U.S. Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman, pictured yesterday at the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, said that the United Sates plans to eliminate 200 metric tons of highly enriched uranium from its nuclear weapons stockpile. The project is expected to occur “in the coming decades,” his department said (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace photograph). U.S. Declares Massive HEU Elimination Over Decades By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The United States is planning to eliminate 200 metric tons of highly enriched uranium from its nuclear weapons stockpile, converting most of it into fuel for the U.S. Navy, a senior government official said yesterday (see GSN, April 5). Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman said the material would be freed up as a result of a Bush administration decision in May to cut the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal, unofficially estimated at about 10,000 warheads, by nearly half...Full Story

Nuclear “Fuel Bank” Advances, Top U.S. Official Says By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The United States is increasing efforts to set up a nuclear “fuel bank” intended to dissuade additional countries from embarking on proliferation-sensitive fuel-production activities, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph said here yesterday (see GSN, Nov. 7)...Full Story

India-U.S. Nuclear Deal Waits on Safeguards Plan By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The United States government is waiting for India to produce a “credible, defensible” plan for separating military and civilian nuclear facilities before pressing forward with a potential nuclear technology transfer deal, a State Department official said yesterday (see GSN, Nov. 3)...Full Story

	Tuesday, November 8, 2005

Nations Must Declare Global War Against Weapons of Mass Destruction, Experts Say By Chris Schneidmiller Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The attention paid by the United States to the threat of nuclear terrorism does not match the danger that someone will detonate an atomic bomb on U.S. soil, experts said yesterday (see GSN, Oct. 28). “We have a global war on terror, but we do not have a global war on weapons of mass destruction,” Harvard University science and international affairs professor Ashton Carter said during a panel discussion at the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference on preventing nuclear terrorism. Speakers focused their comments on nuclear and biological weapons — “those that have the greatest potential to cause the greatest harm,” according to moderator Jon Wolfsthal, a nonproliferation fellow at the Center for International and Strategic Studies. While they offered some glimpses of hope, the overall tone was downbeat. The United States has made significant efforts since the Sept. 11 attacks to safeguard itself from terrorism through spending increases, intelligence reform, creation of the Homeland Security Department and other activities. It has not made similar strides against unconventional weapons, said Carter, co-director of the Preventive Defense Project at Harvard and Stanford universities. President George W. Bush in a 2004 debate with then challenger Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.) identified WMD terrorism as the greatest threat facing the United States (see GSN, Oct. 1, 2004). However, his administration continues to spend far more on missile defense than it does on blocking terrorists from obtaining nuclear material, said U.S. Representative Adam Schiff (D-Calif.) “We know that Osama bin Laden wants the bomb. We know that he has expressed his desire to have an American Hiroshima,” Schiff said. “If al-Qaeda is the No. 1 suspect, then the most likely delivery system is not a missile but a crate.” The greatest and possibly only real impediment to an act of nuclear terror is in obtaining the plutonium or highly enriched uranium needed for a weapon. The know-how to build a bomb is already out there and radiation sensors or other measures should not be counted on to prevent someone from smuggling a bomb into the United States, Schiff said. Since only nations are able to produce weaponizable nuclear fuel, the question of deterring terrorism is inextricably tied to nonproliferation, speakers said. The more nations that have nuclear weapons, the more likely it becomes that nuclear materials could end up in the wrong hands. Carter noted the past and present troubles experienced by nuclear powers. The Soviet Union collapsed into multiple independent nations. North Korea cannot sustain itself in its present level of impoverishment, he said.  “Pakistan I worry about every single day. You’d hardly describe that as a stable situation,” he said. President Gen. Pervez Musharraf has survived several assassination attempts by militants in his country. The Bush administration has had a “relaxed attitude” to nuclear proliferation among certain nations, said panelist Rose Gottemoeller, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. While it has vehemently opposed suspected weapons programs in nations Iran and North Korea, the White House could be willing to give a pass to an ally such as Japan should it seek nuclear weapons status, she said.  Another theme in the White House is that “nuclear weapons create a rush to stability,” Gottemoeller said. If Iran produced an atomic bomb, its neighbors could seek the same weaponry and thereby cancel out the threat posed by Tehran. The detente between nuclear rivals Pakistan and India is held up as an example of this successful balance. Gottemoeller argued, though, that the world cannot afford further proliferation of nuclear weapons and fissile material. While the likelihood of an act of nuclear terrorism is small, the results would be so devastating on a global level that the danger must be addressed, she said. She questioned who would have access to atomic materials should Musharraf be deposed or killed in Pakistan, or if the government of a nuclear Iran were to fall. “These are stark examples but they show we must be cautious about seeking some ephemeral stability involving nuclear weapons,” Gottemoeller said. Speakers gave some time for positive thoughts on nonproliferation. Schiff noted increases in funding for U.S. programs and the geographic expansion and easing of restrictions for the Cooperative Threat Reduction program to eliminate weapons of mass destruction (see GSN, July 22). Leaders should focus on nation-level nuclear prevention and use the tools at hand, Gottemoeller said. She used as an example North Korea — a known proliferator of missile technology that is operating what Carter called a “runaway” nuclear program. Should Pyongyang agree in the six-party talks to eliminate its weapons program there are resources within the United States and in other countries that could support efforts to carry out that goal, Gottemoeller said. The experience that the United States and Russia gained in devising nuclear threat-reduction programs following the breakup of the Soviet Union could be put to work in dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program. However, a similar level of cooperation cannot necessarily be expected given the deep mistrust between Washington and Pyongyang, Gottemoeller said. A program of “scientist to scientist” exchanges of expertise could build confidence between the two nations, she said. Leaders should also look to countries outside the six-party process for support in creating a North Korea without nuclear weapons, Gottemoeller said. Kazakhstan, for example, has historical and cultural ties to North Korea along with experience in removing nuclear fuel from reactors and then shutting down facilities. “I think there’s good news out there. I think we are actually very well positioned to work successfully with North Korea assuming that we can build up a level of mutual confidence fairly quickly and proceed to some actual threat-reduction projects,” Gottemoeller said. “As we know from our experience working with North Korea in the 1990s this will not be easy, but it will be possible.” If nuclear terrorism must be blocked at the source of the material, the answer to biological weapons is more likely to be found at the site of the attack, Carter said. Pathogens such as anthrax or botulism occur in nature, meaning terrorists cannot be barred from them. The objective then must be to heighten the ability of governments and emergency personnel to detect, contain and treat a biological agent before it can spread, Carter said. Infectious and parasitic diseases killed 14.9 million people worldwide in 2001, nearly 4 million more than runner-up killer heart disease, Princeton University astrophysics and international affairs professor Christopher Chyba said in his presentation. Al-Qaeda is known to be interested in biological weapons, he said, and the technological capability that would enable an attack is progressing rapidly past the point in which it is only available to nations. There have only been a handful of actual biological attacks, Chyba said. He noted the Aum Shinrikyo’s failed effort to spread anthrax around Tokyo, two years before its successful 1995 sarin attacks on the city’s subway system. “We should be careful not to suggest that such attacks are somehow inevitable. … You have to [prepare the weapon] in the laboratory without killing yourself and your colleagues,” Chyba said. There is no “silver bullet” against a biological attack, Chyba said. Rather, a “web of prevention” is needed. That will require international efforts, he said. Chyba called U.N. Security Council resolution 1540, which requires member nations to outlaw WMD prevention and to take measures to safeguard dangerous pathogens from misuse, “a step in the right direction.” Carter said he wants the U.S. president 10 years from now to be able to tell the nation that the danger of nuclear terrorism had been eradicated, and that any biological attack would “fizzle” in the face of an overwhelming response. Sixty years after the proposal of the first international controls on nuclear weapons, Carter said he foresees two possible worlds 60 years in the future. In one there is no risk of nuclear terrorism, in the other dangerous people have access to fissile materials. “That’s the path we’re on, I fear, for 60 years from now,” Carter said. Back to top

U.S. Declares Massive HEU Elimination Over Decades By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The United States is planning to eliminate 200 metric tons of highly enriched uranium from its nuclear weapons stockpile, converting most of it into fuel for the U.S. Navy, a senior government official said yesterday (see GSN, April 5). Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman said the material would be freed up as a result of a Bush administration decision in May to cut the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal, unofficially estimated at about 10,000 warheads, by nearly half. “That decision enables us to dispose of a significant amount of weapons-grade nuclear material,” he said here during the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference. The 200 metric tons of highly enriched uranium is the equivalent of 8,000 nuclear warheads, he said. There was no immediate explanation for how the administration would obtain that much material as it does not appear to be eliminating that 8,000 warheads. Bodman said 160 metric tons of the uranium would be put to use in powering U.S. Navy nuclear ships and submarines. The “swords-to-plowshares” plan, Bodman said, would “have the added benefit of postponing the need for construction of a new uranium high-enriched facility [for producing Navy fuel] for at least 50 years.” An additional 20 of the 200 metric tons would be reserved for space missions and for research reactors that currently use highly enriched uranium pending their conversion to low-enriched uranium, he said. The final 20 metric tons of highly enriched uranium would be converted to low-enriched uranium for use in civilian nuclear power reactors or research reactors, he said. Time Frame: Decades Bodman did not give a time frame for the removal to occur. An Energy Department press release yesterday however said the “up to” 200 metric tons would be removed from the stockpile “in the coming decades.” The United States, through a program called “Megatons to Megawatts,” has blended down as of last month 250 of a planned 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons, Bodman said. “That’s the equivalent of 10,000 Russian warheads rendered harmless,” he said, leading to the production of low-enriched uranium “available for use in American civil nuclear reactors.” Bodman said the 200 metric tons would be the largest amount of special fissile material ever removed from the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. He called the plan “both an energy security triumph and a nonproliferation triumph.” The government could have gone further, according to Stephen Young, a senior analyst in Washington for the Union of Concerned Scientists. “This is a positive outcome of the U.S. decision to reduce its Cold War-sized arsenal, but a better outcome would be to find ways to eliminate all use of HEU and downblend it, rather than saving it for submarine reactor fuel,” he stated by e-mail.  Back to top       Nuclear “Fuel Bank” Advances, Top U.S. Official Says By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The United States is increasing efforts to set up a nuclear “fuel bank” intended to dissuade additional countries from embarking on proliferation-sensitive fuel-production activities, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph said here yesterday (see GSN, Nov. 7). The idea was a hot topic on the first day of the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference: Joseph’s lunchtime remarks followed a morning presentation in which International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei extolled the virtues of a fuel-bank system and suggested the system’s framework could be in place next year. “The United States is now working with supplier states and the IAEA to develop a mechanism,” Joseph said. “This is something that we have as an administration made a priority recently.” The U.N. nuclear agency under the proposal would serve in what Joseph called an “intermediary” role in fuel exchanges between nuclear haves and have-nots. The approach would assure nuclear fuel for the energy programs of countries without fuel-production facilities in return for their commitment not to seek uranium-enrichment or plutonium-separation technology. The United States in September offered 17 metric tons of highly enriched uranium to be blended down into reactor fuel for the system (see GSN, Sept. 27). Joseph said the United States would hold the uranium “in reserve,” adding, “We encourage other supplier states to create such reserves as well.” Joseph dismissed a questioner’s suggestion that non-nuclear-weapon countries would require not just fuel assurances but also new disarmament commitments by nuclear powers in exchange for a commitment to forgo pursuit of enrichment and reprocessing technology. The undersecretary said the United States complies with its commitment to work toward disarmament under Article 6 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. “I think Article 6 needs to progress as it has, and I think the United States has a very good record on Article 6,” he said. Joseph Reviews Libya Breakthrough, Offers Lessons Joseph listed what he saw as the main motivations for Libya’s decision in 2003 to give up its WMD programs, a subject he was researching before President George W. Bush tapped him early this year to replace now-U.N. Ambassador John Bolton in the State Department post. Joseph portrayed Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qadhafi’s decision as a complex one that was based in part on Qadhafi’s fear that Libya could soon meet with the same fate as Iraq, which the United States had recently invaded. “The fact that we were deploying hundreds of thousands of forces to the region … had to have an impact,” Joseph said. Other motivations, he said, included a desire to have long-standing sanctions lifted; a new general view of WMD programs as a detriment to, rather than an enhancement of, Libya’s security; the U.S.-spearheaded interception of the BBC China in 2003 as it carried nuclear-centrifuge parts to Libya; fear that Islamic extremists could threaten the Libyan government; and Qadhafi’s desire to leave a “legacy” that included renouncing weapons of mass destruction. The first lesson of the Libyan saga, Joseph said, is that “you have to project a sense of seriousness in combating weapons of mass destruction.” He also named the importance of secrecy in negotiations and the need to ensure a “win-win” outcome as lessons for future such cases. Back to top       India-U.S. Nuclear Deal Waits on Safeguards Plan By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The United States government is waiting for India to produce a “credible, defensible” plan for separating military and civilian nuclear facilities before pressing forward with a potential nuclear technology transfer deal, a State Department official said yesterday (see GSN, Nov. 3). “We expect and have indicated to the government of India’s that India’s separation of its civil and military nuclear infrastructure must be conducted in a credible and transparent manner. It must be defensible from a nonproliferation standpoint,” Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nuclear Nonproliferation Andrew Semmel said during the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference. “Many of our international partners have indicated that they view this as a necessary precondition and that they will not be able to support civil nuclear cooperation with India otherwise,” he said. U.S. President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced the planned deal on July 18. Semmel called “complex” the prospective timing of India’s movement to place civilian nuclear facilities under international safeguards, in relation to White House efforts to change U.S. law to allow nuclear trade with India and to amend Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) rules barring trade with countries lacking comprehensive safeguards. The proposed deal does not require India to eliminate its military nuclear program and place all facilities under international safeguards. “India understands that the NSG and the U.S. Congress are waiting for it to present a credible, defensible and transparent plan for separating civilian and military facilities,” he said. “We expect that India would do this.” “We intend to work with India over the coming weeks and months to develop with India a plan acceptable to the international community,” Semmel said. Consultations with Congress Still Pending House International Relations Committee staff member David Fite, speaking on a panel with Semmel on the India agreement, said the administration still has not begun formal consultations with Congress on the potential deal. “Consultation hasn’t actually formally begun. Communication is beginning to improve slightly,” he said. The July 18 agreement was “declared without any congressional consultation at all. They didn’t ask us what we thought about what was presented and we still don’t know entirely what the administration intends to do with this,” he said. Fite, a staffer from the minority Democrats, many of whom appear to support the deal, said Congress does yet not know what sorts of legislative changes the administration is considering that would allow U.S. nuclear technology transfers to India to occur. “It would be a good idea for the administration to seek our input before it commits to a particular option. The administration unfortunately has had a tendency on major issues to decide what it wants to do, send it up to Congress and basically invite us to meet it on the floor,” he said. Last week, Undersecretary of State Robert Joseph told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that more intensive consultations with Congress would begin soon. Fite said Congress was “stunned” to see recent administration predictions the deal could be finalized by February. “I think if we get it done by the end of this Congress, we will be proceeding at warp speed.” Deal-Threatening Conditions Possible Fite said Congress might seek to attach conditions to the deal beyond those negotiated by the White House and the Indian government. Some analysts have suggested, for instance, India be required to end production of weapon-grade fissile material. “I believe so long as the Indians make a credible effort to separate civil and military facilities and place them under nonvoluntary safeguards and live up to all the other obligations that they have put in, then I think the agreement will pass Congress,” he said. “The question is in what form. And the second question is how long will it last?” he said. Any move by New Delhi to reverse its International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors vote finding Iran noncompliant with international nuclear safeguards — as recently suggested by a former Indian official — could kill congressional support for the deal, Fite said. “If India is not supportive of the United States and Europeans on Iran nonproliferation policy, the agreement’s going to have a very difficult time in the Congress,” he said.  Joseph said last week that any conditions added by Congress or other Nuclear Suppliers Group members could kill the deal. “We would urge both Congress and our international partners to avoid the temptation to renegotiate the deal,” he said.  “Based on our interaction with the Indian government, we believe such additional conditions would likely prove to be deal breakers.” Fite said he believes Bush could bypass Congress and simply waive legal restrictions on transfers to countries lacking full-scope nuclear safeguards of all facilities. Bush could make “certifications that to prevent such exports from going to India would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of U.S. nonproliferation objectives,” he said. “He does, I think, have the authority to do this,” Fite said, but added there is doubt the administration could meet the legal standard of “seriously prejudicial.” Back to top       Perry Sees Unsettled U.S. Policy on North Korea By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The failure of international talks this week on North Korea’s nuclear programs would lead to the latest in a 50-year series of nuclear crises between Washington and Pyongyang, former U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry said last night (see GSN, Nov. 7). Perry described U.S. President George W. Bush’s administration as sharply divided on North Korea and expressed concern that, unless the conciliatory camp in the administration holds sway, a “sixth nuclear crisis” between the two countries could arrive next year. “We do not have a single position in the U.S. government at this point,” Perry said during a dinner speech at the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference. “Much rides on the talks that start this week in Beijing.” The countries reached an agreement in principle in September under which North Korea would dismantle nuclear programs in exchange for aid from the United States and the other negotiating nations. Since then, the two sides have indicated contradictory positions on the meaning of the agreement, and U.S. officials are divided over whether to push for human-rights and conventional-weapons concessions from North Korea in addition to a nuclear promise. Perry expressed support for top Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, Washington’s top envoy to the talks, calling the September aid offer the first “relevant” U.S. proposal under Bush. “I hope he continues to exceed his instructions,” Perry said of Hill. The ex-defense chief narrated a history of U.S.-North Korean “nuclear crises” dating back to pressures within the U.S. government to use nuclear weapons during the Korean War.  The United States was “within a few months” of reaching an agreement with North Korea at the end of Bill Clinton’s term as president, said Clinton appointee Perry. Upon taking office in 2000, Bush brushed aside then-Secretary of State Colin Powell’s plan to continue the Clinton efforts and instead cut off contact with Pyongyang, he said. Perry voiced particular concern about the potential for nuclear terrorism using North Korean weapons. “If North Korea proceeds unchecked with building a nuclear arsenal,” he said, “the risk significantly increases of terrorists’ obtaining a nuclear bomb.” Iran is as big a problem as North Korea, but the latter is “the most imminent danger” to international security, Perry said. “It is a problem that is upon us right now,” he said. Back to top       Japan, South Korea, U.S. to Present “Road Map” for Dismantling North Korea’s Nuclear Programs Negotiators in the six-party talks will press North Korea to accept a phased approach to dismantling its nuclear programs, top Japanese envoy Kenichiro Sasae said yesterday upon arrival in Beijing for this week’s round of negotiations (see GSN, Nov. 7). Japan, South Korea and the United States plan to present a “road map” for dismantlement and corresponding rewards, the Asahi Shimbun reported. The plan would include a schedule of verification measures, Asahi cited South Korean diplomatic sources as saying. Top North and South Korean negotiators met for more than 90 minutes yesterday, AFP reported. “We have had constructive and in-depth talks about how to implement the joint statement” produced at the last set of negotiations, said head North Korean delegate Kim Kye Gwan.  Official six-party talks were set to begin today. Interfax quoted a North Korean official reiterating Pyongyang’s demand for a light-water nuclear reactor, normalized relations with the United States and other assistance while it disarms (Agence France-Presse/SpaceWar.com, Nov. 8). Another official echoed those demands, Reuters reported. “The fair resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula and in particular the prospect of the fifth round of six-party talks depend entirely on the U.S. attitude to implementing its obligations of ending nuclear threats and the provision of light-water reactors in line with the joint statement of the fourth round of six-party talks,” North Korean Ambassador to the United Nations Pak Gil Yon said yesterday (Irwin Arieff, Reuters, Nov. 7). North Korea is unlikely to make real concessions at this week’s talks, one analyst predicted. “I don’t think they’re serious about progress yet,” said Peter Beck, Seoul-based director of the Northeast Asia Project for the International Crisis Group. “Washington has no choice but to go along with this charade.” North Korean leader Kim Jong Il told visiting Chinese President Hu Jintao last month that he was committed to the six-party talks. However, Hu’s economic aid pledge might have relieved some pressure on North Korea to reach a deal on eliminating its nuclear program, Beck said. China was also cautious about expectations for the meeting. “I do not think that progress of the talks needs to be measured by the signing of a document,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao said today (Stephanie Hoo, Associated Press/Washington Post, Nov. 8). Back to top       Talks Proposal Is Iran’s Final Diplomatic Offer to European Union, Chief Nuclear Official Says Iran’s proposal Sunday to resume nuclear talks with France, Germany and the United Kingdom will be the last such offer from Tehran, the country’s top nuclear official said today (see GSN, Nov. 7). The offer “shows Iran’s serious willingness to resume negotiations,” Ali Larijani told the BBC. “In the same way that Iran is negotiating with China, Russia and the nonaligned countries, it can have fruitful negotiations with the Europeans as well,” he said. However, “this is our last word to the Europeans,” he said (Agence France-Presse/SpaceWar.com, Nov. 8). Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki is scheduled to hold closed-door meetings today with ambassadors from International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors member states and the European Union, Iranian radio reported (Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran/BBC Monitoring, Nov. 8). Meanwhile, Iran is reportedly discussing a uranium enrichment plan with South Africa designed to resolve the international standoff over Tehran’s nuclear program, AFP reported yesterday. “We are in the process of negotiating on the modalities of this participation,” said Javad Vaidi, an official from Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. Vaidi said South Africa had discussed delivering to Iran uranium yellowcake that could be converted into uranium hexafluoride gas at the Isfahan facility. South Africa also expressed interest in participating in the process of converting the uranium hexafluoride into highly enriched uranium, which could be used in weapons or as nuclear reactor fuel. Vaidi also confirmed that Russia had made a proposal in which a consortium would handle uranium conversion. Russia and South Africa are among the countries “who accept that conversion activities are continuing and Iran can complete the nuclear fuel cycle,” he said (Agence France-Presse I/SpaceWar.com, Nov. 7). South Africa yesterday denied that it proposed taking part in any uranium enrichment activities in Iran, AFP reported. “The report that South Africa had proposed taking part in the enrichment process in Iran is erroneous and without any foundation,” South Africa’s Foreign Affairs Department said in a statement (Agence France-Presse II/SpaceWar.com, Nov. 7). Back to top       Former IAEA Official Warns of Damage to Agency’s Credibility if Iran’s Nuclear Activities Are Not Curtailed By Marina Malenic Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — Former International Atomic Energy Agency Deputy Director General Pierre Goldschmidt warned yesterday that failure by the agency to further press Iran into full disclosure of its nuclear activities could undermine the international nonproliferation regime (see GSN, Nov. 7). “Iran appears to have two priorities,” Goldschmidt said. “Avoiding [U.N.] Security Council referral and avoiding interruption of its uranium work.” Speaking at the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, Goldschmidt said Iran should be reported to the U.N. Security Council for its continued violation of IAEA safeguards.  However, he said the purpose of referral should not be implementation of sanctions, but rather invoking the greater Security Council’s authority to press Iran into fully disclosing its nuclear activities. He added that Iran must ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, granting inspectors complete access to its nuclear installations, and agree in writing to immediately halt all uranium enrichment-related activities. The IAEA board’s failure to pursue Security Council referral would considerably weaken its authority as well as the global nonproliferation regime, Goldschmidt said. That failure, he added, would invite illicit nuclear proliferation by other countries. In return for making the required concessions, Iran should be provided with nuclear fuel and technology whose value would outweigh pursuit of an indigenous atomic program, according to Goldschmidt. In addition, he said, the United States must be directly involved in any diplomatic effort to resolve the issue. Back to top       Arms Expert Calls for START Verification Extension By David Francis Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — Until the United States and Russia are willing to abandon nuclear deterrence strategies, the verification mechanisms of the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty must be extended to ensure the destruction of the nations’ nuclear weapons, a nuclear expert said yesterday (see GSN, Sept. 15).   “We ought to extend all transparency provisions of START I indefinitely,” Alexei Arbatov, co-chairman of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, said during a panel discussion at the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference on the nuclear verification. The 1991 treaty limits to 6,000 the number of deployed warheads in both the United States and Russia. It mandates that the two sides exchange data on strategic weapons, provide notification of weapons movement and testing, and allow on-site inspections and continuing monitoring activities to ensure obligations are being met. The verification mechanisms are due to expire on Dec. 5, 2009 Arbatov argued, though, the procedures must be maintained “to make sure the transparency provision is correct, that the data the two sides exchange is the correct data.” Maintaining verification procedure “would be a very important endeavor and would gain us time before the policies of the two states come to an understanding of the fact that we cannot cooperate to oppose new threats of the 21st century — terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and many others — if we continue to base our strategic relationship on the foundation of nuclear deterrence.” Verification of treaty compliance will remain necessary as long as the United States and Russia continue to use nuclear weapons as a deterrent against one another, Arbatov said. “Partners, or even allies, cannot have relations based on nuclear deterrence,” he said. “We need a new type of arms control; however, neither the political leadership of the United States nor the political leadership of Russia are presently ready to contemplate a new type of arms control that might provide with doing away with mutual nuclear deterrence.” The United States is talking with Russia about renewing the verification provisions, said panel member Paula DeSutter, U.S. assistant secretary of state for verification, compliance and implementation. “We will be working on the ‘What happens after START issue’ with our Russian partners,” she said.  However, a senior Bush administration official familiar with U.S. negotiations with Russia said no date has been set to discuss renewing the verification mechanisms. Russia and the United States need to broadly agree on what mechanisms work and if they need to be continued, the official added. “We don’t want to just talk about the narrow definition of this and that and this.” The official did not elaborate on controversial provisions of the treaty. The official said the United States and Russia need to re-evaluate whether verification mechanisms are still needed given increased military cooperation and transparency between the two countries.  The State Department in September declared that Russia was violating certain verification mechanisms of the treaty. Russia has prevented U.S. officials from inspecting nuclear warhead re-entry vehicles to ensure that Moscow is accurately representing the number of warheads it deploys, the department said in a report. Moscow has also stopped U.S. inspectors from examining launch canisters to determine if any are carrying a missile, and failed to share required telemetry information following ICBM tests, according to the report. The State Department attributes Russia’s noncompliance to differing interpretations of the treaty.  The United States must use “all available tools,” including ongoing verification mechanisms, to ensure treaty compliance, said Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center.   Abandoning verification of existing treaties is “walking away from hard-won gains,” he said.  Verification negotiations for disarmament treaties between the United States and Russia have deteriorated after years of cooperation due to political differences between leaders of each nation, said James Goodby, nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution and former Foreign Service officer. He said this relationship must be maintained.  “The Russian/American relationship today is not what we all want it to be,” he said. “I think we can do better.” Back to top       U.S. Report Finds IAEA Safeguards Lacking Nuclear experts believe that it remains possible for countries to conceal a nuclear weapons program from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.S. Government Accountability Office said in a report released yesterday (see GSN, Dec. 11, 2003) The report also found that roughly two-thirds of Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty party states have not yet brought the Additional Protocol to their IAEA safeguards agreement into force. The Additional Protocol allows the agency to conduct more intrusive inspections. Also, safeguards are hamstrung or not applied to nations that possess small amounts of nuclear material or do not have a finalized safeguards agreement.  The agency is also faced with a looming work force shortage “caused by the large number of inspectors and safeguards management personnel expected to retire in the next five years,” according to the report. Finally, the agency lacks a system to measure the effectiveness of safeguards systems is detecting illicit nuclear activities, the report states. The United States in 2004 contributed $45.3 million to support IAEA safeguards, accounting for more than 34 percent of the agency’s budget in that sector. Other U.S. agencies provided $27.2 million in technical support. Reliance on voluntary contributions from the United States and other nations is expected to continue, according to the report, despite the agency’s budget increase.  The agency does not have an adequate way to gauge long-term resource needs, according to the GAO report. The report said that the agency had increased efforts to help countries better protect nuclear materials and sources, secure radioactive materials and improve terrorism response. Most of these efforts have been funded through the $36.7 Nuclear Security Fund, which relies on voluntary contributions.  The report found, however, that relying on voluntary contributions creates “budget challenges” and some State Department officials are concerned that the agency cannot measure the program’s effectiveness. The report recommends the agency: eliminate or reduce agreements that handcuff IAEA authority to put in place new safeguards in countries with small amounts of nuclear materials; find more effective ways of evaluating the effectiveness of the safeguards; and make changes that allow for better recruiting and retention of personnel (U.S. Government Accountability Office report, Nov. 7). Senator Norm Coleman (R-Minn.), the lawmaker who requested the GAO inquiry, yesterday called the report “troubling,” the Associated Press reported. “The concerns raised by GAO … need to be addressed immediately to ensure the IAEA remains a key component of global security,” he said (Associated Press, Nov. 7). Back to top       U.S. Converts Czech Research Reactor to LEU Fuel Use The Czech Technical University’s research reactor has become the first Russian-supplied reactor to convert successfully from using highly enriched uranium to the less proliferation sensitive low-enriched uranium, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration announced Friday (see GSN, Sept. 28). The conversion was accomplished under the agency’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative program. To date, 42 reactors have been converted to fully or partially use LEU fuel, according to the agency. The Czech reactor previously used an HEU fuel core. Thirty-one pounds of highly enriched uranium fuel was removed in September and repatriated to Russia. The reactor was converted to use low-enriched uranium, and resumed operation once the fuel arrived last month (National Nuclear Security Administration release, Nov. 4). Back to top       Bring Back NNSA Panel, Says Congresswoman By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — A U.S. congresswoman who played a key role in establishing the National Nuclear Security Administration called today for the restoration of a defunct House of Representatives panel devoted to the agency (see GSN, Sept. 15). Congress lacks organization on addressing nuclear weapons and nonproliferation and needs a dedicated body to deal with those matters, Representative Ellen Tauscher (D-Calif.) said at the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference. She recommended restoring, or creating something similar to, the former NNSA oversight panel appointed by the House Armed Services Committee. “We need to be involved, we need to be well-versed, we need to have people who are deeply involved in these issues,” Tauscher said at a panel discussion at the conference. Atomic Audit editor Stephen Schwartz backed the call to restore the panel, adding that he would support making the body a permanent Armed Services subcommittee. Tauscher called for greater interaction by scientists with Congress on nuclear issues, and a leading congressional role on nuclear questions for members who, like she does, represent districts with ties to nuclear programs. Tauscher’s California district contains two national nuclear-weapon laboratories, which employ 10,000 people.  “We need more people in Congress that are going to take the time to be a part of these issues,” she said. It makes sense for such involvement to be tied to district affiliations, she added, because   “the return, hopefully, if you do a good job, is to be re-elected.” Tauscher expressed hope that the agency could become increasingly independent from the Energy Department, which oversees many NNSA decisions. “Too much was done as we were creating the NNSA to keep the NNSA hooked into DOE,” Tauscher said, naming as one example the fact that NNSA access to intelligence passes through the energy secretary’s office. The agency also needs more funds, Tauscher said. “It is clearly about the money, and it’s about making sure that we have the kind of scientific talent that we need to have,” she said. She added that the federal government should consolidate its nuclear-weapon and nonproliferation budget — now spread out over budgets for the Energy, Defense and State departments — into one “bucket” for congressional approval, recommending that the National Nuclear Security Administration coordinate that budget process. Tauscher touched on a wide range of nuclear-weapon topics during her brief appearance at the discussion.   She called the Moscow Treaty between the United States and Russia an example of “Enron accounting” because it shelves without dismantling nuclear weapons, expressed confidence that the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator is off the table now that Congress has withheld funding for the “bunker buster,” and voiced skepticism about the proposed Reliable Replacement Warhead. Asked about faulty prewar intelligence on Iraqi weapons, Tauscher indicated irritation with claims by allies of President George W. Bush that “everybody got it wrong,” not just the United States. “Everybody might have gotten it wrong,” Tauscher said, “but not everybody attacked them.” Back to top

U.S. Suggests Acceptable Radiation Limits Following Dirty Bomb or Nuclear Weapon Attack The U.S. Homeland Security Department is suggesting that cities and states take into account the costs of cleanup or abandonment of contaminated areas when determining acceptable radiation limits following detonation of a radiological “dirty bomb” or a nuclear weapon, the New York Times reported today (see GSN, Nov. 2). The agency made the recommendation within “protective action guidelines” that do not give fixed numbers for acceptable radiation levels but “balance protection with other important factors,” according to the text of the guidelines. The DHS document states that a dirty bomb or nuclear weapon could overwhelm the United States’ ability to house evacuated people or decontaminate the effected area following the attack. The federal government has specific levels of permissible radiation exposure for industrial workers and people who live near nuclear dumps or power plants. The trade magazine Inside EPA first published the guidelines, which are expected to be released in the coming weeks. Government officials confirmed the document’s content yesterday, the Times reported. Edward McGaffigan Jr., a member of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and one of the document’s authors, said that strict rules “only aids and abets al-Qaeda or any other terrorists.” Officials said that decision on what level of radiation to allow would be made in the days or weeks after an attack.  The guidelines plugged a hole in existing regulations, which only set limits for power plants and dump sites, said officials involved in drafting the guidance.   Acceptable radiation limits have already been established for emergency personnel immediately responding to an attack, but no limits were set for cleanup, according to the Times. A 2003 simulation of a dirty bomb attack in Seattle showed the need for better long-term planning for cleanup. McGaffigan said that federal agencies participating in the exercise offered different advice on steps that had to be taken before people could return to an impacted area (Matthew Wald, New York Times, Nov. 7). Back to top       U.S. Lawmakers Reduce Yucca Funding U.S. lawmakers yesterday reduced the fiscal 2006 budget for the planned Yucca Mountain nuclear waste dump in Nevada below 2005 levels and below President George W. Bush’s spending request, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Sept. 21). House and Senate negotiators also dropped a House of Representatives plan for temporary nuclear waste storage sites, instead allocating $50 million to advocate the recycling of spent nuclear fuel.  The $450 million set aside for the Nevada site, which is proposed to hold 77,000 tons of nuclear waste, is included in the $30.5 billion water and energy appropriations bill. Yucca had received $577 million annually for the last two years. The White House sought $650 million for fiscal 2006, AP reported. “No matter what side of Yucca you're on, the truth of the matter is Yucca is … not on the schedule that even was predicted the last time. It's behind schedule,” said Senator Pete Domenici (R-N.M.), who chairs the Senate Appropriations Energy and Water Subcommittee. “We think that this will keep what should be done on schedule.” The opening date for Yucca has now moved back to 2012 at the earliest, AP reported. “While this funding decision may force us to go at a slower pace, it will not deter us from our principles of using sound science to develop a high-quality license application and a disposal facility that is safe and reliable to operate,” said Craig Stevens, a spokesman for the Energy Department. The appropriations bill also: designates $220 million for constriction of a mixed-oxide fuel processing plant at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina; allocates $337 million for the National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, despite Domenici’s efforts to cut funding; and drops money for study of the nuclear “bunker-buster” warhead (Erica Werner, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, Nov. 7). Back to top       Four Held in U.S. Espionage Probe Two Chinese nationals and two U.S. citizens of Chinese descent are being held in California for allegedly stealing U.S. weapons information and attempting to smuggle it to China, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, Aug. 5, 2003). Tai Wang Mak and his wife, Fuk Heung Li, both Chinese citizens, allegedly conspired to take a disk containing information on U.S. submarine technology to Guangzhou, China. Mak’s brother, Chi Mak, and his wife, Rebecca Laiwah Chiu, both naturalized U.S. citizens from China, are also being held. All four face charges of stealing government property, aiding and abetting, transportation of stolen goods and conspiracy, according to AP. Mak and Li were arrested Oct. 28 at Los Angeles International Airport while attempting to board a plane to China. Authorities discovered the disk in Li’s luggage, said Assistant U.S. Attorney Deirdre Eliot. The alleged conspirators planned to transfer the information to China’s science and technology committee, which is “basically equivalent to the government itself,” Eliot said. Chi Mak is suspected of passing information on to China since 1983, AP reported. Investigators found two lists in Chinese seeking information on various sensitive U.S. defense projects, including early warning technology against missiles and nuclear attack defenses. A hearing has been scheduled for Nov. 15, AP reported (Gillian Flaccus, Associated Press, Nov. 8). Back to top

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