U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan (shown in March) who commended an ad-hoc panel of the General Assembly’s legal committee Friday for adopting a treaty designed to prevent and punish nuclear terrorism (AFP photo/Timothy Clary). U.N. Committee Approves Nuclear Terrorism Treaty By Jim Wurst Global Security Newswire UNITED NATIONS — A treaty designed to improve international cooperation to prevent and punish nuclear terrorism was adopted by consensus Friday by the U.N. committee that had been negotiating the text since 1998 (see GSN, Dec. 1, 2004). ..Full Story

Washington Fails to Set Priorities in Addressing Nuclear Terrorism Threat, Experts Say By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The United States allocates resources for the prevention of nuclear terrorism without setting priorities for the effort, a panel of top nonproliferation experts said here Friday (see GSN, March 29)...Full Story

	Monday, April 4, 2005

Former CIA Directors Dispute Intelligence Report Former CIA Director George Tenet on Friday rejected claims by the presidential WMD intelligence agency that he had been warned about the trustworthiness of the main source on prewar Iraq’s alleged biological weapons program, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, April 1). “It is deeply troubling to me that there was information apparently available within CIA as of late September or October of 2002 indicating that Curveball may have been a fabricator,” Tenet wrote. “There is nothing more serious or galvanizing in the intelligence business than associating the word fabricator with a human source.” In a separate statement, former acting CIA Director John McLaughlin wrote that he would not have permitted information to be used “if someone had made these doubts clear” (Katherine Shrader, Associated Press/Los Angeles Daily News, April 2). The CIA’s former operations chief and another former high-level official, however, said there had been serious debates about Curveball’s reliability within the agency during the lead-up to war, the Los Angeles Times reported. “The fact is there was yelling and screaming about this guy,” said James Pavitt, who retired last summer as CIA deputy director of operations and head of the clandestine service. “My people were saying: ‘We think he’s a stinker,’” Pavitt said. Analysts on biological weapons, though, “were saying: ‘We still think he’s worthwhile.’”  Pavitt said he did not tell Tenet about his concerns because he did not realize prior to the 2003 Iraq invasion that information Curveball provided was “of such import,” he said. “Later, I remember the guffaws by myself and others when we said, ‘How could they have put this much emphasis on this guy?’ … He wasn’t worth [anything] in our minds,” Pavitt said. Senior officials in the CIA European Division had repeatedly warned about Curveball’s reliability, said former division chief Tyler Drumheller. “Everyone in the chain of command knew exactly what was happening,” said Drumheller, who retired in November. He said he never spoke with Tenet, but “did talk to McLaughlin and everybody else” (Drogin/Miller, Los Angeles Times, April 2). The chairmen of the intelligence commission said Friday that anticipated National Intelligence Director John Negroponte should reconstitute or reorganize agencies and possibly punish individuals who were responsible for the worst failures on prewar Iraq intelligence, the Washington Post reported. “Wrong calls and failures to correct the record we believe were so serious that the DNI ought to look at those institutions and decide specific remedies,” said former Senator Charles Robb (D-Va.). The CIA inspector general is investigating the matter, according to retired appellate court judge Laurence Silberman. He added that, if actions are taken, “we would hope it would be by the CIA first.” The report singled out three agencies for their role in “the Iraq WMD debacle” — the Army’s National Ground Intelligence Center, the Pentagon’s Defense Humint Service and the CIA’s Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center (Walter Pincus, Washington Post, April 2). The CIA said Friday it would attempt to offer more candid assessments of the reliability of intelligence from now on, the New York Times reported. “The intelligence community has acknowledged flaws in its findings on the Iraq weapons of mass destruction target,” said CIA spokesman Paul Gimigliano. “It has worked hard to improve its operational and analytic tradecraft across the board and to ensure that its customers get not only a judgment, but a clear sense of the strength of the sourcing and reasoning behind the judgment.” “Our goal is to do even better,” he added. Legislation approved in December to reorganize the intelligence agencies should be adjusted to give the national intelligence director greater authority, said Senator Jay Rockefeller (D-W.Va.). “The DNI should have more control of budget and personnel, and he should be given the mechanisms necessary to ensure quality, independent, and objective intelligence,” Rockefeller said (Scott Shane, New York Times, April 1). Back to top

U.N. Committee Approves Nuclear Terrorism Treaty By Jim Wurst Global Security Newswire UNITED NATIONS — A treaty designed to improve international cooperation to prevent and punish nuclear terrorism was adopted by consensus Friday by the U.N. committee that had been negotiating the text since 1998 (see GSN, Dec. 1, 2004).  Completion of this treaty means that the ad-hoc panel of the General Assembly’s legal committee has only one unfinished antiterrorism text before it: a draft comprehensive treaty on terrorism that would include a consensus definition of terrorism. The nuclear convention outlaws any use or threat of use of a nuclear weapon or other radiological device and would require all states to cooperate in prosecuting individuals accused of committing these crimes.  The treaty will go to the General Assembly within two weeks for formal adoption and will be open for signature by nations on Sept. 14, when the summit marking the 60th anniversary of the United Nations begins. “What the convention seeks to do is to provide a broad global framework for international cooperation,” including exchange of information to prevent nuclear terrorism, assistance for victimized states, and rendering nuclear materials safe,” negotiating committee Chairman Rohan Perera of Sri Lanka said Friday at a press conference. “It envisions a broad range of mutual assistance obligations.” “The basic legal regime is of ‘extradite or prosecute,’” Perera said. If a U.N. country has a suspected terrorist on its soil it must either prosecute the person or deport him to a country that will.  Terrorists “should not find a safe haven in the territory of a state,” Perera added. Under the pact, acts of nuclear terrorism “are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature.” That language was used last year in Security Council Resolution 1566 as its definition of terrorism — the closest the entire United Nations has come formulating a definition.  Now that the definition is enshrined in one treaty it is more likely to be acceptable for the comprehensive treaty. The ad-hoc committee did not discuss the full terrorism treaty during this session, but will consider the matter when it meets again in the fall. The final nuclear terrorism draft is essentially the same text that has been before the committee for more than a year.  That draft itself had changed little from the original text proposed by Russia in 1998.   “We really got stuck on a few key, outstanding issues,” committee coordinator Albert Hoffman said at the news conference. He described the issues as “complex and politically motivated … which makes it difficult for lawyers to sit down and come up with a text that is agreeable to everyone.” One of the final obstacles settled before last week’s session was over the jurisdiction of the treaty.  The final language, first proposed in 2002, says the treaty will not apply if the terrorist act is committed in a single state by a national of that state and that the treaty does not cover actions of national military forces.  It also says that the convention “does not address, nor can it be interpreted as addressing, in any way the issue of the legality of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by states.”    “The scope of this convention cannot by any interpretation to be extended to cover certain types of acts which obviously a law enforcement treaty cannot govern,” Perera said. “There are disarmament treaties, there are principles of international law. … Here the scope is limited to law enforcement.”  When the committee last met in October 2004, there were just a handful of amendments left unresolved.  The feeling in the committee was that informal discussions in the interim would unofficially settle these last points.  Hoffman said the committee began last week with only four amendments left: one each from Pakistan and Cuba on the responsibilities of national armed forces, one from the United States on the proliferation dangers of nuclear power development, and a counterproposal by Iran on the rights of Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty parties to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.  All four countries voluntarily withdrew their texts, Hoffman said. Hoffman said he was “pleased by the will and flexibility” of the delegates.  “There was a strong feeling within the meeting that the time is here for us to adopt this convention,” he added. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan commended the committee for its work Friday. “Nuclear terrorism is one of the most urgent threats of our time. Even one such attack could inflict mass casualties and change our world forever. That prospect should compel all of us to do our part to strengthen our common defenses. I am glad to say that you have risen to that challenge,” he told the group. Back to top       Washington Fails to Set Priorities in Addressing Nuclear Terrorism Threat, Experts Say By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The United States allocates resources for the prevention of nuclear terrorism without setting priorities for the effort, a panel of top nonproliferation experts said here Friday (see GSN, March 29). The scholars engaged in a wide-ranging discussion about what such priorities might be, calling for any generally accepted approach. “There are no really good structures to address this priority-setting process,” whether in the United States or the international arena, Nuclear Threat Initiative Vice President Laura Holgate said. Such structures are “desperately needed,” she said. Before an audience of proliferation watchers gathered at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the experts stressed that “resources” to be prioritized include not only funds but also diplomatic attention and “political capital.” They discussed what priorities to set in a series of binary oppositions: safeguarding potential terrorism targets or nuclear materials, focusing on failing governments or rogue states, stronger International Atomic Energy Agency inspections or a greater focus on preventing new nuclear production. Targets or Sources? Given the infinite number of potential targets, George Washington University professor Amitai Etzioni said, “Hardening targets is probably not the best way to dedicate any additional resources.” A number of panelists agreed, arguing for efforts to secure the supply of nuclear weapons and materials over those to protect terrorist targets. Council on Strategic and International Studies senior fellow Edward Luttwak went a step further, calling on governments to focus primarily on ready-made nuclear weapons, which are finite in number and reside in a limited number of locations. Protecting such weapons, Luttwak said, would require better “administrative measures” in Russia, where bribery is rampant and there is no “culture of protecting these materials.” As the supply side presents a convenient “chokepoint,” Harvard University professor Graham Allison said, countries should start there, pursuing three goals: “no loose nukes”; “no new nascent nukes” — that is, no new production facilities for highly enriched uranium or plutonium; and “no new nuclear weapon states.” The Bush administration, Allison said, is faring poorly on all three counts. In Bush’s second term, according to Allison, the administration should pursue a “global lockdown” of all weapons and weapon-usable materials. Another immediate priority for Allison was the conclusion of a deal with Iran, suspected of seeking to produce nuclear weapons (see GSN, March 31).   Allison said the elements of such a deal may be coming into place: a European Union “bribe”; a Russian agreement to fuel Iran’s Bushehr reactor, and to take spent fuel back from the facility; the possibility of a U.S. promise not to attack Iran, as long as the latter abides by its nuclear commitments; and a credible Israeli threat to try to destroy Iranian production facilities if necessary. Failing States or Rogues? Besides focusing on supply rather than targets, Etzioni called for reversing what he called an existing tendency to prioritize the threat from rogue states over the threat from failing nations. “If the issue is nuclear terrorism, the failing states are much more problematic than the rogue states,” he said. The latter, said the professor, at least have functioning governments with which negotiations can be undertaken. Failing states could present a much more immediate problem, Etzioni said, citing instability and inadequate nuclear controls in Pakistan and Russia. “We could come out of this meeting and find that the Taliban took over the government” of Pakistan,” Etzioni said (see GSN, March 29). Despite the discussion’s theme of setting priorities, former top U.S. State Department nonproliferation specialist Robert Einhorn questioned the necessity of placing more focus on either failing states or rogues. “I don’t see why we have to choose between dealing with rogues and failing states,” said Einhorn, a Center for Strategic and International Studies senior adviser. “De-emphasizing the rogues seriously underestimates the risks associated with rogues becoming nuclear powers.” Beyond the fact that some rogues, such as North Korea (see GSN, April 1), are also failing states, Einhorn said, rogue countries could transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists and could trigger regional domino effects of proliferation. He added that less progress may be possible in failing states. Inspections or Prohibition? The experts also briefly hashed out the oft-discussed question of whether to focus on reforming the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, with the associated nuclear energy privileges and inspections for members, or to seek to prevent new nuclear activity altogether (see GSN, March 30). Einhorn questioned a call by Etzioni for moving from the treaty’s “controlled maintenance” to a policy of “deproliferation.” The goodwill demonstrated by adhering to the pact, Einhorn said, confers greater legitimacy on the United States to promote other antiproliferation steps, such as sanctions on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, the comprehensive IAEA investigation into Iran and the Proliferation Security Initiative. “Nuclear” or “Terrorism”? Speaking last on the panel, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Vice President George Perkovich sought to shift the emphasis in “nuclear terrorism” from the first to the second term. Not only supply but also demand must be addressed, Perkovich said. The United States, he said, should seek to kill terrorists when possible and should pursue a foreign policy that does not “politically reproduce” those terrorists that have been eliminated, in part by promoting resolution of regional security matters such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Luttwak opposed such an approach, in part on the grounds that, while demand is infinite, nuclear sources are finite. “There is no finite demand to reduce. This is totally unpredictable,” he said.  Luttwak sought to place the debate in a broader framework. The fact that it was taking place at all, he suggested, demonstrated how much work remained to be done in seeking a consensus on what steps to take first to prevent nuclear terrorism. “We have not got there, to a persuasive operational scheme,” Luttwak said. “This is not the silliness of this or that administration. We don’t have a scheme.” [EDITOR’S NOTE: The Nuclear Threat Initiative is the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by the National Journal Group.] Back to top       Nuclear Materials Smugglers Could Be Using Central Asian Drug Trafficking Routes Routes used in Central Asia for opium trafficking might also have become conduits for nuclear material, the Associated Press reported Saturday (see GSN, Dec. 10, 2004). Tajikistan is considered the most country in the region most likely to be used for nuclear smuggling, according to the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California. “We don’t know how much (radioactive material) is on the market, but we do know that access is the easiest and controls the poorest in Tajikistan,” said Dauren Aben, program coordinator at the center’s office in Kazakhstan. “Radioactive materials are easier to obtain, easier to assemble, easier to transport, easier to hide and easier to use — all of which would make it the weapon of choice for terrorists,” he said. “This is a real big security risk out of Central Asia because of the smuggling and trafficking routes in this region and the impossibility of protecting every square meter.” Moreover, the disappearance of radioactive material from facilities in Central Asia after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 was a “widespread phenomenon,” according to the International Atomic Energy Agency. The agency has provided funding of $100,000 toward the search for lost or stolen radioactive materials in the region, said Jamshed Abdushukurov, a scientist at the Tajik government-run Institute of Physics and Engineering. In addition, Tajikistan established the Agency for Atomic Energy to inventory radioactive materials in 2000, according to AP. “We are determined to stop anything from crossing our borders, but it is not realistic to say we can completely close our borders,” said Igor Sattarov, chief of the Tajik Foreign Affairs Ministry’s information department. Due to the established drug routes and the lack of accurate intelligence, Interpol and the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime see Central Asia as an expanding smuggling nexus. “It’s impossible to seal the borders. It just can’t be done.  The law enforcement agencies have to be upgraded, have to share information,” said Bernard Frahi of the U.N. office (Kathy Gannon, Associated Press/Arizona Daily Star, April 2). Back to top       Rain Halts Planned Minuteman Launch A planned March 23 flight test of a Minuteman 3 ICBM was scrubbed after rain leaked into the missile silo, the Associated Press reported Friday (see GSN, Sept. 16, 2004). “The plastic environmental cover over the silo opening failed, exposing the missile to rain,” Capt. Todd Fleming, spokesman for Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, told the Santa Maria Times in a written message. “A damage determination will be made when the missile is returned to the ICBM depot [at Hill Air Force Base in Utah] in late April.” “There is water contamination in the missile,” Fleming added. “It needs to be inspected, cleaned, and treated for corrosion if necessary.” An Air Force safety investigation board and the 576th Flight Test Squadron plan separate inquiries on the incident, AP reported. A replacement Minuteman 3 is expected to be tested on May 5 at Vandenberg (Associated Press, April 1). Back to top       Pakistan to Submit Centrifuge Components to IAEA Pakistan formally said Friday it would surrender used uranium centrifuge components to the International Atomic Energy Agency as evidence in an investigation of Iran’s nuclear program, the Financial Times reported (see GSN, March 25). “In principle, some time back a decision was taken (to hand over the centrifuges),” said Pakistani Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri (Farhan Bokhari, Financial Times, April 2). Back to top       Experts Debate Plans to Refurbish or Replace Cold War-Era U.S. W-76 Nuclear Warhead Plans are under way to refurbish or possibly replace the U.S. stockpile of a Cold War-era nuclear warhead carried on submarines, while experts continue to question the weapon’s value, the New York Times reported yesterday (see GSN, July 27, 2004). There are about 1,500 active W-76 warheads in the U.S. arsenal, experts said. “It’s by far the most numerous,” said weapons experts Hans Kristensen of the National Resources Defense Council. Developed in the 1970s, the submarine-launched weapons are among the oldest U.S. warheads and at increased risk for corrosion, decay and other damage as they age, the Times reported. A planned $2 billion upgrade between 2007 and 2017 would extend the missiles’ lives by 30 years. The U.S. government is also considering replacing the W-76. “This is the one we worry about the most,” said Everet Beckner, defense programs director for the U.S. Energy Department’s National Nuclear Security Administration. Experts and arms control advocates see problems with both plans. Former Los Alamos National Laboratory physicist Richard Morse and other weapons scientists argue that problems with the warhead could cause it to explode with less than its intended yield, according to the Times. “What’s out there in those boats is at best unreliable and probably much worse,” Morse said. Federal officials deny Morse’s claims. Beckner said a March 24 meeting with Morse and three W-76 critics gave him “high confidence that this nuclear weapon is a good design, was built properly and will function if required.” Arms control supporters say that replacing the warhead in the U.S. arsenal could lead the government to resume nuclear testing and lead to a new arms race, the Times reported (William Broad, New York Times, April 3). Back to top       North Korean Officials Visit China North Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju and four other officials from Pyongyang arrived Saturday in Beijing to discuss resuming six-party nuclear talks, the Yonhap news agency reported (see GSN, April 1). Kang is considered the highest-level North Korean official on the nuclear issue, according to Yonhap. Kang is scheduled to meet with Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing and senior Communist Party official Wang Jiarui before departing tomorrow, diplomatic sources said (Yonhap/BBC Monitoring, April 4). Meanwhile, South Korean Defense Minster Yoon Kwang-ung, who met with Chinese leaders in Beijing last week, said China was “confident” about resuming six-party talks but also expressed concerns. “They said South Korea and the United States were hurrying too much. They said it would take time to resolve the nuclear issue just like a piece of ice neither freezes nor melts all at once,” Yoon said. China was making “lots of efforts” to restart the talks, according to Yoon (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, April 4). Analysts said the negotiation process is likely to be complicated by North Korea’s call last week to transform the talks into a wider-ranging disarmament forum, Agence France-Presse reported Friday. “North Korea seeks to make its possession of nuclear arms a fait accompli and wants to be accepted as a nuclear power like Pakistan," said Koh Yu-hwan of South Korea’s Dongguk University. “It wants to gain economic and diplomatic rewards by cutting the nuclear issue down very fine, like a salami,” he added. “North Korea just made the nuclear entanglement more difficult to sort out,” said Yun Duk-min, an analyst at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security in Seoul. “The statement suggests everything other than Pyongyang’s willingness to come back to the six-party talks anytime soon,” he said (Park Chang-kyong, Agence France-Presse, April 1). Back to top       Iranian Official Calls for U.S. to Join Nuke Talks Iran is prepared to examine the possibility of a U.S. role in nuclear negotiations with Tehran, a leading member of the Iranian parliament said yesterday (see GSN, March 31). “The United States should either accept the results of the negotiations with the Europeans or otherwise, if they do not accept the position of their European allies, they should come to the negotiating table,” Mahmoud Mohammadi told Agence France-Presse. “If the United States wishes to assure itself of the peaceful nature of our nuclear activities, their participation in the negotiations can be examined,” he added (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, April 3). Back to top       Uranium Containers Overloaded at Y-12 The amount of uranium in more than 25 containers at the Y-12 nuclear weapons plant in Tennessee was higher than allowed under facility mass limits, the Knoxville News Sentinel reported Saturday (see GSN, March 21). “The quantity of material in the containers will be reduced,” said plant spokesman Bill Wilburn. Mass limits are used to ensure that containers of fissile material such as highly enriched uranium do not reach critical mass, which could lead to a nuclear chain reaction and the release of radiation, according to the News Sentinel. Wilburn declined to say whether the uranium in the containers was the highly enriched form of the material. “The cans contained small amounts of additional material and were evaluated and found to pose no threat to worker safety,” Wilburn said. Contractor BWXT has already made safety improvements and is looking at additional changes, Wilburn said. The federal government also requested that the contractor examine its fissile material safety system and consider improvements. “This could involve the use of new technologies to monitor, track, store and move fissile materials within the plant,” said Steven Wyatt, a spokesman for the National Nuclear Security Administration (Frank Munger, Knoxville News Sentinel, April 2). Back to top

CDC Releases Report on Oakland Anthrax Exposures The facility that mistakenly provided live anthrax to a California hospital laboratory last year might have done more to ensure the spores were deactivated, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention said Friday (see GSN, June 11, 2004). Up to 12 workers were potentially exposed to anthrax at the Children’s Hospital Oakland Research Institute, the Birmingham News in Alabama reported. Eight of those people took antibiotics, and none became infected. The heat method used by Southern Research Institute to kill anthrax might not have been fully effective against tough anthrax spores, the federal health agency said in its Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. The deactivation process could be improved by increasing the temperature or length of time of treatment, the agency said. While Southern Research ran test cultures that showed the anthrax had been deactivated, the Oakland laboratory did not, the News reported. The CDC report recommends that facilities researching anthrax also perform such tests. The report issued Friday is preliminary, and the investigation of the incident continues, a CDC spokesman said (Dave Parks, Birmingham News, April 1). Back to top

Retired U.S. Officials, Arms Control Specialists to Send Letter in Support of Bolton Nomination More than 60 retired arms control specialists and diplomats are expected today to send Congress a letter in support of former Undersecretary of State John Bolton, whose Senate hearing on his nomination to be U.S. ambassador to the United Nations is scheduled to begin Thursday, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, March 29). Former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and former CIA Director James Woolsey are among signatories to the letter planned for delivery to Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman. Bolton’s thinking “reflects a clear-eyed necessity of the real limits” of pacts with other countries when they place one-sided conditions on the United States, according to the letter. Bolton “has distinguished himself throughout a long and multifaceted career,” the letter says. Meanwhile, some Bolton critics are scheduled to hold a news conference today, AP reported (Associated Press/New York Times, April 4). Back to top       E-Mail Messages Show Falsities on Yucca A House Government Reform subcommittee on Friday released dozens of pages of e-mail messages in which U.S. government employees told one another that they were falsifying documents on their research into the planned Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository in Nevada, the New York Times reported (see GSN, March 21). The messages indicated that employees did not believe their actual work would satisfy quality assurance inspectors, according to the Times. “I can start making something up, but then the (deleted) projects will need to go on hold,” one person wrote in January 2000. “I’ve made up the dates and names,” a government employee wrote in March 2000. “If they need more proof I will be happy to make up more stuff, as long as [it’s] not a video recording of the software being installed.” The Nuclear Regulatory Commission must approve the opening of the waste depository. However, the agency has rejected other projects based on quality assurance troubles, the Times reported. The House Federal Work Force and Agency Organization Subcommittee has scheduled a hearing on Yucca Mountain for tomorrow. “If the project has been based upon science, and the science is not correct, it puts the whole project in jeopardy,” said subcommittee Chairman Jon Porter (R-Nev.), who opposes the Yucca Mountain project. “I believe that these e-mails show science is not driving the project; it’s expedience to get the job done” (Matthew Wald, New York Times, April 2).         Back to top

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