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Russia Needs to Play Greater Leadership Role in Nonproliferation, Abraham Says By Mike Nartker WASHINGTON — Russia needs to “take on a larger share of responsibility” in nuclear nonproliferation efforts, U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham said yesterday (see GSN, Jan. 7). Noting the improving Russian economy, Abraham called on Moscow to increase its own funding of domestic and international nonproliferation efforts. Doing so would demonstrate Russia’s commitment to such projects and illustrate that they are “permanently sustainable,” he said. “The maintenance of the security programs in the Russian Federation is a permanent challenge, a permanent, ongoing cost into the future,” Abraham said in remarks here hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations. “It would be very comforting to know that these programs would be sustainable regardless of what external resources are made available because the Russian Federation, you know, was taking a greater level of responsibility for them because those are not one-time costs; they’re ongoing costs,” he said. Abraham also called on Russia to allow increased U.S. access to sensitive nuclear and radiological facilities in order to meet a 2008 target deadline for completing security upgrades throughout the country’s nuclear weapons complex (see GSN, Dec. 21, 2004). “We’re still working to gain access to some of these facilities in Russia that, in my judgment, need to be addressed sooner rather than later. It is imperative that the Russian Federation work together with us to quickly resolve outstanding questions about access to these sites so that we can get this job done to ensure that terrorists are cut off from these locations and this material,” he said. U.S. efforts to improve the security of Russian nuclear weapons and radioactive materials, Abraham said, have provided “a lot of positive, tangible evidence that we can engage … in the safeguards program and safety programs at sensitive sites without creating any difficulties for the Russian Federation’s host facilities or their security considerations more generally.” To date, the Energy Department has completed security upgrades on more than 300 metric tons of weapon-usable materials in Russia and at about 70 percent of the sites where such material is located, according to Abraham (see GSN, Dec. 13, 2004). The dispute over access to sensitive locations is one of several lingering issues between the United States and Russia that have hampered efforts to improve the security of Russian nuclear sites. Last month, U.S. President George W. Bush publicly suggested providing Russia with equal access to U.S. nuclear storage sites. Bush’s comments came a month after a high-level delegation from Russia’s Federal Atomic Energy Agency visited several U.S. nuclear sites to discuss best practices and to see how the United States protects nuclear materials. Abraham also hinted that progress could be made “in the months ahead” on another lingering U.S.-Russian dispute concerning liability protections for U.S. workers in the event of an accident or sabotage at a Russian facility. The dispute led to the end in 2003 of the Energy Department’s Nuclear Cities Initiative, which sought to aid the restructuring of the Russian nuclear weapons complex; and has stalled a U.S.-Russian project to eliminate almost 70 tons of weapon-grade plutonium. While declining to comment on the state of negotiations on the liability issue, Abraham said, “I’m not just speculating here, I really believe there is a basis to be cautiously optimistic, based on the current status of both our viewpoints and those of the Russian Federation.” Russia also needs to accelerate efforts to retrieve spent Russian-origin fuel from foreign research reactors, Abraham said. The project is part of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, an effort launched last year to secure stockpiles of nuclear and radiological materials around the world. As part of the initiative, the United States plans to aid the repatriation of all Russian-origin fresh reactor fuel by the end of next year and all Russian-origin spent fuel by 2010 (see GSN, Dec. 23, 2004). While progress has been made on the repatriation of Russian-origin fresh research reactor fuel, with more than 100 kilograms returned from six countries, Russia has yet to accept spent fuel, citing the need to conduct an environmental assessment before each shipment. Abraham called on Moscow yesterday, however, to conduct “a programmatic or at least regional approach to the environmental review process.” In his remarks, Abraham praised the relationship that has developed between the Energy Department and its Russian counterpart, now known as Rosatom. “I don’t think that there is any stronger direct relationship between our department and any counterpart in the world than exists with regard to the … Rosatom directorate in the Russian Federation,” he said. Radiological Security, International Atomic Energy Agency ReformAbraham yesterday also called for greater international focus on improving the security of radioactive materials that could be used to make so-called “dirty bombs,” which use conventional explosives to disperse radioactive materials (see GSN, Jan. 3). Noting that low-level materials that have medical and industrial uses could also be used in a dirty bomb, Abraham said that as efforts progress to secure weapon-grade materials, terrorists may become even more interested in developing radiological weapons. “Given the breadth of the challenge, it is clear that guarding against the threat of RDDs [radiological dispersal devices] simply cannot succeed without the active participation of as many nations as possible,” he said. In addition, Abraham cited the need to reform two of the main aspects of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime — the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The examples of Iran and North Korea’s separate suspected nuclear weapons programs has cast “doubt” on the effectiveness of both, he said (see related GSN stories, today). “Presently, we seem to have meeting after meeting on topics of serious concern, only to put matters off to the next meeting. And that must change,” Abraham said. “We must take appropriate steps to ensure that the nonproliferation tools contained in the NPT are effective, and that the treaty’s members have the political will to ensure that no nation can exploit the treaty to its own advantage,” he added. Abraham was referring to concerns by the Bush administration that would-be nuclear weapons states would seek to develop weapons programs under the guise of civilian nuclear power work. In response to such concerns, the Bush administration has called for a ban on the export of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies to those countries that do not already possess them in exchange for guarantees of reliable access to nuclear power plant fuel. Within the IAEA Board of Governors, there needs to be “a more efficient and effective mechanism” for dealing with countries seemingly in violation of the treaty, Abraham said. Such a process should either result in “compliance with nonproliferation obligations” or “swift action,” he said. Abraham’s criticism of the U.N. nuclear watchdog was in apparent reference to the IAEA board’s handling last year of Iran’s nuclear program, which despite pressure by the United States, was not referred to the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions. “The reality is that the IAEA Board of Governors must serve as an instrument for guaranteeing the safety and security of its members, not merely as a debating club, and not as a convenient protective shield for those who in reality might jeopardize the world’s safety,” he said.
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