By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — Contrasting earlier denials, the Defense Department appears to be formalizing military guidelines for seeking presidential approval to use nuclear weapons pre-emptively against suspected WMD facilities (see GSN, July 22). The Pentagon disclosed the potential guidelines earlier this year with the Internet publication of a “final” draft of a new Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, produced by the Joint Staff. The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy is expected to review the document for possible final approval by the end of the year, according to a defense official, who asked not to be identified. The Washington Post in a story yesterday said the Joint Staff director could sign the doctrine in a few weeks. Differing from its two predecessor doctrines of 1993 and 1995, the document describes several scenarios in which U.S. military commanders might request presidential authorization for a nuclear strike against a suspected WMD threat. They are: — “an adversary using or intending to use WMD against U.S./international alliance forces and/or innocent civilian populations that conventional forces cannot stop”; — “imminent attack from adversary [biological weapons] that only nuclear weapons effects can safely destroy/incinerate”; and — “attacks limited to adversary WMD (e.g. against deep, hardened bunkers containing chemical and biological weapons or the C2 [command and control] infrastructure required for the adversary to execute a WMD attack) that could be employed against the United States.” Critics said the new guidelines reflect a shift toward an increasing role for nuclear weapons in Bush administration war planning, and argued that the public release of the new policy could foster insecurity in other countries and encourage nuclear proliferation. “What’s most troubling is the public visibility to it,” said Steve Fetter, dean of the University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy, who was assistant defense secretary for international security policy during the Clinton administration. The military has always had plans and the ability for conducting nuclear first strikes, he said, but detailing it in a public document “undermines our official diplomatic positions and policies related to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty not to threaten parties to that treaty with a nuclear attack.” The document suggests that “we’re planning to use things first and when it does, if you’re a country like Iran, that’s a pretty good argument for wanting to get nuclear weapons,” said Jeffrey Lewis, a research fellow at the University of Maryland’s Center for International and Security Studies. Recommending the use of U.S. nuclear weapons against suspected enemy WMD arsenals, Lewis said, would be reckless in light of difficulties the U.S. faces in determining whether a country has or is developing a weapon of mass destruction, where such a capability might be located, and whether there is any real intention to use it. “We simply don’t have the intelligence to launch pre-emptive strikes. … If we [had attacked] Iraq with nuclear weapons, we wouldn’t have known that they didn’t have WMD. And as bad as Iraq is because we got it wrong, imagine how much worse it would be if we had used nuclear weapons,” he said. U.S. defense officials have been fairly mum on the document, noting it is still in draft form and subject to changes. They say, however, that the existence of such guidelines would not necessarily make the use of U.S. nuclear weapons any more probable because the decision to use nuclear weapons is not one any president would take lightly. “As far as the nuclear policy, there isn’t a change. The president still has to authorize the use of any nuclear weapon,” the defense official said. Lewis argued the contrary. “If the president really wants to use nuclear weapons, I’d much prefer he’d have to sit down over maps in the Oval Office. I want to make it hard for the president to use nuclear weapons. And you know plans are designed to make it easy.” “What this sets the basis for are plans, operational planning, and it affects the way leaders, military as well as civilian, react in a crisis,” Fetter said. Expression, Not Creation of PolicyThough copies are available elsewhere on the Internet, the Pentagon removed its version of the draft doctrine in the spring and classified it with a code word. “It just created too much controversy,” the defense official said. The proposed language, which remains under review, probably reflects a classified policy decision signed by President George W. Bush several years ago, said Lewis, a former staffer in the Pentagon’s defense policy office. “The White House drafts a national security presidential directive [NSPD]. Then the secretary of defense creates a nuclear weapons employment policy [NWEP], and then that kind of goes down into the bowels of the Pentagon and ends up with the SIOP [Single Integrated Operational Plan] and all the different plans that might exist,” he said. “This doctrine document is an unclassified publication for combatant commanders. So it doesn’t really establish any policies, but it should fairly accurately reflect the contents of the NSPD and the NWEP,” he said. The press reported on such a policy before the March 2003 invasion of Iraq. Military affairs analyst William Arkin in January 2003 published an opinion piece in the Los Angeles Times stating that the U.S. Strategic Command, following a December 2002 presidential decision memo, was preparing target lists for potential nuclear attacks against non-nuclear Iraq. Attributing his information to documents and interviews with military sources, Arkin also wrote of planning for possible targeting of WMD capabilities in other countries, including Iran, North Korea, Syria, Libya, Russia and China. Signs of movement toward the policy, he wrote, emerged in leaked excerpts of the administration’s 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, which called for “deliberate preplanned and practiced missions” against hardened and deeply buried targets, including WMD facilities, and for developing improved capabilities for striking them. In 2002, North Korea justified its nuclear weapons program by saying it was concerned about nuclear pre-emption and appeared to cite the review, which listed that country, Iraq, and the other five noted by Arkin as countries where contingencies could rise requiring nuclear weapons use. Administration DenialsWhile not denying the existence of such a policy or plans, U.S. officials said have said they had no intention of using nuclear weapons pre-emptively. In February 2003, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker said the administration had made no decision on listing North Korea for a possible pre-emptive nuclear attack. “This is a nonexistent decision and a total fabrication,” Rademaker said. The Energy Department’s National Nuclear Security Administration chief, Linton Brooks, several times last year denied the United States would conduct such an attack. On May 12, 2004, he said, “While no one wants to constrain a president’s options in advance, I’ve never met anyone in the administration who would even consider nuclear pre-emption in connection with countering rogue state WMD threats.” “Nuclear pre-emption with a low-yield weapon is fanciful,” he said at an Aug. 11, 2004 event, according to United Press International. “I’ve never heard anyone in the administration who could foresee circumstances under which we would consider nuclear pre-emption.” “It seems to me he’s either completely out of the loop, or extraordinarily economical with the truth,” said Hans Kristensen, a nuclear weapons consultant for the Natural Resources Defense Council. “That’s exactly what they’ve been trying to come up with for the last five years, ways of doing that,” he said, citing for instance Air Force programs for a rapid, global nuclear weapons strike capability. “The first strike language you speak of is clearly not in the context of pre-emption in time of peace. Administrator Brooks stands by his statement and see no inconsistency,” NNSA spokesman Bryan Wilkes said today.
Negotiators are expected to arrive in Beijing today and tomorrow to resume talks on North Korea’s nuclear effort, Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, Sept. 9). Despite a series of bilateral meetings during a five-week recess, North Korea and the United States seem to have maintained their entrenched positions, according to AFP. “What North Korea has to do is get out of the nuclear business,” Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, the top U.S. negotiator, said Friday. Hill and top South Korean envoy Song Min-soon were scheduled to meet tonight to coordinate positions, the Yonhap news agency reported. Six-party talks are expected to resume tomorrow (Agence France-Presse I/Yahoo!News, Sept. 12). The Russian delegation arrived today, while North and South Korean and U.S. teams were due in Beijing tomorrow, according to Reuters China today toned down expectations for a swift resolution. “We hope to see some progress, but we didn’t really expect too much ... because the process takes time,” said Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao. “The basic problem existing, is still the lack of trust between the United States and North Korea” (Reuters, Sept. 12). Some analysts expressed moderate hope for a positive outcome in creation of a statement of principles for future negotiations, AFP reported. “Basically, we are looking at several possibilities in Beijing and it is hard to now which way the talks will go,” said Kim Tae-woo, a nuclear policy expert at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses in Seoul. “First, [the talks] could be successful and we could be looking at an agreement. Second, we could see improvement. Third, the talks could result in further aggravation and ill feeling. Fourthly, they could simply collapse,” “I would say the possibility for one and four is very slim so it has to be two or three, but it is very hard to say which,” Kim said (Agence France-Presse/SpaceWar.com, Sept. 11). Seoul, meanwhile, called for negotiation of a peace treaty to end the Korean War during talks tomorrow with Pyongyang, AFP reported today. The meeting between North and South Korean ministerial officials should “focus on how to bring peace to the Korean Peninsula,” said Kim Cheon-sik, spokesman for South Korea’s delegates (Agence France-Presse II/Yahoo!News, Sept. 12).
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice last week appealed to China, India and Russia to back U.S. efforts to refer Iran to the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions for its nuclear activities, Agence France-Presse reported yesterday (see GSN, Sept. 9). “Iran needs to get a message from the international community that is a unified message, and by this I mean not just the EU-3 and the United States, but also Russia and China and India and others,” Rice said. Russia, Brazil and 13 Nonaligned Movement countries are not expected to support Security Council referral, diplomats said. A senior nonaligned diplomat on the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Board of Governors, however, told AFP that “it is still too early. A lot can happen” in the week leading up to a meeting of that body, which is set to consider Iran’s case. “The NAM position is tentative, a taking stock as Russia and China oppose referral,” the diplomat said. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Russian President Vladimir Putin are expected to meet at the three-day U.N. summit set to begin Wednesday in New York. There are no plans for Ahmadinejad to meet with officials from former nuclear negotiating partners France, Germany and the United Kingdom, according to AFP. The European Union is prepared to support Security Council referral for Iran as a “clear signal of concern” over Tehran’s resumption of sensitive nuclear activities, according to a confidential document circulated among IAEA diplomats last week. “This is highly official,” a senior EU diplomat said. The document says that the “European side sees reporting Iran to the Security Council as a means of reinforcing authority of IAEA resolutions and the diplomatic process.” Under a possible “phased approach,” the board would again call on Iran to cease nuclear fuel work, with Security Council referral only coming into play subsequently if Tehran refuses. The agency could set a deadline for the halt, according to one diplomat. Newly installed Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki yesterday warned of “consequences” for referring Iran to the Security Council (Agence France-Presse I/SpaceWar.com, Sept. 11). Tehran is planning construction of two additional power plants, Mottaki said. He also reiterated Iran’s refusal to resume its nuclear freeze. “There is no question of returning to a new suspension at Isfahan,” he said, referring to Iran’s uranium conversion plant (Agence France-Presse II/SpaceWar.com, Sept. 11). Mottaki added that Tehran wanted to resume nuclear negotiations with the European powers, Reuters reported. “There are some efforts to restart Iran-EU talks. We want those talks to restart without any preconditions,” he said (Parisa Hafezi, Reuters, Sept. 11). A former IAEA deputy director general has called on the Security Council to augment inspectors’ investigatory authority in Iran, the Sunday Telegraph reported yesterday. “It is reaching the point where it is beyond critical,” said Pierre Goldschmidt, who left the agency in July after leading the Iran team for six years. “The IAEA can only work on the basis of the facts that are presented to it, and there have been many serious omissions by the Iranians. The Iranians are exploiting all the loopholes in the international agreements. As to why they are doing this, you can draw your own conclusions.” “As it stands, the investigating authority of the agency is too limited with regard to Iran. To do its job properly it needs to have more authority than is currently available to it,” Goldschmidt said. He said inspectors should be allowed complete access to all Iranian scientists, military institutions and original documents relating to Iran’s nuclear program, as well as freedom to take environmental samples at all sites. Agency inspectors received that authority while investigating the Iraqi weapons programs under deposed President Saddam Hussein, according to the Telegraph. Goldschmidt also criticized IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei’s handling of the Iran dossier in the last two years. “ElBaradei says that any judgment about Iran should be made on their intentions. My view is that we should look at the indications, not the intentions, and then decide,” he said (Con Coughlin, Sunday Telegraph, Sept. 11). Meanwhile, Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Pierre Pettigrew has said that Iran’s human rights abuses — including the death of Montreal-based photojournalist Zahra Kazemi — damage Tehran’s credibility on pledges that its nuclear program is aimed only at energy production. “These are separate things, but they both reflect pretty nasty habits,” Pettigrew said in an interview with the CanWest News Service. Pettigrew hopes to confront Iranian counterpart Mottaki at the U.N. summit in New York and plans to condemn Iran’s nuclear ambitions, according to CanWest (Mike Blanchfield, CanWest News Service, Sept. 12).
A recent report found that India is increasing its stock of weapon-grade plutonium, but cautioned that the estimate is highly uncertain, the Daily Times reported today (see GSN, Sept. 9). “It is assumed that almost all of the plutonium is successfully recovered during reprocessing. Any estimate of India’s weapon-grade plutonium inventory remains highly uncertain. Complicating any estimate is the mixture of solid and ambiguous information regarding India’s capabilities and actions. As a result, an analytical approach is used that specifically aims to capture varying and conflicting information about key parameters affecting estimates of the size of India’s plutonium stock,” said David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, in a report released last week (see GSN, Sept. 8) Albright reached his conclusion by estimating the amount of plutonium produced by India’s Cirus and Dhruva reactors. To calculate the plutonium in the those reactors, Albright used Indian statements on reactor capacity, although official pronouncements on output have varied, according to the Times. “These statements cannot be confirmed and interpreting them is difficult. Dhruva had a capacity factor less than 25 percent during its first few years of operation,” Albright said in the report. “Other problems may have developed in the reactor that lowered its lifetime capacity factor below 60 to 65 percent. Indian officials may be giving capacity factors for periods when the reactors operated well and ignoring periods when the reactors were shut down or operating at significantly reduced power. This practice is rather common when discussing nuclear power reactors. In this case, a capacity factor of 60 to 65 percent would more likely be a maximum lifetime capacity factor” (Daily Times, Sept. 12). Meanwhile, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is expected to meet with French President Jacques Chirac today in Paris to ask for assistance in developing nuclear power, Agence France-Presse reported. Singh said in a statement yesterday that he hopes to expand civilian nuclear energy, trade, investment, defense, space technology, advanced science and cultural cooperation with France. In an interview published in Le Figaro today, Singh said that nuclear assistance provided by other nations would be kept apart from India’s military nuclear program. He also distanced India from its longtime rival, Pakistan. “India is a democracy that functions well. Our political system offers sufficient guarantees to ensure that we keep our promises” (Agence France-Press/Yahoo!News, Sept. 12).
The Savannah River Site in South Carolina has received rods containing the first tritium produced by the United States in 15 years in preparation for the material’s eventual extraction and use in existing nuclear weapons, the Associated Press reported Friday (see GSN, April 12, 2004). A radioactive isotope of hydrogen, tritium must be replaced in nuclear weapons because it decays at a rate of 5 percent each year, according to AP. The shipment recently arrived from the Tennessee Valley Authority’s Watts Bar nuclear reactor, according to the National Nuclear Security Administration. “This milestone is an important element to maintaining the safety, security and reliability of the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile,” NNSA Deputy Administrator Thomas D’Agostino said in a statement (Associated Press/Myrtle Beach Online, Sept. 9).
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