An IAEA report circulated last week has revealed new details of the nuclear program once pursued by Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qadhafi (AFP Photo/Fethi Belaid). IAEA Hails Libyan Cooperation but Airs Doubts on Weapon Work By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The U.N. nuclear watchdog in a report Friday praised Libya for its recent cooperation with investigators working to piece together a complex, 20-year-old secret nuclear program they now believe was almost entirely dependent on foreign help (see GSN, May 26)...Full Story

Iran Warns IAEA that Cooperation is Conditional Iran again warned the International Atomic Energy Agency that Tehran could end its cooperation with the agency if it is pushed too hard about its nuclear program, Agence France-Presse reported Sunday (see GSN, May 28)...Full Story

U.S. to Expand Scope of Proliferation Security Initiative; Russia Signs On U.S. President George W. Bush said today that he planned to expand a U.S.-led multilateral effort to interdict shipments of WMD-related cargo to target financiers involved in WMD proliferation, according to Reuters (see GSN, May 28)...Full Story

	Tuesday, June 1, 2004

U.S. to Expand Scope of Proliferation Security Initiative; Russia Signs On U.S. President George W. Bush said today that he planned to expand a U.S.-led multilateral effort to interdict shipments of WMD-related cargo to target financiers involved in WMD proliferation, according to Reuters (see GSN, May 28). Bush outlined his plan for the Proliferation Security Initiative during a videotaped speech broadcast during a meeting in the Polish city of Krakow to mark the one-year anniversary of the initiative. “I proposed to expand the work of the PSI beyond the interdictions of shipments to disrupt and bring to justice the middlemen and financiers that enable this dangerous trade,” Bush said. U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton told Reuters that to stem proliferation, “you have to go after the complete life-cycle of WMD, beginning with the laboratories where it is developed, manufacturing, financial and shipment networks” (Wojciech Moskwa, Reuters/Yahoo!News, June 1). Meanwhile, Russia yesterday joined the initiative, according to Reuters (see GSN, May 21). “The threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is global and accordingly requires a global response,” the Russian Foreign Ministry said in a statement. “We are sure that we can cope with the problem only through a collective effort,” it added. Russia would only participate in the effort, though, as long as it does not violate international law or Russian domestic legislation, the ministry said. “We view the PSI as a supplement rather than replacement to the existing nonproliferation mechanisms,” the ministry said. “We assume that actions within this initiative should not and will not create obstacles to legal economic, scientific and technical cooperation,” it added. Some U.S. officials have said that Russia’s membership in the initiative could also persuade China to join, Reuters reported (Oleg Shchedrov, Reuters/Moscow Times, June 1). Bolton yesterday called Russia’s decision “a critical development.” “This is a development that the United States has been working on almost since the beginning,” he said (George Jahn, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, May 31). Back to top       Kerry to Outline Nonproliferation Strategy Today U.S. Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.), the presumptive Democratic candidate for the 2004 presidential election, is set to outline today what his advisers have said is a more aggressive nonproliferation policy than the one followed by the Bush administration, according to the Los Angeles Times (see GSN, May 28). In a speech to be given this afternoon in Florida, Kerry is expected to argue that even a small increase to the U.S. annual funding level of about $1 billion for threat reduction programs would result in significant benefits, according to the Times. In addition, Kerry is also expected to call for the appointment of a high-level official to lead threat reduction efforts, an increase in first responders to respond to WMD incidents within the United States and increased diplomatic efforts to halt suspected nuclear weapons efforts by Iran and North Korea, the Times reported (James Rainey, Los Angeles Times, June 1). In an interview Friday with the New York Times, Kerry stressed the need to secure WMD stockpiles in Russia and other former Soviet states. “I mean either this is deadly serious or it’s not. Now when you sit with any expert they’ll tell you it’s the most serious thing in the world. Well, if it is, why aren’t we treating it as if it were? And we’re not,” he said.  “I’m going to make it serious. It’s going to be the top priority,” Kerry added (New York Times, May 30). Back to top       Panel Preparing Harsh Report of Iraq Intelligence The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is preparing to release a report on the issue of prewar U.S. intelligence on Iraq that is highly critical of the CIA and its director, George Tenet, Time.com reported Saturday (see GSN, May 28). The committee last month sent a copy of its report to Tenet for declassification review. According to sources, the committee’s top two members, Chairman Pat Roberts (R-Kan.) and Senator Jay Rockefeller (D-W.Va.) conducted a secret interview of Tenet earlier this month at CIA headquarters. During the meeting Tenet reportedly would not acknowledge that he had told President George W. Bush that the prewar intelligence on Iraq’s alleged WMD efforts had been a “slam dunk,” as has been reported (Burger/Waller, Time.com, May 22).  Back to top       New Zealand to Join G8 Global Partnership, Proliferation Security Initiative New Zealand is set to support two programs designed to help stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the Xinhua News Agency reported today. “The New Zealand government has decided to join the G-8 Global Partnership and to support the Proliferation Security Initiative,” Foreign Minister Phil Goff and Minister of Disarmament and Arms Control Marian Hobbs said in a joint statement today. They also announced that New Zealand would contribute about $630,000 this year to a cooperative nonproliferation project in Russia. The Group of Eight partnership has pledged $20 billion over 10 years for nonproliferation efforts, largely in Russia. The Proliferation Security Initiative allows for greater interdiction ability of ships carrying WMD-related cargo. “New Zealand has a strong record of supporting nonproliferation objectives,” the ministers said. “Our Nuclear Free Zone Act remains a decisive contribution to the global effort by ensuring that nuclear weapons stay out of this part of the world,” they added (see GSN, May 7). The ministers said measures to end the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction must be matched by progress in disarmament and renunciation of plans to renew and refine existing arsenals by nuclear weapons states. “New Zealand will continue to champion the cause for nuclear disarmament as the only real guarantee against the risk that such weapons will spread and one day be used with catastrophic consequences,” the ministers said (Xinhua, June 1). Back to top

IAEA Hails Libyan Cooperation but Airs Doubts on Weapon Work By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The U.N. nuclear watchdog in a report Friday praised Libya for its recent cooperation with investigators working to piece together a complex, 20-year-old secret nuclear program they now believe was almost entirely dependent on foreign help (see GSN, May 26). “It reads like a smooth disarmament operation,” Brookings Institution nonproliferation expert Michael Levi said today. Reporting to its Board of Governors on Libya ahead of a meeting this month, the International Atomic Energy Agency detailed three separate Libyan bids to acquire a uranium conversion facility from abroad and provided information implying North Korea may have converted uranium ore concentrate for Libya. Sparking controversy, the agency also said a U.S.-led team was less successful than was first thought last year when it intercepted a ship bound for Libya with centrifuge components that could have been used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon program. “Libyan authorities have provided prompt, unhindered access to all locations requested by the agency and to all relevant equipment and material declared to be in Libya,” the agency told its board members, which are scheduled to begin a quarterly meeting June 14. The agency added in the report, obtained late Friday by Global Security Newswire, that Libya has “not always been able to provide supporting documents” and that investigation of the country’s claims about its programs would continue. Providing a stark contrast to its frequent, damning reports on proliferation suspect Iran, the agency expressed few doubts about claims made by Tripoli following Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qadhafi’s December 2003 renunciation of his long-secret WMD programs. The report indicated IAEA environmental sampling and other investigations have generally confirmed Libya’s portrayals of its programs. The agency expressed some doubt, however, about Libya’s claim to have done nothing of consequence with documents and drawings related to nuclear weapon design and production, which Tripoli received in recent years and which are now being kept in the United States. “Libya has [said] that although it had received these documents in late 2001 or early 2002, it did not take any steps to act on the information, nor even to assess its credibility or practical utility. This is surprising, given the substantial effort that was being devoted to uranium enrichment. It would have been logical for the Libyan authorities to review Libya’s indigenous capabilities in the necessary technical areas and to consider other resources that might be needed to make use of the nuclear weapons-related information,” the agency said. The agency also called it “practically impossible” to verify Libya’s claim that it never received such information in electronic form and did not obtain any nuclear weapon-related information other than the documents and drawings already surrendered. “Libya may not be being totally truthful on that. There’s no way they’re going to get caught if they’re lying,” Levi said of questions about weaponization.  He suggested Libya could be seeking to appear more trustworthy by claiming never to have actively pursued actual nuclear weapons. The agency said its inspections since December 2003 have “not led to the identification of specific facilities involved in nuclear weapon-component design, manufacturing or testing.” Among areas where further investigation is needed, the agency cited Libyan efforts to obtain uranium hexafluoride and enriched-uranium contamination found on gas centrifuge equipment in Libya. The IAEA said it must continue to assess Libya’s enrichment activities and must verify the country’s holdings of uranium ore concentrate. The agency provided a list of seven “corrective actions” asked of Libya by the board in March, saying that Libya has in each case provided the requested information. U.S. Disputes IAEA Report of Interdiction Failure In one disclosure that has sparked a minor controversy, the agency said a shipment of centrifuge components arrived in Libya in March after it “escaped the attention” of a U.S.-led interdiction team. A senior U.S. official told the New York Times Friday that the container “was not part of the same shipment” that the team intercepted in October of last year, as it traveled from Malaysia to Libya. The IAEA description of the events was contained in a footnote to a section of the report on Libya’s pursuit of gas centrifuges to enrich uranium, potentially enabling its use in nuclear weapons. Recent press reports, including one Saturday in the Washington Post, have indicated Libya was still waiting for such shipments of already-ordered materials well after Tripoli disclosed and renounced its WMD programs. Levi said shippers’ persistence in trying to deliver the materials to Libya could reflect a highly compartmentalized black market or a simple desire to be rid of “hot-potato” components for which countries such as the United States were searching. “To some extent, you can chalk it up to an effort to make the components of the network operate independently,” Levi said. Libya had sought centrifuges since the early 1980s with the help of a “European expert with relevant experience,” the agency said, but no proof exists that the country introduced uranium into L-1 and L-2 centrifuges it obtained. The agency said uranium traces found on L-1 centrifuges in Libya could have come from the country that supplied the equipment, adding that highly enriched uranium contamination was found on two complete L-2 centrifuges and on some other components. According to the IAEA report, Libya began importing the L-1 centrifuges in 1997, eventually conducting successful high-speed tests in 2002. Tripoli acquired two L-2 test centrifuges in 2000 from the same country that supplied the L-1 centrifuges, the agency said, and in December 2002 began taking shipment of components for an order of 10,000 L-2 centrifuges. By December 2003, a “large number of centrifuge components” had arrived, but no rotating parts were included, the agency said. The U.S.-led interception in October 2003 of the BBC China targeted components that were part of the L-2 import effort, according to the report. What countries supplied Libya with centrifuge components is still a matter of some debate, with various nations being named in press leaks by diplomats in Vienna. “Nearly all of the technology involved in Libya’s past nuclear activities was obtained from foreign sources, often through intermediaries,” the agency said Friday. Pakistani national hero Abdul Qadeer Khan, the nuclear scientist behind the recently revealed global nuclear underground, earlier this year named Libya among countries the network supplied. A senior diplomat quoted by Agence France-Presse said Saturday that a private interest in Turkey has provided some centrifuge parts to Libya and may have been the source of the shipment that arrived in March. The Associated Press reported Friday that diplomats named former Soviet countries, South Africa, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates and Malaysia as potential past supporters of Libya’s efforts. Libya Received Drawings of Uranium Conversion Technology The agency also detailed Libyan efforts beginning in 1981 to obtain a uranium conversion facility of the sort that could have been used in a program to make nuclear-bomb fuel. It said a West European company agreed that year to build a plant in Libya that would annually convert 100 metric tons of “yellowcake,” or uranium ore concentrate, into uranium tetrafluoride. The company also offered Libya a number of related facilities and provided the country with “many detailed drawings of buildings and chemical processes,” according to the IAEA report. “Neither the pilot plant nor the laboratories were built,” the agency said. In 1983, the agency said, Libya and a nuclear weapon state reached an initial agreement on construction in Libya of a facility to produce 120 metric tons yearly of uranium hexafluoride. According to Libya, the agency said, the plant was not built. It added that Tripoli “has stated that no technical plans or documents related to this project can be found in Libya.” Libya has also described to the agency a third effort in which the country in 1984 “ordered from a Far Eastern country” a modular uranium conversion facility that could have converted 30 metric tons of yellowcake per year into uranium dioxide, uranium hexafluoride or uranium metal. Parts began arriving in 1986, Libya has told the agency. The IAEA report said the facility was largely assembled in 1998 and was tested without uranium ― as confirmed by agency sampling ― in 2002. The modules are now in the United States. Levi said the details about Libya’s many options in pursuit of a conversion facility are cause for concern. “What it means is that states were able to do things 20 years ago that we didn’t even think they were able to do now. … It appears there’s been a pretty significant market since the early 1980s,” he said. North Korea May Have Converted Yellowcake for Libya As the agency indicated in its previous report on Libya (see GSN, Feb. 23), Tripoli’s efforts to obtain uranium conversion capability also included the 1985 export of a quantity of yellowcake to a nuclear weapon state for conversion into compounds that were then shipped back to Libya. In Friday’s report, the agency specified that the operation involved about 100 kilograms of yellowcake. It said Libya claims “that those uranium compounds were never used in any way.” In a revelation that appeared related to recent reports about North Korea’s role in supplying Libya’s illicit programs, the agency added Friday that Libya, “through clandestine intermediaries … also received UF6 [uranium hexafluoride] from another country: two small cylinders in September 2000 and a large cylinder in February 2001.” Libya has told the agency it originally ordered 20 metric tons of uranium hexafluoride but only ever received one large cylinder and two small cylinders containing a total of about 1,650 kilograms of the material. The New York Times reported last week that members of Khan’s network told investigators North Korea supplied a similar quantity of the uranium hexafluoride to Libya. The agency said its testing indicated that one of the small cylinders contained natural uranium and the other contained depleted uranium. Back to top       Iran Warns IAEA that Cooperation is Conditional Iran again warned the International Atomic Energy Agency that Tehran could end its cooperation with the agency if it is pushed too hard about its nuclear program, Agence France-Presse reported Sunday (see GSN, May 28). “Iran is still bound by its commitments,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi said Sunday. “There is no sign from our side that we will question our cooperation, but the agency should not create an atmosphere that pushes our leadership to doubt this cooperation,” he added. The ministry’s comments came two weeks before the agency’s board meets to review Iran’s dossier amid ongoing suspicions that the country is building a military nuclear program under the guise of a civilian nuclear power effort. “We have shown the greatest cooperation with inspectors and have placed no restrictions on their work,” Asefi said. “We have nothing to hide," he added. Asefi said Iranian leaders hoped that the agency would examine Iran’s case at its meeting “without politicizing it and so that the dossier can be closed as soon as possible.” “There is pressure on the agency,” he added, referring to the United States, “but if the (IAEA) board of governors works diligently, there is no reason why the dossier should not be closed.” Asefi also warned European countries that Iran would not continue cooperating with them if France, Germany and the United Kingdom do not counter U.S. pressure on the agency. “If the Europeans do not keep their promises, we see no reason to continue cooperating with them,” he warned. On Thursday, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami repeated warnings that Iran could resume uranium enrichment if the agency gives in to pressure from the United States. Asefi said the Khatami’s comments “do not signify Iran will disengage” from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (Agence France-Presse/SpaceWar, May 30). However, Iran’s newly convened parliament, now controlled by hard-liners, would consider pulling the Islamic republic out of the treaty, Agence France-Presse reported today. “If the IAEA again acts in the way that the Americans want and if the big powers use the Nonproliferation Treaty to pressure Iran, parliament will examine leaving the NPT,” parliament members Ali Abaspour and Hossein Nejabat told the hard-line Jomhuri Islami newspaper (Agence France-Presse/IranMania, June 1). Meanwhile, IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei said today his inspectors had found no clear evidence that Iran’s nuclear program is being developed for military purposes. “The jury is out on whether the program has been dedicated exclusively for peaceful purposes or if it has some military dimension,” ElBaradei said. “We haven’t seen concrete proof of a military program so it’s premature to make a judgment on that,” he added. The agency has previously said that seven out of 13 Iranian sites involved in manufacturing centrifuges that can enrich uranium for use in nuclear power plants, or weapons, were on military sites, Reuters reported (Alan Crosby, Reuters, June 1). Back to top       Malaysia Arrests Nuclear-Linked Businessman Malaysia arrested a businessman allegedly involved in the international nuclear network led by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Associated Press reported Saturday (see GSN, March 2). Deputy Internal Security Minister Noh Omar said Buhary Syed Abu Tahir, a Sri Lankan citizen with permanent Malaysian residency, was arrested Friday because “he was involved in activities that were illegal at the international level … by involving himself in an illicit international network of nuclear proliferation,” the Associated Press reported. Noh went on to explain that Tahir used Malaysia as an “illegal base” to organize the manufacture of centrifuge parts for Libya’s now-defunct nuclear weapons program. Tahir also brought Libyan nuclear technicians to Malaysia for training, Noh said. “These actions undermined Malaysia’s security and economy, it exposed the country to possible threats of attack by the big powers and economic sanctions,” Noh said. Tahir, who is being held at the Kamunting prison camp, was arrested under a colonial-era law known as the Internal Security Act, which allows indefinite detention without trial, according to the Associated Press (Rohan Sullivan, Associated Press/HiPakistan, May 29). Meanwhile, human rights activists in Malaysia questioned whether Tahir was being used as a scapegoat, arguing that authorities should investigate whether “important persons,” such as the prime minister’s son, were involved in nuclear arms sales. “We question if the detention of Tahir … is an attempt by the government to cover up other important persons in the scandal of nuclear weapons from being exposed,” activist Syed Ibrahim Syed Noh said in a news conference yesterday (Sean Yoong, Associated Press, May 31). Back to top       Illegal Uranium Mining Continues in Congo Despite a government ban, illegal mining continues in a section of the Democratic Republic of the Congo that contains uranium ore, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, March 25). In February, Congolese President Joseph Kabila ordered the closure of the Shinkolobwe mines, near the city of Likasi in the southeastern section of the country. The government has not enforced the ban, and thousands of freelance miners continue to work to excavate high-grade cobalt, and inadvertently, uranium ore, AP reported. “They’re digging as fast as they can dig, and everyone is buying it," said mining engineer John Skinner in Likasi. “The problem is that nobody knows where it’s all going. There is no control,” he said.  The United States said in March that there had not been any “worrisome movement” of uranium ore out of the Shinkolobwe mines, and some experts have said that the small quantity of uranium being extracted is not enough to attract terrorists seeking to develop nuclear or radiological weapons. Even so, some proliferation experts have expressed concern about the illegal mining, AP reported. “It’s a whole other problem when governments can’t control what happens on their own land,” said Michael Levi, a science and technology fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington. The United States has recently sent experts to investigate the Shinkolobwe mine, according to the Associated Press. In addition, the International Atomic Energy Agency also offered to inspect the mine, but the Congolese government has not accepted the offer (Todd Pitman, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, June 1). Back to top       IAEA Praises U.S. Plan to Recover Nuclear Materials The International Atomic Energy Agency last week praised the launch of the U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which seeks to recover U.S.- and Russian-origin fresh and spent highly enriched uranium fuel from research reactors around the world (see GSN, May 27). “The proposal is a continuation and extension of initiatives that the IAEA, the USA and others have been working on for many years, and with renewed intensity in the past couple of years, to address nuclear security around the world,” IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said in a prepared statement. Under the initiative, the United States plans to work with other countries and the agency to repatriate all Russian-origin fresh reactor fuel by the end of the year, and all Russian-origin spent fuel by 2010. In addition, the United States would also seek to recover all U.S.-origin spent research reactor fuel and to convert research reactors to use low-enriched uranium fuel (IAEA release, May 27). Back to top       Russia Disposes of Ballistic Missile Launcher Russia has begun the disposal of another rail-mounted ballistic missile launcher, Interfax reported yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 11). The work is being carried out at the Bryansk central repair facility, and the process is being monitored by U.S. inspectors to confirm that the launcher is destroyed according to procedures set out by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, a Defense Ministry source said (Interfax, May 31). Back to top       Tighter Security Planned for Nuclear Weapons Plant The Y-12 nuclear weapons plant in Tennessee is bolstering security after having been criticized recently for security lapses, the Knoxville News Sentinel reported today (see GSN, May 7). Contractors are adding guards and installing equipment such as iris scanners at Y-12, according to plant general manager Dennis Ruddy. The number of armed guards, many of them with special terrorism training, now exceeds 400, he said. “We’ve added a lot of guards in a lot of different posts,” Ruddy said. “The details of that we’re obviously not at liberty to discuss. But the fact of the matter is we’ve redeployed our people around the plant.” Y-12 visitors now must register at an off-site location. At the main entrance, they must drive under low-hanging bars, intended to restrict traffic only to cars. Cars are subject to random searches, and trucks and other large vehicles must use another entrance, where they are searched and scanned, Ruddy said. “We do 100-percent inspection,” he said. “That’s related to the size of the vehicle and what can be hidden there versus what could be hidden in a passenger car,” Ruddy added. In a policy speech last month, Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham announced plans for tighter security at nuclear facilities, possibly even federalizing the guard force. Abraham singled out Y-12 for security improvements (Frank Munger, Knoxville News Sentinel, June 1). Back to top

Czech Forces Train Greek Unit for Olympic Security Greek army specialists are scheduled to receive training this week in the Czech Republic to prepare for potential chemical and biological attacks on the Olympic Games to be held this summer in Athens, Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, May 25). The 24 soldiers who arrived yesterday are the first of two groups of Greek chemical and medical specialists due to attend a weeklong training course in Prague. Another 24 troops are set to arrive on July 7. The soldiers are to work directly with toxic materials including sarin, soman, VX and mustard gas. They are to learn how to detect and identify such substances and to decontaminate affected areas. Protection of the Olympic Games is expected to be the priority for the Greek unit made up of chemical and medical specialists from the Greek naval, air and ground forces, said Lt. Col. Nasos Konstantinov, unit commander. The NATO battalion for chemical warfare, which largely consists of Czech experts, might also help safeguard the games (Agence France-Presse/Herald Sun, May 31). Back to top       Russia Destroys 50 Tons of Lewisite Russia has destroyed about 50 tons of lewisite stored at its chemical weapons disposal plant near the town of Gorny, ITAR-Tass reported yesterday (see GSN, April 30). The 50 tons of lewisite represents a quarter of the agent stored at the facility, according to ITAR-Tass. The plant plans to halt chemical weapons disposal activities in June and July for maintenance, a plant representative said (ITAR-Tass, May 31). Back to top       Concerns Increase Over U.S. Chemical Facilities The United States has more than 100 chemical facilities where an accident or terrorist attack could put more than 1 million people at risk, the Boston Globe reported today (see GSN, April 30). As officials warn that al-Qaeda is poised to strike the United States again, huge tanks of concentrated deadly gases that the chemical industry stores near densely populated areas are “prepositioned weapons of mass destruction,” watchdogs said. However, proposals to reduce that risk by requiring the use of alternative chemicals or rerouting hazardous tankers around urban areas have faltered. Laws regulating chemical plants remain the same as before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, the Globe said. Government is not up to the task of promoting “inherently safer” approaches, according to the American Chemistry Council, the main lobbying arm of the chemical industry. Such an effort could have unintended consequences, the organization argues. For example, requiring plants to keep fewer toxic chemicals on site might mean more delivery trips and thus a greater risk of accidents. In 2002, Senator Jon Corzine (D-N.J.), introduced a bill that would have required chemical plants to submit security plans to the Environmental Protection Agency. The bill unanimously passed out of committee in July 2002, but died on the Senate floor. Corzine reintroduced the bill in 2003, switching the regulator from the EPA to Homeland Security, only to see his proposal stall again. Meanwhile, Senator James Inhofe (R-Okla.), introduced a rival measure that passed out of committee last fall. It focuses almost exclusively on mandating that firms assess their own perimeter security, according to the Globe. However, few give even this bill much chance of becoming law before the end of this year’s session (Charlie Savage, Boston Globe, June 1). Back to top

Pakistan Tests Nuclear-Capable Ballistic Missile Pakistan conducted a successful test Saturday of its Ghauri nuclear-capable ballistic missile, according to Reuters (see GSN, May 21). Pakistani Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali observed the test of the 1,500-kilometer-range missile, also called the Hatf-5, according to the military. “The prime minister made it clear that Pakistan’s edge over its adversaries in the strategic field will be maintained at all costs,” the Pakistani military said in a statement. “(The) government will provide necessary resources to maintain the quality of the nation’s defense,” it added. An Indian Defense Ministry official said the test had been expected, Reuters reported (Zeeshan Haider, Reuters/Yahoo!News, May 29). Indian Home Minister Shivraj Patil yesterday, though, said the test escalated military tensions in the region. “It is escalating the arms race,” Patil said. “Our policy is to strengthen our country. ... We have to take note of it and have to do what we should do,” he added (Associated Press/The Star, May 30). Pakistan yesterday denied that the test was linked to the recent change in the Indian government following parliamentary elections, according to Agence France-Presse. “The timing of the test was coincidental,” said Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman Masood Khan. “It was not intentional or deliberate in the sense that the test was conducted after the new government in Delhi took over and after the political transition in India,” he added (Agence France-Presse/SpaceWar.com, May 31).   Back to top

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