the incident and will share lessons learned with incinerator workers, AP reported (Associated Press, Feb. 11). Back to top

Pentagon Allows “Dirty Bomb” Suspect to See Attorney The U.S. Defense Department yesterday said that Jose Padilla, who was arrested in 2002 over allegations that he was involved in a plant to detonate a “dirty bomb” within the United States, would be allowed to meet with a lawyer (see GSN, Jan. 23). In a statement yesterday, the Pentagon described Padilla as “an enemy combatant,” and said he “will be allowed access to a lawyer subject to appropriate security restrictions.” In December, a U.S. federal court ordered the Pentagon to grant Padilla legal representation or to free him, a decision that has been appealed and is expected to be examined by the U.S. Supreme Court, according to the Washington Post. Providing Padilla with access to his lawyer, according to the Pentagon, is “a matter of discretion and military authority” and “is not required by domestic or international law and should not be treated as a precedent” (Ricks/Powell, Washington Post, Feb. 12).   Back to top

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