Top Japanese negotiator Kenichiro Sasae spoke to the media today before beginning the second day of six-nation talks in Beijing on the North Korean nuclear crisis (Getty Images/Frederic J. Brown). North Korea Resists U.S. Demand to Make First Move North Korea today offered to scrap its nuclear arsenal, but only after the United States removes nuclear weapons allegedly deployed in South Korea and normalizes relations with Pyongyang, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, July 26). Six-nation talks on the North Korean nuclear issue began yesterday in Beijing after a 13-month pause...Full Story

Senate Measure Would Undermine CW Bans, Experts Say By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — A proposed amendment to a major bill before the U.S. Senate advocates using riot control agents in military combat — a policy, experts said, that would violate two chemical weapons treaties (see GSN, April 21, 2004)...Full Story

Top U.S. Energy Department Security Official Questions Basis for Nuclear Site Protection Level By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The security manager for five U.S. Energy Department sites housing weapon-grade nuclear material yesterday questioned the hypothetical threat used to determine the level and nature of security needed at the facilities (see GSN, Jan. 20)...Full Story

	Wednesday, July 27, 2005

Terrorism Study of Nuclear Waste Site Scrapped U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) said Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) threatened to block energy legislation being considered in the Senate if Hatch did not drop an amendment requiring a terrorism threat assessment of a planned nuclear waste site in Utah, the Salt Lake Tribune reported today (see GSN, May 26). Hatch’s amendment would have required the assessment before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission could give Private Fuel Storage a license to store 44,000 tons of nuclear waste in the Utah desert. Senate Energy Committee Chairman Pete Domenici (R-N.M.) asked Hatch to drop the amendment when he learned that Reid planned to block the bill, according to the Tribune. “I had the chairmen of both (the House and Senate committees) working with me, and Senator Reid misconstrued it and promised to stop the entire energy bill if that amendment was attached to it,” Hatch said. However, Reid spokeswoman Tessa Hafen said the senator did not threaten to torpedo the bill, but was concerned that the amendment could prompt other amendments regarding the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste site in Nevada. Reid is opposed to the planned facility. “It could have opened up a can of worms as far as nuclear waste issues go,” Hafen said. “His concern has always been about how the waste would be transported, so that's a concern of his, but it needs to be approached the right way. He just didn't feel that's the right way to do it” (Robert Gehrke, Salt Lake Tribune, July 27). Back to top

U.S. Chemical, Biological Exports Not Screened Properly, Homeland Security Inspector General Says U.S. Customs and Border Protection agents are lax in checking that sensitive chemical and biological cargo is shipped in accordance with U.S. export regulations, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, June 9). The department “does not consistently enforce federal export licensing laws at all U.S. ports of exit,” acting Homeland Security Department Inspector General Richard Skinner said in a report released yesterday. Monitoring of exports “is limited by inadequate information and staff resources,” the report says. Inspectors also have failed to update internal databases, leaving no record of whether chemical and biological exports are properly licensed, says the report. The bureau is updating its databases, said Customs spokesman Pat Jones. Millions of dollars worth of goods are shipped out of the country every day and many customs agents might not have the training to readily identify chemical and biological products with dual-use potential, said Scott Jones of the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia. “Things are leaving the country in huge volume, and ideally, Customs officers are looking for licenses and making sure everything is inspected,” Jones said. “But overall, you just can’t catch everything” (Lara Jakes Jordan, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, July 27). Back to top       Prewar Iraq Intelligence Inquiry Stalls in Senate The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has not moved forward in its investigation on whether the Bush administration mischaracterized intelligence to justify the Iraq war, the Boston Globe reported today (see GSN, July 15). Committee Chairman Pat Roberts (R-Kan.) had said the committee would begin investigating the matter following last year’s presidential election. However, little progress has been made since and Roberts said earlier this year that the investigation is “on the back burner,” according to the Globe. Roberts told the Globe that the committee has begun investigating the intelligence that predicted an easy time for U.S. troops once Saddam Hussein was overthrown. However, Republicans and Democrats have differing opinions on how to judge statement made before the war by the White House and Congress. Robert said more than 400 statements are based on bad intelligence. “So what do you do with that?” he said. “What have we gained other than the political objective of saying this administration issued the intelligence? Look in the front window.  Don't look in the back and pick off somebody's comment that some senator or somebody in the administration said and say, ‘Gee, had that person known, he wouldn't have said that.’” Some Democrats said political motivations are behind the delay. “The chairman has declared firmly that it will be done,” said committee Vice Chairman John Rockefeller (D-W.Va.). “I always think there's a reluctance to do anything which might embarrass the administration. I think that's been true since the beginning of all of this.” “A year and a half later, there's still no report, no conclusions, no accountability for the mistakes, and no way to be sure they won't be repeated,” said Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.). “This is just further evidence of a pattern by this White House and the Republicans in Congress to stop at nothing to discredit their critics and silence the tough questions before they get asked” (Rick Klein, Boston Globe, July 27). Back to top

North Korea Resists U.S. Demand to Make First Move North Korea today offered to scrap its nuclear arsenal, but only after the United States removes nuclear weapons allegedly deployed in South Korea and normalizes relations with Pyongyang, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, July 26). Six-nation talks on the North Korean nuclear issue began yesterday in Beijing after a 13-month pause. Both Seoul and Washington have denied the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons on the peninsula and are prepared to open U.S. military facilities in South Korea to inspections by the North if it agrees to a disarmament deal, Chosun Ilbo reported yesterday. “Our position concerning nuclear transparency is firm, and both South Korea and the U.S. agree that they are prepared to open up [U.S. forces in Korea] facilities if necessary,” a high-ranking South Korean official said Monday (Chosun Ilbo, July 26). U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill said Pyongyang should completely undo its nuclear arms program, adding that missiles and human rights should be part of the six-nation negotiations, AP reported. North Korean officials, who met directly with the U.S. delegation in Beijing again yesterday, expressed concerns about the sequencing of concessions in any potential agreement.  “They do not want to have obligations ahead of other people’s obligations,” Hill said (Burt Herman, Associated Press/winkTV.com, July 27). At the last round of talks in June 2004, the United States offered security guarantees and South Korea offered aid in return for Pyongyang agreeing to verifiably dismantle its nuclear programs. North Korea today finally responded to that proposal, saying it was “not logical, and accepting it would be difficult,” Reuters reported (Kim/Ueno, Reuters/Yahoo!News, July 27). The new, more flexible U.S. diplomatic approach to North Korea is roughly modeled on 2003 nuclear negotiations with Libya, a senior Bush administration official in Washington told the New York Times. Pyongyang’s nuclear facilities, however, are older, more advanced and better hidden than Tripoli’s were, said the official. Senior U.S. officials have said that the Bush administration remains opposed to front-loading benefits in any deal with North Korea. They have also said, however, that Hill has been given more leeway in negotiations than his predecessor, including permission for one-on-one meetings with the North Korean delegation, according to the Times (Yardley/Sanger, New York Times, July 27). Responding to a U.S. accusation at a bilateral meeting, the North Korean delegation yesterday denied that Pyongyang has a secret uranium enrichment program, ITAR-Tass reported. The United States and Japan, however, remain convinced that Pyongyang is running such a program, Kyodo Tsushin reported (Vasily Golovnin, ITAR-Tass, July 27). Elsewhere, the European Union announced that it is prepared to offer additional aid to North Korea if it becomes necessary to reach a disarmament deal, AP reported yesterday. “We have entered a new phase which we hope will have fruitful effects,” said EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana. “The negotiations now will be open-ended and will continue until ... some possible solution is found.” Solana that the European Union would review its relations with Pyongyang once a deal is achieved Associated Press/Basque News and Information Channel, July 26). Back to top       Top U.S. Energy Department Security Official Questions Basis for Nuclear Site Protection Level By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The security manager for five U.S. Energy Department sites housing weapon-grade nuclear material yesterday questioned the hypothetical threat used to determine the level and nature of security needed at the facilities (see GSN, Jan. 20). The agency’s design-basis threat — a classified security guideline that was made more stringent in October 2004 for the second time since the Sept. 11, 2001, al-Qaeda attacks — may not be appropriate to the actual threat environment, Energy, Science and Environment Security Manager Robert Walsh said at a House of Representatives subcommittee hearing. “I’m not 100 percent certain at this time that the fundamental intelligence that supports … the design-basis threat … supports the level that we currently have as what I consider to be the most representative threat,” Walsh told the Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations. Energy’s Office of the Undersecretary for Energy, Science and Environment oversees five sites with weapon-grade nuclear materials: the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, the Hanford Site in Washington state, the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory-West in Idaho and Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee. The National Nuclear Security Administration manages the department’s six other sites housing special nuclear materials. The Government Accountability Office said yesterday in a report on security at the Energy, Science and Environment sites that the design-basis threat is “the key component of DOE’s approach to security.” “The DBT has been traditionally based on a classified, multiagency intelligence-community assessment of potential terrorist threats known as the postulated threat. The threat from terrorist groups is generally the most demanding threat contained in the DBT,” the report says. Questioned by subcommittee Chairman Christopher Shays (R-Conn.) about the new design-basis threat, Walsh would not say whether actual threats that face the five Energy, Science and Environment facilities demand a higher or lower level of security than that called for by the current postulated threat. A “more complete” review of intelligence is needed, Walsh said. The security manager’s comments follow scattered calls for more attention to the costs that would be incurred in seeking compliance with the new, more stringent design-basis threat. Members of Congress called in a Defense Department authorization bill this year for a cost-benefit review of implementing the new security standard. “There’s some movement to claim that DOE’s going too far,” Union of Concerned Scientists nuclear-materials specialist Edwin Lyman said yesterday in an interview. “I haven’t heard too many people inside the government say the new design-basis threat isn’t adequate.” On the other hand, Lyman said, “It’s hard to argue that it would be too stringent for [the Energy, Science and Environment sites]. There are enormous amounts of plutonium and highly enriched uranium at Savannah River and Oak Ridge.” The GAO report indicates that protection forces at the Energy, Science and Environment sites “generally meet” current department requirements in such areas as firearms proficiency and equipment standardization but that changes are needed to meet the new design-basis threat. GAO officials reviewed documents and interviewed protection officers to determine what actions would be needed to defend against the threat identified in the October 2004 design-basis threat in time for the October 2008 deadline for complying with the new standard. The auditors concluded that Energy, Science and Environment should convert the existing protection force into an “‘elite force’ — modeled on U.S. Special Forces,” deploy new security technology, consolidate and eliminate nuclear materials and improve security coordination across the five sites. “Because these initiatives, particularly an elite force, are in early stages of development and will require significant commitment of resources and coordination across DOE and ESE, their completion by the 2008 October DBT implementation deadline is uncertain,” the office said. The auditors’ caution about prospects for the “elite force” effort follows a flurry of criticism of security contractor Wackenhut in recent years over its performance at Energy Department sites. In one incident, the department’s inspector general found last year that Wackenhut had improperly obtained advance notice of a surprise security drill at Oak Ridge. Representative Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio) yesterday questioned Energy Department officials about what he called their “tolerance” for Wackenhut’s deficiencies. Walsh replied that the company’s performance was improving: During recent departmental tests and reviews at the Y-12 National Security Complex at Oak Ridge, he said, the Wackenhut force “far exceeded” its performance at any time in the past six years. Despite the auditors’ view that meeting the 2008 deadline could prove difficult to meet, Shays pressed department officials on why the Energy Department could not comply earlier with the new standard. “Why does it have to take three years to protect ourselves?” Shays asked. Energy Department Inspector General Gregory Friedman said that although “the ideal is to have a virtually instantaneous defense for the threat that has been postulated,” care must be taken to ensure limited resources are expended wisely. He added that some required steps unavoidably take a long time, particularly the consolidation of nuclear materials. Energy Security and Safety Performance Assurance Director Glenn Podonsky concurred. “The nuclear material-consolidation piece is, in fact, probably the most daunting challenge,” Podonsky said. Lyman said it is difficult to know whether the Energy Department could be proceeding faster in efforts to comply with the new standard, especially given the opacity of the design-basis threat. “It’s easy to criticize,” he said, “and just knowing how long it takes DOE to do anything, even things they want to do, it probably could be expedited, but I’m just not in a position to say whether or not [Shays’ criticism is] justified.” “The fact is everyone was caught with their pants down Sept. 11,” he said, “and it’s unrealistic to expect that you can just change your design-basis threat twice and be able to upgrade security overnight — but it has been three years already.” Back to top       Iran to Resume Fuel Cycle Work Regardless of Details of Pending EU Proposal, Khatami Says Iran plans to resume some sensitive nuclear work regardless of what is contained in a European Union proposal expected to be revealed early next month, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami said today (see GSN, July 26). “Whether Europeans mention our right to resume activities at the uranium conversion facility at Isfahan or not, we will definitely resume them regardless,” Khatami said, according to Reuters. “Our deadline for suspending nuclear work was the EU proposal, we will wait until the first days of August but will restart activities right afterwards,” he said. Tehran does not, however, plan to resume development of uranium enrichment technology in the near future, said Atomic Energy Organization head Gholamreza Aghazadeh. “Enrichment is not currently on the agenda. What we are talking about is Isfahan and not Natanz,” he said. However, “we will certainly start uranium enrichment one day as well,” he added (Reuters/Yahoo!News, July 27). Tehran has called on Brussels in its proposal to permit some sensitive nuclear work to go forward, threatening otherwise to walk out on talks, Agence France-Presse reported. “One of our minimum (demands) is that the suspension is partially lifted,” negotiator Ali Agha Mohammadi quoted a letter from chief negotiator Hassan Rohani to the European Union last week as saying (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, July 26). The EU proposal is expected to offer trade incentives in exchange for Iranian concessions on its nuclear program, and is likely to be presented soon after President-elect Mahmoud Ahmadinejad takes office on Aug. 3, AFP reported. Negotiations will not resume until several weeks after the proposal is presented, said an EU official (Agence France-Presse/Interactive Investor, July 26). Back to top       Countries Seek Greater Nonproliferation Commitment European, Asian, African and Latin American foreign ministers yesterday called on all countries to sign on to the strengthened safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Financial Times reported (see GSN, May 1, 2003). The call was contained in draft language for the Millennium +5 Summit in New York this September. Chile, Indonesia, Australia, Romania, South Africa, Norway and the United Kingdom issued the draft, according to the Times. The draft language says that IAEA safeguards are “essential for effective verification.” The right to peaceful nuclear energy is emphasized and research into methods to control nuclear materials is urged, according to the Times. Action is recommended against countries that try to leave the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. “A state remains liable for breaches of international obligations undertaken prior to withdrawal. Leaving the treaty must not be considered a viable or consequence-free option,” the draft language states. Finally, the language calls for a treaty banning production of fissile materials used in nuclear weapons, a stop to nuclear test explosions, and steps to prevent a space-based arms race. Norwegian Foreign Minister Jan Petersen and U.N. General Assembly President Jean Ping are expected to discuss the proposed summit language next week, according to the Times. Rebecca Johnson, head of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy said the language is a step back from commitments made at the 2000 NPT review conference (Mark Turner, Financial Times, July 27). Back to top

Senate Measure Would Undermine CW Bans, Experts Say By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — A proposed amendment to a major bill before the U.S. Senate advocates using riot control agents in military combat — a policy, experts said, that would violate two chemical weapons treaties (see GSN, April 21, 2004). The amendment’s operative provisions — which require the executive branch to report to Congress on U.S. military use and policies regarding use of riot control agents — are not at issue. What is controversial is the amendment’s opening assertion that “it remains the long-standing policy of the United States” that riot control agents, such as tear gas, may be used by military personnel “in combat and in other situations for defensive purposes to save lives.” Were that description of U.S. policy approved by Congress and signed into law, critics said, it would appear to redefine U.S. policy to allow general combat use of riot control agents. Such use is prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting gas and germ warfare, they said. “It’s a sleight of hand basically,” said Alan Pearson, director of the Biological and Chemical Weapons Control Program at the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation in Washington. In a recent analysis, Pearson wrote, “An expansion of U.S. policy in this manner would be likely to severely undermine the Chemical Weapons Convention and the protections it provides for the United States and members of the U.S. Armed Forces.” The amendment to the fiscal 2006 Defense Authorization bill was introduced last week by Senator John Ensign (R-Nev.). In a phone interview yesterday, Ensign spokesman Jack Finn said the senator is pressing for a change, whether to international law or how the law is interpreted, that would allow use of riot control agent in combat. “Through whatever means is most expedient and whatever documents, agreements or treaties need to be altered, it’s the senator’s goal to allow troops access to tear gas in their defense,” he said. Finn said U.S. military personnel are “handcuffed in their inability to use such things as tear gas.” A State Department official, who asked not to be identified, said expanded use of riot control agents is not needed and would create unwanted controversy. Debate and a vote on the amendment, if any, are likely to occur after Labor Day when Congress returns from its August recess. Traditional Interpretation While not technically considered chemical weapons, riot control agents, including irritating or incapacitating chemicals, are restricted under international law from use in warfare.  In response to the use of riot control and more toxic gases during World War I, the 1925 Geneva Protocol banned the use “in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices.” The United States resisted joining for decades. Before ratifying the protocol in 1975, President Gerald Ford issued the still-standing Executive Order 11850 that makes certain allowances for using riot control agents. It says that the United States “renounces first use of riot control agents in war except in defensive military modes to save lives.” The order lists as examples: riot control situations; situations where civilians are used to mask or screen attacks and civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided; aircraft rescue or prisoner recovery missions in remote areas; and rear echelon areas outside of the zone of immediate combat to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists and paramilitary organizations. The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention directly bans riot control agent use “as a method of warfare.” The Senate’s 1997 resolution for ratifying that treaty reaffirms the 1975 executive order. It adds that the treaty should not restrict nonwarfare use of riot control agents by U.S. forces, such as during peacekeeping operations or to make peace between parties to a conflict. Neither international agreement, nor the U.S. interpretation of the agreements, permits using riot control agents in combat, wrote Pearson. “By stating that RCAs [riot control agents] may be used not only in defensive modes, but also in combat, [Ensign’s amendment] clearly goes beyond Executive Order 11850 and the Senate resolution of ratification of the CWC,” he wrote. Pearson noted conclusions from a Council on Foreign Relations task force report in 2004 that warned against reinterpreting the requirements of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The task force report said, “To press for an amendment to the CWC or even to assert a right to use RCAs as a method of warfare risks impairing the legitimacy of all NLW [nonlethal weapons].  This would also free others to openly and legitimately conduct focused governmental R&D [research and development] that could more readily yield advanced lethal agents than improved nonlethal capabilities.” Finn said Ensign was aware of criticisms, but said understandings of what is allowable need to be changed. “There’s certainly been some discussion, some disagreement as to what category certain things fall into. It’s the senator’s belief that tear gas is a tool that should be available to the troops and that the definition should be rectified so that they are able to use that tool in their defense,” including in combat operations, he said. Ensign’s amendment would require the Justice Department to report to Congress on “the current legal availability and viability of Executive Order 11850, to include the rationale as to why Executive Order 11850 remains permissible under United States law.” Stirring the Pot The U.S. State Department official said there is ambiguity to the Chemical Weapons Convention’s phrase “as a method of warfare,” as it is not defined in the treaty. “What exactly does that mean?” the official said rhetorically.  The official said, though, that the general U.S. interpretation has been that riot control agents may not be used against other combatants by U.S. forces in combat. Riot control agents technically could be used in combat, the official said, but “as long the use is for riot control purposes against noncombatants,” such as against rioting prisoners. Ensign’s amendment, “for no useful purpose that I can see,” blurs such distinctions, and creates unneeded controversy, the official said. “There might be a mistaken notion that commanders in the field are asking to use riot control agents, for whatever reason in Afghanistan or Iraq, and such requests are being denied. Not true.  There’s not a commander that we know of that’s been requesting use of riot control agents, or who’s requested, and been denied,” the official said. “This is a pot we’d just as soon not see stirred,” the official said. Ensign spokesman Finn suggested the proposed amendment was not motivated by any particular event or request.  “The senator, as you know, is a member of the Armed Services Committee so he is always keeping an eye out for anything he can do to support the folks in the field,” Finn also said. “It’s a common sense thing,” he said. Back to top       Russia Storing Unsafe Chemical Weapons Russian chemical weapons storage facilities house about 33,000 ammunition rounds that are no longer safe to store, MosNews.com reported yesterday (see GSN, July 26). “Checks have revealed 11,810 aviation and over 21,000 artillery munitions are beyond their safe storage life,” a source with Russia’s Federal Industrial Agency said, according to Interfax. “The guarantee terms of storage for all the munitions have expired, and the terms of their safe keeping are also expiring.” The source said weapons identified as dangerous are being destroyed at the storage facilities because of safety concerns. For example, 23 sarin-filled warheads have been destroyed in Kizner, 10 sarin-filled rockets were eliminated in Shchuchye and 16 VX-filled aviation bombs were destroyed in Maradykovskiy (MosNews.com, July 26). Back to top

Pakistan Unconcerned About Planned U.S. Patriot Missile Sales to India, Musharraf Says Pakistan is not worried by U.S. plans to sell the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 missile defense system to India, because the system would not neutralize Islamabad’s missile arsenal, Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf said Monday (see GSN, June 15). Patriot interceptors would be expected to take down only about 40 percent of incoming missiles, Musharraf said. The system also has a response time of up to 18 minutes, while Pakistani missiles would begin landing within six minutes, he said. “And, to top it all, our capability, which we have tested and is no secret, goes in the atmosphere. And when it drops down, it sheds its body in the air. The remaining part is the warhead, which is as small as 10 feet, and hard to hit,” Musharraf said. “So, there is no danger to Pakistan. We are aware of the developments in the region. Where we feel we have problems at our hands, we will rectify. We will not compromise on our defense,” he said (Asian News International/WebIndia123.com, July 26).   Back to top

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