By Greg Webb and Jim Wurst
Global Security Newswire
UNITED NATIONS — Iran would allow international inspectors to monitor its nuclear facilities in person on a daily basis, but it would never agree to permanently end its planned uranium enrichment activities, a top Iranian nuclear negotiator said yesterday (GSN, May 3).
In an interview with Global Security Newswire, Iran’s senior nuclear negotiator Hossein Mousavian railed against U.S. and European calls for Tehran to abandon its nuclear fuel-cycle plans. To offer reassurance that it was not building nuclear weapons, however, he repeatedly offered to cooperate with virtually any International Atomic Energy Agency oversight measures. “We are completely open. We have no limitation to any kind of control, supervision, whatever it is, they can have carte blanche because we are not after [the] atomic bomb,” he said. “We are ready to negotiate and to agree [to] more measures for confidence building as objective guarantees, like permanent presence of IAEA inspectors in the sites.” Mousavian spoke outside the U.N. General Assembly, where several dozen nations have gathered to review the status of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. He left no doubt that Iran would not offer to make permanent its current suspension of activities to develop a uranium enrichment capability. Iran agreed only to a temporary suspension in a November 2004 deal reached with three European nations in Paris, Mousavian said. “In the Paris Agreement, it was reiterated that the issue between Iran and [the] EU is suspension, not cessation,” he said. “We agreed together on suspension with four conditions: [the suspension would be] 1. Voluntary, 2. Not a legal obligation, 3. just for confidence building, and 4. just for the period of negotiation. It meant the period of suspension would not be indefinite.” In follow-up talks to the Paris Agreement, Mousavian said, EU negotiators have failed to offer Iran significant incentives in the areas Tehran sought: political, security, technological, economic and nuclear cooperation. The most recent meetings were held last week in London. “Deadlock was clear,” he said. “There was no progress, therefore suspension cannot be kept.” In Tehran yesterday, Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi was more explicit. “We will definitely restart some activities,” he told reporters, according to several media accounts. He did not define what steps Iran would take, but said uranium enrichment “will remain the last option.” Reports last week indicated that Iran would probably first resume its uranium conversion efforts, a process to create uranium gas that can be enriched in centrifuges. Mousavian’s comments strengthened official statements made earlier yesterday about Iran’s overall intentions. “Iran, for its part, is determined to pursue all legal areas of nuclear technology, including enrichment, exclusively for peaceful purposes,” said Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi in his address to the NPT conference. With Iran’s determination well-stated, the only question is to agree on measures to assure other nations that any uranium enriched in Iran was used for its budding nuclear power program, Mousavian said. He asserted that IAEA investigations had ended all questions of whether Iran’s nuclear program had conducted any nonpeaceful work. “The questions, suspicions and ambiguities about 25 years activities of Iran now [are] removed. … They know that there is no atomic bomb, there was no diversion,” he said. “This is now the matter of future,” he added. That position directly contradicts the U.S. position as presented Monday to the conference, where Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Rademaker accused Iran of continuing a “clandestine nuclear weapons program.” The only solution would be a “permanent cessation of Iran’s enrichment and reprocessing efforts, as well as dismantlement of equipment and facilities related to such activity,” he said. Pressure From HomeSuggesting a good-cop, bad-cop strategy, Mousavian cautioned that domestic support in Iran for nuclear negotiations with the West was tenuous. Iran’s “negotiating groups in the last 18 months have been [under] extreme internal pressure,” he said. “You have a lot of groups which are really suspicious, pessimistic of the process. They have been from the beginning.” “It would be really unfortunate if after two years of such a comprehensive cooperation and negotiations we reach a situation that they have been right,” he added. China and RussiaTwo other nuclear-weapon states — China and Russia — addressed the assembly yesterday. Like the United States, both said they were fulfilling their nuclear disarmament obligations and neither referred to the 13 practical steps on nuclear disarmament agreed to at the 2000 NPT review conference. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak said Moscow “is committed to its obligations under the treaty, including to the nuclear disarmament measures.” He cited the agreements with the United States on reducing both countries’ strategic warhead arsenals, unilateral reductions in nonstrategic arms, reprocessing nuclear materials from warheads into fuel and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. “The NPT laid down conditions for consistent and irreversible progress towards nuclear disarmament. The treaty helps to fulfill the task of minimizing the risks of nuclear conflict,” Kislyak said. The standard Chinese position on disarmament is that the primary responsibility lies with the two largest nuclear powers. “The two countries with the largest nuclear arsenals should earnestly implement the treaty they have concluded to reduce their nuclear weapons and further reduce their nuclear arsenals in a verifiable and irreversible manner, thus creating a favorable condition for ultimate, complete and thorough nuclear disarmament,” said Zhang Yan, director general for arms control of the Chinese Foreign Ministry. In clear references to U.S. policies, Zhang criticized “negative developments,” including the abrogation of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty; “advocating pre-emptive strategy,” an apparent reference to the invasion of Iraq; “lowering the threshold of using nuclear weapons” by threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states; and “researching and developing new types of nuclear weapons.” Zhang said states should deal with proliferation concerns “through political and diplomatic means within the current international legal framework. Unilateralism and double standard practices on nonproliferation issues should be discarded.” In addition, he said, efforts “should not undermine the legitimate rights of countries, while on the other hand diversion from peaceful use to non-peaceful purposes should be prevented.” Neither official treated the Iranian issue as a crisis (see related GSN story, today). “We call for current negotiations and consultations to provide such decisions with regards to Iran’s nuclear program that would meet the country’s legitimate energy needs on the one hand and dispel doubts as to the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities,” Kislyak said. “China favors resolving the Iranian nuclear issue within the framework of the IAEA and supports the efforts by Iran and the three EU countries to negotiate a long-term solution,” Zhang said. On North Korea, Zhang called the six-party talks the appropriate forum for resolving the nuclear standoff. “We hope that parties concerned could refrain from provocative action and demonstrate more flexibility to create favorable conditions for the resumption of the talks,” he added. South Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Chun Yung-woo called North Korea’s withdrawal from the nonproliferation pact “an irreparable blow” to the “integrity and credibility of the treaty,” “While the NPT regime has enhanced security elsewhere in the world, the Korean Peninsula suffers from diminished security because of the miserable failure of the NPT to contain the nuclear specter,” Chun said in his speech yesterday before the conference assembly. He said Seoul remains “committed” to the multilateral talks, but that “nothing short of Pyongyang’s strategic decision to abandon and dismantle once and for all its entire nuclear weapons programs will bring about a breakthrough in the six-party talks” (see related GSN story, today). Chun said the treaty “must be supplemented and strengthened” by “enhanc[ing] the verification authority and capabilities of the IAEA through the universalization of the Additional Protocol.” The protocol “should be a condition of nuclear supply to non-nuclear weapon states,” he added. South Korea also “attaches great importance to export control over technologies and items of proliferation potential as a practical means of closing the existing loopholes in the NPT,” Chun said. Echoing a proposal from the U.N. nuclear watchdog, Chun said, “We believe that ironclad guarantees for the security of fuel supply at a reasonable price should be provided to those countries that voluntarily forgo the possession of sensitive fuel cycle facilities. We see no inconsistency between tightened export controls on the sensitive fuel cycle and the inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.” Several of the addresses made it clear that coming to a consensus on restricting nuclear technology will be difficult. Some delegates worried that restrictions would impede all civilian nuclear development and that new restrictions on non-nuclear states without complementary disarmament steps by the nuclear powers would increase the discriminatory character of the treaty. “At the review conference, we should guard against the adoption of new measures that would restrict the inalienable right of states parties to verifiably utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,” said Abdul Minty, South Africa’s deputy director general for disarmament. “There is a growing concern that while demands are being made for non-nuclear weapon states to agree to new measures in the name of nonproliferation, concrete actions towards nuclear disarmament are neglected.”
European officials requested last week that the United States offer Iran new incentives to boost nuclear negotiations with France, Germany and the United Kingdom, the Los Angeles Times reported today (see GSN, May 3). Several European governments have said greater U.S involvement — including efforts to normalize relations with Tehran and security guarantees — were necessary for the success of the talks. However, a U.S. called last week’s request vague. “Because things weren’t going well, they wanted more out of us,” the official said. “They would like to turn this from an EU3 to an EU-U.S.4, but that won’t happen. Our approach has not changed.” Talks by France, Germany and the United Kingdom with Iran have a “50-50 chance of success,” a European official said last week in Washington. “We’d enhance these chances if we could add U.S. carrots” (Marshall/Farley, Los Angeles Times, May 4). Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice warned yesterday that Iran’s case could be referred to the U.N. Security Council, the New York Times reported (Hoge/Sanger, New York Times, May 4). French Foreign Minister Michel Barnier told Rice yesterday that if Iran resumes uranium enrichment-related activities, France would back referring Tehran to the Security Council, U.S. officials told the Washington Post. Barnier added that Paris still believes such a move could be avoided. The Bush administration, however, began working yesterday on options for Security Council action, according to one U.S. official (Dafna Linzer, Washington Post, May 4). International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei urged Washington and Brussels to make a clearer offer of economic incentives to Tehran in return for prolonged suspension of nuclear activity, the Times reported. “I think in diplomacy if you offer more, you get more,” he said. “Iran is no exception. If you offer trade, technology and security, you ought to be able to get good assurances on the nuclear issue” (Hoge/Sanger, New York Times, May 4). Iran’s recent threats to resume enrichment-related activity are related to both Tehran’s disappointment with the European Union and with the upcoming Iranian presidential elections, said Cliff Kupchan, a Middle East specialist with the Eurasia Group. “The Iranians didn’t think the negotiations would go on this long and they are now thoroughly frustrated by that,” Kupchan said. “But it’s also election season in Iran and everyone who is involved in the nuclear negotiations are jockeying for their next jobs” (Linzer, Washington Post, May 4). Iran could soon end its voluntary suspension of nuclear activities and declare that talks with the EU powers are over, one European diplomat told the Financial Times. A German official, meanwhile, said Berlin did not want to set a “trigger,” by which Iran through some particular behavior would be referred to the Security Council. He added that, while a violation of the suspension would end negotiations, talks might resume after Iranian elections next month (Turner/Dinmore, Financial Times, May 4). Australia Foreign Minister Alexander Downer yesterday urged Iran to import enriched uranium for its nuclear energy program rather than developing its own nuclear fuel cycle, the Australian Associated Press reported today. “We want to be confident that future generations of Iranians, whatever the present generation says, don’t go down the nuclear weapons path and the greater guarantee would be if they were to import enriched fuel as other countries do,” Downer told the al-Jazeera television network. “Many countries just import enriched fuel, countries like South Korea do that, and that just gives us greater confidence about South Korea’s peaceful use of nuclear energy,” he said (Australian Associated Press/NEWS.com.au, May 4). Elsewhere, British Prime Minister Tony Blair said yesterday that the United Kingdom has no plans to participate in any pre-emptive strike against Iranian nuclear installations, the Associated Press reported. “I’ve got no intention of bombing their nuclear installations or anything else,” Blair said in a television interview. “We’ve got a process fortunately with Iran, where you’ve got France, Germany, the U.K. and America working on the same side together,” he said (Associated Press, May 3).
South Korea’s foreign minister said Seoul is considering “all possibilities” in attempting to resolve the standoff over North Korea’s nuclear program, but acknowledged that prospects for a return to six-nation negotiations were “not bright,” the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, May 3). “North Korea should realize the current situation, in which the six-party talks are not taking place, cannot go on aimlessly,” said Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon. “Various recent situations have developed to a level that is worthy of considerable concern, and the prospects of the resumption of the six-party talks are not bright.” Meanwhile, the missile North Korea tested Sunday appears to have been an upgraded version of a Russian-made SS21 with a range of 60 to 75 miles, according to Kim Sung-il, chief intelligence director at the South Korean Defense Ministry (Soo-Jeong Lee, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, May 4). “Tracking the trajectory of the missile, it appeared to be a ballistic missile, not a cruise missile such as Silkworm,” one official told JoongAng Ilbo (Kim Min-seok, JoongAng Ilbo, May 4).
Former Russian Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeny Adamov was arrested in Switzerland on suspicion of diverting $9 million in U.S. money aimed at securing Russian nuclear facilities, the New York Times reported today (see GSN, March 25, 2002). An indictment is expected in Pittsburgh charging Adamov with multiple felony counts of fraud and money laundering. Adamov could receive a lengthy prison sentence if convicted, according to his chief attorney, Lanny Breuer. The money in question allegedly came from the U.S. Energy Department, which has worked to help collect nuclear material from Russian warheads and to improve safety at Russian nuclear reactors, according to the Times. Breuer called the allegations “baseless.” Adamov served as atomic energy minister from 1998 to 2001, when Russian President Vladimir Putin forced him from office. U.S. officials have long complained that the institute headed by Adamov — which since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 has sought Western aid and commercial contracts — was selling nuclear technology to Iran, according to the Times (David Stout, New York Times, May 4). “As far as we are aware, Adamov is facing charges in connection with his commercial activities in the early 1990s prior to his appointment as Russian atomic energy minister,” Alexander Yakovenko, spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, told the Interfax new agency. If Adamov rejects a simplified extradition to Pittsburgh, the United States will have to file a formal extradition request, said Swiss Justice Ministry spokesman Folco Galli (Balz Bruppacher, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, May 4).
The U.S. Energy Department has faced significant roadblocks in instituting its Megaports Initiative, which seeks to halt illicit shipments of radioactive or nuclear material at foreign seaports, the Government Accountability Office said in a report released yesterday (see GSN, March 10). Under the program, the U.S. government installs radiation detectors at ports and provides training for workers there in using the equipment. The program began in 2003. Since then, the Energy Department has finished work only at ports at Rotterdam in the Netherlands and Piraeus, Greece, according to the GAO report. The agency has signed agreements for detector installation at five other ports and negotiations are under way with governments of another 18 nations. Plans call for detectors to be placed at 20 ports by 2010. U.S. officials have had difficulty in negotiations on high-priority ports in nations such as China, the report states. Some governments fear that large-scale use of the detectors on cargo could slow work at the ports, while other ports are reluctant to hire additional personnel to operate the equipment. The Energy Department also lacks a long-term plan for the program to guide work in coming years and help determine the success of the effort, according to the GAO report. The Government Accountability Office questioned cost estimates for the program. While the Energy Department anticipates spending $337 million by 2010, the agency’s per-port cost estimate of $15 million may not be accurate, the report states. A more accurate figure might be available at the end of fiscal 2005, when the Energy Department expects to have five ports in the Megaports Initiative. Additional operational and technical issues also persist, the report states. Radioactive material can be shielded from detection by lead or other materials, while highly enriched uranium that could be used for a nuclear weapon emits low levels of radiation. Physical layouts and environmental conditions at ports could also affect the capability of radiation detectors, according to the report. The Energy Department is installing material and equipment to address such problems. The agency is also preparing a long-term plan for the project and expects to re-examine cost estimates at the end of this fiscal year (Government Accountability Office report, May 3).
International support is growing to require all nations to adopt the Additional Protocol to their safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Yomiuri Shimbun reported today (see GSN, March 22). Transfer of nuclear technology and materials to non-nuclear weapons states should be allowed only to countries that abide by the Additional Protocol, Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura said Monday at the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty review conference in New York. The protocol allows for more intrusive inspections of a nation’s nuclear sites by IAEA officials. Japan, New Zealand and the European Union have proposed that adoption of the Additional Protocol be mandatory for countries importing nuclear technology, according to the Yomiuri (Yutaka Ishiguro, Yomiuri Shimbun, May 4). In addition to proposing that the Additional Protocol be a condition of nuclear supply to non-nuclear weapon states, the Australian delegation to the conference announced Monday that Canberra intends to require that nations adopt the protocol if they are to receive Australian uranium (Australian official statement, May 2). Many developing countries — such as Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Malaysia and Syria — have hesitated to adopt the Additional Protocol over concerns that the right to peaceful nuclear technology could be limited through such agreements, Yomiuri reported (Ishiguro, Yomiuri Shimbun, May 4).
The Caribbean island nation of Saint Kitts and Nevis has ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the treaty organization reported yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 7). To date, 121 countries have ratified the treaty, including 33 of the 44 states needed to bring the pact into force (Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization release, May 3).
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