By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire
LONDON — The thousands of radiation detectors employed by New York City to identify radioactive material smuggled into the city for terrorism are too sensitive, sapping police resources with false alarms, a senior official said here yesterday (see GSN, March 8). Ed Gabriel, deputy commissioner at the New York City’s Emergency Management Office, discussed the issue in a presentation on the city’s extensive post-Sept. 11 efforts to prevent or mitigate the consequences of any potential terrorist attack using a radiological or nuclear weapon. As many as 20,000 hand-held radiation detectors carried by police, fire and emergency personnel throughout the city “go off all the time,” he said. “They’re really not that effective in terms of their capability to help us protect, but we are deploying them and we have a standard protocol for response to that,” he said. Similarly, stationary devices throughout the city are triggered often by vehicles transporting medical isotopes. “Each and every time they go off, we are required to take that car off the road and look at their papers and define whether or not it is a threat or not,” Gabriel said. As a result, “that’s a huge manpower issue. … The response to that situation is really problematic for anyone who places these detectors,” he said. The Brookhaven National Laboratory of Upton, N.Y, is working on altering the equipment to focus on specific kinds of isotopes, he said. MultifacetedThe Emergency Management Office has multiple missions, including coordinating federal, state and city response to a disaster, attack prevention, information dissemination, preattack public education, and funding solicitation, Gabriel said at a conference on nuclear and radiological security organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency. In the event of an incident, the agency is geared to manage multiple components of response, including organizing transportation shutdowns, and ensuring the availability of sources of drinking water, power and medical assistance. “There are many, many thousands of people responding to these kinds of events,” he said. Initial response to an incident, he said, takes an “all hazards approach,” anticipating any number of kinds of possible attacks. “We take a broad perspective of approaches to WMD,” he said. “The emergency response personnel who come to the scene will not know whether it is a radiological event or whether it’s a chemical event.” In the event of a catastrophic attack, the office would operate continuously a military-style command center that would be the focal point for coordinating a response. Mechanisms exist for bringing medicine into the city if needed for radiological or biological events, and some 50,000 people are prepared to administer such drugs at 210 locations to all 8.5 million people in the city within 48 hours, he said. The office has put together databases that can track equipment and supplies, at local, state and federal levels for knowledge of what’s in hand and potentially available. It can also locate physicians throughout the state and people with other skills throughout the city. “One of the things we learned from Sept. 11 is that without this kind of planning process, we have lots of equipment and it took us a long time to use it. Now we know where the equipment is and we have a logistics plan to use it in case it comes into play,” he said. To mitigate public panic, the office has prepared an information booklet called the Ready NY guide that gives citizens information on basic measures for preparing and dealing with different kinds of disasters. Comedians were hired to inform the public about city security preparations. “People are resilient when they know that everything’s going to be OK,” he said. To facilitate quick resumption of business in the city, authorities have “precredentialed” large numbers of people “in the event that their businesses are in an affected area, so they can get back into work,” he said. Working with the U.S. Energy Department, the office has a plume tracking mechanism for informing responders on who might be affected and who might require evacuation from an attack at a given location, he said. TrainingTraining for disaster planning also is extensive, according to Gabriel. “We bring in all of the agencies that could participate and we run exercise after exercise after exercise in different venues around the city with thousands of emergency responders,” he said. For the sake of realism, exercises often are modeled on major events that occurred in other cities that illustrate particular challenges, called “motivational events,” and are informed by intelligence threat information. “In each of those exercises, we try to put in something that includes not only a force protection element, [but also] a large regional response element including hospitals. … Our events include 50, 60 hospitals from around the area,” he said. “Anything that we think is a large-scale event, we will test,” Gabriel said. The city conducted eight major exercises last year, each involving more than 1,000 patients treated by four or five thousand emergency responders, he said. “The only way you’ll ever work together in an emergency response is to practice, practice, practice,” he said.
By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire
LONDON — A strategy for preventing nuclear and radiological terrorism must include increased efforts to secure radioactive materials in developing countries, experts said at a conference here this week sponsored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (see GSN, June 19, 2003). There may be thousands of sources of radioactive material in countries with no nuclear weapons programs or nuclear power plants, experts said. Many such countries lack the resources to secure them all on their own. “The problem of nuclear and radiological security is not a simple one,” said Azhar Djaloeis of Indonesia’s Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency in a presentation. “Loss of control over such materials, illicit trafficking, existence of orphan sources, all increase the risks not just of one country but of all countries of the region,” said Ron Cameron of the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization. He cited three security incidents involving radioactive material that have occurred in Southeast Asia in recent years: accidental overexposures and deaths in 2001 in Thailand from a noncontrolled radiotherapy source; illegal possession and attempted smuggling of cesium in 2003 in that country; and theft in 2000 from a steel company in Indonesia of 25 radioactive sources, many of which have not been recovered. The International Atomic Energy Agency in a report last year estimated there were more than 10,000 sources of radiotherapy materials worldwide and tens of thousands of large radiation sources used as gauges, sterilizers and metal irradiators by industries, according to a story last June by New Scientist. There were 215 cases of confirmed radioactive materials smuggling in the previous five years and many more unconfirmed instances, the story said. Security measures can include technologies such as radiation detectors for border controls and on-site physical security arrangements including locks, alarms, tracking systems, and armed guards, according to experts attending the conference. They can also include incident response training, support in developing regulatory and legal frameworks, an independent national regulatory body, assessments of security strengths and vulnerabilities, international sharing of experiences and best practices, and mechanisms for cross-border coordination on trafficking, they said. Different countries, though, might identify different security challenges, according to Denis Flory, a nuclear adviser for the French Embassy in Moscow, summarizing several papers submitted to the conference from different countries. He noted trafficking fears in crossroads countries such as Serbia, Bulgaria and Paraguay, regulatory framework and nuclear expertise concerns in Serbia, and a desire to obtain the most modern physical protection systems by the Czech Republic. For all four countries, a “need for trained and competent personnel was very, very strongly expressed,” he said. Indonesian CaseDjaloeis estimated that more than 3,000 sites with radioactive material at hospitals and about 1,000 industrial sources exist in Indonesia, in addition to the country’s three research reactors, research and development and training centers, and fuel cycle production facilities. He called the nation’s prevention, detection and response capabilities “inadequate” and said Indonesia faces “major challenges” in improving safety and protection features at the sites and in developing a strong regulatory framework and infrastructure. Indonesia also must overcome patterns of “collusion, corruption and conflicts of interest,” he said. Securing such facilities is particularly important in light of recent major terrorist attacks and also because Indonesia aspires to have in about 10 years a nuclear power plant, he said. A radiological attack could “perhaps kill our nuclear program entirely,” he said. To muster political will for improving national capabilities, the government needs to promote national awareness about radiological threats, he said. Indonesia also must obtain the benefit of international funding and expertise. The problems are “too big to handle” by the country alone, he said. Cameron said there are a number of countries including Australia, organizations including the International Atomic Energy Agency and agreements providing various kinds of assistance in the Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, including expertise, assistance with implementing international guidance, and potential tactical support. He said, though, that securing radioactive sources is a national responsibility and noted only three countries in the region — Indonesia being one of them — have indicated they intend to implement an International Atomic Energy Agency revised Code of Conduct on Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources published in January 2004.
By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — A U.S. Energy Department watchdog for nuclear materials security today criticized the past performance of managers involved in the effort but expressed hope for a “new day” under the department’s new leader (see GSN, Feb. 1). The department must succeed in improving physical and information security, protection technology and personnel at sites housing weapon-sensitive nuclear materials, Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance Director Glenn Podonsky told the House Energy and Commerce Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee. The department has been shaken in recent years by a series of security slip-ups, such as the apparent loss last year of computer disks at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico that were later found never to have existed. “We depend on local DOE line management for … timely identification and correction” of such weaknesses, Podonsky said, but management “has not always been up to the task.” He added, however, that the tenure of new Secretary Samuel Bodman could bring more discipline and effectiveness. Bodman became head of the department last month, replacing Spencer Abraham. “It’s a new day with Secretary Bodman,” Podonsky said. “He has made it clear that he will not tolerate missed commitments and inadequate management controls.” Speaking as part of the same panel, National Nuclear Security Administration chief Linton Brooks struck a different tone, emphasizing progress as he outlined security changes made at sensitive sites. “While we still need to improve, none of the security assets entrusted to NNSA are at risk, and our security program is robust and effective,” Brooks said. Brooks said his agency is taking measures to harden nuclear sites — by increasing numbers of guards, improving weapons and barriers, and making employees more aware of potential security threats — even as it works toward consolidating special nuclear materials in fewer locations. Physical security must be accompanied by electronic security of classified materials, Brooks said. He said the agency is reducing the amount of classified materials at its facilities and has begun using central, formal lending libraries at the sites. Ultimately, he said, the facilities will operate in a “diskless computer environment” without removable hard drives or zip drives containing classified material. Subcommittee Chairman Ed Whitfield (R-Ky.) elicited a difference of views between the two officials when he asked whether Brooks’ plan to create an oversight office within his agency would clash with Abraham’s purpose in creating Podonsky’s office. Brooks replied that his goal was to create a more frequent oversight process to keep him and his site managers continually informed about security performance. “He [Podonsky] is the verification to the secretary that we’re doing our job,” Brooks said. “What I want to do is provide a routine interaction … that the site manager can call on if he needs help.” Podonsky said he approved of the plan as Brooks described it but voiced concern that the planned office’s eventual role could become different from what was intended. He added that oversight at the Energy Department often does not bring improvement. “This department does a lot of checking on itself without much improvement,” Podonsky said, blasting what he called a history of “checkers checking checkers … a lot of reports and not a lot of action.”
The U.S. incentives offer for Iran to abandon its nuclear efforts was symbolically important even though Iran quickly rejected the measures as inadequate, European diplomats said in a Financial Times article today (see GSN, March 17). Iran had requested the gestures, and it was understood that additional rewards would be forthcoming if Tehran made concessions on its uranium enrichment activities, diplomats said. Analysts close to the Bush administration, however, said Washington had no plans for additional concessions and that the United States was focused on preparing to take Iran before the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions. The White House also rejected Iran’s quiet offer to halt most of its nuclear work while maintaining some enrichment capabilities, the Financial Times reported (see GSN, March 14). “We are on a course for disaster,” said Cliff Kupchan, an analyst with the Eurasia Group consultancy. “There is a 30 percent chance of saving it. President Bush is not willing to play a meaningful card” (Dinmore/Dombey, Financial Times, March 18).
The Republican takeover of Congress in 1994 undid North Korea’s hopes for normalizing relations with the United States in 1994, the head of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization said yesterday (see GSN, March 17). “The bad lesson they learned is that you’d better get your benefits a little up front” in any deal with the United States, said KEDO Executive Director Charles Kartman, according to the Associated Press. “Normalization with the United States (was) something that the North Korean government felt was more important to its long-term security needs than the two light-water reactors, which were going to take many years to build,” he said. The 1994 Agreed Framework establishing KEDO was negotiated by the Clinton administration in response to Pyongyang’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and suspicions that North Korea had diverted plutonium from its Yongbyon reactor to a weapons program. A political settlement was less likely to occur after the Democratic Party lost control of Congress in 1994, said Korea Society President Donald Gregg. “Putting it a bit more bluntly, I think that the Republican Party never really liked the Agreed Framework,” Gregg said. “When the 1994 elections took place, Newt Gingrich was at the height of his powers, and a number of the things which we were supposed to have done, in addition to building light water reactors, thereby were jeopardized,” Gregg said (Peter James Spielmann, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, March 18).
Israeli nuclear whistleblower Mordechai Vanunu faces another two years in prison after being indicted on charges of violating the terms of his 2004 release from custody, Reuters reported yesterday (see GSN, Nov. 29, 2004). The indictment contains 21 counts alleging that Vanunu spoke to reporters and attempted to visit the West Bank despite orders that he not speak to foreign media or leave Israel. “Since his release, Vanunu has systematically violated (the orders), the Israeli Justice Ministry said in a statement. “In the many interviews he has given … he passed on information on sensitive and classified matters allegedly related to materials manufactured at the Dimona nuclear reactor.” Vanunu spent 18 years in prison after passing on Israeli nuclear secrets he gleaned while working at Dimona to a British newspaper in 1986. He was released in April. “They can charge me 50 times if they want. I will continue speaking to the press,” Vanunu told Reuters. He was not arrested following the indictment. “I have not been charged with harming national security but with not respecting the restrictions placed on me. The police are just following procedure … I am hopefully they will end my restrictions,” he said (Jeffrey Heller, Reuters, March 17).
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