By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The North Korean government understands that the six-nation statement agreed to this month on its nuclear program allows for discussions on providing the country a light-water reactor only after it has disarmed, the top U.S. negotiator said here today (see GSN, Sept. 19). “Let me be clear, there is no ambiguity about what their undertakings are in that text. They know full well, I mean, we didn’t spend 20 days and nights talking about the Major League pennant races,” said Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill, speaking at the United States Institute for Peace. The day after the multiparty statement of negotiating goals was signed on Sept. 19, a North Korean official said his country would expect to receive a light-water reactor from the United States before dismantling its suspected nuclear weapons and programs (see GSN, Sept. 20). North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Choe Su Hon also said this month that Pyongyang is looking to dismantle a partially built graphite-moderated reactor concurrent with construction of a light-water reactor, Hill said. U.S. officials have said that negotiators did not include either effort in the statement and have portrayed the North Korean position as a negotiating bid ahead of the next round of talks scheduled for November in Beijing (see GSN, Sept. 21). Statement Language AmbiguousThe statement text does not say North Korea should receive a nuclear reactor, only that the parties “agreed to discuss” providing a light-water reactor to Pyongyang. It also does not specify a schedule for those discussions, saying only they would occur “at an appropriate time.” An opinion piece Sunday in the Washington Post by a recently retired State Department Korean interpreter argued that the statement’s ambiguity has left it open to interpretation. The document is a “linguistic minefield,” according to Tong Kim. Hill said U.S. negotiators during the talks “took the occasion to define what ‘appropriate time’ is and the other parties did so as well and we agreed that once they are denuclearized, once they are back in the NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty], once they have IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards, that we would agree to have a discussion about the subject of the provision of a light-water reactor.” Hill said it is “hard to say” where North Korea was coming from with its Sept. 20 statement, but suggested it might have been intended to assuage internal political pressures. “Certainly internal considerations must be there. Certainly they have a rather substantial nuclear industry, industry in a sense of a lot of people engaged on these nuclear programs,” he said. Hill cautioned that the six-nation statement on potential North Korean disarmament was not a “deal,” as it has been described by commentators and in the press. “Right now we have what I think is a very important first step, but we don’t have a deal. … We’ve got a long way to go before anyone can proclaim that we have a deal. What we have is an agreement on principles that if anyone is going to walk away from them, they have to walk away from five other parties,” he said.
By David Francis Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The number of illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities involving nuclear and radioactive materials in 2004 increased significantly compared to prior years, according to a report released yesterday by the International Atomic Energy Agency (see GSN, June 16). Countries reported 121 incidents to the agency, according to the Illicit Trafficking Database report covering the theft of nuclear and radioactive materials from 1993 to 2004. Approximately 77 incidents were reported in 2003, the report states, and approximately 57 were reported in 2002. The agency attributed the rise in reported trafficking, theft and other incidents to better reporting by the 81 countries involved. The increase in 2004 is the first since 2000. The agency said, however, that since 1993 incidents have been trending downward. “Improved reporting may in part account for it,” the report says of last year’s increase. There has been only one reported incident involving trafficking of weapon-grade material since 2003, according to the report. An individual was caught attempting to smuggle 170 grams of highly enriched uranium across the border of the former Soviet republic Georgia. While 170 grams is not enough nuclear material for a weapon, the incident illustrates the vulnerabilities of nuclear materials, said Anthony Wier, a research associate at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. “The theft and potential smuggling of nuclear material … that can be used in a nuclear weapon isn’t a hypothetical risk,” he told Global Security Newswire. Terrorists “don’t steal enough for a bomb in one fell swoop,” Wier said, adding that recent U.S. Homeland Security Department emergency planning scenarios involved terrorists gathering nuclear material for a weapon from different sources. The U.N. nuclear watchdog noted the attempted trafficking of the 170 grams in its 2004 annual report. However, this is the first mention of an incident involving such a large amount of highly enriched uranium in a trafficking report Wier said. Few Incidents of Weapon-Usable MaterialsSince 1993, the agency has tracked 196 incidents including plutonium, uranium, and thorium. Only 18 of the incidents involved highly enriched uranium or plutonium, and just a few of these involved kilogram quantities of weapon-usable materials. However, the agency warned that small quantities of weapon-usable materials seized were likely samples of larger supplies that may not be secure. Two hundred and twenty incidents of theft of low-grade nuclear materials in the form of natural and depleted uranium, reactor fuel pellets and thorium were reported between 1993 and 2004. The agency said these incidents indicate gaps in nuclear material security. “The majority of confirmed incidents with nuclear materials recorded during 1993 to 2004 involved criminal activity, such as theft, illegal possession, illegal transfer or transaction,” the agency said in a release accompanying the report. “Some of these incidents indicate that there is a perceived demand for such materials on the ‘black market.’ Where information on motives is available, it indicates that profit seeking is the principal motive behind such events.” Finally, the agency reported 424 incidents from 1993 to 2004 of radioactive sources that could be used by terrorists. “In the hands of terrorists or other criminals, some radioactive sources could be used for malicious purposes, for example in a radiological dispersal device or ‘dirty bomb,’” the report says.
Nearly 14 kilograms of highly enriched uranium was transferred yesterday from a research reactor in the Czech Republic to Russia for converting into a non-weapon-usable form, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, May 26). The transfer was the eighth sponsored by a U.S-Russian initiative to repatriate Soviet-produced highly enriched uranium from research reactors around the world. Russia has pledged to retrieve the material from civilian research facilities in 17 countries in order to prevent the uranium from falling into the hands of terrorists, according to AP (Associated Press, Sept. 28).
Iran may need several months to correct technical difficulties at its Isfahan uranium conversion facility before being able to generate uranium hexafluoride pure enough for enrichment, the next step in producing reactor or bomb fuel, Platts Nuclear Fuel reported last month (see GSN, Sept. 7). Iran was able to generate initial amounts of UF6 “within a few hours” of resuming operations at Isfahan on Aug. 10 (see GSN, Aug. 16), an official at the Vienna headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency told Platts (Mark Hibbs, Platts Nuclear Fuel, Aug. 15). The quality of UF6, however, was so poor that it could not be used as feedstock for enrichment, Reuters reported yesterday. “The UF6 is crap,” said a Western diplomat in Vienna. “I wouldn’t say it’s garbage,” said another Western diplomat. “But the UF6 produced at Isfahan is of such poor quality that if it were fed into centrifuges it could damage them.” “It makes one wonder why they’re so insistent about running (Isfahan) at this point,” another diplomat said. Several EU officials said Iran would maintain continuous work at Isfahan rather than showing weakness in the face of Western pressure by halting activity. “It’s a question of dignity,” said one diplomat. China, India, Russia and South Africa all unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Iran last week to suspend conversion for a few weeks in order to avoid a U.N. Security Council showdown, according to diplomats (Reuters, Sept. 27). To obtain pure UF6, Iran must operate the plant initially at very low levels in order to control the process and minimize contamination, a learning process that could take “several months,” officials at the International Atomic Energy Agency told Platts. Mastering the technology could take even longer if components and processes introduced in the last year by Iran require further modification, the experts added. Iran’s hurried efforts could indicate it is attempting to create an impression of a far greater mastery of the technology than it in fact has, said Gary Samore, vice president for global security and sustainability at the MacArthur Foundation in Chicago. “Iran took steps which seemed to imply to the outside world that it was on the verge of making a dramatic breakthrough in its enrichment program. They haven’t apparently wanted us to know that things haven’t been problem-free,” said Samore (Hibbs, Platts Nuclear Fuel, Aug. 15).
The Iranian parliament today gave priority to a bill halting application of the country’s Additional Protocol to its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreement, Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, Sept. 27).). Bringing the legislation up for a vote could take several weeks because it must first go through a specialized commission, according to AFP (Agence France-Presse I/SpaceWar.com, Sept. 28). Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency head Alexander Rumyantsev said Iran does not have the ability to fulfill its threats of resuming enrichment, the Associated Press reported today. “Currently Iran has no enrichment capacity — there is no possible way Iranians can enrich uranium,” Rumyantsev said. He said Iran’s pilot enrichment project at Natanz would not be ready for more than a year. IAEA diplomats confirmed Rumyantsev’s statements, adding that the several tons of uranium hexafluoride Iran managed to produce since resuming conversion last month were contaminated and could not be used as feedstock for enrichment (see related GSN story, today). “It would need purification before it would be suitable,” said one diplomat. “They need to work on their ... production, but they’re getting expertise,” the diplomat added (Ali Akbar Dareini, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, Sept. 28). Meanwhile, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said today that it is “inconceivable” that a military strike would be launched against Iran over its nuclear program, AFP reported. “All United States presidents always say all options are open, but it is not on the table, it is not on the agenda. I happen to think it is inconceivable,” Straw told BBC radio (Agence France-Presse II/SpaceWar.com, Sept. 28).). The United States perceives Iran’s nuclear ambitions as a greater threat than even North Korea’s avowed nuclear weapons program, analysts said yesterday. “In terms of threats — at this point — the Bush administration sees the Iranian regime as more threatening than the North Korean regime,” said Robert Einhorn, an adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washington fears that Iranian nuclear technology could be transferred to terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas, which Iran a history of supporting, Einhorn said. “The question exists what kinds of ties Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have with militant groups and would they be prepared to provide assistance in some very nasty weapons,” he said. North Korea, an impoverished, isolated, resource-poor nation is seen as inherently less threatening than Iran, which has world’s second-largest oil and gas reserves, said Joseph Cirincione, nonproliferation director at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “So while there is no evidence at all that Iran has any significant quantity of nuclear material or any nuclear weapons, Iran is a much more difficult nuclear issue to resolve for the United States,” said Cirincione (Agence France-Presse III/SpaceWar.com, Sept. 28).
Work has begun to determine the specific steps by which North Korea would dismantle its nuclear programs and the reciprocal measures to be granted by the five countries negotiating with Pyongyang, South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon said today (see GSN, Sept. 27). “We have launched preparations to set up specific steps and their sequence, focusing on nuclear dismantlement and corresponding measures,” Ban said. China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea and the United States are expected to resume multilateral negotiations in November, Reuters reported (Jack Kim, Reuters/Yahoo!News, Sept. 28). Finalizing the terms for North Korea’s disarmament could take years, an analyst said yesterday. The agreement reached last week in Beijing “is an expressed destination but not a roadmap how to get there,” said Center for Strategic and International Studies adviser and former Assistant Secretary of State Robert Einhorn (see GSN, Sept. 19). “It is easy to overstate what happened,” Einhorn said. “It could take years.” North Korea is skilled at pitting its negotiating partners against one another, said Derek Mitchell, a former Defense Department official and a senior fellow at the center. Pyongyang is aware of the desire by China and South Korea for stability in the region “at all cost,” Mitchell said. The two countries forced acknowledgement of North Korea’s right to a nuclear energy program into the agreement, the analysts said. “The question is whether China and South Korea will apply real leverage on North Korea,” Mitchell said (Barry Schweid, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, Sept. 27).
Russia said yesterday it wants to join a U.S. plan to establish a supply of uranium fuel for nuclear power reactors in countries that agree to forgo developing their own fuel capabilities, Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, Sept. 27). “We support this American initiative,” said Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency head Alexander Rumyantsev, referring to a proposal U.S. Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman announced Monday at the International Atomic Energy Agency. The agency should oversee the fuel bank, Rumyantsev said. “The IAEA is the organization that will have to develop the regulations and rules for such a mechanism,” he said. IAEA officials said yesterday that they had not yet studied the U.S. proposal. The initial U.S. offer of 17.4 metric tons of nuclear fuel is an effort to “kick-start” development of a multinational fuel bank, said one senior U.S. diplomat. Washington did not, however, offer a proposal for the bank’s management or any other details of its potential structure. Brazil, China, France, Japan, Russia, the United States and the Urenco consortium —Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom — are the world’s only producers of enriched uranium for commercial use (Agence France-Presse/SpaceWar.com, Sept. 27).
Russia plans to develop hypersonic strategic missile systems, President Vladimir Putin said yesterday (see GSN, Nov. 18, 2004). “We are developing and will provide the army with new, high-precision strategic complexes that are unique and unlikely to appear earlier in any other country,” Putin said. The missiles would use hypersonic sound to change course and altitude and “will be virtually invulnerable, even to the missile defense systems being developed in some of our partner countries,” Putin said (Associated Press, Sept. 27). Meanwhile, the Russian navy said it successfully tested a new submarine-launched ballistic missile yesterday, the Associated Press reported. The Bulava solid-fuel missile was fired from a nuclear submarine in the White Sea and struck a target on the Kamchatka Peninsula, navy spokesman Capt. Igor Dygalo said in a statement. Yesterday’s test was the first live fire of the missile, which has a range of 5,000 miles, according to AP. “The successful test launch demonstrated the high level of readiness of the naval strategic nuclear forces and effectiveness of the navy’s military command,” Dygalo said. The Russian navy expects to get two newly equipped nuclear submarines in 2006 armed with the missiles, Dygalo said. Interfax reported that each of the submarines would carry 12 missiles (Associated Press, Sept. 27).
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