Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi (shown in a 2003 photo) last week defended Iran’s nuclear efforts (AFP photo/Behrouz Mehri). Iran Plans to Extract Uranium from Mine in 2006 Iran is less than two years away from extracting uranium from the country’s Saghand mine, the Associated Press reported Sunday. “We will be able to extract uranium ore in the first half of 2006 from Saghand mine. More than 77 percent of the work has been accomplished,” said Ghasem Soleimani of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran...Full Story

Missile Defense Might Need Iraq, Afghanistan Bases By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — A U.S. national missile defense system may someday require interceptor bases in Iraq and Afghanistan to defend against long-range Iranian ballistic missiles, according to a congressional study published this summer...Full Story

Kerry Issues Plan to Protect Scientists Who Disclose Information on International WMD Programs By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — Democratic presidential nominee Senator John Kerry (Mass.) last week proposed the creation of a program to encourage scientists to provide information on active WMD programs worldwide (see GSN, July 29)...Full Story

	Tuesday, September 7, 2004

Experts Cool on Bush’s Intelligence Reform Orders By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — Intelligence experts were skeptical last week over the value of a recent set of executive orders issued by President George W. Bush for intelligence reform, saying the move may be intended more as a political gesture (see GSN, Aug. 27). In one of the executive orders, the White House increased the authority of the director of central intelligence to serve as an acting national intelligence director until such a position was created through legislative action. Under the order, the director of central intelligence will be responsible for determining intelligence collection priorities, helping developing the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget and recommending nominations for the leadership of various intelligence agencies. In two other executive orders, Bush created a national counterterrorism center, to be headed by the director of central intelligence until a national intelligence director is in place, and called for increased information sharing among federal agencies on terrorism matters. The creation of a national intelligence director and a national counterterrorism center — two of the key intelligence reform recommendations put forth by the Sept. 11 commission this summer — have been the subject of a number of a congressional hearings held during Congress’ summer recess. The Sept. 11 commission proposed the creation of a national intelligence director, separate from the CIA, with full budgetary and personnel authority over the various intelligence agencies. While the White House initially resisted giving the new director that much power, there have been signs that the Bush administration may be shifting its position. Charles Pena, director of defense policy studies at the CATO Institute, described the executive orders as “largely window dressing” and said that the White House was under “tremendous pressure” to respond to the Sept. 11 commission’s recommendations. “The administration can’t be seen as doing nothing,” Pena said. The White House said in an Aug. 27 fact sheet that the executive orders “strain the limits” of presidential authority to strengthen the authority of the director of central intelligence without legislative action.  “I think one of the most important things is the signal it sends to the [intelligence] community about the president’s expectations in terms of the DCI’s [director of central intelligence] day-to-day role in managing and marshalling the assets of the community,” a senior administration official said during an Aug. 27 background briefing. The official also said that the planned national intelligence director would probably receive even more budgetary and personnel authority once legislation is completed by Congress. “By no means does this preclude us giving more power to the NID; in fact, I think … that’s where we’re moving toward,” the senior administration official said. “I think this is further evidence of the president’s commitment that the national intelligence director is going to have all the authority they need to do the job that they need to do.” Several U.S. senators, along with the chairman and vice chairman of the Sept. 11 commission, are expected to announce today the introduction of legislation to implement the commission’s recommendations. Pena and other intelligence experts were cool last week to the White House’s efforts to strengthen the authority of the director of central intelligence. The executive orders are just “campaign politics,” said John Pike, executive director of the GlobalSecurity.org think tank. “The White House is slowly, slowly twisting in the wind on this,” he said of intelligence reform. Noting the creation of the Homeland Security Department, which the Bush administration first opposed and then supported, Pena said that last week’s executive orders could represent an attempt by the White House to gain greater control over the issue of intelligence reform. “They’re staking out the lines they want drawn around this,” Pena said, referring to the planned national intelligence director. James Carafano of the Heritage Foundation called the orders a “positive” step. He also said, though, that Bush should have separated the director of central intelligence from overseeing the CIA. That would have given Congress someone with experience to work with in drafting legislation for a national intelligence director and allowed that person to focus on developing the new position rather than leading the CIA, Carafano said. During the Aug. 27 briefing, the senior administration official said the White House’s “clear stated, unequivocal intention” is to separate the national intelligence director from the director of the CIA. Doubting that Congress could approve intelligence reform legislation prior to the November presidential election, Pike said that an opportunity for “real” reform could come in March of next year, when the presidential commission investigating prewar intelligence on Iraq’s alleged WMD efforts is set to release its report.  That report, Pike said, could provide an opportunity to “do something actually serious, rather than come up with sound bites for the chat shows.” Back to top

Kerry Issues Plan to Protect Scientists Who Disclose Information on International WMD Programs By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — Democratic presidential nominee Senator John Kerry (Mass.) last week proposed the creation of a program to encourage scientists to provide information on active WMD programs worldwide (see GSN, July 29). The Nuclear Whistleblower Initiative would be intended to “ensure that any scientist who is willing to disclose an illicit weapons program will be given protection and a safe haven in the United States,” according to a Kerry campaign fact sheet. The initiative would provide scientists guarantees of safe passage out of their country of origin and political asylum if they are willing to “come clean” on any WMD programs they helped develop, according to a Kerry campaign adviser familiar with the proposal. While the effort has initially been designed as a U.S. program, the campaign adviser stressed the need to involve U.S. allies and the United Nations. “This is an example of something we can bring the world behind,” the adviser said last week. Michael Levi of the Brookings Institution in Washington agreed on the need to broaden the initiative into an international effort, saying that it should be promoted during inspections conducted by organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. “You want to make it easy for people to get out and blow the whistle,” Levi said last week. Integrating the initiative with inspections conducted by the U.N. nuclear watchdog and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons would also increase those organizations’ confidence in using the information provided by defectors, Levi said. One concern is that some would-be defectors may fraudulently claim to have been involved in WMD efforts to take advantage of the initiative, according to the Kerry campaign adviser and experts. Levi suggested that a two-tier system be developed, with one tier consisting of countries suspected of conducting WMD efforts. With countries such as Iran and North Korea, the United States would probably be willing to absorb a large number of fraudulent defectors to gain access to those scientists who had truly been involved in WMD programs, he said. In the second-tier of countries, the burden of proof would be on the would-be defector to prove involvement in WMD efforts, Levi said. Legal protections for defectors would also have to be established to reassure scientists that they would not be prosecuted for their WMD-related activities were they to come forward, according to the Kerry campaign adviser. For example, there have been reports of North Korean scientists conducting chemical weapons tests on humans. Such protections, though, would have to be determined on a case-by-case basis, the adviser said. Levi said, however, that he personally would err on the side of pardoning most scientists to encourage their participation. Back to top       No Evidence that Prewar Iraq Developed Drones for WMD Attacks, U.N. Chief Weapons Inspector Says U.N. acting chief weapons inspector Dimitri Perricos has determined that there is no evidence that prewar Iraq produced drones capable of dispersing biological or chemical agents, the Washington Post reported Sunday (see GSN, April 26). While Iraq acknowledged a 1990 program to convert a MIG-21 fighter into an unmanned drone, the program was halted by the onset of the 1991 Gulf War, according to a report obtained by the Post. Iraq developed several other drones, but the report says that U.N. inspectors found “no technical evidence” that they were intended for use with biological or chemical agents. Perricos also said in the report that the discovery of small amounts of chemical munitions in Iraq by coalition forces was not surprising given that 25,000 such weapons were scattered throughout Iraq prior to U.N. inspections initiated after the Gulf War, according to the Post (Colum Lynch, Washington Post, Sept. 5). Meanwhile, the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency has asked for congressional permission to redirect $10 million from the fund the agency planned to use to destroy Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. “DTRA’s supplemental funding is available because the requirement for the large-scale weapons of mass destruction eliminations mission in Iraq is executing at a lower than anticipated level,” the request says (DOD reprogramming request, Aug. 11). Back to top

Iran Plans to Extract Uranium from Mine in 2006 Iran is less than two years away from extracting uranium from the country’s Saghand mine, the Associated Press reported Sunday. “We will be able to extract uranium ore in the first half of 2006 from Saghand mine. More than 77 percent of the work has been accomplished,” said Ghasem Soleimani of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. The mine has a capacity of 132,000 tons of uranium ore per year, according to the AP. The United States and its allies worry that Iran’s mastery of the entire nuclear fuel cycle would lead to development of nuclear weapons (Ali Akbar Dareini, Associated Press/Chicago Sun-Times, Sept. 5). Iran’s fuel cycle capability was described last week in a quarterly report by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is conducting a review of the program. The U.N. nuclear watchdog said that Iran was cooperating with many aspects of an investigation into its nuclear programs but was moving ahead with some sensitive nuclear work over the objections of the agency’s board. Iran’s new nuclear activity appears certain to fuel new calls by the United States for tougher measures against Tehran, which Washington alleges is seeking nuclear weapons. The board is set to begin its next meeting Monday at IAEA headquarters in Vienna. In an Aug. 14 letter, Iran told the U.N. agency it was about to start “hot tests” that would generate uranium hexafluoride, a compound of choice for enrichment to weapon-grade forms of uranium. Iran said it would introduce 37 metric tons of raw uranium into its Uranium Conversion Facility during the tests, which were to begin Aug. 19. Indicating a possible use of the uranium hexafluoride, diplomats told the Associated Press last week that Iran has told the agency it plans, possibly as early as next month, to introduce a “substance” into its Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz. Iran has also resumed making components for uranium-enrichment centrifuges and assembling and testing the centrifuges. By the middle of last month, the country had shown the agency about 70 newly assembled and tested centrifuge rotors, according to last week’s report. At its last meeting, held in June, the board called on Iran to suspend all enrichment- and reprocessing-related activity, including production of uranium hexafluoride and of centrifuge components. Following a test in May and June at the Uranium Conversion Facility on a smaller scale than the one mentioned in the Aug. 14 letter, the panel specifically asked the country to reconsider its intention to conduct tests at the facility. Iran promised in December 2003 to suspend enrichment and reprocessing and said in February of this year that the suspension extended to centrifuge-component production. In May, however, the country foreshadowed the contents of last week’s report by saying it had never promised not to produce feed material for enrichment and that its suspension did not apply to uranium hexafluoride production. Former Iranian envoy in Vienna Ali Akbar Salehi told AP last week that the agency has long known of Iran’s plans to use the Uranium Conversion Facility and that the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant is not suitable for producing nuclear-weapon material. “To produce a bomb, you need vast facilities, including thousands of advanced centrifuges, cascaded in a special pattern, to work for a long time to produce enough weapons-grade enriched uranium,” Salehi told AP. “The equipment at Natanz can’t do that, and IAEA cameras there watch the facility 24 hours a day.” U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell told reporters last week that Washington would continue at next week’s meeting to press for a referral to the U.N. Security Council. “Whether there is a consensus to do that now remains to be seen,” AP quoted Powell as saying, “but we think we’ve seen enough. The world should have seen enough over the last year to come to the conclusion that it’s time for it to be referred to the Security Council.” Several Iranian Claims Borne Out in Report Led by the United States, the IAEA board’s members are almost certain at least to condemn Iran’s new activities. For the first time in the current investigation, however, the report also vindicated Iran on several important questions — potentially bolstering the comparatively conciliatory position of countries such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom, which together obtained an Iranian promise late last year to suspend enrichment activities. The development further emboldened Iran in its usual declarations of innocence and jabs at the United States. “We believe there is today no ambiguity in Iran’s file at the IAEA, or, if there is any, it is over very minute and insignificant matters,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi said last week, according to the official Islamic Republic News Agency. “We hope the remaining minute issues, too, would be resolved speedily in near future, although some parties keep making hue and cry over the issue and try to create a chaotic atmosphere.” The agency termed it “plausible” that Tehran is being truthful in claiming enriched-uranium particles found at certain sites are not the result of domestic production (Joe Fiorill, Global Security Newswire, Sept. 7).  The agency has found that Pakistan was the source of Iran’s centrifuge designs and equipment, the New York Times reported last week. A diplomatic source indicated that the designs came from the laboratories of Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. “What Iran got came almost entirely from one country,” said a senior international diplomat who was briefed on the findings. “And it seems to point directly back to Pakistan’s own laboratories” (David Sanger, New York Times, Sept. 2). The IAEA probe also yielded findings the agency called “consistent” with Iran’s statements on uranium-conversion and laser-enrichment programs. On the question of centrifuge enrichment of uranium, the agency said it has verified that Iran has not operated or tested centrifuges at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, has not introduced new material into centrifuges at the facility and has installed no new centrifuges at the facility or at a related site. The agency has also confirmed that no reprocessing has taken place at another site, the Jabr ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories. “Although the agency is not yet in a position to draw definitive conclusions concerning the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declarations related to all aspects of its nuclear program,” the agency said in the report, “it continues to make steady progress in understanding the program.” “In this regard, the agency’s investigations have reached a point where, with respect to two aspects previously identified by the agency as requiring investigation (i.e. Iran’s declared laser-enrichment activities and Iran’s declared uranium-conversion experiments), further follow-up will be carried out as a routine safeguards implementation matter,” it said (Fiorill, Global Security Newswire). European Union foreign ministers, however, expressed concern Friday over Iran’s nuclear plans and called on the Islamic republic to cooperate more fully with the agency, Agence France-Presse reported. “We agreed upon the need to send out a strong signal to Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and to provide the necessary information as requested by its director general Mr. (Mohamed) ElBaradei,” said Dutch Foreign Minister Bernard Bot, whose country holds the EU’s rotating presidency. He said the union was “pessimistic” about the situation, noting recent “regrettable developments” in the matter. “I think this is exactly the reason why we are looking at the measures that can be taken to make quite clear to the regime that we cannot accept certain things,” said Bot (Agence France-Presse/SpaceWar.com, Sept. 3). Iran announced Sunday that it would send national security chief Hassan Rohani to Europe in order to forestall U.S. efforts to have the Islamic republic called before the Security Council, AFP reported. “Currently, we are in very sensitive discussions with the Europeans. Tomorrow Mr. Rohani will go to the Netherlands to meet with Dutch officials,” Asefi said (AFP/Yahoo!News, Sept. 5). Uncertainty Persists on P-2 Centrifuges, Uranium Particles The IAEA report indicates Iranian explanations “do not provide sufficient assurance” that Iran’s effort to use powerful P-2 centrifuges to enrich uranium was dormant between 1995 and 2002, as the country claims. The watchdog added that several questions remain unanswered in its investigation into low-enriched uranium (LEU) and highly enriched uranium (HEU) particles found at four Iranian sites. Iran maintains the particles came from imported centrifuge components, not domestic enrichment activity. Three main questions remain unanswered with regard to the uranium, according to the report: “why, if the contamination of the domestically manufactured centrifuge components was due solely to contamination from the imported components, the domestic components showed predominantly LEU contamination, while the imported components showed both LEU and HEU contamination; why, if the source of contamination is the same (imported components), the contamination at PFEP differed from that found at the Kalaye Electric Co. workshop and Farayand Technique; why 36 percent uranium 235 (U-235) particles were found mainly in three of the locations where the imported components were located and not at others and why, at the Kalaye Electric Co. workshop, there was a relatively large number of particles of 36 percent U-235, compared to the number of particles of U-235 with other enrichment levels.” Another sensitive question at the panel’s June meeting was Iran’s razing this year of buildings at the Lavisan-Shian site in Tehran, a move Iran’s critics alleged was intended to conceal illicit nuclear activity. Last week’s report indicates Iran told the agency it demolished the buildings, part of a “physics research center” run by the Defense Ministry, because of a decision to give the land back to the city government. “Iran recently provided documentation to support this explanation,” the report reads. Iran told the agency the center’s purposes were “preparedness to combat and neutralization of casualties due to nuclear attacks and accidents (nuclear defense), and also support and provide scientific advice to the Ministry of Defense.” The country added that “no nuclear material declarable in accordance with the agency’s safeguard(s) was present” and that “no nuclear material and nuclear activities related to fuel cycle (were) carried out in Lavisan-Shian.” IAEA inspectors have taken environmental samples at the site in a bid to verify Iran’s explanation (Fiorill, Global Security Newswire). Back to top       IAEA Praises Libyan Cooperation With Investigation, Says Some Questions Remain Unanswered By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — While praising Libya’s cooperation in the investigation into its past nuclear efforts, the International Atomic Energy Agency said last week that several questions remain that could be resolved through increased cooperation from other countries that might have supplied Tripoli with nuclear technology (see GSN, Aug. 27). In a report released last week, the U.N. nuclear watchdog said Libya has provided full access to sites and senior personnel since its decision late last year to disclose and dismantle its WMD efforts. Such assistance, the report says, has “enabled the agency to build an understanding of Libya’s previously undeclared nuclear program.” Nevertheless, not all aspects of Libya’s past nuclear efforts are clear, according to the report. Questions include the origin of three containers of uranium hexafluoride, which is used in uranium enrichment centrifuges, that Libya received in 2000 and 2001; the source of traces of enriched uranium found on centrifuge components; and Libya’s possible use of nuclear weapon designs and fabrication information it received in past years. There are also questions as to the fate of a consignment of centrifuge-related equipment that was destined for Libya but never arrived, the report says. The agency said that some aspects of Libya’s past nuclear program “can be fully understood and confirmed only with the cooperation of foreign sources.” “The agency is pursuing discussions with some of these private intermediaries involved and several member states are supporting the agency’s investigations. These lines of enquiry are by nature somewhat slow to develop (e.g. due to ongoing legal actions), and will continue for some time,” the report says. As an example of the value of such cooperation, the report says that environmental sampling may help to determine the origin of the enriched uranium contamination found on centrifuge components. “In connection with this work,” the report says, “information from the companies and/or intermediaries involved in the production of the centrifuge components would be “indispensable.” While the IAEA report did not specifically identify what other countries’ cooperation the agency is seeking, Pakistan has emerged over the past several months as one of Libya’s chief nuclear suppliers. Early this year, top Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan confessed to having transferred nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea, revealing an international nuclear network with aspects in a number of countries.  Nuclear weapon design information was also transferred through the network to Libya. Pakistan has repeatedly said that it is fully investigating the nuclear network, and that it is sharing its findings with the United States and the agency. Islamabad has refused, though, to provide direct access to Khan and his associates or to Pakistani nuclear sites. This summer, U.S. lawmakers proposed legislation that would limit U.S. aid to Pakistan if it did not fully cooperate with investigations into the network, including providing the United States with access to Khan and his associates (see GSN, Aug. 9).  Pakistan is not the only country involved in efforts to investigate the international nuclear network. According to recent reports, Swiss police have raided three companies there as part of an investigation into a German national suspected of aiding Libya’s nuclear weapons program (see GSN, Aug. 27). South African authorities have also charged a man with purchasing materials and producing centrifuges suspected of being intended for Libya’s former nuclear program (see related GSN story, today). A Western diplomat said last week that while the International Atomic Energy Agency is satisfied so far with the level of cooperation it has received from other countries, it would like to see even more. The diplomat also said that there is hope that Pakistan would relent and allow the agency with direct access to its sites to conduct environmental sampling. In addition, the Western diplomat said that last week’s IAEA report is likely to be the final agency document released on Libya’s nuclear program, adding that the few questions still remaining are more related to the international nuclear network revealed by Khan that to Tripoli itself. Back to top       Seoul Acknowledges Uranium Enrichment Experiments By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — South Korea acknowledged last week that government scientists in 2000 conducted experiments involving the enrichment of nuclear materials, including small amounts of uranium (see GSN, Aug. 27). The experiments involved the use of laser isotope separation on 0.2 grams of uranium, as well as other nuclear materials such as gadolinium, talium and samarium, the South Korean government said in a statement. The experiments were conducted “as part of the research for domestic production of nuclear fuel,” Seoul said. According to the South Korean statement, the experiment involving uranium was an “isolated activity” conducted “exclusively by a few scientists.” All such activities have ended and all related equipment has been dismantled, Seoul said. The International Atomic Energy Agency said last week that South Korean officials told the agency late last month that the experiments were conducted without official approval. A Western diplomat said last week that the agency had been “concerned” for many months about the South Korean facility where the experiments took place, declining to provide further detail. There is little commercial value in laser isotope separation, suggesting that there may have been military motives behind the experiments, according to Robert Einhorn of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He also said last week, though, that it was “too early” to speculate on the experiments. The head of the South Korean governmental nuclear research institute told the New York Times yesterday that the uranium enrichment experiment was an “academic test.” “I knew there was an international agreement, but it was such a small-scale experiment, I didn’t think it would be a problem,” the Times quoted Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute President Chang In-soon as saying. “Then, we scrapped the equipment afterward. If we had ambitions, why would we scrap the equipment?” Seoul said in its statement last week that “every necessary step” was being taken to prevent further incidents. “The R.O.K [Republic of Korea] government has never had any program for enrichment or reprocessing of nuclear material, and remains in full compliance with the obligations of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear nonproliferation,” the South Korean government said. The enrichment experiments were not the first time, however, that elements of the South Korean military research complex operated without apparent government approval, according to a former U.S. government official. The official said last week that South Korean military research entities have previously conducted missile-related research activities that were not necessarily backed by Seoul. Such experiments, the official said, were conducted because of concerns over North Korea’s possession of long-range ballistic missile technology. The enrichment experiments were disclosed during discussions held Aug. 23 between IAEA and South Korean officials concerning Seoul’s first declaration to the agency since ratifying the Additional Protocol to its agency safeguards agreement. The protocol provides the U.N. agency with authority to conduct more-intrusive monitoring of a country’s nuclear efforts. IAEA inspectors completed their work in South Korea this weekend, according to reports, and are set to provide their findings to agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei this week. ElBaradei is then scheduled to report the inspectors’ findings to the IAEA Board of Governors when it meets next week. The Associated Press reported yesterday that South Korea plans to send a delegation to the IAEA headquarters in Vienna next week to further explain the experiments. “The delegation will explain that the uranium experiment was conducted by only a few scientists for purely academic purposes, and the government will seek transparency on experiment procedures from now on,” AP quoted a South Korean Foreign Ministry disarmament official as saying. While saying the experiment should not have occurred, the United States last week praised Seoul for voluntarily reporting its work. “They are cooperating fully and proactively in order to demonstrate that the activity has been eliminated and it is no longer cause for concern. Their transparency and cooperation in resolving this matter is a strong example of how states should respond in complying with their obligations under the [Nuclear] Nonproliferation Treaty,” State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said Sept. 2. Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda was quoted by Agence France-Presse as saying Friday that news of enrichment experiments was “regrettable if it is true.” “We will take a look at how discussions (among the International Atomic Energy Agency and South Korea) would go from the perspective of nuclear nonproliferation … before we pass judgment (on the issue),” he said. Boucher also said that South Korea could set an example for North Korea to disclose its alleged uranium enrichment program. While the United States has maintained that North Korea has acknowledged possessing an enrichment program along with its plutonium reprocessing efforts, Pyongyang has never officially done so. “Every example of … a nation that comes forward and says, ‘Help us get rid of this program’ is a good example. That’s happened many times over the last 10 or 15 years,” Boucher said. “That’s the kind of example, I think, that South Korea is following. And we hope that other nations would follow it as well.” Boucher rejected suggestions that the disclosure of the South Korean experiments could affect the current diplomatic efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. “We are working with other parties to achieve another round of talks by the end of September, as the parties all agreed and we don’t expect this to have any impact on that. It should not,” he said (see related GSN story, today). There has yet to be any official reaction from North Korea. Einhorn said, though, that Pyongyang may attempt to use the incident for propaganda purposes to “muddy the waters and play for time” in the nuclear negotiations. Back to top       Indian, Pakistani Officials Meet as Part of Peace Dialogue, Fail to Make Progress on Kashmir By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — India and Pakistan yesterday completed the latest round of talks held in an effort to reduce tensions between the nuclear-armed rivals, but failed to make progress on control of the disputed region of Kashmir (see GSN, July 26). During a joint press conference held at the conclusion of the two-day talks, Indian External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh said that India and Pakistan had accomplished “modest progress … worthy of respect.” He also said he had established “rapport and mutual trust” with Pakistani Foreign Minister Khurshid Mohammed Kasuri.  Singh added, though, that “we should not lose sight of the wise dictum ‘diplomacy provides hope, not salvation.’” The foreign minister talks, held in New Delhi, were the latest round in the peace dialogue India and Pakistan launched early this year with the hope of resolving their long-standing dispute over Kashmir, over which the two countries have warred three times. Over the past several months, lower-level officials have met and discussed a number of issues, reaching agreement on several nuclear risk-reduction measures such as creating a formal system of advance notification of missile tests and a nuclear “hot line” between their foreign ministers. Singh said yesterday that India and Pakistan have agreed to hold several meetings over the next few months on issues such as conventional and nuclear confidence-building measures, a railroad link between the two countries and establishing communication links between the Indian Coast Guard and the Pakistani Maritime Security Agency. Kasuri described the agreement on holding talks on conventional confidence-building measures as “one of the successes” of the talks. Teresita Schaffer, director of the South Asia program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, said today that she expected future talks on confidence-building measures would more likely “cross the Ts and dot the Is” on reviving existing measures than they would include discussion on new proposals. She also said that she hoped that any future talks would involve discussion of a proposal developed last year by a group of retired Indian and Pakistani officials on establishing nuclear risk-reduction centers in the two countries. Regarding Kashmir, Singh said yesterday that he had reiterated to Kasuri India’s long-standing concerns over cross-border terrorism. For his part, Kasuri said during yesterday’s press conference that he had told Singh of Pakistan’s human rights concerns in the region. While noting the “centrality” of the Kashmir issue, Kasuri also said that he had told Singh that Pakistan was not “unifocal.” “We know that we live in an age when — we call this a post-industrial, postmodern age — there are areas where we can cooperate. There are areas where other countries in the world are cooperating and they are doing so more successfully when the efforts are joint. I am sure there are areas where Pakistan and India can cooperate,” Kasuri said. One such area, according to Singh, is the field of energy cooperation. He said yesterday that India and Pakistan have agreed to have their ministers of petroleum and natural gas meet and discuss the issue of access to energy resources in South Asia. Such an agreement represents a change in the positions of both countries, Schaffer said, adding that it was one of the significant accomplishments of the talks. Previously, India had refused to consider any proposals on energy cooperation with Pakistan, and while Islamabad had been open to such an idea, it had not been willing to move forward without progress on Kashmir, she said. Singh said yesterday that that the next round of talks will be held between the Indian and Pakistani foreign secretaries in December. Beforehand, he said, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf are expected to meet on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly in New York. Singh also said that he had accepted an invitation from Kasuri to travel to Pakistan. Kasuri expressed hope during yesterday’s press conference that India and Pakistan would resolve their outstanding disputes, including the issue of Kashmir. “They are not intractable. I do not believe that they are intractable. Given the political will they can be resolved and they should be resolved. And that is our major guarantee for durable peace in South Asia,” he said. Back to top       New North Korea Talks Could Begin This Month The fourth round of six-nation talks over the North Korean nuclear standoff could begin around Sept. 22 in Beijing, the Kyodo News Agency reported Friday (see GSN, Aug. 27). “Beijing is currently in the process of coaxing Pyongyang to agree,” to the date, the Korea Herald quoted a diplomatic source as saying, according to Kyodo (Kyodo News Agency/Yahoo!News, Sept. 3). Chinese officials said today that they hope talks would go ahead this month as planned, Agence France-Presse reported. “There are some difficulties but these are not difficulties which have just arisen at this moment,” said Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan.  “We should work together and … have the next round before the end of September,” he added. Li Changchun, a senior Chinese Communist Party official, is set to travel to North Korea on Friday, a move seen as a final attempt to persuade Pyongyang to participate in the talks, according to AFP. “The visit will cover some regional and international issues and I think that will also include the nuclear issue,” Kong said (Agence France-Presse/SpaceWar.com, Sept. 7). Meanwhile, senior Japanese, South Korea and U.S. officials are expected to meet Thursday and Friday in Tokyo to prepare for the next round of talks, AFP reported (Agence France-Presse/SpaceWar.com, Sept. 7). South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun said Sunday that, while he remains hopeful of a diplomatic solution to the crisis, he did not expect a major breakthrough soon, Reuters reported. “We shouldn’t expect major, speedy progress in the six-party talks for a while,” Roh told MBC TV. “The issue will proceed a bit slowly during the U.S. presidential election. But it will be eventually solved peacefully, through dialogue” (Reuters, Sept. 5). Elsewhere, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization agreed yesterday to extend its suspension of the project to build two nuclear power reactors in North Korea by another year, AFP reported. The decision by board members Japan, South Korea and the United States to extend the freeze is aimed at inducing Pyongyang to completely abandon its nuclear programs, according to the Yomiuri Shimbun. The board is expected to formally adopt the agreement on Oct. 13 in New York, according to the Yomiuri (AFP/Khaleej Times, Sept. 6). Back to top       South African Police Arrest Man Suspected of Aiding Libya’s Former Nuclear Program South African authorities on Friday charged 53-year-old engineer Johan Meyer with assembling uranium enrichment centrifuges intended for Libya’s former nuclear weapons program (see GSN, Aug. 27). Meyer was arrested last week at his engineering company about 50 miles south of Johannesburg. Meyer’s arrest was the third this year of a South African resident on nuclear weapons-related charges, the New York Times reported. Meyer was arraigned Friday on charges of violating two South African nuclear nonproliferation laws, the Times reported. He produced, imported and exported materials from November 2000 to November 2001 for the “design, development, manufacture, deployment, maintenance or use in weapons of mass destruction,” according to court records. Beginning in 2000, Meyer also allegedly possessed equipment and plans for making gas centrifuges that could be used to produce weapon-grade highly enriched uranium, according to the Times. Meyer did not enter a plea and will be held until a hearing to set bail scheduled for Wednesday. Heinrich Badenhorst, Meyer’s defense attorney, said that his client “at this stage” denies the charges. U.S. diplomats in South Africa said the arrest helped dismantle the international nuclear network revealed early this year by a top Pakistani nuclear scientist who confessed to transferring nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea (Michael Wines, New York Times, Sept. 4). The International Atomic Energy Agency said yesterday that it had sent a team of inspectors to South Africa as part of its investigation into the international nuclear network, according to Agence France-Presse (Agence France-Presse, Sept. 6). South African authorities over the weekend also confiscated 11 containers during a raid on Meyer’s home, AFP reported. The South African newspaper Beeld said officials working with IAEA investigators dismantled a suspected uranium enrichment plant, and that plans and pictures of an enrichment plant were also found at the home (Agence France-Presse, SpaceWar.com, Sept. 6). Back to top       Sandia Resumes CREM Functions Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico last week resumed using classified data storage devices, laboratory officials announced (see GSN, July 28). Deputy Energy Secretary Kyle McSlarrow approved the restart on Aug. 31. The decision came six weeks after Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham ordered a department-wide stand-down, process review and inventory for all activities involving Classified Removable Electronic Media after two computer disks were reported missing at Los Alamos National Laboratory. “We took this time to check and double check our holdings and further improve our security and accounting procedures for CREM,” said Sandia Vice President for Security Ron Detry. Classified Removable Electronic Media can include removable hard drives, computer memory disks, laptop computers and other electronic media (Sandia National Laboratories release, Sept. 1). Back to top       U.S. Studies Microwave Technology for HEU Casting The U.S. Department of Energy is testing microwave technology for casting highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons at its Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee for use in nuclear weapons, the Associated Press reported Sunday. “This is a promising use of microwave technology, and it is likely to be used in a new production facility,” said DOE spokeswoman DiAnn Fields. The microwave facilities would be “much smaller” than the current casting facilities and would improve nuclear safety and energy efficiency, according to Y-12 officials (Associated Press/WKRN.com, Sept. 5). Back to top

Argentina Hosts Chemical Export Control Meeting A three-day meeting on customs-related aspects of the Chemical Weapons Convention opened yesterday in Argentina yesterday, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons announced (see GSN, July 19). Hosted by the organization and the government of Argentina, the meeting includes more than 95 participants from 49 treaty parties and several international organizations, according to a press statement (OPCW release, Sept. 7). Talks are targeted “essentially at the probe of the customs control on the imports and exports of chemical substances,” according to the Argentine Foreign Ministry (Xinhua News Agency, Sept. 7). Back to top

Missile Defense Might Need Iraq, Afghanistan Bases By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — A U.S. national missile defense system may someday require interceptor bases in Iraq and Afghanistan to defend against long-range Iranian ballistic missiles, according to a congressional study published this summer. The Congressional Budget Office study “Alternatives for Boost-Phase Missile Defense” in July concluded that several factors — including limits to the maximum speed of U.S. interceptor missiles, Iran’s size, and the time needed to make decisions — could create the need to base missile interceptors just east and west of Iran for a comprehensive land-based, boost-phase defense. “If two launch sites were needed, they could be located in Iraq to the east and Afghanistan to the west,” it says. Securing permission for foreign basing could therefore be essential for providing an effective boost-phase defense against Iran, the study says. “Surface-based BPI [boost-phase intercept] systems would need to be deployed to sites in countries adjacent to the threat country being covered, which would require permission from the host nations. … In the case of missile defense, being denied basing access could complicate BPI efforts to the point of rendering them infeasible,” it says. If the United States were to develop extremely fast missile interceptors that could travel eight to 10 kilometers per second, then Iranian missiles could be shot down from bases in just two countries: Iraq and Afghanistan, the study says. To defend against Iranian missiles using the slower interceptor technology under development, however, could require adding missile defense sites in Turkmenistan and in the waters of the Persian Gulf or the Gulf of Oman, according to the study. U.S. access to basing in Turkmenistan or Azerbaijan is “less assured” than the other sites, the report says. “The CBO report comes to the same conclusion as the American Physical Society report a year earlier. And in both cases, what they point out is that for boost-phase missile defense to work, you the defender have got to be very close and very fast,” said Philip Coyle of the Center for Defense Information (see GSN, July 15). “And so it doesn’t work if the country that you’re worried about is very large and Iran is big enough so that you can’t cover all of Iran from one place. You sort of have to surround it.” No Deployment Plans Indicated The Bush administration is pursuing multiple, different technological approaches for defending the U.S. homeland against ICBMs: boost-phase defenses, which strike enemy missiles soon after they launch; midcourse defenses, which attack enemy warheads in space; and terminal defenses, which attack them as warheads near their targets. The administration plans on deploying some components of a midcourse system this year, and fielding elements of a boost-phase system in the Pacific by next year for future defense against a potential North Korean capability. Officials have not disclosed any plans for positioning a boost-phase defense against Iran. The CBO study said Iran and North Korea were chosen for its analysis as “representative threats.” Iran was identified, though, by the U.S. intelligence community in a 2001 report as the most likely southwest Asian ICBM threat to emerge, with the potential for developing a capability by 2015. The Bush administration in a budget document this year indicated plans to develop and demonstrate anti-ICBM boost-phase missile defenses by 2008 and 2009. Assumptions The CBO study assessed the costs and technical trade-offs of five options — three ground- and sea-based and two space-based — for boost-phase defenses against theoretical Iranian and North Korean capabilities. It concluded that costs to develop and operate a surface-based, boost-phase defense for 20 years could range from $16 billion to $37 billion and for space-based, $27 billion to $78 billion. Those figures, however, included a number of assumptions, according to the Congressional Budget Office. For instance, the office assessed a limited ground-based defense against 30 ICBMs for both countries. The surface-based options assume buying 112 interceptors and deploying 60 of them, with 52 reserved for tests and spares. The office assumed that such a force would allow for an attempted defense against 30 ICBMs, assigning two interceptors per ICBM. More interceptors could be required to address the potential that an adversary might expand its ICBM arsenal, or fire decoys to waste U.S. interceptors, the study says. “The threat country could try to saturate a defensive site by launching more than three ICBMs or some combination of actual ICBMs and decoys intended to draw BPI fire,” it says. Low effectiveness of the interceptors once developed also could affect the cost, with greater production and deployment needed to increase the probability for success. In addition, greater numbers of faster interceptors and more bases near Iran could be required to defend against faster solid-fuel missiles, were Iran to develop those. “If the enemy figures out how to build solid-fueled [missiles] … it’s almost impossible” to defend against them with a ground-based system, Coyle said. Defense Considerations The CBO calculations also do not factor for the potential cost of protecting the interceptor bases. The study says that the bases themselves would need to be defended against short- to medium-range Iranian missiles. “Short-range ballistic missiles or cruise missiles, as well as attack aircraft, from that country could reach a BPI surface site. Consequently, the site might require its own defenses, such as Patriot missiles for air defense and a ground force for perimeter defense,” it says. For the purposes of its analysis, the study assumes the sites would be located about 100 kilometers away from the borders of Iran, so that they “would be out of range of artillery or unguided rockets.” Back to top       PAC-3 Passes Intercept Test The U.S. Army’s Patriot Advanced Capability 3 missile defense system destroyed two targets during a test Thursday in New Mexico, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Aug. 13). The exercise tested the PAC-3 with hardware changes designed to reduce missile cost and improve its production, officials with the U.S. Army Program Executive Office of Air and Missile Defense in Huntsville, Ala. “The test also demonstrated the system’s capability to detect, track, engage and intercept a short-range tactical ballistic missile target and a low-altitude cruise missile target,” the office said in a statement (Associated Press/San Angelo Standard-Times, Sept. 3). Back to top       Israeli Early Warning Satellite Launch Fails Israel yesterday lost a satellite intended to monitor Iran’s ballistic missile efforts due to a rocket malfunction during takeoff, Israeli officials said (see GSN, Aug. 12). The Ofek-6 satellite was also intended to be an early warning device in the event of a surprise missile attack, according to the New York Times. It landed in the Mediterranean Sea. Israel said it plans to attempt the launch again in a few months (Steven Erlanger, New York Times, Sept. 7).     Back to top