U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell last week discussed nonproliferation funding during a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing (AFP photo/Luke Frazza). Biden Says Cheney, Others Thwart Nonproliferation Opportunities By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — Certain senior Bush administration officials have kept President George W. Bush from increasing U.S. nonproliferation funding and supporting other arms control initiatives, a senior Senate Democrat said recently, prompting some candid comments from Secretary of State Colin Powell. “I worry that in too many cases ideology for the first three years of this administration has trumped, or at least gotten in the way of, nonproliferation policy,” said Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.) during a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing with Powell last week...Full Story

Iranian Uranium Enrichment Program May Resume by Fall A personal representative of Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has said that Iran’s suspension of its uranium enrichment program would probably end before October, the Financial Times reported today (see GSN, Feb. 17)...Full Story

U.S. Needs to Improve Recovery of Overseas Uranium, Auditors Say By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The U.S. Energy Department needs to improve and expand its efforts to recover highly enriched uranium that it supplied to foreign nuclear research reactors, according to a report released this month by the department’s inspector general (see GSN, Dec. 16, 2003)...Full Story

	Wednesday, February 18, 2004

Biden Says Cheney, Others Thwart Nonproliferation Opportunities By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — Certain senior Bush administration officials have kept President George W. Bush from increasing U.S. nonproliferation funding and supporting other arms control initiatives, a senior Senate Democrat said recently, prompting some candid comments from Secretary of State Colin Powell. “I worry that in too many cases ideology for the first three years of this administration has trumped, or at least gotten in the way of, nonproliferation policy,” said Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.) during a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing with Powell last week. Biden, the senior committee Democrat, said that in an earlier meeting with Bush, the president seemed enthusiastic about increasing support for programs to secure and eliminate WMD and missile arsenals in former Soviet states. Currently, the United States spends about $1 billion annually on such programs. Biden said, however, that Vice President Dick Cheney and other officials opposed the idea, arguing that the increased U.S. assistance would simply free Russian money for other objectives. Bush’s “enthusiasm was real. But the enthusiasm of others in the room was not only not real, it was in opposition,” Biden said. Calling such assistance “the single most important nonproliferation tool available to us,” Biden said, “This is mindless. It’s ideological idiocy.” Powell said he supports the programs and appeared to dismiss concerns about the impact of U.S. funding. “Of course, money is fungible, but in this case, we have ways of making sure that this fungible money is serving our interest, not serving the interests of the Russians alone,” he said. Names Named In its fiscal 2005 budget request, the administration has requested $409 million for the Defense Department’s Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, a $42 million decrease from current funding levels (see GSN, Feb. 11). Committee Chairman Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), the leading Senate advocate of those programs, gave a similar, though more diplomatic, explanation for the administration’s approach to the program. Bush has appeared “very supportive of these programs,” Lugar said, but “down in the weeds sometimes, the president’s enthusiasm is not followed through.” “That’s not to suggest that you’re the weeds. The weeds are down below you,” Senator Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.) said to Powell. Biden added, “I think there’s one weed above you, [a] big weed. His name is Cheney.  And I’m not nearly the diplomat that my colleague is.” The White House and the vice president’s office provided no comment in time for this story. Biden also said that Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton was partially responsible for the administration’s current reconsideration of a previously supported ban on nuclear weapons fuel production. “For over two years the administration has castigated — rightly — other countries for preventing negotiations from starting. Now [that] there’s a chance of success, however, the administration announced that our policy is under review,” he said. “Well, tell Mr. Bolton that it’s a good idea for him to go on vacation,” Biden said, prompting an, “I beg your pardon?” from Powell. “It’s Bolton. Bolton is the guy who thinks this is a bad idea, along with Mr. Feith and a few others,” he said, referring also to Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith. “Don’t worry about Mr. Bolton. He works for me and we’ll work it out with respect to our position,” Powell said. Ideology Biden charged that ideology has guided other administration decisions, citing Bush’s opposition to ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the administration raising “the specter of the possible use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states,” and the administration’s interest in developing new nuclear weapons capabilities. Those policies could undermine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Biden said. “Over the last three years I believe we have sent mixed signals at best, and negative signals at worst,” Biden said, “The United States has undermined our message that other nations must forgo the bomb.” Powell said that while the administration has no plans to resubmit the test ban treaty for Senate approval required for ratification, a U.S. test moratorium would remain in effect. “There’ll be no testing on our side,” he said. Powell also expressed opposition to using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. “Whatever contemplation may be given to this, it’s my own personal judgment that this would not be a sensible policy,” he said. Back to top       Experts Question Bush’s Assertions of Iraq’s WMD “Capacity” Experts have challenged U.S. President George W. Bush’s recent assertion that prewar Iraq had the “capacity” to produce weapons of mass destruction, the Boston Globe reported yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 12). In an interview last week with NBC’s Meet the Press, Bush said that former chief U.S. weapons inspector in Iraq David Kay had reported that Iraq had the “capacity” to produce weapons of mass destruction. Kay did not use such language, though, to describe prewar Iraq’s WMD production capabilities in either an interim report last fall or in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee late last month, according to the Globe. Several experts have questioned Bush’s characterization of Kay’s findings, the Globe reported.  “There are easily ways in which that would be a true statement and easily ways in which it could be a stretch,” said Gerald Epstein, a former assistant director for national security at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. “It all depends on the squishy word ‘capacity.’ Almost everything is dual-use technology — there is biotech all over the world that is not much different than what you’d need to produce a weapon. But does that mean having everything ready to go for a military attack using that weapon? No, that’s very different,” Epstein said. Kay himself said the issue of Iraq’s WMD “capacity” was more complex than Bush had asserted. “Did they have the capacity to make a small number of chemical or biological weapons using existing civilian infrastructure? Sure,” Kay said.  “Look, if some nut can make enough anthrax to terrorize us in very small amounts, Iraq could have made some. That’s different than saying it could have made large amounts of weaponized anthrax that would have been useful in a militarized conflict,” he said. National Security Council spokesman Sean McCormack said Bush’s assertion was based on portions of Kay’s interim report that said evidence had been found of prewar Iraq’s “weapons of mass destruction-related program activities.” “One question is, ‘How close (to making a weapon) do you want them to be able to be?’” McCormack said (Charlie Savage, Boston Globe, Feb. 17). Back to top

Iranian Uranium Enrichment Program May Resume by Fall A personal representative of Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has said that Iran’s suspension of its uranium enrichment program would probably end before October, the Financial Times reported today (see GSN, Feb. 17). Last year, Iran agreed during negotiations with three European countries to suspend its uranium enrichment program, and Iranian officials now believe that the suspension “can last no longer than September,” said Khamenei representative Hussein Shariatmadari. Meanwhile, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi reiterated yesterday that Iran is capable of exporting enriched uranium abroad for use as nuclear reactor fuel, according to the Times. On Sunday, Kharazi said Iran had made “an important achievement” in acquiring technology needed to enrich uranium for peaceful uses. Kharazi said yesterday that his comments were in reaction to a major nuclear nonproliferation speech given recently by U.S. President George W. Bush. “This is our legitimate right and my remark was a reaction to the recent speech by George W. Bush saying only specific countries have the right to produce nuclear technology,” Kharazi said (Gareth Smyth, Financial Times, Feb. 18). Back to top       U.S. Needs to Improve Recovery of Overseas Uranium, Auditors Say By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The U.S. Energy Department needs to improve and expand its efforts to recover highly enriched uranium that it supplied to foreign nuclear research reactors, according to a report released this month by the department’s inspector general (see GSN, Dec. 16, 2003). As of 1993, 51 countries possessed a total of about 17,500 kilograms of U.S.-supplied HEU materials. Of that, about 5,200 kilograms is eligible to be returned to the United States through the Energy Department’s “takeback” policy. The policy, which began in the wake of the 1950s-era “Atoms for Peace” program, allows foreign research reactors that use U.S.-origin uranium fuel to return the spent fuel to the United States for storage and disposal. Energy Department officials are currently considering whether to extend the takeback policy, which is set to end in 2006. A departmental audit conducted last year found that only about half of the eligible material was likely to be returned to the United States, the report says. The audit also found that the Energy Department lacked a program to recover the remaining 12,300 kilograms, it says. “If the department is unable to recover a more significant percentage of HEU produced in the U.S. and dispersed to other countries, there may be a greater risk that some of the materials will be diverted by groups or governments hostile to the U.S. — for use in nuclear weapons,” the report says. The Energy Department is only likely to recover about half of the 5,200 kilograms of material covered by the takeback policy, in large part, because participation in the program is voluntary and many countries have chosen not to take part, the report says. Out of 33 countries with U.S.-supplied material, 12 have chosen not participate in the takeback policy, including countries of proliferation concern to the United States, such as Iran and Pakistan, the report says. The report also criticizes the Energy Department for failing to have a program in place to recover the remaining 12,300 kilograms of U.S.-origin HEU not covered by the takeback policy. It notes that the department, in a program administered by the National Nuclear Security Administration, is funding efforts to help Russia recover HEU it supplied to other countries. “In fact, in one country, the department is paying to recover Russian-produced, but not U.S.-produced, HEU,” the report says. According to the report, the Energy Department has formed a working group to assess the takeback policy, with a priority to be placed on accepting eligible material from reactors and countries that may pose increased proliferation risks. In addition, Energy Department staff have been directed to identify ways to accelerate the return of U.S.-origin spent fuel and to accept additional materials under the takeback policy or another program, the report says, adding that NNSA officials agreed the takeback policy would be more effective if it were expanded. The report also noted management concerns of the takeback policy, as well as Energy Department efforts to alleviate those concerns. Currently, the policy is managed by the department’s Office of Environmental Management, which has previously questioned overseeing programs that do not directly relate to its core functions of site cleanup and closure, the report says. It adds, though, that the Energy Department has agreed the takeback policy “may be a better fit” within another departmental office, and appropriations have been made to transfer the policy to the Office of Civilian Waste Management. Jon Wolfsthal of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Nonproliferation Project said today, though, that responsibility for the takeback policy should be given fully to the NNSA because of the policy’s nonproliferation aspect. Back to top       Russia Suffers More Missile Mishaps in Nuclear Exercises Russian missiles experienced more problems today during a major Russian strategic nuclear weapons exercise, as a submarine-launched ballistic missile was ordered to self-destruct after it flew off-course only 98 seconds into its flight, according to the Russian navy press service (CNN.com, Feb. 18). The errant test followed yesterday’s mishap in which two submarine-launched missiles failed to take flight as Russian President Vladimir Putin watched from a neighboring submarine (see GSN, Feb. 17). Putin had been aboard the Arkhangelsk, a Typhoon-class ballistic missile submarine, to observe the SS-N-23 missile tests from the nearby Novomoskovsk, but after waiting 25 minutes for the expected launch, he disappeared below deck without a word. A few hours later, the Russian navy’s top admiral, Vladimir Kuroyedov, denied that any launch had been planned, but that a “virtual launch” had been intended from the start and had been successful (Peter Baker, Washington Post, Feb. 18). That incident, and today’s malfunction of the same missile type from the Karelia, occurred during what has been Russia’s largest military exercises in more than two decades, according to CNN (CNN.com).  One weapons expert cautioned today against reading too much into the failed launches. “While it is tempting to say that this is a reminder of the decrepit state of missiles in the former Soviet Union, anybody who has been to a launch knows that sometimes they go and sometimes they don’t,” said John Pike, director of GlobalSecurity.org. “Getting the president of your country to stand there almost guarantees it won’t work,” he added (Marina Malenic, GSN, Feb. 18). Other parts of the exercise were more successful today, as Russia tested an SS-19 ICBM from the Baikonur cosmodrome in Kazakhstan (BBC Monitoring, Feb. 18), and Putin observed a satellite launch from the Plesetsk space center in northern Russia (Pravda, Feb. 18). In addition, Russia Tu-95 Bear strategic bombers successfully launched cruise missiles during the exercise, a Russian air force spokesman said yesterday. “The cruise missiles have hit the set targets on a proving ground in the north of Russia. The launches were held under complicated weather conditions,” said Col. Alexander Drobyshevski (RIA Novosti, Feb. 17). Back to top       Kelly Reaffirms U.S. Position That North Korea Acknowledged Uranium Enrichment Program Amid recent North Korean denials that it possesses a uranium enrichment program, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly last week reaffirmed the U.S. position that Pyongyang admitted to possessing such a program during talks held in 2002 (see GSN, Feb. 17). In mid-October 2002, Kelly and a U.S. delegation traveled to Pyongyang to meet with North Korean officials. In a speech last week, Kelly described that meeting, during which he said he met with North Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju. At that meeting, Kelly said last week, “it was very clear to all members of my team that Kang was acknowledging the existence of a highly enriched uranium program.” North Korea, however, has publicly denied possessing a uranium enrichment program. Last month, retired Stanford University professor John Lewis, who traveled to North Korea in January, suggested that translation problems might be responsible for the disagreement. Last week, though, Kelly dismissed such speculation (see GSN, Jan. 23). “Kang’s remarks were interpreted into English by his own interpreter, and his original Korean presentation was monitored by our side’s experienced professional interpreter,” he said. Kelly also said that for two months after the United States had announced that North Korea had disclosed its uranium enrichment program, Pyongyang “did not deny the program or the acknowledgement.” “Only later, when it became clear that this was a major tactical error that was resulting in massive international criticism, did D.P.R.K. officials first begin to suggest that the United States had misunderstood its statements, and later still that the United States had lied about them. Only much later did the North Koreans actually begin to claim that they have no HEU program,” Kelly said (Nautilus Institute release, Feb. 13). Back to top       India, Pakistan Agree on Timetable for Future Peace Talks India and Pakistan have agreed to a timetable for peace talks on a set of issues, including the disputed Kashmir region, which has threatened to become a flashpoint between the two nuclear-armed rivals, a senior Pakistani official announced today (see GSN, Feb. 17). “We do have a basic roadmap for a Pakistan-India peace process to which we have both agreed,” Pakistani Foreign Secretary Riaz Khokhar told a press conference after three days of bilateral talks ended today in Islamabad. The timetable envisions a series of mid-level meetings that would begin after Indian parliamentary elections scheduled for April, followed by a summit between Pakistani Foreign Minister Khursheed Kasuri and Indian External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha in August, according to the Associated Press. A set of technical-level talks on several issues such as transport links between India and Pakistan will be held prior to the Indian elections, and the foreign secretaries of the two countries will meet again in May or June, Khokhar said, adding that exact dates and locations for the talks have not yet been set (Munir Ahmad, Associated Press/Washington Post, Feb. 18). Back to top       Musharraf Rejects International Monitoring of Pakistani Nuclear Sites In an interview yesterday with the Financial Times, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf again rejected the idea of allowing international inspectors to monitor Pakistani nuclear activities (see GSN, Feb. 17). “This is a very sensitive issue,” Musharraf said. “Would any other nuclear power allow its sensitive installations to be inspected? Why should Pakistan be expected to allow anybody to inspect,” he added. Two weeks ago, Musharraf pardoned top Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan for his reportedly confessed role in transferring Pakistani nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea. Musharraf yesterday said he was confident that no such transfers would occur again in the future, removing the need for international monitoring (see GSN, Feb. 6). “We are not hiding anything … what is the need of any inspection? What for?” he said.  “We will cooperate with any organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency, or anybody. But don’t treat us as if we do not know what we are doing. We are doing everything according to international standards,” Musharraf added (Luce/Bokhari, Financial Times, Feb. 17). He also acknowledged the sensitivity of Pakistan’s internal probe into the activities of Khan, who has long been regarded as a national hero in Pakistan for providing the country with nuclear weapons. “Here is a person who is trying to destroy the very thing (Pakistan’s nuclear independence) or giving excuses for others to destroy it and that person happens to be the person who has created it,” Musharraf said. Khan signed a written agreement two weeks ago promising not to resume any contacts with those involved in the international nuclear network outside of Pakistan, Musharraf said. He added that Khan’s pardon would be revoked if he violates the agreement (Bokhari/Luce, Financial Times, Feb. 17). In addition, Musharraf also told the Times yesterday that Pakistan plans to conduct a test of its Shaheen 2 ballistic missile, which has a range of 2,000 kilometers, within the next few weeks (see GSN, Jan. 23). “We are not interested in competing with India,” he said. “If they want to reach 5,000 [kilometers] or have intercontinental ballistic missiles, we are not interested in those. We are only interested in our own defense,” Musharraf added (Luce/Bokhari, Financial Times). Back to top       Russia Trains Indian Nuclear Plant Staff Indian nuclear power plant personnel have been undergoing training at a neighboring Russian nuclear facility, the Press Trust of India reported Monday. The trainees will staff the Indian nuclear power plant now under construction at Kudankulam (see GSN, Feb. 14, 2003). In November 2001, Russia began construction of the Indian plant on the basis of a 1988 protocol signed by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev (Press Trust of India, Feb. 16). Back to top       U.S. Air Force, Lawmakers Discuss Return of Retired B-1s The U.S. Air Force is negotiating with Congress over how many strategic B-1 bombers should be brought out of retirement, a general said last week. In the past few years, the Air Force has retired 32 B-1 bombers, but Congress last year ordered the reactivation of 23 (see GSN, Feb. 6). General Hal Hornburg, head of the Air Force’s Combat Command, said it would cost the unaffordable sum of $2 billion to reactivate all 23 of the aircraft Congress wants returned to service. Hornburg said seven or eight of the retired aircraft probably could be reactivated for an affordable amount of money (Aerospace Daily, Feb. 17). The long-range bombers were originally intended to carry strategic nuclear weapons, but have been converted for conventional missions (Marc Selinger, Aerospace Daily, Feb. 17). Back to top

FBI Interrogates EPA Scientist in Anthrax Investigation The FBI has questioned a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency scientist about an anonymous letter sent shortly before the 2001 anthrax attacks that accused a fellow scientist of plotting a bioterrorist act, the Washington Times reported today (see GSN, Aug. 11, 2003). According to a document, FBI agents involved in the bureau’s investigation into the anthrax attacks sought information on the letter, which charged that EPA toxicologist Ayaad Assaad was an anti-American “religious fanatic” with the ability to launch a biological attack, the Times reported. The document said an FBI agent told an EPA scientist last week that he had been identified by coworkers as the man who wrote the letter about Assaad. It also indicates that the FBI agent warned the scientist not to discuss the interrogation and that he may be subjected to a lie-detector test, according to the Times. The FBI refused to comment on whether the anonymous letter was linked to the anthrax attacks. “At this point, I’m unable to discuss whether or not there is a nexus between the anthrax mailings of 2001 and this anonymous letter written to the FBI before the first anthrax mailing,” a representative at the FBI’s Washington field office said yesterday (Guy Taylor, Washington Times, Feb. 18).   Back to top

About Newswire  |  Contact National Journal  |  Re-Use Guidelines

© Copyright 2008 by National Journal Group, Inc. The material in this section is produced independently for NTI by National Journal Group, Inc. Any reproduction or retransmission, in whole or in part, is a violation of federal law and is strictly prohibited without the consent of the National Journal Group, Inc. All rights reserved.