The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty review conference begins Monday at the United Nations in New York. There is no agenda yet for the session, and significant differences remain between member nations to the pact, according to conference president-elect Sergio Duarte (U.N. photo). Serious Differences Remain as Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Conference Approaches By Jim Wurst Global Security Newswire UNITED NATIONS — One year of nearly constant informal negotiations has failed to bridge the differences among the members of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as they prepare to begin a crucial review conference Monday in New York, the president-elect of the conference said (see GSN, April 6)...Full Story

Syria Unlikely to Have Received Iraqi WMD, ISG Says By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — U.S. inspectors do not believe that Iraqi weapons of mass destruction or weapons materials were transferred to Syria before the 2003 invasion, according to the final report released yesterday by U.S.-led WMD hunters in Iraq (see GSN, Oct. 7, 2004)...Full Story

Experts Question Detection Unit’s Reach, Highlight Need for Overall U.S. Strategy on Nuclear Attack By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — A new Homeland Security Department office will not have the power to spearhead the much-needed global coordination of U.S. programs for preventing a nuclear terror attack, proponents of a higher-level “czar” on the problem said this week (see GSN, April 21)...Full Story

	Tuesday, April 26, 2005

Syria Unlikely to Have Received Iraqi WMD, ISG Says By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — U.S. inspectors do not believe that Iraqi weapons of mass destruction or weapons materials were transferred to Syria before the 2003 invasion, according to the final report released yesterday by U.S.-led WMD hunters in Iraq (see GSN, Oct. 7, 2004). Inspectors concluded last year that Iraq did not possess chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or programs, as had been alleged by U.S. officials prior to the invasion. The Iraq Survey Group released a nearly complete report in December, and yesterday posted an addendum and an accompanying note from chief weapons inspector Charles Duelfer. The addendum said reports of WMD transfers to Syria had warranted examination, but the investigation — including interviews of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and detained scientists, engineers and officials — found no evidence of such transfers. “Based on the evidence available at present, ISG judged that it was unlikely that an official transfer of WMD material from Iraq to Syria took place,” the addendum says. Duelfer said the group found that Iraq had transferred military and other non-WMD material to Syria in violation of U.N. sanctions prior to the war. Confidence Despite Uncertainty The addendum says the group “could not rule out the possibility” of WMD transfers, as it was unable to complete its investigation.  Site visits in Iraq were shut down last November because of security concerns, he said, noting the deaths of two team members from suicide bombings since September. “For now, this report is the best picture that could be drawn concerning the events, programs, policies, and underlying dynamics of the relationship of the former regime to WMD over the last three decades,” Duelfer wrote. Furthermore, the report does not rule out the possibility that unofficial transfers of “limited WMD-related materials” might have occurred. Duelfer nevertheless expressed confidence in the report’s conclusions, saying they are based on extensive interviews of captured Iraqi officials and scientists, none of whom gave information that indicates such transfers took place or even that WMD materials had existed. “Given the [U.S.] access to individuals involved in these programs, it would seem probable that someone would have given some concrete indication of surviving or undeclared capability” if it existed, he said. One Iraqi detainee, former Industry Minister Abd al-Tawab al-Mullah Huwaysh, told inspectors he was asked in early 2002 by one of Saddam’s sons to prepare a list of Iraqi biological weapons scientists to give to Syria.  The list was prepared, but Huwaysh said he was not certain it was ever submitted and said no Iraqi WMD scientists were sent to Syria.  Another former official said Syria feared that Iraqi scientists working there would have been discovered by Israeli intelligence. Residual Threats Ruled Out Duelfer argued that with the conclusion of the investigation, many of the detainees should be released. “After 18 months, the WMD investigation and debriefing of the WMD-related detainees has been exhausted. … There is no further purpose in holding many of these detainees.” The report cites unconfirmed estimates that there were 1,100 scientists in Iraq working on weapons programs, including 600 with core expertise specific on WMD research, development and production. While their expertise might pose a proliferation risk, it says, their skills probably have deteriorated since the programs were closed in the early 1990s. There is “very little evidence” that jihadists or insurgent groups in the country are attracting the scientists, the report says. There have been no signs that any Iraqi scientists were recruited to work in WMD programs of other countries, the report says, although there was a report that an Iraqi scientist helped Iraqi insurgents produce chemical mortars (see GSN, April 12). Duelfer said there continue to be reports of unconventional weapons in Iraq, but that such reports usually are “scams” or result from “misidentification of materials or activities.”  In rare cases, coalition forces found old chemical munitions produced before 1990, he said. Such munitions do not pose a militarily significant threat because of agent deterioration and their small quantity, the report says. It says any biological agents left over from the former program “probably have significantly decreased pathogenicity because Iraq never successfully formulated its biological agents for long-term storage.” It concludes further that Iraqi chemical and biological weapons physical infrastructure “does not pose a proliferation concern” nor do Iraq’s remaining dual-use nuclear equipment and materials, as long as the government maintains control over them. Any “surprise” future discovery of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq would be expected to involve biological weapons, “since the signature and facilities for these efforts are small compared to the other WMD types,” Duelfer wrote in his note. “ISG disproved much of the prewar reporting from a specific source concerning mobile BW capability (see GSN, April 1), but it is still possible, though I would judge very unlikely, that such a capacity remains undiscovered,” Duelfer wrote. Back to top       Bolton, Intelligence Officials Clashed Over Syria Undersecretary of State John Bolton and U.S. intelligence officials disagreed sharply in recent years over how far he could publicly press the case that Syria was developing weapons of mass destruction, the New York Times reported today (see GSN, April 25). The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is examining those run-ins as it considers Bolton’s nomination to become U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. A high-level Democratic staffer said that disputes over Syrian weapons programs are “an example, perhaps the most serious one, not of Mr. Bolton’s abusing people, but of trying to exaggerate the intelligence to fit his policy views.” A draft speech for Bolton in April 2002 included language on potential nuclear weapons efforts in Syria. A senior State Department intelligence official called the language “a stretch,” and Bolton did not mention the alleged nuclear work when he delivered the speech, the Times reported. Bolton in June 2003 told the House International Relations Committee that U.S. officials were “looking at Syria’s nuclear program with growing concern and continue to monitor it for any signs of nuclear weapons intent.” The CIA, in a report issued two months earlier, stated only that “broader access to Russian expertise provides opportunities for Syria to expand its indigenous capabilities, should it decide to pursue nuclear weapons.” Bolton also told Congress that U.S. officials “know that Syria is pursuing the development of biological weapons.” The CIA in April had said it was “highly probable that Syria is also continuing to develop an offensive B.W. capability.” In July 2003, intelligence officials objected to claims Bolton planned to make before Congress about Syria’s weapons programs, including that the nation’s chemical and biological weapons programs endangered Middle East stability. “There were a lot of disagreements about the speech,” Bolton said earlier this month during his nomination hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “It was clear to me that more work needed to be done on it.” The nominee noted, however, that intelligence agencies completely cleared the final speech he gave September 2003, according to the Times (Douglas Jehl, New York Times, April 26). Republican and Democratic staff members on the Foreign Relations Committee agreed Monday to interview more than 20 people regarding incidents involving Bolton, the Los Angeles Times reported. Meanwhile, another former U.S. diplomat has spoken out against Bolton. “If it is now U.S. policy not to reform the U.N. but do destroy it, Bolton is our man,” Frederick Vreeland, former ambassador to Burma and Morocco, stated in a letter to Senator Joseph Biden (Del.), ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee.  Vreeland said Bolton “dealt with visitors to his office as if they were servants with whom he could be dismissive, curt and negative. He was well known for never being good-tempered or well mannered.” Criticism from Vreeland, who was appointed by former President George H.W. Bush, was first reported by Time magazine. Bush administration officials fired back yesterday against Bolton’s detractors. “The personal recollections of a retired ambassador notwithstanding, John Bolton has a distinguished record of diplomatic service on behalf of the United States, a fact to which five former secretaries of state and three former secretaries of defense have publicly attested,” said State Department deputy spokesman Adam Ereli (see GSN, April 4; Sonni Efron, Los Angeles Times, April 26). “I think what we’re seeing, frankly, is a pattern that’s emerging, and that is charges get made, many of them are either unsourced or based on distant and vague memories or really short on details,” Ereli said. “Then when you look at them closely, you find out that the facts don't add up or that they can't be substantiated.” Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also reiterated the Bush administration’s support for Bolton and pushed for his appointment, Agence France-Presse reported. “We’ve tried to be as responsive as possible to all of the questions that have been asked,” she said. “But I would really hope now that people will move forward on John Bolton’s nomination” (Agence France-Presse, April 25). Elsewhere, the British Foreign Office said that Foreign Secretary Jack Straw had no recollection of a 2003 meeting in which he was reported to have warned then-Secretary of State Colin Powell that Bolton was hurting efforts to develop an allied stand on Iran’s nuclear program. Ereli said that Straw sent a letter to Bolton after his nomination saying he looked forward to working together, AP reported (Liz Sidoti, Associated Press/The Guardian, April 26). Back to top

Serious Differences Remain as Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Conference Approaches By Jim Wurst Global Security Newswire UNITED NATIONS — One year of nearly constant informal negotiations has failed to bridge the differences among the members of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as they prepare to begin a crucial review conference Monday in New York, the president-elect of the conference said (see GSN, April 6). “There’s a lot of mistrust” among the parties, so much so that they have not even agreed to an agenda for the conference, Ambassador Sergio Duarte of Brazil said last week in an interview with Global Security Newswire. The deadlock is based on the “different views about what the thrust of the review conference should be,” he said. “It shouldn’t be so difficult to agree,” Duarte added, but “people are very guarded.” At the heart of the procedural wrangling is the debate over whether the treaty’s priority should be disarming the nuclear powers or addressing such proliferation threats as North Korea and Iran. U.S. representatives have said that closing “loopholes” in the nonproliferation regime that make it possible for countries to develop nuclear weapons programs under the guise of civilian programs should be the conference’s goal. On the disarmament side of the equation, the nuclear-weapon states “will say they are proud of their [disarmament] record,” Duarte said, and the non-nuclear nations will say, “Fine … but we would like to have it verified as much as possible, we would like to have more transparency.” Duarte said the treaty regime is in jeopardy. “It is [an erosion] of confidence in the ability of the instruments of the treaty to provide the results that the parties wish,” Duarte told GSN. On nonproliferation, he said, “There is a perceived need to upgrade, to improve the system of verification.” On the other hand, “There is also a sentiment … that the nuclear countries are less than forthcoming in the efforts and commitments to nuclear disarmament. These two sentiments account for the erosion of confidence,” he said. “Most [countries] understand [the gravity] of this, but they have agendas and their agendas are important to them. It is a mixture of these things, to see how much of their agenda they can get away with, but they also realize they cannot endanger the system,” Duarte added. “I believe there is wide agreement on the need to reinforce the treaty. I think there is quite widespread sentiment that this reinforcement should touch all aspects of it. … The problem of any conference, including this one, is how to harmonize those divergent interests,” he said. “Most are ready for some give and take. … It’s more than a hope, but it’s less than a certitude. Because if there is no give and take, we may not have a result.” The final session of the conference’s preparatory committee ended a year ago without agreement on numerous political and procedural issues for the review conference, most notably whether to acknowledge the parties’ own consensus decisions from the 2000 review conference.  The final document from 2000 included what is now called the 13 practical steps for nuclear disarmament —specific actions the nuclear powers agreed to take as part of their disarmament commitments under the treaty (see GSN, May 10, 2004).  Many of these steps, including the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and negotiations for a cutoff treaty for production of fissile materials, have yet to occur. Most of the nuclear-weapon states, and the United States in particular, resisted any language then would imply continued endorsement of the steps. As a result, the preparatory meeting ended deadlocked. Duarte’s task over the year has been to find common ground that would allow the conference to move forward on those issues.  The position of the United States at the conference will be pivotal. Washington’s priority will be noncompliance issues and how to stem proliferation.  In talks between Duarte and U.S. officials, “They reiterated their main concerns, but how exactly they are going to behave, they have not told me,” Duarte said. “I have not asked them.”  The United States will come into the conference and “demand and eventually they will negotiate. If they want a result they will have to negotiate. Everyone comes demanding.  The [nonaligned] will come demanding. The other nuclear countries will come demanding. It’s the normal way.”  The hard-line U.S. approach on the nuclear issue is closely identified with John Bolton, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, whose high-profile nomination as ambassador to the United Nations has come under fire (see related GSN story, today). Bolton “personifies the strong views … of the United States in these matters of security in general,” Duarte said, “He will have a psychological impact on the conference and the U.S. delegation.” Any discussion of treaty noncompliance would highlight North Korean nuclear activities and question Iran’s nuclear intentions, Duarte said, and Iran would be handled “cautiously” in the review conference. “Despite the U.S. views and actions on Iran, the fact is that the [International Atomic Energy Agency] is the competent organ to say whether a country is or not in compliance,” Duarte said. “What they found is that Iran is at fault with minor breaches — not really violations — so it will be hard to make the case of serious violations against Iran.”  North Korea’s status at the conference will be finessed the same way it was at the preparatory meetings, Duarte said. North Korea has withdrawn from the treaty, but states did not want to appear to endorse the withdrawal by leaving North Korea off the list of states parties to the treaty. The participants would agree “not to discuss the status of North Korea,” he said, so as not to prejudice the six-party talks. The North Korean nameplate will be held by Duarte as president of the conference. The plate is “just the visual evidence of the decision not to discuss the status,” he said. “The important thing is the decision not to discuss the status, because the conference will realize that it will not take the conference anywhere.” Back to top       Experts Question Detection Unit’s Reach, Highlight Need for Overall U.S. Strategy on Nuclear Attack By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — A new Homeland Security Department office will not have the power to spearhead the much-needed global coordination of U.S. programs for preventing a nuclear terror attack, proponents of a higher-level “czar” on the problem said this week (see GSN, April 21). Although ambiguous and still evolving, official characterizations of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s mission have at times indicated a scope of activity broad enough to belie the new bureau’s name. Officials have made reference to a potential key role for the office in integrating not only detection but also threat reduction, interdiction and other related U.S. programs around the world. According to two top experts and a lawmaker contacted by Global Security Newswire over the past few days, though, any such ambitions would be futile. “I don’t think they’re set up in the right department, have the right authority or have the right mission statement to get the job done,” said Representative Adam Schiff (D-Calif.), who along with Representative Christopher Shays (R-Conn.) is sponsoring legislation to create a presidential Office of Nonproliferation Programs. “They don’t have the power to dictate, to allocate budgetary resources, to command the president’s attention. A lot of this is international in scope. It’s not homeland security exclusively or even primarily,” Schiff said yesterday. “I think their title is really what they’re about first and foremost, which is detection, and they may be kind of adding on to the mission of this agency out of a sense that it was too narrowly conceived.” Official Descriptions Leave Mission Unclear The new office’s acting director, Vayl Oxford, told a House of Representatives Homeland Security subcommittee last week that the unit “is now responsible for developing an overall global architecture that assesses and links” a wide variety of detection, threat reduction, interdiction and other programs “in an effort to ensure that the nation proceeds with a single, comprehensive prevention and detection strategy.” Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff has at times used similarly broad language in describing the office, for which the Bush administration is requesting $227 million in fiscal 2006. Last week, Chertoff testified to a Senate Appropriations subcommittee about the new “joint national office to protect the nation from radiological and nuclear threats.” The remarks by Oxford and Chertoff were contained within much longer statements that elsewhere focused mainly on nuclear detection technology and on setting policy for its use. Nevertheless, in their more ambitious interludes, they departed noticeably from initial government descriptions of the office. Oxford’s reference to a “single, comprehensive prevention and detection strategy” set by the new office, for example, appeared to add to a Homeland Security fact sheet last week that made reference only to a “global nuclear detection architecture.” The acting chief also offered what appeared to be the first list of non-Homeland Security programs — including the Energy Department’s Material Protection, Control and Accountability program, the Defense Department’s Cooperative Threat Reduction program and the State Department’s Export Control and Border Security program and Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund — that the new office would “assess” and “link.” The office’s eventual authority over such programs remains unclear. Homeland Security Undersecretary for Science and Technology Charles McQueary said two weeks ago that the detection office would “be responsible for the implementation of the domestic portion of the global architecture” but that Defense, Energy and State would keep policy and implementation responsibility for their various international programs. Experts, Legislators Eye Higher-Profile Integration Effort Meanwhile, security experts and lawmakers such as Schiff and Shays continue to push for a top-level office to tie together U.S. national and international programs related to preventing a nuclear attack, particularly by terrorists. They say the role is not now filled anywhere in the federal government. Schiff, Harvard University nuclear expert Graham Allison and Homeland Security Associates founder Randall Larsen all recommended creating an office within the White House to set overall strategy and tie together the disparate existing efforts. A “czar” is needed, Allison said yesterday, simply “because you’ve got multiple agencies” working on the problem. The former assistant defense secretary recommended creating a position within the National Security Council whose occupant would focus single-mindedly on the spectrum of ways to keep would-be attackers from obtaining or using nuclear weapons. Another agency that has been cited as a possible location for such a program is the proposed National Counterproliferation Center, which Bush’s WMD intelligence commission recommended last month (see GSN, April 1) and creation of which is stipulated in the mammoth intelligence reform bill Bush signed into law late last year (see GSN, Dec. 17, 2004). Definitions included in the law, though, make it clear that its scope “does not include” threat reduction activities or programs related to nonproliferation treaties. Larsen said last week that the counterproliferation center could still be the proper setting for an overall leader on preventing a nuclear attack, but that such a position should not be placed under the national intelligence director, as some have suggested and as the center’s presence in the intelligence reform law could imply. In Congress, a small but bipartisan group will continue to work for establishment of a czar position, said Schiff, despite being rebuffed in the past when seeking to include the project in legislation such as the intelligence bill. “Right now it’s still a very small cadre of people. It’s a bipartisan cadre, but we’re not the majority,” he said. “There’s still not a buy-in by the leadership in Congress.” As for the new detection office, he said, the effort is “fine as far as it goes, but it doesn’t go very far.” “This office, housed where it’s housed, doesn’t seem to have that kind of responsibility,” he said. “If the president is serious that this is the No. 1 threat facing the country, then why is it a suboffice of a mammoth agency which is having trouble already with what’s under its roof?” A lack of overall leadership of the sort envisioned by Schiff could be what is causing Homeland Security officials to contemplate a larger role for the detection office, Allison suggested. He said addressing detection alone on a global scale in the absence of a more general global structure would be difficult. “This fellow starts thinking how do his job, and works way up the logic chain,” Allison said, but “he can’t call a meeting of Stratcom [the U.S. Strategic Command].” Larsen said Oxford’s unit is not set up to succeed in reaching beyond detection. “That would be great if he can do that,” he said, but “when you look at the whole statement that he has there — you know, why are they calling it domestic?” Efforts to tie together programs to head off a nuclear attack are “sort of being written as we go,” Larsen said. The new detection office may ultimately do more than its name implies, he said, but the need for a White House-level czar would nonetheless remain. “I think it’s improperly named,” he said, “and I think we should have someone in charge of preventing a nuclear attack on the U.S.” Back to top       U.S. Envoy Meets With Chinese Officials to Discuss North Korean Nuclear Developments A top U.S. official met with Chinese leaders today in Beijing to discuss strategies for persuading North Korea to resume negotiations on its nuclear program, Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, April 25). Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific Christopher Hill arrived in Beijing after talks in South Korea and is scheduled to depart for Japan tomorrow before returning once more to Seoul, U.S. officials said. Beijing reiterated its support for the six-party talks, which include China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Russia and the United States. “Our wish is that all relevant parties can resume the talks soon and do more to contribute to peace and stability on the North Korean Peninsula,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang said in response to a question on North Korea’s reported plans for a nuclear weapons test. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also expressed support for the talks, but repeated Washington’s warning that it may refer Pyongyang to the U.N. Security Council (Agence France-Presse/SpaceWar.com, April 26). U.S. officials said Hill during his travels may discuss Washington’s potential plan to seek a U.N. resolution authorizing interdiction of suspected North Korean WMD shipments, Reuters reported. “Hill has a few aces up his sleeve. He’s sounding out possibilities,” one U.S. official said. Such a move could, however, be vetoed by Security Council members Russia and China (John Ruwitch, Reuters, April 26). North Korea announced yesterday that the United States was “getting on its nerves” and that it was prepared for any attempt by Washington to impose sanctions, AFP reported. “The stand of the D.P.R.K. is that the U.S. may bring the nuclear issue to the UNSC (United Nations Security Council), if it wants that so much,” a Foreign Ministry spokesman said. “But, we make one thing clear: The D.P.R.K. will regard the sanctions as a declaration of war. We are fully ready to cope with everything in a do-or-die spirit and have already prepared all countermeasures against the sanctions” (Agence France-Presse/SpaceWar.com, April 25). Back to top       Iran Says Not Concerned About Possible U.N. Sanctions Iranian leaders have said they are not particularly concerned about the prospect of U.N. sanctions, which the United States has threatened to pursue if Tehran does not abandon its nuclear ambitions, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, April 25). “We don’t know with what language to tell the Europeans and Americans that Iran is not afraid of the U.N. Security Council,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi said recently. “We have been subject to sanctions in the past,” said Asefi, referring to the 25-year U.S. embargo on Tehran. “In the short term, it has put us under pressure. But in [the] long term, it has helped our economy to flourish.” Many Iranians say the embargo has made their country more self sufficient, and has not hampered economic or scientific advances, according to AP. The sanctions block U.S. companies from exporting advanced technology to Iran. As a result, Tehran has been forced to acquire aircraft from the former Soviet Union and has experienced several plane crashes recently, AP reported. One expert said, however, that Iran’s defense industry has modernized despite the sanctions. Before Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution, Tehran “was a net importer of weapons,” said Iranian political analyst Saeed Leylaz. “Sanctions forced Iran to produce its defense requirements locally. Now, it’s even an exporter of weapons” (Tarek Al-Issawi, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, April 26). Back to top       IAEA Members to Discuss ElBaradei Tomorrow The International Atomic Energy Agency’s Board of Governors is scheduled to meet tomorrow to consider the agency’s next director general, but indications remain that the 35-nation Board of Governors may put off the decision until June (see GSN, April 14). The United States has opposed a third term for current Director General Mohammed ElBaradei, who is running unopposed. However, Washington might be forced to accept him because “there is no [other] country that has said it is not able to support ElBaradei,” a Western diplomat told Agence France-Presse. “Everything shows the United States won’t have the blocking minority (of 12 votes) needed to stop ElBaradei,” another Western diplomat said. A U.S. official agreed, saying that while the United States continues to look for other candidates, Washington may eventually accept ElBaradei again.. “The White House does not want this to become a damaging foreign policy problem at a time when we are working well with Europe and others on pressing challenges like Iraq, Darfur, Iran, arms embargo to China, etc.,” the official said. “If no competing candidate emerges soon, I imagine the president and secretary of state will be faced with a tough choice, and that they would ultimately choose to avoid a damaging diplomatic split at the board,” said the official (Michael Adler, Agence France-Presse/TurkishPress.com, April 25). Back to top       India Considers Purchase of F-16 Fighter Jets India has requested cost and delivery schedule information for Lockheed Martin Corp.’s F-16 fighter aircraft, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, March 29). “We sent out a request for information to Lockheed Martin. We are awaiting information from them,” said Air Chief Marshal S.P. Tyagi. The Indian air force has already obtained information on fighter jets from three non-U.S. manufacturers, an air force officer said. The Bush administration has authorized Lockheed Martin to pursue the orders. Washington lifted a 1998 embargo on arms sales imposed after India’s first nuclear weapons test, but U.S. arms manufacturers still need government approval for dealing with New Delhi, according to AP (Ashok Sharma, Associated Press/iwon.com, April 26). Back to top       Northrop Grumman to Join Los Alamos Hunt California-based defense company Northrop Grumman will pursue the management contract for the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Associated Press reported yesterday (see GSN, April 6). The seven-year contract is worth roughly $2.2 billion annually. With a potential 13-year extension, the contract could be valued at $44 billion over two decades, according to a Northrop Grumman press release. The University of California’s contract to operate the New Mexico nuclear weapons research laboratory ends in September. University officials have not declared whether they will seek to retain the arrangement, which is opening to bids following security and management troubles at the facility, AP reported. Defense contractor Lockheed Martin has announced its intention to seek the contract, and University of Texas officials are reconsidering an earlier decision to opt out of competition. Other possible bidders include Bechtel, Computer Sciences Corp., CH2M Hill, Washington Group BWXT Operating Services, Titan Corp., Teledyne Brown Engineering and Shaw Environmental & Infrastructure, according to the Energy Department’s National Nuclear Security Administration (Associated Press/Yahoo!News, April 25). Back to top

U.S. Chemical Plants Remain Vulnerable, Expert Says U.S. chemical plants are open to terrorist attacks due to inadequate government regulations, a former homeland security adviser to U.S. President George W. Bush said yesterday (see GSN, April 5). Facilities that manufacture chemicals and the rail cars that transport the material are vulnerable targets, according to written testimony that Richard Falkenrath plans to deliver tomorrow to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. Falkenrath left the White House in May, USA Today reported. “I am aware of no other category of potential terrorist targets that presents as great a danger,” Falkenrath’s statement says. Carolyn Merritt, the head of the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, plans to tell the committee that there are “serious gaps in the preparations for major chemical releases by companies, emergency responders, government authorities and the public,” according to USA Today. Many plants “have little more to secure them than a fence around the perimeter,” said committee Chairwoman Susan Collins (R-Maine). Inspectors have, however, evaluated security at more than half of the 300 plants “of immediate concern,” said Homeland Security Department spokeswoman Michelle Petrovich. The department also supports the voluntary security measures created by the American Chemistry Council, according to USA Today. The council, however, wants new federal regulations requiring security upgrades, spokeswoman Kate McGloon told USA Today (Mimi Hall, USA Today, April 26). Back to top       OPCW Inspectors Visit Anniston Depot Inspectors from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons were in Alabama last week to examine chemical weapons storage at the Anniston Army Depot (see GSN, Oct. 29, 2004). This was the agency’s 11th inspection at Anniston. Officials were verifying that the depot is maintaining accurate records of its chemical weapons stockpile, according to a press release from the U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency. “I am proud to report that the inspection concluded earlier than expected and that it was very successful,” Lt. Col. Darryl Briggs, Anniston Chemical Activity commander, said in the release. The international agency is charged with verifying compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, the treaty that requires the United States, Russia and other nations to eliminate their chemical arsenals. The chemical stockpile at Anniston consists of munitions and 1-ton containers filled with the nerve agents sarin and VX and mustard agents HD and HT (U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency release, April 24). Back to top       Fire Breaks Out at Umatilla Weapons incineration was stopped at the Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility in Oregon after a fire ignited on Saturday, the East Oregonian reported (see GSN, April 12). The fire began at 1:30 p.m. Saturday in the facility’s explosive containment room while an M-55 rocket that had been drained of sarin was being cut into pieces. The fire burned out after air was shut off to the room. There were no injuries or release of chemical agent outside the containment room, depot officials said. The cause of the fire is under investigation, the Oregonian reported. The fire appears similar to an April 7 blaze at the depot, said spokeswoman Mary Binder (East Oregonian, April 25).   Back to top

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