U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin pose for photographers at their February summit in Bratislava, where they agreed to revitalize efforts to secure nuclear materials in Russia (AFP photo). Significant Hurdles Remain to U.S.-Russian Nuclear Security, Report States By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — Bureaucratic and political impediments continue to frustrate U.S.-Russian efforts to secure vulnerable weapon-usable nuclear materials, top experts said here today as they released a new report on preventing nuclear terrorism (see GSN, April 21)...Full Story

FBI Resisting Changes, Says WMD Panel Chief By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The FBI is the source of “probably the fiercest bit of resistance” to proposed changes in how the United States collects and analyzes intelligence, a chairman of President George W. Bush’s WMD intelligence commission said here yesterday (see GSN, April 4)...Full Story

EU Official Hints at Compromise on Iran Nuclear Work While a complete end to Tehran’s uranium enrichment activities was the “starting point” of the European Union’s demands, an agreement “pretty close” to that goal might be acceptable to Brussels, EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana said yesterday (see GSN, May 4)...Full Story

	Thursday, May 5, 2005

FBI Resisting Changes, Says WMD Panel Chief By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The FBI is the source of “probably the fiercest bit of resistance” to proposed changes in how the United States collects and analyzes intelligence, a chairman of President George W. Bush’s WMD intelligence commission said here yesterday (see GSN, April 4). In its March 31 report, the commission wrote that the president should order the FBI to group together all its intelligence efforts and to place them under the authority of the director of national intelligence created by last year’s intelligence reform law. The panel said the new law “almost accomplishes this task, but at crucial points it retreats into ambiguity.” Retired federal judge Laurence Silberman, one of the commission’s two chairmen, laid into the bureau again at a panel discussion yesterday afternoon at the American Enterprise Institute. If reforming the FBI proves too difficult, Silberman said, the United States should consider creating a separate security service akin to the United Kingdom’s MI5. “As one of our consultants said to us, and we’ve made it clear in the report, this is the last chance,” Silberman said. “If the bureau will not reform, if they won’t set up a national security service focused on this issue and which is linked to the rest of the intelligence community and to the director of national intelligence, then I will … agree with the notion that you have to have a separate MI5.” Silberman returned to many of the commission’s conclusions in less formal terms that those found in the report. He battered U.S. intelligence organizations for a “pervasive failure of analysis” in prewar assessments of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s nuclear, biological and chemical weapon programs. “It would have been eminently justifiable to have told the president and the Congress that it was likely that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction, based on his past use, insufficient indicators of the destruction [of weapons] and his deceptive behavior, but we thought the intelligence community made a grave, grave mistake in concluding that there was a 90 percent-degree certainty that he had weapons of mass destruction,” he said. “It was a grave mistake not based on hindsight,” he said. “It was a grave mistake when we went back and looked at the material that they had before them at the time.” The intelligence agencies worked with poor material, analyzed it poorly and communicated poorly with each other, Silberman said. He said that the conclusion that imported aluminum tubes were for nuclear centrifuges was “almost shockingly wrong,” given that the tubes were designed for use in rockets; that U.S. conclusions on Iraqi biological weapons, based mainly on the now-discredited source known as Curveball, amounted to “a comedy of errors”; and that initial suspicions of a chemical weapon program — a “legitimate mistake” based on photographs of tanker trucks — were allowed to stand because, although “we were taking more pictures, the analysts and the collectors never talked about that together.” Silberman dismissed concerns that harsh criticism could undermine morale at the intelligence agencies. “We’re at war. We’re at war,” he said.  “If the American Army had made a mistake anywhere near as bad as our intelligence community, we would expect generals to be cashiered, as we did in North Africa after the disaster when [World War II German Commander Erwin] Rommel clobbered the 2nd Corps.   We would expect inquiries, and we would expect a much tougher reaction.” “If our intelligence community is so frail that this criticism impairs their morale,” he added, “we’re in even greater trouble than I thought.” Back to top       Lugar Won’t Back Democrats’ Request for Information on Bolton Dispute Over Syrian Weapons Program Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) did not support panel Democrats’ request for information from the State Department regarding disputes between Undersecretary of State John Bolton and U.S. intelligence agencies regarding potential Syrian weapons efforts, the New York Times reported today (see GSN, May 4). Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.) made nine broad requests for information Friday from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Three involved assertions made regarding Syria by Bolton, the White House nominee for U.S. ambassador to the Untied Nations, according to the Times. Committee Democrats have argued that Bolton as recently as 2003 made public statements on Syrian development of weapons of mass destruction that exceeded U.S. intelligence estimates of the nation’s weapons effort (see GSN, April 26). Lugar, in a letter to Rice on Wednesday, asked for a prompt response to five of Biden’s requests for information regarding Bolton’s alleged efforts to punish personnel who disagreed with him and his acquisition of transcripts of conversations intercepted by the National Security Agency involving U.S. officials. However, Lugar did not mention three requests regarding Syria and another involving a 2001 Bolton speech on Sudan, the Times reported. He said only that some of the requests “are extremely broad and may have marginal relevance to specific allegations.” Spokesman Andy Fisher said Lugar doubted the value of the information requests on Syria. “The purpose of seeking the documents appears to be to witness internal debates having to do with the clearance of speeches,” Fisher said (Douglas Jehl, New York Times, May 4). Back to top

Significant Hurdles Remain to U.S.-Russian Nuclear Security, Report States By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — Bureaucratic and political impediments continue to frustrate U.S.-Russian efforts to secure vulnerable weapon-usable nuclear materials, top experts said here today as they released a new report on preventing nuclear terrorism (see GSN, April 21). Stronger presidential leadership is needed in both countries to overcome disagreements over site access, liability and other concerns, according to two Harvard University experts and former Senator Sam Nunn, now the chief executive officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. Nunn praised Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President George W. Bush for calling, at a summit this year in Bratislava, for better cooperation on safeguarding Russia’s nuclear stockpile and for joint global leadership on nuclear security. Nunn added, however, that the countries are “doing too little and moving much too slowly.” “I think the issue is sustained, focused leadership at the presidential level,” Nunn said. Bush and Putin made progress in Bratislava, Nunn said, but “they did not remove the obstacles” relating to liability concerns, site access and Group of Eight threat reduction funding — the “unfinished agenda” of the summit, he said. Nunn expressed hope that the Bush-Putin meeting next week in Russia could yield such progress. In their report commissioned by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Harvard’s Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier note, as examples of progress over the past year, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 on WMD security, the U.S. Energy Department’s launch of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the Bush-Putin summit in February. “Translating last year’s pledges into the needed rapid action,” they write, “will require sustained leadership from both President Bush and President Putin and from the leaders of other key nuclear states.” To maintain focus on the effort, they say, Bush should appoint a senior-level official to work solely on nuclear security and should be consistently available to the official in order to make needed decisions. “Action from the highest levels is needed because difficult bureaucratic and political impediments persist that cut across agencies and departments and cannot be resolved by officials within any one agency,” write the authors. “Success will require not just occasional encouraging statements but in-depth, day-to-day engagement.” The researchers call on Washington to pursue an “accelerated and strengthened partnership with Russia” to replace cooperation that is faltering and asymmetrical. “To achieve both the top-level Russian commitment necessary to move nuclear security cooperation forward and the working-level Russian ‘buy-in’ essential to ensure that upgraded security systems will be sustained and improved over time, a shift from a donor-recipient relationship toward a true partnership will be essential,” according to the report. “In a real partnership, Russia would have to contribute more of its own resources, and the United States would have to pursue a truly joint approach, with Russian and U.S. experts involved in all stages of the conception, design, implementation and evaluation of these programs.” Making such a shift, Nunn said repeatedly, would require the two countries to “change the psychology” of their relationship, including through Russian access to U.S. nuclear sites and Russian participation in designing the security and threat reduction programs. As for the Russians, he said, “They’ve got to step up not only with more funding themselves, but they’ve got to take on a global role.” In addition to U.S.-Russian liability and access disagreements, the “unfinished agenda” to which Nunn referred included Group of Eight threat-reduction funding. “Nearly three years ago,” Nunn said, “the G-8 pledged to match U.S. Nunn-Lugar funding, but this G-8 effort is making glacial progress and needs focused leadership” (see GSN, Jan. 28). Bunn said Russia and the United States should strive to obtain support from other countries by emphasizing the urgency of the problem, which he said is illustrated by continuing terrorist attacks around the globe and by al-Qaeda’s known desire to acquire a nuclear capability. “The threat is urgent, and therefore so is the need for action,” Bunn said. Wier presented the pair’s analysis of U.S. funding for threat-reduction programs and progress at Russian sites. The Bush administration’s fiscal 2006 budget request for the programs, although a 22-percent increase at $982 million, is still too little, Wier said. In particular, he said the Global Threat Reduction Initiative could use more money. “Most programs are limited more by the level of cooperation that has been achieved with potential recipient states than by money,” the authors write, “but there are several areas where small increases in available funds could accelerate progress.” “Probably the best available indicator” of progress in Russia, they say, is the percentage of buildings containing weapon-usable material that have undergone U.S.-funded security upgrades, which stands at 56 percent.   The buildings figure corresponds to just 26 percent of weapon-usable nuclear material at Russian sites, however, and the researchers said a “dramatic acceleration” would be needed to bring the second figure to the U.S. Energy Department’s goal of 100 percent by 2008. [EDITOR’S NOTE: The Nuclear Threat Initiative is the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by the National Journal Group] Back to top       EU Official Hints at Compromise on Iran Nuclear Work While a complete end to Tehran’s uranium enrichment activities was the “starting point” of the European Union’s demands, an agreement “pretty close” to that goal might be acceptable to Brussels, EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana said yesterday (see GSN, May 4). Officials involved in the negotiations led by France, Germany and the United Kingdom, however, rejected the possibility of compromise on that point, the Financial Times reported. Solana said he understood that Iranian negotiators had made an informal proposal during talks Friday in London that Tehran be allowed to resume production of uranium hexafluoride gas, which would be enriched in another nation for use in Iranian civilian reactors. A European official who was present at the discussions said there was no discussion of shipping uranium hexafluoride for enrichment, only of placing the process under international supervision within Iran. That proposal failed to advance negotiations, the official said (Dinmore/Dombey, Financial Times, May 5). “The talks with the Iranians have not been brilliant to say the least. … There is a risk of that breaking down,” one British official told the Times. “Each side’s position is not acceptable to the other,” said a second official. “We’re not heading for an immediate crisis in the next week or two, but Iran is a major issue that will have to be dealt with” (Christopher Adams, Financial Times, May 5). Back to top       Iran-U.S. Clash Hinders Progress at Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Conference, Diplomats Say Disagreements between Washington and Tehran are hurting efforts to improve the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty at the review conference that began this week, diplomats said yesterday (see GSN, May 4). There still is no agenda for the monthlong conference, Reuters reported. “Without an agenda, the meeting has no value at all. It is a very serious business,” said Algerian ambassador Abdallah Baali. Conference president Sergio Duarte of Brazil said Tuesday he may have found compromise language to allow for an agenda, but diplomats yesterday said Iran had not yet replied to the proposal. “We have approved the agenda. It’s really the Iranians holding up the agenda,” said Richard Grinnell, spokesman for the U.S. mission to the United Nations. At the same time, Washington continued to oppose a proposal by Iran and the nonaligned movement nations to divide participants into working groups on three separate topics — nuclear disarmament, the Middle East, and pledges by nuclear powers not to use their atomic weapons against non-nuclear treaty members. That format would promote attacks on U.S. policy, a U.S. official said (Reuters, May 4). Iran objects to agenda language that would place added attention at the conference on its nuclear program, the Associated Press reported yesterday. Washington opposed a proposed focus on commitments made by nuclear weapons states to take specific steps toward disarmament, the Associated Press reported yesterday. Some diplomats said progress was being made in setting the agenda, AP reported. “We’re very close,” one diplomat said (Charles Hanley, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, May 4). Back to top       Saudi Arabia Prepares to Sign IAEA Agreements Saudi Arabia plans to sign documents that would provide for limited international oversight of any nuclear work in the country, Agence France-Presse reported today (see GSN, April 27, 2004). A March 9 letter to the U.N. nuclear watchdog included “an authorization from the government of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia to sign the comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Small Quantities Protocol,” Saudi disarmament official Naif Bin Bandar Al-Sudairy said in a speech yesterday at the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty review conference in New York. The safeguards agreements allow for IAEA inspections of nuclear facilities in a country. Saudi Arabia was one of 27 non-nuclear nations that had not signed the agreements, AFP reported. The Small Quantities Protocol, however, allows NPT member states to forgo reporting possession of up to 10 tons of natural uranium and 2.2 pounds of plutonium.  The rule also allows new nuclear facilities to be kept secret until six months prior to operation. Saudi officials have denied claims that they might seek nuclear technology or weapons, according to AFP. The nation continues to support efforts for a nuclear-free Middle East, the Saudi envoy said in his NPT speech. The International Atomic Energy Agency has argued abolishing the Small Quantities Protocol, fearing it could undermine its nuclear inspections efforts. The rule would allow for exceptions on submitting design information or “initial reports on all nuclear material” even for nations that have signed the Additional Protocol, which allows for more intrusive IAEA inspections, according to a document circulated in February by the agency (Michael Adler, Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, May 5). Back to top       Moscow Will Not Allow U.S. Monitoring of Nuclear Arms Depots, Russian General Says Russia has no plans to allow the United States to monitor its nuclear weapons sites, a top Russian military official said today (see GSN, April 21). “Our stand on the monitoring of nuclear weapon depots is firm: There is no access to these depots at present, and I do not think it will be granted in the near future,” Col. Gen. Nikolai Solovtsov was quoted as saying by Interfax. He added that Russia would reduce its ICBM forces by one or two divisions annually for the next five years in order to bring Moscow into compliance with a 2002 U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. The pact obliges each side to reduce its deployed strategic nuclear arsenal by about two-thirds by 2012, the Associated Press reported. Russia will keep SS-18 ICBMs until 2014 to 2016, and plans to commission its first Topol-M mobile missile system next year, Solovtsov said (Associated Press, May 5). Meanwhile, rail-mobile SS-24 missile systems are expected to be decommissioned this year, Solovtsov told ITAR-Tass (Babkin/Kuznetsov, ITAR-Tass, May 5). Back to top       Malta Ratifies IAEA Additional Protocol The Maltese House of Representatives yesterday ratified the Additional Protocol to its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreement, the Times of Malta reported (see GSN, May 5). Although Malta does not have a nuclear weapons program, guarding against illicit transport of nuclear-related materials through its seaport remains a priority, said Foreign Minister Michael Frendo. “This is a responsibility which we take very seriously,” Frendo said. “The government is committed to continuing to ensure that the level of security at the Freeport remains at least as high, and possibly higher, than at other neighboring harbors so as to prevent the transport of weapons or other dangerous material.” Malta is the 63rd country to ratify the Additional Protocol, which allows for more intrusive inspections by the U.N. nuclear watchdog, the Times reported. The island nation pledged to ratify its protocol as part of its entrance in 2004 into European Union (The Times of Malta, May 5). Back to top

Al-Qaeda Planned Chemical Attack on U.S. Naval Base in Spain, Terror Cell Member Says Al-Qaeda had planned an attack using chemical weapons against the U.S. naval base in Rota, Spain, Reuters reported Tuesday (see GSN, Feb. 17). Said Arif of Algeria told authorities of the plot by his terror cell after being extradited to France from Syria in June 2004, the Spanish daily newspaper ABC reported. Details on how the French-based cell planned to conduct the attack were not known, the newspaper reported. Arif is believed to be a lieutenant to Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who is being tried in absentia for a foiled chemical attack in his native country (see related GSN story, today; Reuters/Yahoo!News, May 3). Back to top       Angry Outburst Halts Jordan Chemical Attack Trial The trial of 13 people suspected of plotting a chemical attack last year in Jordan was halted yesterday following an angry outburst by the defendants that included a death threat and thrown shoes, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, April 21). Nine suspects are in custody, while Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and three others are being tried in absentia for foiled strikes on sites believed to include the U.S. Embassy in Amman and the Jordanian intelligence agency. Lead suspect Azmi al-Jayousi became enraged yesterday during testimony from a forensic doctor on the wounds suffered by four additional plotters killed in a shootout with police in April 2004. Jayousi threw his slippers at lead judge Col. Fawaz Buqour, and then told the three-judge panel “Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi will chop off your heads and stuff it up your mouths, you God’s enemies.” A 10-minute recess did not calm the defendants, AP reported. “The blood of our brothers will not go wasted,” defendant Ahmad Samir yelled as the trial resumed. Samir also told military prosecutor Lt. Col. Mahmoud Obeidat to, “Await death … for you are God’s enemy.” Other defendants yelled or spoke from the Koran. All subsequently turned their back on the judges, kneeled and began to pray, AP reported. Al-Jayousi and two other defendants were removed from the courtroom. That failed to bring order, so Buqour adjourned the trial. It was not immediately known when the case would resume (Jamal Halaby, Associated Press, May 5). Back to top       New Zealand to Expel Former Iraqi Official Allegedly Involved in Chemical Weapons Production New Zealand has revoked the visa of a former Iraqi official believed to have been involved in the production of chemical weapons under Saddam Hussein’s regime during the 1980s, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, March 18). Amer Mahdi Al-Khashali had been in the country for more than a month. However, Wellington had been unaware that he had once served as agricultural and agrarian reform minister in Iraq, AP reported. In his former job, Al-Kashali “was responsible for chemical weaponry production … and wouldn’t that have been an indicator that this man should not be in this country,” said opposition lawmaker Winston Peters, who first publicly identified the one-time Iraqi official. New Zealand’s government ordered Al-Khashali to leave within two weeks. Al-Khashali will fight the visa cancellation, his attorney announced today. “We believe that the Immigration Service is working from incomplete or inaccurate information and has been directed to take these actions as a matter of political expediency,” said Simon Laurent. Laurent said yesterday that it was not safe for Al-Khashali to return to Iraq because of his work with the previous regime. “He could face very serious repercussions, either official or unofficial, from the Iraqi population,” said Laurent (Ray Lilley, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, May 5). Back to top       Pine Bluff Destroys 9 Tons of Chemical Agent The Pine Bluff chemical weapons incinerator in Arkansas has destroyed 9 tons of the nerve agent sarin in just more than a month of work, the Pine Bluff Commercial reported yesterday (see GSN, April 20). The facility began destroying sarin-filled rockets on March 29. As of Tuesday, it had eliminated 2,440 rockets and 18,001 pounds of sarin, according to the Commercial. “We emptied our first igloo of M55 rockets on the 21st of April,” said spokeswoman Raini Wright. “(The operation) has been pretty uneventful.” There are roughly 90,000 sarin-filled rockets at Pine Bluff, along with land mines and rockets containing VX nerve agent and ton containers of mustard agent. Full disposal is scheduled to be completed by 2010 (Amy Riggins, Pine Bluff Commercial, May 4).   Back to top

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