By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — U.S. biodefense advocates have been “crying wolf” on the potential for catastrophic bioterrorism, playing up worst-case scenarios and driving billions of dollars into developing questionable defenses against questionable threats, a U.S. military analyst said yesterday (see GSN, March 9). Prominent exercises and arguments since the Sept. 11 attacks suggesting terrorists could effectively use biological weapons to create catastrophic destruction are backed by few facts and little hard, reliable data, said Anthony Cordesman, who holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and is a national security analyst for ABC News. “I’m not convinced that we have been willing to admit the level of uncertainty, the level of difficulty, and the lack of credible data, particularly on an unclassified level,” he said, speaking at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars here. While Cordesman acknowledged he has no technical background in biological defense, he does have several decades of government national security experience. That includes shutting down U.S. military biological warfare programs at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in the early 1970s after the United States signed on to the Biological Weapons Convention. Before the offensive programs were terminated, he said, little research was done that decisively showed how to effectively weaponize biological agents — which Cordesman described as producing “stable particulates that are disseminated in the air of a very precise size.” “Frankly, we simply did not know how to analyze the impact of weaponization in biological weapons when we terminated our programs,” he said. Cordesman also has served as a national security assistant to Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) on the Senate Armed Services Committee, as intelligence assessment director in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and as civilian assistant to the deputy defense secretary. He said commercial experts have questioned the reliability of data developed by U.S. biological weapons designers on the effectiveness of disseminating such deadly agents. Cordesman said any future biological terrorism would most likely be on a limited scale, and that the United States should focus more on preparing to respond to such an incident and discouraging panic than on “planning for the end of the world.” “I think it is much more likely it will be a low-level, very crude attack with physiological, political and economic impacts at least initially,” he said. Atlantic StormCordesman criticized exercises predicating massive casualties from terrorist attacks such as the much-publicized “Atlantic Storm” conducted by several nongovernmental U.S. organizations in January. “Where are these lethality data coming from? Have you ever read the footnotes on them?” Cordesman said. “It’s a study done years and years ago that was actually using data derived by somebody else and repeating it again and again.” The Atlantic Storm scenario had terrorists enlisting expert help to build aerosolized smallpox weapons used in one day to ultimately infect more than 600,000 people in multiple countries, killing 25 percent of victims. While Cordesman did not participate, he was an “observer” to Atlantic Storm’s predecessor, “Dark Winter,” which in the summer of 2001 was conducted by many of the same people. Experts criticized that exercise for assuming an initial smallpox transmission rate of 10 people for every person infected and a 33-percent fatality rate, killing as many as 1 million people. “I have almost stopped going to biological war games. I don’t find them credible. I don’t find them parametric. I don’t find people are briefing on the uncertainties involved or creating realistic models for decision makers,” he said. “Time and again, they’re either valid by focusing on one narrow issue or are simply designed to scare the hell out of everybody and show how important the issue is. The time is over frankly where you should run these models,” he said. A senior organizer defended the exercises in an e-mail to Global Security Newswire. “Cordesman buttonholed me during Dark Winter to tell me how great the exercise was; apparently he changed his mind,” said Tara O’Toole, chief executive officer of the Center for Biosecurity of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center. “The whole point of both Dark Winter and Atlantic Storm was to increase awareness of bioterrorist threats,” she said. “As a genre, smallpox was supposed to be illustrative of the array of potential bioweapons attacks and the types of problems and decisions leaders would confront. In this regard, both exercises met with some success.” A program from Cordesman’s own network, ABC News’s “Nightline,” over two nights covered favorably the play-by-play of Atlantic Storm, which included former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, a French former health minister, a Canadian former foreign minister, and a former prime minister of Norway who was also director general of the World Health Organization. Cordesman did not spare the program his critique. “I think it was very deterministic. I think it was designed to show how serious the problem could be and that’s what I might expect from a media analysis,” he said. “Did I think it was valid? Could you tell within the limits of uncertainty whether this met a credible case? No.” Some of Cordesman’s major points echoed a Congressional Research Service report released in May 2004, which concluded that biological terrorism against the United States would be expected to produce mass terror but limited casualties. “The potential public threat posed by [chemical and biological] terrorism is not accurately assessed through the development of worst-case scenario exercises such as Dark Winter” and others that point to U.S. vulnerabilities but not likely threats, it says. On SpendingCordesman said there is poor decision-making on how biological defense money should be spent and poor accounting of the money is used. “We are spending a hell of a lot of money, on what is in many ways, almost anybody’s guess,” he said. “What are we spending it for? When will there be deliverables? What will the deliverables be? How well will they deal with terrorism? Find me the report, find me the analysis [that gives the answers],” he said. The federal government across agencies spends as much as $7 billion a year on biological defense, he said. On vaccine development and stockpiling programs, which reportedly account for a significant portion of the expenditures, he said, “If you look each of them you can’t figure out the cost and effectiveness.” “I suspect if nothing else, I could put some of that money into the public health program and stop spending a significant portion of it pretty quickly,” he said. Commission Report CriticizedCordesman also criticized a prominent commission’s report on U.S. intelligence capabilities regarding weapons of mass destruction, released in March, for disclosing insufficient information to help the public understand any al-Qaeda biological weapons capabilities. The commission, also known as the Robb-Silberman panel, concluded al-Qaeda had assembled capabilities for producing an unspecified deadly agent, supposedly anthrax. Cordesman challenged the report’s recommendation to invest more heavily in spies to penetrate the al-Qaeda network. “I’m not sure we can necessarily count on penetrating into these groups.” Even were U.S. intelligence able to infiltrate such groups, he said, a lack of understanding about effectively weaponizing biological weapons would hamper efforts to understand the capabilities of other states or groups. While the United States conducted some weapons dissemination tests in the past, the research was not extensive or particularly successful, he said. “The few tests which were actually effective, and they were chemical not biological, had as much of a mistake rate as a success,” he said.
By Chris Schneidmiller Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — Extensive screening and education appear to have reduced the potential for serious side effects among people who were vaccinated against smallpox in recent years, according to an article published this week in the Journal of the American Medical Association (see GSN, Nov.14). Still, the vaccine was not without risks — at least three people died shortly after receiving the shot during a U.S. Health and Human Services vaccination program and two suffered permanent disabilities. Nevertheless, researchers said the safety system set up for vaccine recipients could point the way to safeguarding patients who are exposed to the pathogen in an act of bioterrorism. Health and Human Services between Jan. 24 and Oct. 31, 2003, administered the Dryvax smallpox vaccine to 37,901 civilian medical professionals and first responders in 55 jurisdictions, according to the article by Centers for Disease Control researcher Christine Casey and 18 colleagues. That count was far less than the millions of volunteers the Bush administration hoped to inoculate so that they could safely provide medical and emergency care following an intentional release of smallpox. All potential volunteers received educational material that included a questionnaire that would help them determine if they had risk factors such as eczema or immune system deficiencies that could lead to health problems following vaccination. Recipients also received instructions on proper care for the vaccine injection site and details on reporting any “adverse events” following vaccination. An adverse event is a health problem that arises following vaccination that cannot be directly connected to the treatment, the article states. An “adverse reaction” is one that is found to be caused by the shot. There were no reports of potentially fatal adverse reactions or reactions that required treatment with the vaccinia immune globulin, the article states. “The absence … provides indirect evidence of effective vaccination screening and education, as well as attentive vaccination site care and monitoring,” the article states. “The goal of the education and the screening was to make this as safe a vaccine administration program as possible for the adverse events we know about and were able to prevent. And I would say that we succeeded in that with this program,” Gina Mootrey, associate science director for the epidemiology and surveillance division of the CDC National Immunization Program, said in an interview. Volunteers were also monitored following vaccination. State and local jurisdictions contacted the recipients within 28 days to ensure that any serious health effects had been identified, the article states. All adverse events were to be reported to the Centers for Disease Control and to the nationwide Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System, Mootrey said. There were 822 reports of adverse events — 100 of which were determined to be serious. Eighty-five people required hospital care, with 10 suffering life-threatening conditions. Two women, ages 55 and 57, suffered fatal heart attacks within four days of vaccination, while a 45-year-old man died following a heart attack 69 days after his treatment. “This was the safest possible vaccination program that could be undertaken with the smallpox vaccine, but at its best it remains a very hazardous vaccine,” Vanderbilt University vaccine expert William Schaffner told the Washington Post. “Eighty-five hospitalizations, two permanent disabilities, 10 life-threatening reactions and three deaths. That is not a safe vaccine.” There were a total of 203 potential cardiac events that were possibly linked to the smallpox inoculations, according to the researchers. That included 21 cases of heart inflammation and 10 “ischemic cardiac events” — heart attacks or angina. Such responses “were not anticipated based on historical data,” the article states. They quickly led to increased screening in Health and Human Services and Defense Department vaccination programs of vaccinees for potential heart problems that could be exacerbated by inoculation. No heart attacks and angina were reported after the heightened screening was instituted, the article states. The researchers note in the article that the rate of heart events “identified in civilian vaccinees, including the incidence of sudden death, does not appear to be greater than that expected in a comparable nonvaccinated population.” It remains unknown whether the vaccine actually caused the incidents. The researchers encouraged additional study of heart and skin risk factors and development of a vaccine less likely to produce reactions as steps toward further reducing potential health effects from the treatment. Mootrey said the safety system used in the Health and Human Services program could be used in a mass, rapid vaccination effort in preparation for or in the wake of a bioterror incident. The educational material is available and the reporting system operating, she said. “Our understanding of the adverse events that was gained in this small program would be readily available,” she said. “We wouldn’t have to learn it again.” Neurologic EventsA separate study published this week in the Journal reported limited neurologic adverse events connected to the smallpox vaccine. The Defense and Health and Human Services departments vaccinated 665,000 people from 2002 to 2004. Subsequently, there were 214 reports of neurologic problems potentially linked to the shot. The most common complaint was headaches, with 95 cases, the article states. There were eight seizures, which resulted in one death. Also reported were 13 cases of suspected meningitis, three incidents of suspected encephalitis and 11 cases of Bell palsy. Twenty-seven of the 39 serious events occurred in first-time vaccines, and 37 of the cases were reported within 12 days of vaccination. The events “occurred in accordance with expected ranges,” according to the article.
|