By Joe Fiorill
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — Efforts to improve U.S. chances of detecting a smuggled nuclear device before it can be used in an attack are rapidly gaining steam, despite a tenacious controversy over whether fundamentally better detection is physically or operationally possible (see GSN, May 25). The U.S. Homeland Security and Energy departments broke ground this month for the Radiological/Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex, housed at Energy’s remote Nevada Test Site. The departments said the complex will test detectors in realistic reproductions of roads, border crossings and airport checkpoints, in a bid for better monitoring of moving automobile traffic, passenger luggage and international mail. “The testing area will help evaluate the latest technology to detect radiological dispersal devices, improvised nuclear devices or nuclear weapons smuggled across a U.S. border for use by terrorists within the United States,” they said in a release last week as they broke ground for the complex. “The Department of Homeland Security is implementing a comprehensive system approach that emphasizes early detection and effective intervention capabilities at the federal, state and local levels.” Through testing at the site and other activities, Homeland Security’s new Domestic Nuclear Detection Office is aiming for big improvements to what many experts agree are currently inadequate detection capabilities (see GSN, June 6). Those experts who support a greater focus on locking down nuclear materials where they lie, however, are questioning whether any amount of research can yield basic improvements in detection, given the difficult physics involved. They say the relatively weak radiation emitted by highly enriched uranium — a particular focus of nuclear terrorism worries, because HEU stocks are more plentiful, less secure and easier to use than plutonium — constitutes a fundamental limit on detection that underscores the need for preventing nuclear materials from being stolen or diverted in the first place. “I hope they’re right,” Homeland Security Associates founder Randall Larsen said of those who are optimistic about improvements, “but I think there’s a lot of people that have too much faith in technology.” Detection of nuclear materials can be done in two ways. The more common of the two, called “passive” detection, senses radiation naturally emitted by weapon-usable nuclear material and by many other objects. The less common “active” approach induces fission — and, therefore, causes the emission of comparatively strong radiation — in a suspect object using an external stimulant such as a stream of neutrons from an accelerator. For the foreseeable future, only passive detection is likely to be a plausible basis for the wide-range monitoring capabilities that are a main focus of current research: Although active detection can improve capabilities at controlled checkpoints, filling large areas with neutrons or gamma rays to induce detectable radiation is not possible, experts say. Using passive methods, highly enriched uranium — the material that sparks the most concern among experts — is more difficult than plutonium to detect, because the uranium emits radiation at a lower rate and is more easily shielded. Even for plutonium, though, most experts estimate the current range of possible detection only in the hundreds of yards — although they differ over how much better the figure can get. Given such limits, many nonproliferation advocates are questioning the wisdom of spending large amounts of money on programs that may never lead to a detection capability beyond a narrow set of formal checkpoints and roads. “I very much doubt that we’re going to get to a situation where we can do wide-area searches for highly enriched uranium,” said Harvard University nuclear expert Matthew Bunn. Natural Resources Defense Council nuclear head Tom Cochran agreed, “I don’t think it’s going to happen, and I think for your money, and because of the fact that you can’t really detect it readily or reliably, you ought to have a very high — really, really high — priority on rounding it up and eliminating it, particularly at the commercial uses of HEU.” Many approaches to improving detection that are now under consideration involve changing how detectors are used, not sensitivity or range as such. Researchers cite the possibility of networking large numbers of detectors — along a road, for example — and processing the many data points in a way that compensates for background interference. Many also refer to the possibility of putting detectors in shipping containers when they leave for the United States, to extend detection time and mitigate low rates of radiation emission, or of capitalizing on uranium-232 traces present in much of the world’s highly enriched uranium. A report last year by a Defense Science Board task force, however, indicated that detection range and capability can be fundamentally improved. The group called on the United States to dramatically step up funding for research in the area and said such efforts could pay off quickly. “Detection systems with order-of-magnitude better performance can be developed in two to perhaps five years,” wrote the task force. “Detection range can be extended by an order of magnitude, opening new defense operational modes, such as rapid, wide-area airborne and vehicle sweeps and monitoring large remote areas and/or extensive road networks,” the experts wrote. “Shielding around the weapon could reduce performance of the detection systems, but the shielding mass can slow down the attacker and expose him to discovery by other means, e.g., detection of the shielding itself.” Critics of a detection focus concede that such claims are not totally unfounded, given the expected large infusion of funds into the effort, but that such statements neglect to mention the strict conditions that would circumscribe such improvements — large increases in detection range may be possible only for plutonium, they point out, and even those new technological means that are developed may prove impractical because of massive cost and logistical constraints. “If you put Los Alamos Laboratories at Long Beach, you could detect” nuclear materials threatening that port over a relatively wide area, Cochran said. The cost of putting large, sophisticated facilities at an essentially unlimited number of entry points, however, is an inevitable barrier to effective detection, he said — adding that, in any case, the approach does not account for the adaptability of potential attackers, who would probably choose routes with an eye specifically to avoiding detection. Bunn said he supports increased research and development in detection technology but that the fruits of such efforts would be mainly “refinements” — lower costs, easier use, small increases in sensitivity — that would never amount to a “cordon” to keep highly enriched uranium out of the United States. “We have to be realistic about what we’re buying and what we’re not buying,” he said. Meanwhile, he said, there is a risk that “complacency” based on excessive confidence in detection could undermine support for securing materials in the former Soviet Union and around the world. More spending is needed on all fronts, he said. In a report circulated in March to government officials and top experts, Cochran delivered a detailed indictment of current detection capabilities. Hundreds of portal monitors recently installed at U.S. ports, he said this week, “will detect a lot of things, but they do not reliably detect highly enriched uranium.” “So now they’re sort of poised to do another round of improvements with new spectroscopic systems that are going to have the same problem,” he said, referring to detectors that, unlike those currently in use, can reliably distinguish among various kinds of radiation. Cochran said spectroscopic detectors may lose in sensitivity even as they gain in specificity. He expressed doubt about whether detection technology will ever provide a reliable response to the nuclear terrorism threat — “stings,” he said, are the way to catch those with illicit nuclear materials. “The guys that steal it typically don’t know how to get in touch with the guys that want it,” Cochran said. Cochran also blasted “senior officials in customs and Homeland Security” for disseminating “false information” about the capabilities of detectors. He called detection programs a “cash cow.” “Congress is in the pork business, and this is another case,” he said. While refusing to speculate about how good detection might get or what aspects of the effort might see breakthroughs, the new Homeland Security detection unit says that, “committed to both evolutionary and revolutionary progress in detection technology,” it is pursuing improvements across the board. “We do not agree that the limits of improvements have been reached,” Homeland Security spokesman Donald Tighe said this week. “Included in the focus on evolutionary progress,” he said, “are improvements in effectiveness, affordability and deployability, including mobility.” As for the other, “revolutionary” track, the office has been noncommittal about what could be in store — possibly because, as Bunn said, “Nobody has a revolutionary idea.”
Washington has abandoned its attempt to prevent International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei from seeking a third term in the post, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, April 28). ElBaradei is expected to arrive in Washington late today and is scheduled to meet with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Undersecretary of State for Arms Control Robert Joseph, the Post reported. European officials last week pleaded with their U.S. counterparts to support ElBaradei, arguing that the standoff over Iran’s nuclear program called for greater cooperation between the agency, the United States and its allies, according to U.S. officials and a senior European diplomat. Rice decided afterward to invite ElBaradei to Washington and officially support his candidacy, two U.S. officials told the Post. “He is going to win either way, and if we went in opposing him, it would be ugly for us and for him,” one official said. “So it’s in everyone’s interest to use the opportunity to work better together.” However, Rice also intends to emphasize that Washington expects certain things in return for its support, the officials said. “We’re willing to lift our objections under certain conditions,” one official said. “Namely, get tougher on Iran.” In the past two years, agency inspectors have uncovered a large-scale, clandestine Iranian nuclear program developed over an 18-year period, according to the Post. In its attempt to unseat ElBaradei, the Bush administration halted intelligence sharing with the agency and eavesdropped on ElBaradei in search of incriminating information against him, the Post reported. The effort was largely seen as having been spearheaded by former Undersecretary of State for Arms Control John Bolton, now the Bush administration’s nominee to be ambassador to the United Nations (see related GSN story, today). Despite such efforts, all 34 other countries on the agency’s Board of Governors continued to support him (Dafna Linzer, Washington Post, June 8).
By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The Bush administration’s effort to revive funding for the controversial Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator program suffered another setback yesterday, as a House committee passed a bill excluding money for it (see GSN, May 26). In approving a $408 billion defense appropriations bill for fiscal 2006, the House Appropriations Committee excluded $4 million sought by the administration to resume a feasibility study on developing a new nuclear weapons capability for striking hardened and deeply buried targets. The committee did approve, however, $4.5 million requested by the administration for the Air Force to assess how to deploy the penetrator from a B-2 stealth bomber. Feasibility StudyIn its budget request this year, the administration sought to have the “bunker-buster” feasibility study resumed at the Energy Department, having gone unfunded by Congress for the current fiscal year. The Appropriations Committee also withheld the $4 million from its version of the fiscal 2006 energy and water appropriations bill last month. The House Armed Services Committee, however, last month approved language authorizing the Air Force to resume the study, stating in report language that a key field test of the weapon’s metal shell could guide a decision to pursue a nuclear or conventional penetrator. Study critic David Culp, legislative representative for the Friends Committee on National Legislation, said the new appropriations language approving $4 million explicitly for a “conventional penetrator” feasibility study should trump the authorizers’ language and allow funding only for studying a conventional penetrator option. “If you talk to anyone in the executive branch, they will tell you the appropriations bill language is ultimately what counts,” he said. Nevertheless, the final outcome remains unclear, Culp said, noting that the Senate Armed Services Committee authorized $4 million for the nuclear penetrator study to resume at the Energy Department and that the weapon’s fate could ultimately be decided when House and Senate negotiators conference to resolve differences in their respective bills. “I’m not declaring victory today,” he said.
The U.S. State Department yesterday confirmed accounts of U.S.-North Korean contact in New York Monday and that the North Korean side had expressed a willingness to resume negotiations at some unspecified date, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, June 7). “The ball is in the North Koreans’ court to provide a time when they will return to the table and to actually return to the table to engage in a constructive manner,” said State Department spokesman Sean McCormack. The body language by the North Koreans at Monday’s meeting, according to one U.S. official familiar with details of the interaction, was “very good.” However, Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, the Bush administration’s point man on the standoff with Pyongyang, said yesterday that it was too soon to say talks would resume. “They did not give us a date. Until we get a date and get everyone sitting at the table, we do not have a process,” said Hill. Asian officials, however, were openly optimistic. “I think it will be pretty soon, in the next few weeks,” Chinese Ambassador to the U.N. Wang Guangya said yesterday. “I understand that it will be [in] Beijing.” U.S. officials are still awaiting a North Korean response to a U.S. proposal put forth at the last session of six-party talks a year ago, according to the Post. No updates would be made to that proposal before a new round of talks, U.S. officials said. They added, however, that Washington was willing to be flexible if North Korea were to make a legitimate counteroffer (Glenn Kessler, Washington Post, June 8). During Monday’s meeting, the North Korean officials told their U.S. counterparts that Pyongyang insists on being treated as a nuclear power, the Asahi Shimbun reported today. “We deserve treatment as a nuclear nation,” Asahi quoted North Korean Ambassador to the U.N. Pak Gil Yon as having said. It is the first time Pyongyang has made a direct claim of nuclear power status to Washington, according to Asahi (Kyodo/Yahoo!News, June 8). North Korea’s suggestion that it might be willing to resume talks could be a stalling tactic, some analysts said today. “This is probably a diplomatic tactic to stall while hanging on to its nuclear programs,” said Lee Dong-bok, senior associate with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told Reuters. “North Korea basically is not going to give up its nuclear programs, so it will come to the talks with demands not acceptable to the United States,” he said. Don Oberdorfer, an expert on North Korea at John Hopkins University, said the threat of the U.N. Security Council taking up the issue may have pushed North Korea to make the statement. “The North Koreans may have decided that, in order for the United States not to move to what is called in Washington ‘other options,’ it is a good time to suggest that they are not opposed in principle to returning to the talks,” he said (Reuters/New York Times, June 8).
The 16th WMD interdiction simulation held under the auspices of the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative is expected to conclude today in Mediterranean waters off the coast of Spain, the State Department announced (see GSN, Nov. 10, 2004). A two-day exercise, “Blue Action ’05” consisted of two phases. In the first phase, participants exchanged information from regional capitals about a cargo airliner suspected of transporting uranium centrifuge parts under the guise of water purification pipes. The aircraft was en route to South America via the Portuguese Azores from a fictitious country in Eurasia, according to fictional scenario. In the second phase, the aircraft was tracked by radar as it flew over Italy, France and Spain. New intelligence then came to light, suggesting that the aircraft was transporting radioactive material and that it would deviate from its flight plan to land in an unidentified African nation. According to the scenario, the country in question had links to terrorist organizations and the shipment therefore had to be prevented from reaching its destination. The Spanish Air Force was then expected to shadow and intercept the aircraft, which would be diverted to Spain’s Zaragoza Air Base for inspection. Last week, Poland and the Czech Republic hosted PSI exercise “Bohemian Guard 2005.” Participants included Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Ukraine, Romania, Slovakia and the United States. The scenario for that ground interdiction exercise involved an illicit rail shipment of WMD-related components and materials traveling from Poland via the Czech Republic to a third country. Singapore is scheduled to host the next PSI exercise, “Deep Sabre,” August 15-19, according to the State Department (State Department release, June 6).
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