The British Trident submarine HMS Victorious. An extension to a U.S.-British nuclear cooperation agreement was signed in June and, absent congressional intervention, will take effect shortly (AFP photo). U.S.-British Nuclear Agreement Heads Toward 10-Year Extension Despite Concerns on Pact By Chris Schneidmiller Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The agreement between the United States and United Kingdom to share nuclear weapons information and technology appears set to be quietly extended for another decade, despite some critics’ concerns that it undermines nonproliferation efforts focused on countries such as Iran and North Korea (see GSN, Aug. 8, 2003)...Full Story

Experts Say Civilian Smallpox Shots Not Needed By Marina Malenic Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — Two former Bush administration advisers are no longer urging front-line U.S. health care workers to volunteer for smallpox vaccinations, even though they see no reduction in the threat from smallpox as a potential biological weapon (see GSN, July 14). ..Full Story

Military Action Not Ruled Out to Stop Suspected Iranian Nuclear Weapons Program, Rice Says The United States would not rule out covert military action against Iranian nuclear installations, the New York Sun reported today (see GSN, Aug. 5)...Full Story

	Monday, August 9, 2004

Bush Examining Ways to Provide Intelligence Director With Effective Authority, Rice Says The Bush administration is considering ways to provide a new national intelligence director with “effective” budgetary and management authority, U.S. national security adviser Condoleezza Rice said yesterday (see GSN, Aug. 6). The new director would need “to have more effective authority than the director of central intelligence has,” Rice said during an appearance on NBC’s Meet the Press.  “We’re discussing the mechanisms by which that might be done,” she added. While President George W. Bush has backed creating a national intelligence director — a key intelligence reform proposal put forth by the Sept. 11 commission — he has differed with the commission over how much authority the new director should have over the intelligence budget and the selection of personnel to head the various intelligence agencies. The only thing Bush has so far committed to, Rice said, is that the new director should not be located in the White House and should not be a Cabinet-level position (Walter Pincus, Washington Post, Aug. 9). On Friday, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld seemingly reversed himself and came out in support of a national intelligence director, according to the Chicago Tribune. While Rumsfeld earlier said that creating such a director would be a “disservice” to the United States, he said in an interview with the Tribune that his position then was a reference to combining the various U.S. intelligence agencies under one department. The White House has envisioned a director who would have authority over the intelligence agencies, but not combine them. That proposal is “a good idea,” Rumsfeld said. He said, however, that other commission proposals must be examined closely (Stephen Hedges, Chicago Tribune, Aug. 7). Back to top

U.S.-British Nuclear Agreement Heads Toward 10-Year Extension Despite Concerns on Pact By Chris Schneidmiller Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The agreement between the United States and United Kingdom to share nuclear weapons information and technology appears set to be quietly extended for another decade, despite some critics’ concerns that it undermines nonproliferation efforts focused on countries such as Iran and North Korea (see GSN, Aug. 8, 2003). Article 3 bis of the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement would expire on Dec. 31 without action, but that appears unlikely to occur. Over the objections of some members of Parliament, the British government has already approved a 10-year extension. U.S. President George W. Bush also in June signed off on the agreement, which would be automatically approved under federal law if Congress makes no objections within “60 days of continuous session.”  “The U.K. side of this is complete,” British Labor Party MP Alan Simpson told Global Security Newswire. “I don’t suspect it will be challenged in the U.S,” he added. In the contract, the United States and United Kingdom pledge to “communicate to or exchange with the other party such classified information, sensitive nuclear technology, and controlled nuclear information” needed for the allies’ nuclear defense plans, delivery systems and military reactors. The agreement does not include transfer of actual nuclear weapons, but allows for exchange of enriched uranium. “The United Kingdom intends to continue to maintain viable nuclear forces,” Bush said in a June 14 message to Congress. “In light of our previous close cooperation and the fact that the United Kingdom has committed its nuclear forces to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, I have concluded it is in our interest to assist them in maintaining a credible nuclear force,” he added. The agreement allows the two allies to ensure the safety, security and reliability of their respective nuclear arsenals, said Simon Shercliff, a spokesman for the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The extension would continue that  cooperation, he said. Details of what has been exchanged under this agreement remain classified. However, it is “almost a certainty” that the United States shared warhead design information for its submarine-based Trident ballistic nuclear missiles, given the strong similarities between the two countries’ systems, said Matt Martin, deputy director for the British American Security Information Council (BASIC). Renewing the agreement could open the door for development of a replacement for the British Trident system, according to BASIC (see GSN, Oct. 3, 2002). The two countries could collaborate on new weapons such as low-yield nuclear bombs or the “bunker buster,” according to critics, who also fear the agreement could be used to perform an end-run around barriers to nuclear development in either country (see GSN, July 16). For example, U.S. officials could send information on the bunker buster to the United Kingdom for further work if they are unable to obtain approval for development here, Martin argued. Even if that occurred, the weapon under the pact could not be sent back to its country of origin, countered Stephen Rademaker, U.S. assistant secretary of state for arms control, in an interview last week with GSN. Rademaker also rejected the results of a legal analysis commissioned by BASIC and other nonproliferation groups that found that the agreement violates the spirit — and possibly the letter of the law — of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Article 1 of the treaty forbids member states from transferring any nuclear weapons to another country or entity, while Article 6 requires members to “pursue negotiations in good faith” toward nuclear disarmament. Critics acknowledge that the Mutual Defense Agreement does not involve transfer of weaponry. They argue, however, the pact breaks the commitment to disarm by sharing information and equipment that could be used to develop new weapons. There is nothing in the Nonproliferation Treaty that requires the five recognized nuclear states not to share information or seek new weaponry, Rademaker said. He pointed to the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty, under which the United States and Russia agreed to reduce their respective deployed strategic nuclear warheads to no more than 2,200, as an indication of the administration’s disarmament work (see GSN, June 22). “The United States doesn’t feel that it has any apologies to make,” Rademaker said. Problems with the agreement go beyond its Nonproliferation Treaty implications, critics said.  The two countries give up the moral high ground by operating a secretive nuclear agreement while pressing other countries to abandon nuclear or WMD programs, Simpson said. Global opinions on the war in Iraq would be greatly different if Saddam Hussein had been found operating a secret program to share nuclear weapons information with an ally, he said.  “It completely undermines any chance the United Kingdom has to organize against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction around the world,” said David Lowry, an independent consultant for nuclear matters for British Labor Party MP Llew Smith. The Schedule Following negotiations during the spring, Rademaker signed the extension agreement with British representative Frank Baker on June 14 in Washington. The amendment changes the expiration date for the information-sharing agreement from Dec. 31, 2004, to Dec. 31, 2014, and updates text in the contract to correspond to personnel and physical security policies made over the last decade. The proposal was forwarded for consideration to the U.S. Congress and the British Parliament in June. The British government, however, rejected a motion signed by 43 members of Parliament to open the matter for debate, Simpson said. Instead, it included the agreement in a series of routine legislative matters that could be removed from the docket but could not be argued. Simpson said he did not recollect if anyone tried to remove the MDA amendment before its passage, but said the British leadership simply would have kept bringing it back until it was approved. Beginning in mid-June, the agreement must sit before Congress for 60 session days under the 1954 U.S. Atomic Energy Act. If no action is taken, it goes into effect following an exchange of messages between the two countries. That is expected to happen before the end of the year. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House International Relations Committee would have jurisdiction over the agreement. The Senate committee has not set its fall schedule, but with most legislators out of Washington during the summer recess, it would be difficult to know if matter would come up before Congress’ Oct. 1 target closing date for the 2004 session, said Andy Fisher, spokesman for committee Chairman Richard Lugar (R-Ind.). Lawmakers could issue a resolution of disapproval for the amendment, but the president could veto any effort to block the extension, Rademaker said. Congress should at least hold a hearing to allow members to be informed and to enable nongovernmental agencies to file their opinions on the extension, Martin said. “I can’t imagine it’s going to happen,” he said. “I don’t know that most members of Congress even know this arrangement exists,” Martin said. “Unless they’re made to look they’re not going to know,” he added. Back to top       Military Action Not Ruled Out to Stop Suspected Iranian Nuclear Weapons Program, Rice Says The United States would not rule out covert military action against Iranian nuclear installations, the New York Sun reported today (see GSN, Aug. 5). The Bush administration is considering “many means” to prevent the Islamic republic from building a nuclear weapon, national security adviser Condoleezza Rice said yesterday on NBC’s Meet the Press. “We cannot allow the Iranians to develop a nuclear weapon,” she said. “The president will look at all the tools that are available to him,” she added (Luiza Savage, New York Sun, Aug. 9). The United States has been calling attention to Iran’s nuclear development for 3 1/2 years, and the world is finally “worried and suspicious” about those activities, Rice said. “The United States was the first to say that Iran was a threat in this way, to try and convince the international community that Iran was trying, under the cover of a civilian nuclear program, to actually bring about a nuclear weapons program,” she said. “I think we’ve finally now got the world community to a place, and the [International Atomic Energy Agency] to a place, that it is worried and suspicious of the Iranian activities,” said Rice. “Iran is facing for the first time real resistance to trying to take these steps,” she added (William Mann, Associated Press/San Francisco Chronicle, Aug. 9). Meanwhile, Iranian officials said they would retaliate if the U.N. Security Council imposes sanctions on their country, the Financial Times reported. “You don't expect a country like Iran to be pushed around and take it sitting down,” said Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s U.N. ambassador. “What is important is that our integrity is not to be bargained or up for sale. We react very strongly when we see people trying to undermine our national integrity,” he added. Iran rejected a request from France, Germany and the United Kingdom during talks last week in Paris to “relinquish” control of uranium enrichment as a “confidence-building measure,” said Hossein Mussavian, foreign policy chairman of the Supreme National Security Council. The Europeans proposed that Iran receive an international supply of enriched uranium and that resulting spent fuel be removed, according to the Times. Talks with the European powers would continue, according to Mussavian, who considers it “very unlikely” that they would support a referral to the U.N. Security Council. The situation is “on the verge of something drastic,” according to an anonymous Iranian official in Tehran. Iranian security officials expect the International Atomic Energy Agency to pass a critical resolution in September and they believe that the United States might launch attack targets in Iran, he added. “If there is more criticism in September, Iran will remove the (IAEA) cameras (at nuclear sites) and start injecting the gas (the final stage of uranium enrichment),” he said. “Iran notes the example of North Korea, a regime the U.S. is negotiating with,” he added. “Radicals” are thinking of “stupid things against the U.S. and even Europe,” the official said, recalling the days when Iran “carried out assassinations” in Europe (Smyth/Dinmore, Financial Times, Aug. 8). Back to top       U.S. Diplomacy With Allies Fails to Slow Iranian, North Korean Nuclear Development Iran and North Korea have made significant progress in their nuclear programs despite U.S. diplomatic efforts with its Asian and European allies, according to U.S. intelligence officials and outside nuclear experts (see GSN, July 12). While Iran seems to be keeping within the bounds of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, it probably has the ability to switch gears and begin nuclear weapons work at any time, said Robert Gates, the director of central intelligence under President George H.W. Bush. “The evidence suggests that Iran is trying to keep all of its options open,” Gates said last week at a conference on nuclear terrorism and the spread of unconventional weapons. “They are trying to stay just within their treaty obligations” while producing highly enriched uranium, “and I think they can go with a weapon whenever they want to,” said Gates, now president of Texas A&M University. Iran is assembling the necessary ingredients and might be using a Chinese- origin bomb design that the nuclear network operated by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan sold to Libya, intelligence experts said. They added that the Islamic republic might be just a few years away from developing a working nuclear device. A cautiously worded U.S. intelligence report on North Korea asserts that Pyongyang now probably has enough weapon-grade plutonium to test a bomb in the future, which would allow it to demonstrate its capability, according to the New York Times. A “whiff” of a nuclear byproduct detected by an American spy plane off the coast of North Korea last year is believed to be evidence that plutonium reprocessing was under way in the communist nation, said Gary Samore, who led nonproliferation work at the National Security Council under President Bill Clinton and has conducted a detailed assessment of North Korea for the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London (see GSN, July 21, 2003). However, some intelligence analysts say North Korea may have run into difficulty in the chemical process of converting spent fuel into bomb material (see GSN, Sept. 12, 2003). “The conventional wisdom now is that they have completely reprocessed all of [the spent plutonium fuel],” Samore said. “They had a huge window of opportunity when we were invading Iraq, and they appear to have made maximum use of it,” he added (see GSN, April 28). “It’s very frustrating,” said one former official who left the Bush administration recently and believes that the administration has failed to set “red lines” beyond which North Korea would not be allowed to expand its nuclear work.  The official noted that the Bush administration has been touting Libya as a disarmament model for North Korea and Iran, highlighting the North African nation’s re-establishment of political and economic ties with the West as its reward (see GSN, March 8). However, the official argued, such an offer was unlikely to tempt Iran because it does strong trade with Europe. Likewise, North Korea still receives considerable aid from China, the official added. Bush administration and intelligence officials say they are exploring ways to use unspecified covert actions “to disrupt or delay as long as we can” Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons efforts, according to the Times. However, former Clinton administration officials and other experts say such covert action would likely be less effective than in the past, as the Iranian program is increasingly self-sufficient. “It’s a much harder thing to accomplish today than it would have been in the ‘90s,” said one senior U.S. intelligence official, citing assistance to Iran by the network built by Khan. The scientist’s sales have also complicated efforts to disarm North Korea, according to intelligence reports. Meanwhile, Israel’s increasing concern over Iran’s nuclear program has made military action an option. “They are doing what they can to delay the Iranian program and preparing military options,” said one official who has dealt with the Israeli government on the issue (David Sanger, New York Times, Aug. 8). Back to top       Legislation Would Limit U.S. Aid to Pakistan for Failure to Increase Cooperation in Khan Investigation By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — A bill introduced late last month in the U.S. House of Representatives would limit U.S. aid to Pakistan if Islamabad fails to sufficiently help U.S. efforts to investigate the international nuclear black market formerly headed by top Pakistani nuclear weapons scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan (see GSN, July 26). The Nuclear Black Market Elimination Act would limit U.S. aid to Pakistan to 75 percent of a year’s allotted funds unless the president certified to Congress that Pakistan was “fully sharing” all relevant information to the international nuclear network and had provided U.S. investigators with full access to Khan and his associates.  The bill would also require certification that Pakistan had “verifiably halted” any nuclear- and missile-related cooperation with other countries before receiving full U.S. aid. The aid restriction could be waived if it were found to be in the interest of national security interest and determined to help increase Pakistani cooperation in efforts to investigate the nuclear network. The bill would also provide the president with the authority to impose sanctions against any foreign entity found to have provided enrichment or reprocessing technology to a country determined to be seeking nuclear weapons or that has not provided the International Atomic Energy Agency with the authority to conduct more intrusive nuclear monitoring. The sanctions envisioned in the bill would prevent the targeted entity from engaging in transactions with any U.S. entity for a period of at least three years. Representative Tom Lantos (Calif.), the top Democrat on the House International Relations Committee, introduced the bill on July 22. The bill’s four co-sponsors include Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Fla.), who was one of the main authors of the Syria Accountability Act, which imposed sanctions against Damascus for failing to cease its suspected efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction (see GSN, May 12). Khan confessed early this year to transferring Pakistani nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea; and there is concern that other countries may have also been recipients. To date, the Bush administration has shown little interest in punishing Pakistan for the illicit transfers, supporting instead the assertions by Pakistani leaders that the smuggling occurred without official approval. U.S. lawmakers, though, have criticized Islamabad for failing to provide the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency with full access to Khan and his associates to aid efforts to further investigate the network. A Democratic congressional staff member said today that while the bill has yet to be brought to the White House’s attention, he expected the administration’s reaction to be “negative.” While denying that the bill specifically targeted Pakistan, the staff member acknowledged the key role of Pakistani nuclear scientists in the international network. The staff member also suggested, though, that the section related to Pakistan could be later removed from the bill. “If they were allowing full access to Khan … then there would be no need for that provision,” the staff member said. The Pakistani Embassy in Washington did not return calls for comment. South Asian expert Michael Krepon, president emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center, today said that the bill would likely be considered as a “slap in the face” in Pakistan and would not result in increased cooperation. If U.S. lawmakers “feel compelled to send messages to Pakistan,” Krepon said, “I don’t think this is the best way to do this.” Krepon also said that he would be “very much surprised” if Pakistan made Khan available to U.S. officials for interrogation, noting that the Pakistani public would likely see such a move as “disrespectful.” Khan has long been held in high esteem in Pakistan for his role as the “father” of the country’s nuclear weapons program. The bill was referred to the House International Relations Committee, but little is expected to happen before the 2004 session ends on Oct. 1. The staff member said the bill would probably be reintroduced during the next congressional session, adding that an effort was being made to add co-sponsors to the legislation.  While the proposal would restrict U.S. aid to Pakistan if it were found to be hindering efforts to investigate the nuclear black market, there is little support within Congress for directly cutting U.S. aid to Islamabad, according to the staff member. The White House’s fiscal 2005 budget request contains the first allotment of a planned five-year, $3 billion economic and security aid package to Pakistan. Noting the belief among lawmakers that Pakistan was “crucial” to the U.S. war on terrorism, the staff member said that the planned aid package would be unaffected unless Pakistan “does something stupid.” As examples, the staff member cited theoretical revelations of continuing transfers of Pakistani nuclear technology or official cooperation with the suspected nuclear weapons efforts of Iran and North Korea. “There’s a point where you can’t ignore particular activity,” the staff member said. Back to top       Lockheed Martin Drops Out of Competition for Los Alamos National Laboratory Management Contract U.S. defense contractor Lockheed Martin abandoned efforts Friday to win a contract to manage the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, a facility that has come under fire for security concerns, according to the Alameda Times-Star (see GSN, Aug. 5). The recent security issues at Los Alamos, stemming from the disappearance last month of two computer disks containing classified information, were part of Lockheed’s decision to “look at the resources it would take to manage the contract,” company spokeswoman Wendy Owen said Lockheed Martin manages the Sandia National Laboratories and an Energy Department atomic power laboratory, and also is part of the management of the United Kingdom’s nuclear weapons laboratory. Owen said that Lockheed has decided to focus on managing those facilities (Ian Hoffman, Alameda Times-Star, Aug. 7). Back to top       No Natural Uranium Missing From Iraqi Nuclear Site, IAEA Says After Completing Inventory International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors have found that none of the natural uranium stored at the Tuwaitha nuclear complex in Iraq is missing, the agency announced Saturday (see GSN, Aug. 4). IAEA inspectors conducted an inventory of “several tons” of natural uranium stored at the site, agency spokeswoman Melissa Fleming said. The material poses little proliferation risk, according to the Associated Press (George Jahn, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, Aug. 7). The inventory was required as part of the safeguards agreement that the agency has in place with Iraq, according to an agency press release (IAEA release, Aug. 7). Back to top

Experts Say Civilian Smallpox Shots Not Needed By Marina Malenic Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — Two former Bush administration advisers are no longer urging front-line U.S. health care workers to volunteer for smallpox vaccinations, even though they see no reduction in the threat from smallpox as a potential biological weapon (see GSN, July 14).  It is the first time officials connected to the Bush adminstration have publicly said that no further immunizations are necessary. “We don’t need to vaccinate the first-responders,” Donald Henderson, a former senior Health and Human Services Department adviser, told Time magazine last month. Federal officials have distributed smallpox vaccine supplies nationally in sufficient quantities to enable first responders and other emergency medical personnel to receive the inoculation in time to protect them following an attack, said Henderson, who ran the World Health Organization program that eradicated smallpox in the 1970s and is now a professor of medicine at the University of Pittsburgh. “The difference between now and where we were at 9/11, is that now we have a lot of vaccine, in a number of cities we have the capability to deal with an outbreak pretty quickly,” Henderson, who continues to advise Health and Human Services a part-time basis, told Global Security Newswire last week. “We are in a very different position,” he added. “In an emergency we have the vaccine ready, and ready to move very quickly. Our first priority, the health care workers in emergency rooms that would be first in contact with the disease — 250,000 would fall into the category — could be vaccinated very quickly in case of an attack,” he said. Two years ago, the Bush administration announced a smallpox vaccination program, with a target of inoculating 500,000 military personnel and 500,000 civilian health workers. The military program succeeded in meeting its goal and even surpassed it — more than 625,000 service members have received the vaccine — and the U.S. Defense Department last month expanded the effort to include all personnel deployed by U.S. Central Command and, for the first time, select units within U.S. Pacific Command (see GSN, June 30). However, the civilian program never got off the ground due to concerns about the vaccine’s side effects, according to Jerome Hauer, a former Health and Human Services acting assistant secretary and director of the Response to Emergencies and Disasters Institute at George Washington University. While the administration encouraged millions of first responders and other medical professionals to volunteer for vaccinations (White House press release, Dec. 13, 2002), in the end fewer than 40,000 received the inoculation. “I don’t know that there has been a huge policy reversal rather than that it just fell apart,” Hauer told Global Security Newswire last week.  Because no stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction have been found in Iraq since the end of the war, Hauer added, there has been no impetus to continue smallpox vaccinations. “Once the war ended and no WMD were found — no smallpox, no biological agents — at the end of the day the sense of urgency waned,” he said. “People felt there was no need to go through the risk of being vaccinated unless the threat became immediate,” he added. “The sense of urgency by the first responder community also waned,” Hauer said. “Barring something new, it would be extraordinarily difficult to get first responders vaccinated,” he added. However, there is good reason to believe that biological warfare programs using smallpox remain a threat, Henderson said. “At this point, the same factors that rated smallpox as high as it was are still there,” he said. Hauer agreed. “We were concerned about smallpox in the hands of terrorists well before Iraq,” he said. Henderson explained that in the early 1990s a group of Soviet “bioweaponeers” said that smallpox was “at the top of their list” of biowarfare agents under development. “They admitted their intent to use smallpox in ICBMs and small bomblets for dispersal,” said Henderson, adding that some Soviet weapons scientists may have left those labs to work elsewhere (see GSN, Oct. 22, 2003). “It’s hard to know who they are now working for,” he added. Henderson said there are indications that other countries may be involved in such efforts as well. “Soviet scientists at the time said that there had been activities with smallpox in North Korea,” he said. “Whatever was going on or my have gone on in Iraq was not the only factor — we did not know anything more about Iraq than we did about Iran or Syria, for example,” he said. “It takes few people and not a lot of money to set up such a program. It’s not like nuclear work,” he added. Back to top       Iraqi Interim Government Reinstates Death Penalty for Biological Warfare, Other Offenses Those who commit crimes ranging from drug trafficking murder to the use of biological weapons in Iraq could again face execution, the country’s interim government said Sunday in reinstating capital punishment (see GSN, Aug. 3). “Yesterday we announced an amnesty. Today the death penalty.  Choose one of them,” said government spokesman Gurgis Sada. The law took effect immediately, according to Agence France-Presse. Mass killings, strikes against the country’s vital infrastructure and biological warfare are explicitly listed as capital crimes under the new law, according to Deputy Justice Minister Busho Ibrahim. The law applies to both Iraqi citizens and foreigners who commit those crimes on Iraqi territory, said Minister of State Adnan al-Janabi. “Iraqis want to see those who are committing crimes to be punished. ... Ask the Iraqi people if they want this and they will give you the answer,” he said. The death penalty was used under the regime of former dictator Saddam Hussein, but was abolished by the U.S.-led occupation authority (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, Aug. 9). Back to top       FBI Searches Car as Part of Anthrax Investigation FBI agents Saturday searched a car in Pennsylvania belonging to Kenneth Berry as part of the bureau’s investigation into the 2001 anthrax attacks, according to the Associated Press. Last week, FBI agents searched Berry’s home and former apartment in New York and his parents’ summer house in New Jersey as part of the anthrax investigation (see GSN, Aug. 6). The car was located at Connellsville Airport, about 30 miles southeast of Pittsburgh, according to AP. Berry kept the car at the airport for use when he visited family in the area, said Frank Sero, a lineman at the airport.  The FBI would not say what agents were looking for, but said there was no immediate danger to the public. Berry has told police that he had nothing to do with the 2001 attacks, Point Pleasant Beach N.J. Police Chief Daniel DePolo said Friday (Allison Schlesinger, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, Aug. 7). Back to top

Iran Plans to Test Improved Medium-Range Missile Iran plans to test a modified version of a medium-range missile in response to Israel’s test of its antimissile system last month, Agence France-Presse reported Saturday (see GSN, Aug. 5). “We will improve the Shahab 3 and when we test it, in the very short future, we will let you know,” how it has been improved, Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani said on Saturday. “These improvements do not only concern its range, but other specifications as well,” Shamkhani said. Israel successfully tested its Arrow 2 missile interceptor last month in the United States, successfully destroying a real Scud missile for the first time.  “The Israelis are trying hard to improve the capacity of their missiles, and we are also trying to improve the Shahab 3 in a short time,” Shamkhani said, adding that his country is not developing a more advanced Shahab 4. The Shahab 3 is believed to have been developed from technology acquired from Pakistan and North Korea and is said to be capable of carrying a 1-ton warhead at least 1,300 kilometers, according to AFP (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, Aug. 7). Back to top       Iran Denies Missile Cooperation With N. Korea Iran on Friday denied cooperating with North Korea on long-range missile development in response to a Bush administration official’s claim that Iran has been conducting missile tests for Pyongyang, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Aug. 6). “Iran does not cooperate with North Korea in missile technology and it does not need to,” said Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani (Associated Press/Al-Jazeerah.com, Aug. 7). Back to top       Bulgaria Joins Missile Technology Control Regime By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — Bulgaria has joined a multilateral export control regime whose members agree to implement similar export controls on missiles and related technologies, the U.S. State Department announced last week (see GSN, July 22). Bulgaria joined the Missile Technology Control Regime in June, bringing the regime’s total membership to 34 countries, according to the State Department. The decision to admit the Eastern European country was made by a “consensus” of regime members, a State Department official said today. The official added that the United States has few missile proliferation-related concerns regarding Bulgarian entities. In 2002, the United States helped Bulgaria to destroy Cold War-era SS-23 and Scud ballistic missiles (see GSN, Oct. 31, 2002). MTCR members agree to apply common export control policies to the items included on the regime’s control list. The control list is divided into two categories — Category 1, which includes complete missile systems capable of carrying a 500-kilogram payload to a range of at least 300 kilometers and related production facilities; and Category 2, which includes missile-related items and technologies and some other missile systems. MTCR members agree to hold exports of Category 1 items to a “strong presumption of denial” while exports of Category 2 items are considered on a case-by-case basis, according to the State Department. The regime is scheduled to hold its annual plenary meeting Oct. 4-8 in Seoul, according to the State Department official. The meeting’s agenda is expected to include discussions on changes to the regime’s control list, status of missile proliferation programs of concern and cooperation on national export controls, the official said. This year’s MTCR plenary meeting could include the addition of new members to the regime (see GSN, June 4). The regime has engaged in a “technical dialogue” with China, which has indicated a willingness to join, according to the State Department official. It is unlikely, though, that the dialogue would result in Beijing joining the regime by this year’s plenary meeting, the official said. Back to top

U.S., Denmark, Greenland Sign Radar Upgrade Pact The United Stated, Denmark and Greenland signed an agreement Friday to modernize a U.S. early warning radar system at Thule air base in northwestern Greenland, as part of the U.S. missile defense effort, Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, July 30). “Together we will meet the security challenges of the 21st century, from missile defense to international terrorism,” Secretary of State Colin Powell said at the signing ceremony held in Igaliku, an Inuit village of about 40 inhabitants. Powell and his Danish and Greenland counterparts, Per Stig Moeller and Josef Motzfeldt, signed the agreement, according to AFP. Thule is the northernmost U.S. Air Force installation and operates an early warning system for ballistic missiles. Local authorities have opposed expanding the base’s capabilities to include missile interceptors. Powell said it is too early to discuss such a capability at Thule. “Right now we are some distance from determining where we might need interceptors,” he said. “There is no plan right now for anything other than what we have already made known to the home-rule government (of Greenland) and Kingdom of Denmark,” he added. Denmark is not automatically opposed to missile defense, but “we have said yes to that (the agreements signed Friday) and nothing else,” said Danish Foreign Minister Moeller. Powell added that the United States did not “want to do anything that would put at risk the strong relationship we have had for many, many years.” “The updated agreement provides for consultations so that we are partners and we will move forward together,” he said. “It allows us to make sure that we are providing for the kinds of threats that the civilized world might see in the future (from rogue states),” he added. Before the signing ceremony, Powell toured Norse ruins dating from 1200 and dined on local delicacies such as roast musk ox, reindeer steak, smoked salmon and halibut, according to AFP (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, Aug. 6). Meanwhile, the Russian Foreign Ministry said today that the U.S. agreement with the two nations could pose a threat to Russia’s security, Reuters reported. “The United States has more than once assured us that the future missile defense system will not be targeted against Russia,” the ministry said in a statement. “However, the very geography of the radar in Greenland gives us reasons to think that even at this stage the U.S. missile defense could potentially threaten Russia’s national security,” it adds. “Russia will carefully analyze the situation from the point of view of its own security and reserves the right to take all appropriate measures to maintain it on an appropriate level,” the statement said without providing details (Reuters/Yahoo!News, Aug. 9). Back to top       Lockheed Martin Delivers First SBIRS-High Payload U.S defense contractor Lockheed Martin last week announced that it had delivered to the Air Force the first payload for use in the Space-Based Infrared System High (SBIRS-High) program, part of U.S. missile defense efforts, according to Defense Daily (see GSN, June 25). Delivery of the payload was delayed by almost a year-and-a-half while Lockheed Martin and subcontractor Northrop Grumman worked to eliminate electromagnetic signals from the payload that could interfere with its host satellite, according to Defense Daily. The payload will now be installed on a satellite for launch into a highly elliptical orbit (HEO) around the Earth. The SBIRS-High program envisions launching two HEO payloads and four satellites into geosynchronous orbit to detect ballistic missile launches (Ann Roosevelt, Defense Daily, Aug. 9).   Back to top

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