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Ivanov Rejects Claims of Russian Loose Nukes From Friday, January 14, 2005 issue.

Ivanov Rejects Claims of Russian Loose Nukes

By Jim Wurst
Global Security Newswire

NEW YORK — It is a “myth” that Russia does not have control over its nuclear weapons, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said last night (see GSN, July 8, 2004).

“There has not been a single loose nuke case on the record, not as little as a gram’s worth of weapons-grade uranium or plutonium has been lost,” he said.

Speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations, Ivanov said keeping weapons of mass destruction off the black market is a priority for Russia.

“To counter this danger, it is essential to make concerted action that will serve as an added practical mechanism for reinforcing the existing system for nonproliferation,” he said. Ivanov said that existing cooperation on this issue with the United States means “we are not even partners, our relations here are very close to allies.”

Nuclear safety and security exercises last year in Russia, which were overseen by NATO countries, “proved that Russia was capable of ensuring dependable controls, safe custody, and security at nuclear facilities,” Ivanov said. He called the exercises “another testimonial to the Russian capability both to reliably safeguard its nuclear facilities and weapons and to ensure their full safety and security” (see GSN, Aug. 3, 2004).

Ivanov’s claims that no material has ever been lost are strongly disputed by nonproliferation experts.

“He’s wrong,” said Matthew Bunn of Harvard University’s Managing the Atom project. “There have been multiple, well-documented cases of theft of real weapon-usable highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium over the last decade.”

In addition, Bunn cited a 1992 case in which a worker stole 1.5 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium from a facility near Moscow.

“He was convicted and has repeatedly described to the press exactly what he did and how and why. So the notion that this kind of thing hasn’t happened is just plain false,” Bunn said (see GSN, Sept. 16, 2004).

On other topics, Ivanov dismissed rumors that conservatives in the Russian military and industry “secretly shipped WMD components to Iraq or Iran” are “complete nonsense.”

“The mythology demonizing Russia as a habitual proliferator is being trumpeted not only in action movies … but is already being used by some fortune seekers to cash in on it.” As an example, he said that he has reports of Russian containers containing weapon-grade nuclear material being found in Afghanistan. Ivanov said his talk was the first public mention of the claim, which he called “nonsense.”

When asked if Russia would agree to accelerate the Cooperative Threat Reduction program — designed to secure former Soviet nuclear and unconventional weapons — Ivanov said Russia still had concerns about the program but that “the project so far works. … We are eager to cooperate.”

Ivanov said there are areas of cooperation possible within the joint NATO-Russia Council. The plan for 2005 lists “the most promising areas of cooperation,” including tactical missile defenses, nonproliferation of WMD and delivery vehicles, crisis management, and counterterrorism.

When asked if Russia would destroy the nuclear missiles it is due to decommission under the Strategic Offense Reductions Treaty with the United States, he said, “on a reciprocity basis … yes.” The treaty only requires the parties to reduce their stockpiles of deployed nuclear warheads to 2,200 each by the end of 2012.

“Above all, strategic stability in today’s world is inseparable from the reductions in strategic offense arms,” Ivanov said.

Ivanov acknowledged there are fields where the two powers do not see eye-to-eye.

“We cannot but have some concerns about possible plans to deploy U.S. silo-based antimissile launchers in Eastern Europe,” he said. “To say the least, the choice of the deployment area for such a [missile intercept] system” for the United States “is rather arguable” (see GSN, Oct. 18, 2004).

“It would substantially undermine the work on theater missile defense programs” by the NATO-Russia Council, Ivanov said, “as well as having an adverse impact on the entire system of Euro-Atlantic security.”

On North Korea, he said Washington and Moscow agree that Pyongyang’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty “runs counter to international efforts in nuclear nonproliferation” and that the country should rejoin the treaty. However, any efforts should be diplomatic through the six-party talks, he added.

“The military pressure scenario on North Korea is unacceptable to us because it’s likely to spark off a regional conflict right on our borders,” he said.

Ivanov said there were also differences over the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, “but I won’t stress that point.”


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