The International Atomic Energy Agency has found strong evidence in recent weeks that a container of uranium hexafluoride surrendered by Libya this year originated in North Korea, the New York Times reported today (see GSN, May 21). Basing their conclusions on interviews with members of Abdul Qadeer Khan’s underground nuclear network, inspectors discovered evidence that North Korea secretly provided Libya with nearly 2 tons of uranium in early 2001, according to U.S. officials and European diplomats familiar with the intelligence. The cask was sent to the United States by Libya earlier this year as part of Col. Muammar Qadhafi’s agreement to dismantle his nuclear and other WMD programs. At the time, U.S. officials identified Pakistan as the probable source of the materials. The uranium could not be used as nuclear fuel unless it was enriched in centrifuges, which Libya was constructing as part of a $100 million program to purchase equipment from the Khan network. If enriched, the 2 tons could have produced a single nuclear weapon, experts said. North Korea has mines that the Federation of American Scientists has described as “4 million tons of exploitable high-quality uranium.” The IAEA discovery suggests that the communist nation has become a supplier of nuclear technology, the Times reported. Intelligence agencies worldwide are exploring whether North Korea made similar sales to other countries or perhaps even to terrorist organizations, according to the Times. “The North Koreans have been selling missiles for years to many countries,” one senior Bush administration official said recently, referring to the country’s sales to Iran, Syria, Egypt, Pakistan and other nations. “Now, we have to look at their trading network in a very different context, to see if something much worse was happening as well,” the official added. IAEA officials hope to confirm the finding with the North Koreans, but since inspectors were evicted on Dec. 31, 2002, there has been minimal contact with the reclusive Pyongyang government (Sanger/Broad, New York Times, May 22). Meanwhile, U.N. envoy Maurice Strong, who returned from North Korea Saturday from a visit on behalf of Secretary General Kofi Annan, said Pyongyang has vowed to move forward with its nuclear programs until it receives security guarantees from the United States, the Associated Press reported. “They look at their nuclear weapons as the best guarantee they have against a threat that they perceive from the United States,” Strong said. “They are going to continue, they say, to develop that capability until there is a security guarantee that they can rely on,” he added (Joe McDonald, Associated Press/San Diego Tribune, May 22). Elsewhere, Russia called for security guarantees and economic aid to North Korea ahead of talks tonight with visiting South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon, ITAR-Tass reported. Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Yakovenko said Russia calls for “security guarantees and economic assistance to North Korea with the aim of improving the situation in the Korean Peninsula.” Yakovenko added that Moscow attaches economic and political importance to the trilateral business partnership of Russia, South Korea and North Korea (Valery Agarkov, ITAR-Tass, May 24). Meanwhile, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi said Saturday after a 90-minute meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il that Kim was prepared to solve the nuclear standoff through the six-party talks, Agence France-Presse reported. “Chairman Kim Jong Il said he aimed to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula,” Koizumi said. “He said he wanted to make efforts towards a peaceful solution by utilizing the six-way talks,” he added. Koizumi said he offered North Korea 250,000 tons of rice and $10 million worth of medical supplies as humanitarian aid (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, May 22).
By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The United States must do more to quickly secure stockpiles of nuclear weapons and fissile materials in Russia and other countries to prevent them from falling into the hands of terrorists, according to a report released today by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (see GSN, May 14). In the two years following the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, less nuclear material was adequately secured against potential terrorists than the amount secured in the two years prior to the attacks, says the report, prepared by Harvard University researchers Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier. In addition, the report criticizes the Bush administration’s funding for nuclear material security efforts, noting that the budget for such efforts from fiscal 2002-2005 was about 15 percent more than the funding level from the end of the Clinton administration. Much of the increase, the report says, came from congressional action and not White House requests. “The facts are that the amount of inadequately secured bomb material in the world today is enough to make thousands of nuclear weapons; that terrorists are actively seeking to get it; and that with such material in hand, a capable and well-organized terrorist group plausibly could make, deliver and detonate at least a crude nuclear bomb capable of incinerating the heart of any major city in the world,” Bunn and Wier wrote. The report identifies three areas of concern where “urgent action” is needed to protect weapon-grade materials — Russia, research reactors in use around the world and Pakistan. While noting the improved economic and security situation in Russia, the report warns that weapon-grade material there still remains vulnerable to would-be terrorists. Bunn and Wier cite Russian media reports that the Chechen militants who seized a Moscow theater and hundreds of hostages in October 2002 had initially considered capturing a Moscow site that possessed highly enriched uranium. The report also warns of continued security problems at Russian nuclear sites, noting a security manager at the Seversk nuclear material processing facility who reported that guards there regularly conduct patrols without ammunition in their guns to prevent accidental firings. According to the report, U.S.-funded security and accounting upgrades were conducted on 35 tons of Russian nuclear material in fiscal 2003. That amount represents only 6 percent of the estimated 600 tons of vulnerable Russian material, the report says, adding that at the pace of 35 tons per year, it will take 13 years from now to complete security upgrades on all vulnerable materials within the former Soviet Union. “Until that time, the world is relying, without transparency or confidence, on whatever security improvements Russia is able to afford on its own,” the report says. In addition to nuclear materials in Russia, about 20 metric tons of highly enriched uranium is used as fuel in civilian research reactors around the world, according to the report. Warning of relatively low security at many facilities, the report says that research reactor fuel elements are small enough to be easily stolen by terrorists and that information on extracting uranium from the fuel elements is available in open literature (see GSN, April 15). Concerns surrounding Pakistan, according to the report, are based less on the security of its guarded nuclear facilities than on the “very, very high” threat posed by both nuclear personnel who may be sympathetic to radical Islamic militants and by remnants of al-Qaeda and the Taliban operating within the country. As an example of the insider threat, the report notes top Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, who was highly respected for his role as the “father” of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and who confessed earlier this year to transferring nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea. RecommendationsIn their report, Bunn and Wier called for “sustained presidential leadership” to help quickly and effectively secure stockpiles of nuclear materials. The report calls on U.S. President George W. Bush to issue a new presidential directive that would label the securing of nuclear material worldwide as a top national priority and would set targets of securing all nuclear weapons and fissile materials in the former Soviet Union within four years and worldwide within six years. In addition, Bush should launch a “global cleanout” program to quickly remove weapon-grade materials from the most vulnerable sites around the world and should appoint a senior high-level official “with full-time responsibility” to oversee all nuclear material security efforts. Already, some action has been taken on the report’s recommendation of a “global cleanout” program. The U.S. Senate voted last week to amend the fiscal 2005 defense authorization bill that would authorize funding for such a program. A set of new nuclear nonproliferation measures expected to be announced this week by U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham is also anticipated to include a cleanout program (see GSN, May 20). The report also calls on Russian President Vladimir Putin to implement several necessary measures, such as enshrining nuclear material security as part of Russia’s national security policy, appointing a senior-level official to oversee nuclear material security efforts, assigning adequate funding resources and working to eliminate bureaucratic obstacles to U.S.-Russian security cooperation (see GSN, May 10). The report also envisions a role for the remainder of the Group of Eight economic powers, which in 2002 initiated the Global Partnership to pledge $20 billion over 10 years for nonproliferation efforts, primarily in Russia. The G-8, which consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, should use a summit set to be held next month in the United States to expand the Global Partnership to secure nuclear material stockpiles wherever they may be located in the world, the report says (see GSN, April 27). In a telephone interview today, Bunn told Global Security Newswire that the three most essential recommendations were the fast elimination of vulnerable stockpiles of nuclear materials, Russian presidential-level efforts to improve cooperation with the United States and the creation of new partnerships with other countries to address materials not in Russia or covered by a global cleanout program. While both Bush and Putin are “genuinely concerned” about the possibility of terrorists obtaining nuclear weapons, many policy-makers around the world hold to a set of “myths” as to how terrorists might acquire nuclear weapons, Bunn said. For example, Bush has suggested in public statements that the main way terrorists might obtain a nuclear weapons is through a rogue state, Bunn said. The report illustrates that terrorists are more likely to obtain such weapons through a failure by states to adequately protect warheads and materials. [EDITOR’S NOTE: The Nuclear Threat Initiative is the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by National Journal Group.]
The United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency are debating U.S. intentions to remove more than 500 tons of uranium from Iraq, the New York Times reported Saturday (see GSN, Aug. 7, 2003). The United States has informed the agency of its plans to remove the uranium, stored at the Tuwaitha nuclear complex south of Baghdad, to a location outside of Iraq, Western diplomats said. The material includes 500 tons of slightly processed uranium ore called yellowcake and about 2 tons of low-enriched uranium, according to the Times. None of the uranium has been enriched to the point where it could be used in a nuclear weapon. If moved, the material would probably be transported to a secure repository within the United States, according to nuclear experts. An official with the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad confirmed that a proposal to remove the uranium was under consideration, according to the Times. “The story I’ve heard is that no decision has been made as yet,” the official said. “That was some months ago. When it was discussed, the view was that it was just too expensive to ship. I doubt that anything has changed,” the official added. The International Atomic Energy Agency, however, views the uranium as Iraqi property and believes that the agency cannot give permission for its removal from the country, a diplomat said. The diplomat also said that the United States was likely to move ahead with the plan regardless of the IAEA position, adding that U.S. officials discussed the proposal earlier this year with the agency before increased instability occurred in Iraq. “I think that if the stuff had not gone up in intensity … they would already have moved on this,” the diplomat said (James Glanz, New York Times, May 22).
Iran delivered a lengthy report on its nuclear activities Friday to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the nuclear watchdog announced (see GSN, May 21). The report is an essential component of the agency’s inspections and evaluation process in advance of a meeting next month in which it will hand down its latest assessment of Iran’s nuclear activities, according to the Associated Press. The agency will assess the “correctness and completeness” of the materials turned over by Iran, and IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei is set to deliver a report to the organization’s board of governors at its June 14 meeting, IAEA spokesman Mark Gwozdecky said (Associated Press/Columbia Daily Tribune, May 23). Diplomats said the report was delivered too late for the agency to fully analyze the 1,000-page document prior to the meeting, according to Agence France-Presse. One diplomat explained that the technical analyses and follow-up tests necessary to verify the materials could take between six months and one year (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, May 22). Elsewhere, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi warned that a breakdown in cooperation over the nuclear issue could harm the agency and European Union, Agence France-Presse reported. “The European side has not forgotten its commitments towards Iran’s nuclear case, this is a common project, that is, if Iran fails, the EU and the IAEA will suffer losses as well,” Kharazi was quoted as saying by the Iranian student news agency ISNA today. During a visit in October to Iran by British, French and German foreign ministers, Tehran promised full transparency and cooperation with the nuclear agency. In exchange, Iranian officials have said they expect the European Union to oppose U.S. pressure to take Iran’s case to the U.N. Security Council, according to Agence France-Presse. “We intend to show our transparency and goodwill by handing in this 1,000 page report, and gradually everyone will realize that Iran means to use the nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and has no secret plans,” Kharazi said (Agence France-Presse/SpaceWar.com, May 24).
By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — Pakistan hopes the new Indian government led by the Congress party will continue with a peace dialogue orchestrated by former Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan’s foreign minister said Friday (see GSN, May 18). In January, Musharraf and Vajpayee announced the launch of a joint dialogue intended to resolve several outstanding issues between the two nuclear-armed rivals, including the disputed region of Kashmir. Earlier this month, though, Vajpayee’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was defeated by the Congress party in national parliamentary elections. As a result, Vajpayee stepped down as prime minister and the position has been filled by Manmohan Singh. The change in Indian leadership has affected India and Pakistan’s plans to hold this week talks on nuclear confidence-building measures, according to reports. The Gulf News reported today that India delayed the talks because an external affairs minister has yet to be named. During remarks Friday at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, Pakistani Foreign Minister Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri said that he hoped the Congress party would continue with the peace dialogue established by its predecessor. So far, the new Indian government has made “promising statements” regarding the dialogue, Kasuri said. In a brief reply to written questions posed by Global Security Newswire soon after the Indian elections, the Indian Embassy in Washington said the Congress party had made clear its desire to pursue strong relations with Pakistan. “There is consensus on major foreign policy issues … so I think the rest of the world need not have any anxiety about India at all,” an embassy spokesman said. Kasuri on Friday also called on the BJP, which retains a sizable presence in the Indian Parliament, to not establish “roadblocks” to the dialogue. He added, though, that senior Indian officials had indicated that the party remained committed to the dialogue. In a telephone interview with GSN earlier this month, Michael Krepon, founding president of the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, speculated that the BJP could change its stance on the dialogue if the new government was seen to be making progress. In a prepared text distributed after his remarks Friday, Kasuri said that the dialogue must move beyond the issue of nuclear risk reduction to address “the real issues” between the two countries, primarily Kashmir. “We must realize that CBMs are not an end in themselves,” Kasuri said in his prepared statement. Krepon told GSN, though, that Pakistan has indicated a willingness to relax its past policy of requiring progress on Kashmir before agreeing to implement nuclear risk reduction measures. The change in Islamabad’s position, he said, resulted from the scandal surrounding the nuclear proliferation activities of top Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. The Khan scandal has forced Pakistan to demonstrate that it is “responsible concerning nuclear issues,” Krepon said.
U.S. authorities contend that the case of Asher Karni, an Israeli businessman accused of trying to sell nuclear components to an associate in Pakistan, offers insight into the international network of nuclear trafficking, the Los Angeles Times reported today (see GSN, Feb. 20). “There are Iranian networks, Chinese networks, Middle East networks, sophisticated networks buying technology and parts all over the world,” said a senior official at the U.S. Homeland Security Department. “They’re operating in the United States every day. Some of them are family businesses, where fathers pass it on to their sons,” the official added. Officials said the Karni case is an example of what they believe is an international network of entrepreneurs, transporters, scientists, manufacturers, government agents, organized-crime syndicates and possibly terrorists, the Times reported. One network was discovered early this year when Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan confessed to selling nuclear weapons programs to Iran, Libya and North Korea (see GSN, Jan. 28). “This is another piece in the global puzzle of suppliers and buyers, middlemen and [front companies] all over the planet,” said Representative Christopher Cox (R-Calif.), chairman of the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, who added that he was not commenting on Karni’s guilt or innocence. “The problem was hardly created on Sept. 11. But the stark reality of it and the unspeakable consequences of it have now gripped policy-makers,” he added. Karni is suspected of trying to ship to Pakistan up to 200 triggered spark gaps, dual-use items that could be used as nuclear detonators. He is charged with violating the federal Export Control Act and other laws; federal authorities have kept Karni in custody since his arrest, arguing that he is a flight risk and a national security threat. He faces a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison (Josh Meyer, Los Angeles Times, May 24).
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