U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly was in Beijing today for multilateral talks on North Korea’s nuclear program (AFP photo/Kim Jae-Hwan). North Korea Nuclear Talks Expected to End Tomorrow Negotiations in Beijing are expected to conclude tomorrow, a Chinese spokesman said today, the third day of the six-nation talks. Lower-level working groups would meet in the weeks ahead in preparation for another full meeting before April 30, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Feb. 26; Ted Anthony, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, Feb. 27). After yesterday’s offer to freeze its weapons program, North Korea today blamed U.S. intransigence for the continuing impasse, according to the Washington Post. It criticized U.S. demands that the communist country relinquish all nuclear programs...Full Story

NNSA Launches Program to Employ Iraqi Scientists The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration announced the launch of a new program Wednesday to provide employment for Iraqi scientists, technicians and engineers to prevent them from possibly transferring any WMD-related knowledge they may possess to other countries of concern or terrorist groups (see GSN, Dec. 19, 2003)...Full Story

Secret Talks Led to Iran’s Enhanced Suspension of Uranium Enrichment Iran’s agreement to expand its suspension of uranium enrichment activities came after three days of backroom negotiations with France, Germany and the United Kingdom, Reuters reported yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 26)...Full Story

	Friday, February 27, 2004

U.S. Sets Norms for Anti-WMD Gear, Links Grants to Detector Standards By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The U.S. Homeland Security Department yesterday and today announced its first standards for radiation detectors and for gear to protect personnel in a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear incident. The standards are intended to help state and local governments make procurement decisions and to provide manufacturers with performance criteria. This afternoon in New York, the department’s Science and Technology Directorate announced standards for radiological and nuclear detectors, providing performance criteria and test methods that government officials and manufacturers will use in evaluating portable radiation detectors and portal monitors installed in buildings. The department’s Office for Domestic Preparedness, along with the Commerce Department’s National Institute of Standards and Technology and the Energy Department’s national laboratories, helped to develop the standards. “The [Homeland Security] Department, through [the Bureau of] Customs and Border Protection, has already moved forward with deploying state-of-the-art radiation detection technologies at key installations on our nation’s borders. These standards will facilitate our ability to ensure that equipment meets rigorous standards and supports the quick deployment of the best equipment available,” said Asa Hutchinson, Homeland Security undersecretary for border and transportation security (see GSN, March 26, 2003). Meanwhile, the department’s Science and Technology Directorate yesterday announced its adoption of standards on protective clothing, self-contained breathing apparatus and air-purifying and self-contained respirators. The National Fire Protection Association and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health developed the standards over several years. Jurisdictions receiving grants from the Office for Domestic Preparedness, which is the department’s major provider of grants to first responders, are to use the radiation detector standards to guide their spending, the Homeland Security Department said today. Homeland Security Undersecretary for Science and Technology Charles McQueary testified Wednesday before the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science and Research and Development about the detector standards and their relationship to grant decisions. Representative Robert Andrews (D-N.J.) used the hearing to stress the importance of establishing equipment standards when doling out homeland security funds. “The world is just filled with charlatans right now,” Andrews told McQueary. Subcommittee members also cited complaints from business owners that it is difficult to reach the Homeland Security Department with information about their anti-WMD and other technologies. Businesses are “constantly” contacting committee members about relations with the Science and Technology Directorate, Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.) said. The department is certifying such technologies, through its Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency, with an eye toward encouraging research and development by limiting the legal liability of vendors in case of a WMD attack. The certification process, though, has also been the focus of complaints, with businesses calling the process unduly complicated and bureaucratic. “There might be some undue burden. We’ve got some barriers to entry there,” McQueary acknowledged at the hearing. McQueary said the $1.04 billion requested for the directorate for fiscal 2005 would be a $126.5 million increase over fiscal 2004, mostly because of increased spending on biological defense. Representative Jim Turner (D-Texas), praised the biological defense spending but asked whether more money should be devoted to other areas as well. McQueary replied that more money is needed for protection in that sector because a biological attack would be relatively easy to carry out but might not be as readily detectable as other kinds of WMD attacks. “I truly believe that the greatest threat to this country lies in the biologic area as much as any,” McQueary said. McQueary said a “budget decision” has been made to limit overall spending for the directorate. “We all work for somebody. … I view my responsibility as trying to get the best performance we can get our of the budget request,” he said. Amid such budgetary constraints, the department has sought to spend in a more targeted way by improving its ability to assess the threat of terrorism around the country and where vulnerabilities lie. The department’s Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate is conducting a national threat and vulnerability assessment, which will be aided in part by the submission last month of states’ homeland security plans and assessments. Department officials said repeatedly last year that the assessment could take up to five years, but Turner said Deputy Homeland Security Secretary James Loy told him the process will take place much more quickly. According to Turner spokeswoman Moira Whelan, Loy said Homeland Security Department officials “expect to get something rolling and have something by the end of the year.” Loy provided no specific timeline and said he expects something akin to a “rough draft” this year, Whelan said. “Without that comprehensive threat and vulnerability assessment,” Turner said Wednesday, “in many ways, we are kind of operating ad hoc.” Back to top

NNSA Launches Program to Employ Iraqi Scientists The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration announced the launch of a new program Wednesday to provide employment for Iraqi scientists, technicians and engineers to prevent them from possibly transferring any WMD-related knowledge they may possess to other countries of concern or terrorist groups (see GSN, Dec. 19, 2003). The agency is conducting the program in cooperation with the Arab Science and Technology Foundation (ASTF) and the Cooperative Monitoring Center at the U.S. Sandia National Laboratories. Under the first phase of the effort, foundation scientists would conduct a survey of Iraq’s science and technology infrastructure. A workshop would then be held in the region to discuss areas for technical cooperation with Iraqi scientists, and funding would be sought from donor countries and international organizations to begin work on several of the highest-priority projects. “This program addresses the critical need to provide significant and meaningful employment opportunities for all scientists in Iraq,” NNSA Administrator Linton Brooks said in a statement. “Moreover, it is helping them rebuild Iraqi science and technology infrastructure and reintegrate Iraq into the international science community,” he said (NNSA release, Feb. 25). Back to top       U.S. Officials Provide Details on Work With Libyan Nuclear Materials By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — Since Libya’s Dec. 19 offer to dismantle its WMD programs, the United States has taken many of the most sensitive nuclear materials out of the African nation and continues to ship more materials, Assistant U.S. Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance Paula DeSutter said yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 26). “Significant and dangerous” nuclear weapon-related items and key missile guidance equipment are among materials taken to the U.S. Energy Department’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee, DeSutter told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “I haven’t had much of a chance to sit back and ponder these momentous changes, but I would have been amazed three months ago if someone had told me that much of the most sensitive Libyan nuclear material was in Tennessee and not in Tripoli,” De Sutter said. Testifying alongside Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs William Burns, DeSutter described the removal of “detailed nuclear weapon designs” acquired through the global black market led by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan (see GSN, Feb. 24); containers of uranium hexafluoride; centrifuges for enriching uranium; parts, equipment and documentation for such centrifuges; and five Scud C guidance sets, “thereby making inoperable all of Libya’s existing Scud C missiles, produced with extensive assistance from North Korea.” More than 55,000 pounds of Libyan nuclear equipment and documents have been removed from Libya and taken to Oak Ridge, said Committee Chairman Richard Lugar (R-Ind.). “We have already brought out of Libya much of the most proliferation-sensitive nuclear items,” said DeSutter, “but only a small percentage of the nuclear equipment by volume. Even as I speak with you today, for instance, our experts are working with Libya to inventory, pack and remove a large quantity of additional equipment related to Libya’s nuclear centrifuge program.” She added that the United States is helping Libya to convert its Tajura reactor into a low-enriched uranium facility and to retrain Libyan “WMD personnel” to do other jobs. An unusual feature of the Libya operation has been the removal to the United States of Libyan materials under International Atomic Energy Agency seal (see GSN, Feb. 6). Describing IAEA-U.S. cooperation on Libya, DeSutter said Libyan weapon designs under IAEA seal “are in U.S. custody,” adding that “some items of centrifuge equipment and the centrifuge documentation were placed under seal” and “segregated and stored separately upon their arrival in the United States.” “The IAEA was invited to be present when the seals were broken on the Libyan nuclear weapons designs a couple of weeks ago here in Washington. Two IAEA officials attended.  The IAEA will also be invited to be present when seals are removed on other equipment or items removed from Libya, including the UF6 containers and some centrifuge components,” DeSutter said. With respect to chemical weapons, DeSutter said, Libya had large stockpiles of sulfur mustard and was working on nerve agent and binary programs (see GSN, Feb. 26). “There is no question this was an offensive chemical weapons program,” DeSutter said. According to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Libya was to begin destroying its chemical munitions today. DeSutter said Libya has begun consolidating chemical weapon stocks to better protect them. She said U.S. and British officials have been aiding Tripoli in preparing its first Chemical Weapons Convention declaration and that Libya last month conducted an initial destruction of two chemical bombs. Lifting Sanctions Tricky but Potentially Useful for Threat Reduction The committee members and administration officials welcomed what they called extraordinary cooperation by Libya since its Dec. 19 announcement. “The success of Libya,” said DeSutter, “is a ray of light in the otherwise dark world of the WMD black market.” On the same day the Bush administration announced it was lifting some sanctions on Libya, the hearing participants stressed a need for caution in offering such rewards to Libya. The senators and officials expressed particular concern over Libyan Prime Minister Shukri Ghanim’s recent claim that his country acknowledged responsibility in the 1988 Lockerbie bombing only for pragmatic purposes. In a statement issued through its official Jamahiriya news agency, Libya expressed regret Wednesday for Ghanim’s remarks. Although all expressed caution about lifting sanctions, some sanctions would have to be lifted for the United States to draw on major nonproliferation programs that are forbidden from operating in countries under sanctions. “The same restrictions that have so successfully imposed pressure on Libya greatly restricted our ability to conduct operations there in order to implement the trilateral elimination and verification program,” DeSutter said. Lugar said some sanctions must be lifted because the State Department’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, the major source of funding for the U.S. efforts in Libya so far, lacks money to complete the task. “NDF is a relatively small program geared for short-term emergencies. It does not have the size, scope or experience to do dismantlement operations, to employ nuclear scientists or undertake longer-term nonproliferation efforts. Other programs will be necessary as we proceed in Libya, and these programs will require waivers or the lifting of some sanctions before they can be used. In particular, the Defense Department’s Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program is well-equipped to deal with Libya’s biological and chemical weapons,” Lugar said. “You’ve got sanctions, and if you have any sanctions, you can’t use Nunn-Lugar money there. Well, our feeling is we better lift those sanctions. In other words, to sit there and to say $50 million is unavailable, a very small State Department fund is all we can do, simply because we don’t have the gumption simply to get rid of whatever the sanctions are so that money can be used, defies common sense,” Lugar said. Top committee Democrat Joseph Biden (Del.) raised the possibility of amending the legislation that underlies the Cooperative Threat Reduction program in order to resolve the situation. “We keep talking about spending Nunn-Lugar monies or any other monies as if we’re doing other countries a favor, and the countries that have these weapons are countries that, as they say in southern Delaware, that ain’t got no money. … They ain’t got no money to destroy the weapons, to help them,” Biden said. “The president should think about … coming up with an agreement whereby we could amend Nunn-Lugar, that he would support with the political capital he has in this place now, to end this mindless debate. … There is a mindset about helping them or helping us, like this is a zero-sum game,” he said. Burns indicated the outlook is uncertain for the lifting of many U.S. measures against Libya, though. “Libya remains on the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Before this changes, we will need to confirm that Libya has implemented a strategic decision to repudiate terrorism as a tool of foreign policy and to break with any residual ties it may have to any terrorist organization. This evaluation is ongoing,” he said. Back to top       U.S. Treasury Department Clarifies New Policy on Travel to Libya While the White House has lifted the U.S. travel ban on Libya to reward Tripoli for its progress in dismantling its WMD programs, some restrictions remain, the U.S. Treasury Department announced yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 26). U.S. airlines, for example, will still be prohibited from scheduling flights to Libya, the department said (U.S. State Department release, Feb. 26). U.S. residents, however, are allowed to travel to Libya, and travel agents can book trips and accommodations for U.S. clients going to the African nation. The White House also granted permission yesterday for U.S. companies with prior holdings in Libya to resume negotiations on returning to the country. Representatives from several oil companies said yesterday that talks would soon begin on new agreements with Libya, adding that such talks are expected to last for months (Brad Foss, Associated Press/Environmental News Network, Feb. 27). Back to top       Proliferation Continues Despite Recent Successes, U.S. Intelligence Chiefs Say By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — While the world has recently made important strides in combating proliferation, Russia, China and North Korea continue to spread weapons of mass destruction and missile technologies and nonstate international networks persist, according to the two top U.S. intelligence chiefs in congressional testimony this week (see GSN, Feb. 24). “Russia, China, and North Korea support various WMD and missile programs, especially in the Middle East and South Asia,” said Navy Vice Adm. Lowell Jacoby, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, testifying Tuesday before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence with CIA Director George Tenet. Tenet singled out North Korea as a proliferation source, saying Pyongyang “exports complete ballistic missiles and production capabilities, along with related components and expertise.” He emphasized though that proliferation persists through international business networks, citing the recently revealed nuclear technology smuggling network involving former Pakistani nuclear program chief Abdul Qadeer Khan. Russia, China, North Korea Jacoby, in his written statement, said Russian entities support missile and civilian nuclear programs in China, Iran and India, while Chinese companies continue involvement with nuclear and missile programs in Iran and Pakistan. “In some cases entities from Russia and China are involved without the knowledge of their governments,” Jacoby said. “Islamabad has recently developed the capability to produce plutonium for potential weapons use,” he added (see related GSN story, today). Jacoby called North Korea “the world’s leading supplier of missiles and related technologies.” Tenet also noted long-standing Russian agreements to help Syria with its civilian nuclear program, but said, “specific assistance has not yet materialized.” However, Syria is developing longer-range missile programs with aid from North Korea and Iran, he said. Nonstate Proliferation Tenet applauded recent nonproliferation successes, such as Libya’s move in recent months to abandon its WMD programs and the “roll-up” of the Pakistani proliferation network, but expressed concern that proliferation is occurring at the substate level, involving networks that seek to acquire sensitive technologies. “WMD technologies are no longer the sole province of nation-states. They might also come about as a result of business decisions made by private entrepreneurs and firms,” he said, repeating testimony from last year. Khan is believed to have used an international network of suppliers to obtain essential nuclear weapons-making equipment, which he then passed on to Iran, Libya and North Korea. “New procurement strategies continue to hamper our ability to assess and warn on covert WMD programs. Acquisitions for such programs aren’t the work of secret criminal networks that skirt international law. They’re done by businessmen, in the open, in what seems to be legal trade in high-technology,” Tenet said. “Proliferators hiding among legitimate businesses, and countries hiding their WMD programs inside legitimate dual-use industries, combine to make private entrepreneurs dealing in lethal goods one of our most difficult intelligence challenges,” he said. Differences of Emphasis Jacoby and Tenet differed in their emphasis on nonstate networks. The DIA director only mentioned them once during his testimony this week. “Proliferation of WMD- and missile-related technologies continues and new supply networks challenge U.S. counterproliferation efforts,” he said. Tenet described Khan as “the most dangerous WMD entrepreneur,” echoing comments by U.S. President George W. Bush and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf suggesting Khan acted without authority or direction from his government. Independent analysts have said Khan could not have traded so much Pakistani know-how and technology without government sanction, and have accused the Pakistani government of trading nuclear technology for missile know-how. “For most [proliferation specialists], the mammoth scale of the diversion from KRL [Khan’s Laboratory], its extended time span, the logistics of transporting material and machines out of Pakistan, and the difficulty of circumventing the security detail surrounding senior Pakistani scientists and KRL, are obvious pointers to state complicity,” said Gaurav Kampani, a researcher with the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, in an analysis this week. Kampani said in an interview that there appears to be a new trend in proliferation involving nonstate actors, but cautioned against concluding that governments are not also involved or that state-to-state WMD proliferation has diminished. “This is new, and yet, it’s not as though the states don’t have their fingerprints in this,” he said in an interview yesterday. Jacoby expressed continued concern about state-level proliferation, citing a “linkage of North Korean, Libyan and Iranian enrichment programs to Pakistani technology.” Other Technologies The potential for biological and chemical weapons proliferation remains a concern, as does the spread of cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles, the intelligence directors said (see GSN, Feb. 26). “The numbers and capabilities of cruise missiles will increase, fueled by maturation of land-attack and antiship cruise missile programs in Europe, Russia and China; sales of complete systems; and the spread of advanced dual-use technologies and materials,” Jacoby said in his prepared statement. Terrorists also seek to acquire chemical, biological and radiological weapons, said both intelligence officials. Knowledge gained about the al-Qaeda network “continues to validate my deepest concern: that this enemy remains intent on obtaining, and using, catastrophic weapons,” Tenet said. “Although gaps in our understanding remain, we see al-Qaeda’s program to produce anthrax as one of the most immediate terrorist CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear] threats we are likely to face,” he said. Back to top       U.S. Officials Still Guided by Five-Year-Old Threat Assessment, New Book Says The Bush administration continues to use a 1999 intelligence report concluding that China, North Korea and other countries are increasing their nuclear arsenals and that terrorists are likely to use weapons of mass destruction against the United States within 20 years, according to excerpts of a new book by Washington Times reporter Rowan Scarborough. Details of the Defense Intelligence Agency’s 160-page classified assessment, “A Primer on the Future Threat,” were described for the first time in excerpts of Scarborough’s book, Rumsfeld’s War. The document was prepared during the Clinton administration to forecast terrorist, nuclear and economic dangers through 2020. The agency in 1999 believed North Korea had two to four limited-yield nuclear weapons and a WMD arsenal that included “anthrax, plague, cholera and toxins,” according to the report. By 2020, the communist nation could possess up to 10 atomic weapons, including intercontinental ballistic missiles, the DIA said. While the country’s leadership appeared unlikely to declare war to reunify the Korean Peninsula, “the possibility of conflict spurred by internal instability, miscalculation or provocation is increasing,” the report states. North Korea has come under intense international pressure to give up its nuclear weapons program, and delegates from six nations met this week for a second round of negotiations in that effort. China, one of the nations involved in the talks, could push its arsenal of long-range ICBMs from 40 to 220, the DIA report states, but there was no indication the country sought “a first-strike, war-fighting strategy,” the agency said. Longtime bitter foes Pakistan and India were expected to more than double their nuclear stockpiles with nuclear-tipped missiles, and India was expected to launch its first submarine capable of firing ballistic missiles. The report also found that Israel would maintain a nuclear arsenal of about 80 warheads (Rumsfeld’s War excerpts/Washington Times, Feb. 25).   Back to top

North Korea Nuclear Talks Expected to End Tomorrow Negotiations in Beijing are expected to conclude tomorrow, a Chinese spokesman said today, the third day of the six-nation talks. Lower-level working groups would meet in the weeks ahead in preparation for another full meeting before April 30, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Feb. 26; Ted Anthony, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, Feb. 27). After yesterday’s offer to freeze its weapons program, North Korea today blamed U.S. intransigence for the continuing impasse, according to the Washington Post. It criticized U.S. demands that the communist country relinquish all nuclear programs. “Despite our flexible position, [the United States] continues with its stale demand that we give up nuclear programs first,” said a statement issued by the North Korean Embassy in Beijing (Pan/Kessler, Washington Post, Feb. 27). China’s chief negotiator, Wang Yi, said the process was experiencing “differences, difficulties and contradictions,” the BBC reported, but a Chinese government spokeswoman added that “gaps between the various parties are gradually narrowing.” China is also pushing for a written statement to conclude the round and for further negotiations. “The Chinese side hopes to lay down the reached consensus in written form through joint efforts with the other five parties,” said Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue yesterday afternoon (BBC News, Feb. 27). Russia’s top delegate, Alexander Losyukov said that a “gap” remains in the negotiations, but that Pyongyang’s desire to maintain a “peaceful” nuclear capability was understandable, the Associated Press reported. “North Korea is not ready to drop all its nuclear programs. It’s not realistic to ask them to do it,” Losyukov said. “North Korea is ready to drop its nuclear defense program, but some countries are not satisfied with that,” he added. Japan’s Deputy Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda today questioned the notion of partial dismantlement, the Associated Press reported. “What does the peaceful use of nuclear development mean? … [It] doesn’t make sense,” he said. Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi joined the United States in demanding a full and permanent end to North Korea’s nuclear programs. Even if that happens, however, Tokyo would not provide direct energy assistance to North Korea. Japan would support other countries offering such aid, as has been discussed, but “we are currently not in a situation to do so ourselves,” Kawaguchi said (Associated Press, Feb. 27). Back to top       Secret Talks Led to Iran’s Enhanced Suspension of Uranium Enrichment Iran’s agreement to expand its suspension of uranium enrichment activities came after three days of backroom negotiations with France, Germany and the United Kingdom, Reuters reported yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 26). The agreement appeared to resolve a nagging dispute over the terms of an Iranian promise late last year to suspend uranium enrichment activities. Following that commitment, Iranian officials said they would not enrich any uranium but would continue to assemble centrifuge equipment. The United States protested that such ongoing activity did not constitute a full suspension and Iran announced Tuesday that it would end its centrifuge assembly activity next week. “It took intensive contacts on Saturday, Sunday and Monday in particular until we got full agreement of the Iranians to a total suspension including the centrifuges,” a European Union diplomatic source said. Tuesday’s announcement would probably avert a possible move by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s governing board to report the matter to the U.N. Security Council, according to Reuters. “If there had not been an agreement on total suspension, it could have moved forward to open the (U.N.) sanctions process. But this agreement will allow Iran not to go to the Security Council and maybe not even have a Board of Governors resolution at all” when it meets early next month, the EU source said. EU officials said the agreement could lead to the exchange of peaceful technology with Iran, a promise the EU had held out in October in exchange for Iran opening its nuclear activities to international oversight. “It’s the beginning of mainstreaming Iran with Europe, which I think is very important,” said a senior official in Vienna. However, the three European nations are not in complete accord, with British officials expressing more caution on Iran than their continental partners. Prime Minister Tony Blair warned that Iran would have to end its pattern of nuclear secrecy. “I want to make it very clear to the Iranian authorities that there must be complete and total compliance with the IAEA,” he said (Charbonneau/Taylor, Reuters, Feb. 26). Back to top       Israel to Monitor Nuclear Whistleblower Following April Prison Release Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon decided earlier this week that Israeli nuclear whistleblower Mordechai Vanunu should be “subjected to appropriate supervisory measures” following his release from prison to prevent him from committing “additional security offenses,” the London Independent reported today (see GSN, Jan. 5). Vanunu served 18 years in prison after giving pictures and descriptions of alleged Israeli nuclear weapons facilities to the London Sunday Times in 1986. He is set to be released on April 21, the Independent reported. According to the Independent, Israeli officials are considering banning Vanunu from leaving the country, monitoring his phone calls and supervising whom he meets with and what they discuss. Israeli security officials are concerned that Vanunu may again speak out against Israel’s long-assumed nuclear arsenal upon his release. “He may not have any new secrets, but it is sufficient that he will mount a campaign. People around the world will use him as a banner. There is no reason for us to allow this kind of provocation when we can stop it,” a senior security official said.  In a statement issued through his brother, Vanunu criticized the planned restrictions. “In the end the locks will be open,” Vanunu said. “They didn’t break me or drive me mad after all those years of isolation,” he added (Eric Silver, London Independent, Feb. 27). Back to top       Pakistan May Have Conducted Joint Nuclear Test With North Korea in 1998 The reported confession by top Pakistani nuclear weapons scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, in which he admitted to having transferred nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea, has renewed speculation that Pakistan might have tested nuclear weapon with North Korea in the late 1990s, the New York Times reported today (see GSN, Feb. 24). After the last of a series of nuclear weapons tests conducted by Pakistan in May 1998, a U.S. military jet dispatched to sample the air over the test site detected traces of plutonium, according to current and former U.S. intelligence officials. The finding surprised experts at the Los Alamos National Laboratory because Pakistan had said that all of its nuclear weapons used enriched uranium, according to the Times. Analysts believed at the time that Pakistan did not have enough material or experience to develop a plutonium-based nuclear weapon on its own. Some suggested that North Korea might have provided Pakistan with plutonium to conduct a joint nuclear weapons test, the Times reported.  “It could only have come from one of two places: China or North Korea,” said one senior intelligence official involved in the debate. “And it seemed like China had nothing to gain” from providing plutonium to Pakistan, the official said. There was no “compelling evidence” at that time, though of a joint Pakistani-North Korean test, a senior defense official in the Clinton administration said (Sanger/Broad, New York Times, Feb. 27). Back to top       U.S. Plans Visit to Malaysia to Encourage Nonproliferation Measures A high-ranking U.S. State Department official will soon visit Malaysia to discuss nuclear proliferation in light of recent revelations that a Malaysian firm machined nuclear equipment that was distributed by a smuggling network, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, Feb. 25). Officials said that U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John Wolf would visit the South Asian nation to persuade its leaders to tighten export controls on dual-use components. Sri Lankan businessman Buhary Syed Abu Tahir is believed to have contracted with Scomi Precision Engineering of Malaysia to build parts that were to be used in centrifuges to enrich uranium. Tahir is the suspected middleman in the now-defunct international network led by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, according to AP. Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi’s son is a part owner of the company. Authorities said the company believed it was making parts for the oil-and-gas industry (Patrick McDowell, Associated Press, Feb. 27). Back to top       South Asia at Risk From Nuclear, Radiological Terrorism, Report Says By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The large amount of radioactive material used India and Pakistan have led to concerns of a possible radiological, or even nuclear, terrorist incident in the region, according to a report released this month by the Henry L. Stimson Center. While there has long been concern over the possible results of an intentional nuclear exchange between rivals India and Pakistan, the report also warns of the possibility of a terrorist incident in the region involving either crude nuclear weapons or “dirty bombs,” which use conventional explosives to spread radioactive materials. In their report, Kishore Kuchibhotla, a Harvard University doctoral student, and Matthew McKinzie, an analyst at the Natural Resources Defense Council, applied computer-modeling software to examine scenarios including a dirty bomb attack and a crude nuclear weapon attack on a major Indian or Pakistani city. “These … events, none of which involve the deliberate use of nuclear assets by India or Pakistan, could have horrific consequences ranging from the significant loss of life and long-lasting contamination to a crossing of the nuclear threshold — especially if the event occurred during a crisis,” the report says. Late last month, experts told U.S. lawmakers that the United States should do more to help India and Pakistan secure stockpiles of nuclear weapons materials and radioactive material used for civilian purposes (see GSN, Jan. 29). “I think we can work together with India and Pakistan, because we all have this common problem of nuclear terrorism,” said Stimson Center founding president Michael Krepon, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Radiological Terrorism According to the report, radioactive materials used for a variety of purposes in both India and Pakistan are kept under “sometimes deficient” security. Over the past several years, there have been 25 reports of missing radioactive materials in India; the material was never recovered in 13 cases, the report says.   It adds that comparative numbers for Pakistan are not available. The report examines three possible dirty bomb scenarios in Karachi and New Delhi. In what the report calls a “worst-case” scenario, the detonation of a dirty bomb made with 200 grams of cobalt 60 in Karachi would result in high levels of radiation exposure to those near the site of the blast and widespread radioactive contamination. Such an attack on Karachi “would be a national catastrophe,” the report says. “Because of Karachi’s strategic location as the key port of entry for Pakistan, this … attack would have massive ramifications for Pakistan’s economic security,” it adds. The report also examines the possible results of a smaller, and “more plausible,” dirty bomb attack on New Delhi involving a weapon made with 9 grams of cobalt 60 — equivalent to the weight of two paper clips. According to the report, the casualties from such an attack would likely result more from the conventional explosives used in the dirty bomb than from the radioactive materials. In addition, an area the size of about 33 city blocks would be contaminated with radiation, the report says. In a third scenario, according to the report, terrorists detonate a dirty bomb made with 17 grams of cesium 137 in Karachi. While “in the short term,” there would be few deaths from such an attack, the report says, the resultant psychological and economic effects could “halt Pakistan’s economic growth and place the region in turmoil.” Nuclear Terrorism The report also examines two scenarios in which terrorists detonate a crude nuclear weapon in Mumbai and Islamabad. While a nuclear terrorism incident is less likely to occur than a dirty bomb attack because of the increased difficulty in obtaining the needed materials and expertise, “the possibility of nuclear terrorism using HEU [highly enriched uranium] or plutonium cannot be discounted in South Asia or elsewhere,” the report says. “Given the existence of nuclear trafficking routes near South Asia, the possibility exists that fissile material could reach an Indian or Pakistani city,” it adds. Detonation of a 5-kiloton nuclear weapon in Mumbai would result in 95,000 casualties from the blast itself and additional 800,000 fallout casualties, the report states. A similar detonation in Islamabad would result in about 115,000 blast casualties and 400,000 fallout casualties, it adds.  “Our simulations suggest that even a low-yield nuclear weapon detonated by a terrorist would produce devastating physical and economic damage that could cripple a major metropolitan area in either India or Pakistan,” it says.   Back to top       Russia to Deploy New Missiles By End of Decade, Senior Military Officer Says Russia’s strategic forces will receive new ballistic missiles by the end of the decade, Col.-Gen. Yuri Baluyevsky, senior deputy chief of the Russian general staff, said in an interview published yesterday in the Russkii Kurier (see GSN, Feb. 19). The planned missiles will have increased maneuverability, “with regard to altitude and course,” to counteract missile defense systems, Baluyevsky said. He said that experiments conducted during a recent Russian strategic forces exercise confirmed that Russia would have weapons capable of defeating missile defense systems. Baluyevsky also said that Russia has no plans to develop its own large-scale missile defense system. “This is not our way. First and foremost, because it is much too expensive,” Baluyevsky said. He said, however, that Russia is not opposed to missile defense in general. “At the same time, we are opposed to missile defense systems that may pose a threat to Russia or devalue its arsenals,” Baluyevsky said. During the interview, Baluyevsky said the strategic exercise “confirmed the reliability of combat control systems and missile systems.” He also discussed two apparently failed ballistic missile tests that occurred during the exercise, saying that Russian submarines conducted both “simulated and actual” missile launches. One apparently failed test, which involved the failure of two missiles to launch at all, was defended as a planned, and successful, “virtual” launch. The second failure, in which an SS-N-23 missile veered off course after being fired from the submarine Karelia, will be investigated, Baluyevsky said. He defended the missile’s past performance. “Unless I’m mistaken, there has only been one aborted launch of this type of missile out of 36 launches executed since 1992,” Baluyevsky said (Vitaly Strugovets, Russkii Kurier, Feb. 26). Back to top       U.S. Plans to Resume Enriched Uranium Processing Are Long Overdue, Study Finds The resumption of U.S. uranium processing at the Y-12 nuclear weapons plant in Oak Ridge, Tenn., is five years behind schedule and $300 million over budget, according to an Energy Department audit released yesterday, the Washington Post reported. The only U.S. facility capable of recovering and purifying highly enriched uranium for warheads may be at least three years away from full operation, according to the department’s inspector general. The Y-12 uranium processing operation closed in 1994 following an accidental release of hydrogen fluoride. The program was initially expected to restart in December 1998 and cost $119 million. “As a result [of delays], the enriched uranium operations necessary for national security are not available to meet future mission needs,” the inspector general’s office announced (Duncan Mansfield, Associated Press/San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 27). Back to top

Cult Leader Sentenced to Hang for 1995 Sarin Attack in Japan A Japanese court today sentenced Aum Shinrikyo cult leader Shoko Asahara to death after convicting him of orchestrating a 1995 sarin attack on the Tokyo subway and other murders, according to the Associated Press (see GSN, Feb. 23). Asahara was also found guilty of ordering Aum members to produce and stockpile arsenals of chemical and conventional weapons, AP reported. Asahara is the 12th Aum member to be sentenced to hang in connection with the 1995 attack that killed 12 and sickened thousands. Lead defense attorney Osamu Watanabe said Asahara’s defense team immediately appealed the guilty verdict on the basis that prosecutors ignored testimony showing Asahara was not behind the crimes (Mari Yamaguchi, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, Feb. 27). The 1995 sarin attack, along with one conducted a year earlier by the cult, prompted the Japanese government to review and improve its antiterrorism measures, Defense Agency Director-General Shigeru Ishiba said today. “Sarin, a weapons of mass destruction, was used for the indiscriminate terror in Japan. It has a significant meaning,” he said (Kyodo News Service/BBC Monitoring, Feb. 27).      Back to top

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