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Our nuclear power facilities have been built on decades of belt-tightening of our people. Our people’s sweat and blood is in those facilities. It is unimaginable for us to give up without an alternative.
—Commentary in Monday’s edition of North Korea’s official Rodong Sinmun daily.

By Chris Schneidmiller Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The U.S. chemical industry has spent more than $2 billion to increase security since the Sept. 11 attacks, but the risk of a terrorist strike on a plant can never be entirely eliminated, public and private sector officials said last week (see GSN, July 14)...Full Story
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By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — Two prominent U.S. Democratic politicians yesterday criticized the Bush administration’s efforts at preventing the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons capabilities worldwide (see GSN, Aug. 3)...Full Story
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Iran could develop a nuclear weapons capacity in five years with a fully committed effort, according to a study released today by a London-based think tank (see GSN, Aug. 26)...Full Story
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Wednesday, September 7, 2005 |  | | |  |
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By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — Two prominent U.S. Democratic politicians yesterday criticized the Bush administration’s efforts at preventing the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons capabilities worldwide (see GSN, Aug. 3). Speaking here at a conference on addressing terrorism hosted by the New America Foundation, retired Gen. Wesley Clark said the administration has not sufficiently supported international arms control agreements and diplomacy and called for “talking to Iran and North Korea directly.” Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.), ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said the administration has not addressed “radical fundamentalism” and proliferation “as well as we could or should.” He called for increased emphasis on “rebuilding and building” alliances and international organizations. Taking multilateral rather than unilateral action can bring practical benefits such as “basing rights and burden sharing,” Biden said. Clark, who campaigned unsuccessfully for the Democratic nomination for president in 2004, and Biden are considered potential candidates for the nomination for the 2008 race. Biden Advocates Multilateral Preventive ForceEchoing two major Bush administration themes, Biden also called for developing a “prevention strategy to diffuse threats to security long before they are on the verge of exploding,” and “reforming failed and antidemocratic states.” Biden’s prevention strategy includes securing sensitive material worldwide, “fully funding” homeland security budgets, new international laws for seizing “suspect cargos,” and tougher international nonproliferation requirements. It also includes a recommendation for legitimizing the preventive use of force. Appearing to differ though from the so-called Bush Doctrine, which advocates potential use of U.S. force to prevent suspected future WMD threats from developing, Biden called for obtaining international legitimacy for using multilateral force to prevent potential threats from developing. States “without democratic checks” that “seek weapons of mass destruction and harbor terrorists” should be judged to “forfeit their sovereignty,” just as states systematically abusing human rights in the 1990s were argued to have done, he said. “The U.S. should seek new international consensus that there is a duty to protect innocence and responsibility to prevent acts — terrorist acts — of destruction,” he said. He called the administration’s approach to preventive force “dangerous and destabilizing.” “It says to rogue states that their best insurance policy against regime change is to acquire weapons of mass destruction and do it as quickly as possible, which is one of the reasons, I believe, North Korea’s nuclear arsenal apparently increased by 400 percent in the past four years,” he said. The approach also demands a standard of proof for intelligence “that may be impossible to meet,” he said. Biden did not say, though, how his proposal for multilateral preventive force would overcome the difficulty of obtaining proof or eliminate concerns from states about an attack over suspected illicit behavior. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in a July 25 interview with The American Interest magazine, argued that obtaining international consensus on the use of force is difficult and rare. “The only times in which you were actually able to get a U.N. Security Council resolution on the use of force was the Korean crisis when, of course, the Russians walked out of the room, and the Gulf War in 1991, which I think was potentially, well possibly, a kind of crack in time,” she said. A Last ResortClark argued for building a “diplomatic and legal framework that will advance our interests, protect our people and keep us safe, and let us use military force as a last, last, last resort.” That would include efforts to “rebuild our ties with Europe, to strengthen NATO,” and “to build up in a constructive way the United Nations,” as well as “talking to Iran and North Korea directly.” “To neglect legal instruments is to neglect what the United States ultimately has stood for in over 50 years, since the Second World War: legality, legitimacy,” Clark said. U.S. State Department officials have said they continue to support the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, but have proposed mostly measures outside the treaty for strengthening nuclear nonproliferation. They have argued that circumstances, particularly the demise of the Soviet Union and emergence of “rogue” states clandestinely pursuing banned weapons, require that focus be shifted away from building international legal norms toward formulating more ad hoc solutions to proliferation. “Contemporary diplomatic efforts related to countering the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery bear little resemblance to that of the past — when we engaged in what were often ponderous and lengthy negotiations that were focused primarily on the strategic offensive forces of two antagonistic superpowers,” Undersecretary of States for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph said in an Aug. 15 speech in Singapore. “Today, diplomats are increasingly working to build a lasting basis of support for rapid coordination and action when proliferation related intelligence and law enforcement information becomes available,” he said, citing the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative to intercept shipments of WMD materials. “We are building support in the international community, both on a bilateral and multilateral basis.” Clarke praised a number of administration foreign policy initiatives, including denying the al-Qaeda terrorist organization a safe haven in Afghanistan, breaking up suspected terror plots overseas, and Libya’s decision to abandon its illicit weapons capabilities and activities. He said, though, terrorism worldwide has increased and in the area of nonproliferation, “precious little has been accomplished besides the denuclearization of Libya.” “We know that there was a Pakistani source in proliferation, but he hasn’t actually been interrogated. In fact, he’s a national hero. We had a Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty five-year review conference that the administration failed to prepare for and never really weighed in on,” he said. “North Korea and Iran are still pursuing nuclear weapons,” he added. Meanwhile, “negotiations are proceeding in fits and starts.”
As U.S. officials grapple with the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, they are wondering about the government’s ability to respond to a WMD attack, Agence France-Presse reported today (see GSN, April 15). Despite drills and other preparations for a mass casualty event since the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the difficulty in responding to the hurricane has indicated that the United States may not be adequately prepared for such an event. “It’s very important for us to understand the relationship between the federal government, the state government and the local government when it comes to a major catastrophe,” President George W. Bush said yesterday. “And the reason it’s important is that we still live in an unsettled world. We want to make sure that we can respond properly if there’s a WMD attack or another major storm,” he said. Bush has ordered an investigation into the hurricane response, and U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said yesterday that the military has units studying “lessons learned” from the disaster, according to AFP (Agence France-Presse/Khaleej Times, Sept. 7).
The Maryland Health and Mental Hygiene Department is offering Maryland residents cards with information on weapons of mass destruction, the Associated Press reported yesterday (see GSN, Aug. 12). The cards, which are sized to fit in a wallet, contain information on how to plan for, identify and respond to a WMD attack. The state had 10,000 cards printed for $7,100, according to Diane Matuszak, director of the department’s Community Health Administration. The cards contain information from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Homeland Security Department on anthrax, plague, smallpox, botulism, sarin and radiological “dirty bombs.” They are available at public health offices. Information can also be printed off the agency’s Web site, according to AP. “I think that a lot of times we distribute things like that and unless we make it easy for people to have with them, then they don't have the information when they really need it,” Matuszak said. She added that the Maryland cards are based upon cards distributed in Virginia (David Dishneau, Associated Press/Baltimore Sun, Sept. 6).
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Iran could develop a nuclear weapons capacity in five years with a fully committed effort, according to a study released today by a London-based think tank (see GSN, Aug. 26). “We estimate, if everything goes right, if they throw all their effort into solving their problems, they might be able to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a single nuclear weapon within five years,” Gary Samore, editor of the report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, told BBC radio. However, Samore said Iran was more likely to acquire production capability over 10 or 15 years before deciding whether to acquire a nuclear bomb. The report also says it is unlikely that Iran has stockpiled significant amounts of undeclared nuclear weapons materials, but that its ability to design and manufacture a nuclear weapon was less clear. In addition, the document warns of the consequences of a nuclear-capable Iran. “At worst, it could lead to a long-term erosion of the [Nuclear] Nonproliferation Treaty, as additional countries sought to hedge their bets by acquiring latent nuclear weapons capability under the guise of dual use fuel-cycle programs,” it says (Reuters/Yahoo!News, Sept. 6). The International Atomic Energy Agency said in a report Friday to its Board of Governors Friday that Iran has produced about 7 tons of uranium hexafluoride — enough for an atomic bomb — since resuming reprocessing last month, the Associated Press reported. The confidential report obtained by AP says the agency was unable “to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran.” “Iran’s full transparency is indispensable and overdue,” it says. It calls on Iran to provide “access to individuals, documentation related to procurement ... certain military-owned workshops and research and development locations.” The report cites gaps in documentation provided by Tehran detailing the development of its centrifuge program. The report did, however, confirm that most of the traces of weapon-grade uranium found on Iranian equipment originated in Pakistan — though it added that it could not determine the origins of low-enriched uranium traces. The document reports on Iranian activities through the end of last month, when inspectors last visited the Isfahan uranium conversion facility, according to AP (George Jahn, Associated Press/Washington Post, Sept. 3). The report provides the United States and the European Union with ample evidence to refer Iran to the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions, said David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security. “It again shows that Iran is not willing to cooperate to clear up what are violations of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,” he said. A senior U.S. diplomat said that unless Iran ceases uranium conversion, cooperates with the U.N. nuclear watchdog, and returns to negotiations with the European Union, the IAEA board should refer the matter to the Security Council, Agence France-Presse reported (Michael Adler, Agence France-Presse/Hindustan Times, Sept. 4). Iran believes the report “contains errors” and makes “excessive” demands on Tehran, a senior official there said today. “Iran’s response to the report is being prepared and will be given to the IAEA soon. This response is in fact a rejection of the report by the director general, which contains errors,” said nuclear negotiator Ali Agha Mohammadi. “In certain cases, the report includes excessive demands and inspections that go beyond” those required by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, he said (Agence France-Presse/IranMania.com, Sept. 7). Top Iranian nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani, meanwhile, said Iran would move to satisfy international concerns as it continues with its nuclear development, AFP reported today. “Having said this principle, that we are determined to have nuclear technology, at the same time we are fully prepared to have any negotiation or discussion to remove the international concern,” Larijani said (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, Sept. 7). Top deputies in Iran’s parliament, however, threatened to limit international inspections at the country’s nuclear sites, AFP reported yesterday. If the West “wishes to deprive Iran of its rights by using political pressure, a suitable decision will be taken such as a halt to inspections or a halt in the application of the Additional Protocol [to Iran’s IAEA safeguards agreement],” said foreign policy commission spokesman Kazem Jalali (Agence France-Presse/IranMania.com, Sept. 6). French President Jacques Chirac took a hard line with Iran Monday, warning Tehran that it would face the Security Council if it did not abide by a nuclear freeze as declared under November’s Paris Agreement. “The use of civilian nuclear energy, which is perfectly legitimate, must not serve as a pretext for pursuing activities that could actually be aimed at building up a military nuclear arsenal,” Chirac said (Barry Schweid, Associated Press/Washington Post, Sept. 1). British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, however, said Friday that London hopes Tehran will resume negotiations, Reuters reported. “We want to see these talks resumed because we not only believe this is in the interests of the international community but also in the interests of Iran,” he said (Reuters, Sept. 2). The European Union, though, has lost hope that Iran will reinstate a nuclear freeze or resume nuclear negotiations, a senior EU diplomat said yesterday. Iran’s decision to reject EU incentives and instead resume uranium conversion meant that the EU’s diplomatic role was effectively finished, he told AFP. “If the Iranians changed their minds and decided to restart the suspension or discuss restarting the suspension, I think that would be very interesting, but that doesn’t seem remotely likely,” he said (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, Sept. 6). Russia, however, remains opposed to referring Iran’s case to the Security Council, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Yakovenko told Interfax (Reuters, Sept. 5). Meanwhile, an Iranian exile group said last week that China had provided Iran with dual-use material that could be used in a nuclear weapons program, Reuters reported. The National Council of Resistance of Iran said Iran obtained beryllium, a substance under international export controls, from China last year. “The (Iranian) Ministry of Defense is vigorously trying to obtain beryllium. This includes smuggling 20 kilograms of beryllium from China in 2004 for use in the regime’s nuclear weapons project,” the council announced in a statement. Beryllium can be combined with polonium 210 to create a catalyst for a nuclear explosion, according to Reuters (Francois Murphy, Reuters, Sept. 1). Elsewhere, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad reinstated the head of Iran’s nuclear program yesterday, AP reported. Gholamreza Aghazadeh, who has led Iran’s nuclear program since 1997, will remain in his post, seemingly indicating that the new administration will continue to take a hard line on nuclear policy, according to AP (Nasser Karimi, Associated Press/Washington Post, Aug. 29). The U.S. State Department, meanwhile, announced that Washington would grant a visa to Ahmadinejad to attend the opening next week of the U.N. General Assembly, the Washington Post reported today (Robin Wright, Washington Post, Sept. 7).
North Korea plans to build additional nuclear reactors that could produce weapons material, Pyongyang’s top nuclear negotiator told a visiting U.S. lawmaker last week (see GSN, Aug. 26). Kim Kye Gwan told U.S. Representative James Leach (R-Iowa), the chairman of the House Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, that North Korea “ought to have the right to a light-water reactor.” “Beyond that, there was a notification that they are proceeding with the building of a graphite facility,” said Leach, referring to the type of reactor North Korea operates at its Yongbyon nuclear site. Pyongyang is also working toward developing additional weapon-grade nuclear material, said Leach, who traveled to North Korea with Representative Tom Lantos (D-Calif), the Associated Press reported (Ji-Soo Kim, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, Sept. 4). U.S. officials have indicated that they might be willing to compromise on a nuclear energy program for Pyongyang if it abandons all nuclear activity and admits international inspectors, the Washington Post reported Sunday. “When that takes place, other possibilities are open,” Lantos said. He added, however, that North Korea had not indicated willingness to accept such a compromise (Edward Cody, Washington Post, Sept. 4). North Korea would be allowed to operate a nuclear energy program if it resumed its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, a senior Chinese official said Thursday. “According to relevant rules of the NPT, a country could enjoy certain rights if it assumes due obligations,” said Zhang Yan, director general of the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s arms control department. “In this sense, if a country joins the treaty and accepts the supervision of safety guarantee by the International Atomic Energy Agency, it has the right to use nuclear power peacefully,” Zhang said (Reuters, Sept. 1). North Korea, meanwhile, appears ready to resume negotiations on its nuclear program on Sept. 13. Officials there are apparently holding fast to their demand to be allowed a nuclear energy program, AP reported. “Our nuclear power facilities have been built on decades of belt-tightening of our people. Our people’s sweat and blood is in those facilities. It is unimaginable for us to give this up without an alternative,” said a commentary in the Rodong Sinmun daily (Associated Press/USA Today, Sept. 6). South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon said today that there would be no time limit on the upcoming six-nation talks, Agence France-Presse reported. “With no ending date fixed in advance, the talks will continue as long as there are chances for making any progress,” Ban said (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, Sept. 7). Meanwhile, in New York, the head of the international consortium set up to build two nuclear power plants for North Korea as part of a 1994 disarmament deal has resigned his position. Charles Kartman, executive director of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, plans to step down Sept. 1, said KEDO spokesman Brian Kremer (Peter James Spielmann, Associated Press/Washington Post, Aug. 28).
By David Francis Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The U.S. Energy Department has failed to implement adequate accounting controls on its nuclear nonproliferation work in Russia and other nations, according to a report released last week by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (see GSN, July 28). The auditors examined records for contracts managed by the department’s National Nuclear Security Administration and found that one agency office lacked “the processes ensuring that work done under a contract meets contract specifications and that payments go to contractors as intended.” “Staff could not provide a complete set of deliverables, invoices, and approvals of deliverables and invoices for seven of the nine contracts we reviewed,” the GAO report states. “The types of missing documents differed among contracts.” The agency said the inability of the NNSA Office of Nonproliferation and International Security to deliver the documents might indicate that officials who manage contract work do not have access to these records. The office lacks “procedural guidance on how to maintain management controls for its contracts” and “does not periodically review its management control processes … to ensure that the controls remain appropriate and effective,” according to the report. To correct these problems, the Government Accountability Office recommends that: the National Nuclear Security Administration “develop guidance for implementing and documenting management controls … program managers have quick access to key contract records, regardless of the records’ location, and NNSA perform periodic reviews of its management controls to ensure their effectiveness.” The report states that the nuclear security agency accepted the recommendations and would begin working to implement those changes. However, NNSA officials objected to the assessment of management controls in certain cases. The report, requested by members of the Senate and House of Representatives armed services committees, also found that the NNSA Nuclear Risk Reduction Office and the International Material Projection and Cooperation could document controls for nearly all contracted work. The Government Accountability Office reviewed two Nuclear Risk Reduction Office and seven Material Projection and Cooperation contracts. Work contracted by the Nuclear Security Administration includes “upgrading the security of nuclear weapons sites and ‘blending-down’ weapons-grade highly enriched uranium so it can be used in nuclear power plants to generate electricity,” according to the GAO report. The U.S. Energy Department, from fiscal 2001 to 2004, allocated $1.7 billion for this type of contract work.
The United States is pushing for the removal of all references to disarmament from the U.N. reform plan to be considered this month by world leaders, Reuters reported last week (see GSN, Aug. 26). U.S. Ambassador John Bolton said the changes proposed by the United States “significantly strengthen and focus [the draft plan’s disarmament and proliferation section] with respect to responding effectively to current and emerging threats. … Our changes identify as well the proposals in the current draft that run contrary to U.S. policies and, as such, will not receive U.S. endorsement,” he wrote in a letter to colleagues at the United Nations. Bolton wants to remove the word “disarmament” from the plan and concentrate on weapons proliferation. He also wants references to a moratorium on nuclear testing removed and language on nuclear-free zones deleted, according to Reuters. Reference to “the peaceful use of nuclear energy” should also be eliminated because of concerns over Iran’s nuclear program, Bolton argued (Irwin Arieff, Reuters I, Sept. 1). Reuters also reported that negotiators claim that Australian Ambassador John Dauth said there was “no prospect of making progress” on the proliferation issue (Evelyn Leopold, Reuters II, Sept. 5).
A Brazilian nuclear scientist said his nation’s military had almost completed work on an atomic weapon by 1990 through a secret program, the Associated Press reported on Aug. 30 (see GSN, Nov. 29, 2004). The military was preparing a nuclear test before the program was dismantled in August 1990, said Jose Luiz Santana, former president of Brazil’s nuclear energy commission. Former Brazilian President Jose Sarney in August disclosed that he had eliminated a nuclear weapons program in 1985, when he came to power following a 20-year military dictatorship. Santana, however, said the military continued a clandestine program even after Sarney left office in 1990. An underground test blast was planned in the eastern Amazon before the program was terminated, he said. “I took office in April 1990 ... but it was only in August that [the Brazilian nuclear energy commission] managed to gain control of the container” of enriched uranium from the military, Santana told Globo TV. The commission denied the allegations. “There do not exist any documents in the institutional archives or information that prove the claims in the story,” the agency said in a statement. The statement also says that the International Atomic Energy Agency oversees all nuclear material in Brazil (Michael Astor, Associated Press/ABCNews.com, Aug. 30).
A former Russian official awaiting extradition to the United States to face embezzlement charges has accused Washington of attempting to smear Moscow, the Associated Press reported yesterday (see GSN, Aug. 16). Former Nuclear Energy Minister Yevgeny Adamov stands accused of diverting $9 million in U.S. nuclear safety aid. He is being held in Switzerland, awaiting extradition to either Russia or the United States. “Their main goal is to prove that the government of Russia is corrupt, and such [a] country with nuclear weapons can’t be left uncontrolled; it needs guardianship, control and patronage,” Adamov told Ekho Moskvy radio. “The creation of an image of a corrupt Russia with a thieving, corrupt leadership is a step toward the occupation of our country,” he said (Associated Press/Moscow Times, Sept. 6). A Moscow court last month rejected an appeal of Adamov’s arrest on charges of fraud and abuse of office, RIA Novosti reported. His attorney had argued that the arrest was illegal. The judge ruled that Adamov could remain in custody until Oct. 8. The Swiss Federal Department of Justice has final say on which country receives Adamov, RIA Novosti reported (RIA Novosti, Sept. 5). The United States is maintaining its extradition request on Adamov, RIA Novosti reported (RIA Novosti, Aug. 30).
Egypt last month rejected the International Atomic Energy Agency’s request to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, March 2). “Egypt’s ratification of the (test ban) treaty is linked to the extent of developments that may occur in regional and international circumstances, including the possibility that Israel may join the [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty],” Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit was quoted by the Middle East News Agency as saying (Salah Nasrawi, Associated Press/Washington Post, Aug. 27).
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More than 60 deadly pathogens from the former Soviet Union’s biological weapons program were scheduled to arrive Saturday at Dover Air Force Base in Delaware, the Chicago Tribune reported (see GSN, Aug. 22). The bacterial strains, which included those for anthrax and plague, left Azerbaijan on Friday. U.S. government scientists are expected to begin studying the strains this week. Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), who finalized an agreement with Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev, said the results of the study would be “important in the war against terror and combating biological warfare.” He added that the strains would be added to a worldwide library of dangerous pathogens to allow for quick diagnosis of a plague or an outbreak. The former Soviet republic of Georgia also has agreed to share knowledge on the former Soviet biological weapons program. The samples were transferred as part of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. The agreement with Azerbaijan was formalized in June and calls for the United States to help the country improve security for pathogens, the Tribune reported. Andy Weber, a Defense Department adviser to the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, praised the transfer. “I see this as proof that Azerbaijan is serious about cooperating with the United States on combating global terrorism,” he said (Jeff Zeleny, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 3). Lugar also announced last week that the United States and the Ukraine have entered into a threat reduction agreement to improve security at Ukrainian health laboratories that store biological agents, according to a State Department press release (see GSN, Aug. 24). The agreement also includes U.S. assistance to help improve detection, diagnosis and treatment of outbreaks in Ukraine. In a May letter, Lugar told Ukrainian President Victor Yushchenko that “this high priority initiative includes a provision for a modern, safe and secure diagnostic health laboratory and a national network of epidemiological monitoring stations equipped to rapidly detect, diagnose and respond to infectious disease outbreaks throughout Ukraine, whether naturally occurring or as a result of bioterrorism” (U.S. State Department release, Aug. 29).
The U.S. State Department has found that Iran, North Korea, Russia and Syria are maintaining biological weapons programs, the Associated Press reported last week (see GSN, March 29). The State Department also found that China still has “some elements” of a biological weapons program, while experts failed to agree on Cuba’s bioweapons production capacity, AP reported. The findings were outlined in the State Department’s “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments” report. The congressionally mandated report, covering the two-year period ending in December 2004, details individual country’s WMD capabilities and missile proliferation efforts, according to AP. According to the report: Based on available intelligence, Iran is believed to have an offensive biological weapons program; North Korea has a “dedicated, national-level effort to develop a BW capability; Russia “continues to maintain” a weapons program; and Syria would be in violation of the Biological Weapons Convention if it was a member. China “maintains some elements of an offensive BW capability,” while Cuba has at least a “limited offensive BW research and development effort,” the report found (George Gedda, Associated Press/Baltimore Sun, Aug. 30). China rejected the report’s findings, according to Voice of America. “These statements are far from the truth, and are irresponsible,” said Zhang Yan, director general of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's arms control department. “We hope that the U.S. side will stop such erroneous practices, and we also express our strong dissatisfaction” (Luis Ramirez, Voice of America, Sept. 1). Russia has also challenged statements made in the report regarding its weapons programs, RIA Novosti reported last week. “Those are not new accusations,” the Russian Foreign Ministry said in a statement. “The Russian Foreign Ministry has had to comment on similar points in other ‘research papers’ that put Russia in a group of countries violating nonproliferation agreements without providing any evidence many times before.” The Foreign Ministry said the report presents “a one-sided and distorted picture of the implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.” Russia said the State Department offered no evidence that it has failed to honor its Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological Weapons Convention commitments (RIA Novosti, Sept. 1).
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By Chris Schneidmiller Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The U.S. chemical industry has spent more than $2 billion to increase security since the Sept. 11 attacks, but the risk of a terrorist strike on a plant can never be entirely eliminated, public and private sector officials said last week (see GSN, July 14). It would be extremely difficult to block a strike by a trained, well-armed attack force without turning chemical facilities into heavily guarded fortresses, said Gregory Keeports, risk management services director for chemical company Rohm and Haas. The difficulty in implementing antiterrorist plans is exacerbated by the troubles in collecting intelligence and the impossibility of predicting targets, he said. “One crazy person, if he’s ready to give his life, it’s hard to stop him,” Keeports said during an Aug. 29 symposium hosted by the American Chemical Society. Prior to September 2001, top safety concerns at chemical sites included theft of materials, vandalism and natural events such as hurricanes, speakers said. Those risks remain, as demonstrated by the explosion last week of a New Orleans chemical depot in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. The attacks raised new security fears, and the industry has spent the subsequent years working to reduce the vulnerability of chemical production and storage sites to acts of terrorism. There are several possible uses of chemical sites by terrorists, said Scott Berger, director of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers’ Center for Chemical Process Safety. They could attack a facility in hopes of releasing a toxic cloud; attack with the intention of damaging industries reliant on chemicals; or divert chemicals for use in weaponry or to contaminate products, Berger said. A toxic release from a site near a major metropolitan community could kill hundreds of thousands of people, Berger said. He argued, though, that a number of variables could reduce casualties during an event. Taller buildings could provide shelter above the chemical cloud. Wind direction would carry the toxins away from some areas, and not all people exposed to the chemical would receive a fatal dose. “Many people, even if they do get that dose, would not be affected,” Berger said. Plant accidents in recent years have revealed continued weaknesses in the emergency response capabilities of operators and local authorities, said Carolyn Merritt, chairwoman and chief executive officer of the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. An April 2004 toxic gas release in Dalton, Ga., sent 156 people to the hospital. The plant was not equipped to manage a toxic release, and failed to inform emergency responders of the full danger posed by the escaping allyl alcohol, according to CSB investigators. Fire and police personnel, meanwhile, lacked appropriate protective gear, and firefighters did not have chemical detection equipment. Only 16 percent of local fire departments in the United States have hazardous materials teams, Merritt said. “We’re behaving as if [terrorism against chemical plants is] probably not likely and that we have all the time in the world,” she said. “I don’t think we have all the time in the world.” Improvements in security, technology and public preparedness must be made before an event that leads to a public outcry and backlash from lawmakers, Merritt said. “You need to figure out how to make that happen,” she told the symposium audience. What Has Been Done, and What Should be DoneSpeakers addressed both the efforts that have been made and the work that remains to be done to improve security at U.S. chemical sites. The Homeland Security Department has conducted security assistance visits at all “high-consequence” chemical facilities — those in which a terrorist event could harm 50,000 or more people, said Charles McQueary, DHS undersecretary for science and technology. The agency in March announced more than $90 million in grants under its Buffer Zone Protection Program, which helps local agencies purchase equipment to counter effects in their communities of an attack against a chemical or nuclear plant or another critical site. Homeland Security also has installed chemical sensor networks in the subway systems of Boston, New York and Washington, D.C, and operates a mobile facility that can analyze environmental samples for potential chemical contamination. All 130 American Chemistry Council member companies have conducted vulnerability assessments and made security improvements at more than 2,000 sites, said Dorothy Kellogg, the organization’s senior security and operations director. Efforts across the industry, Rohm and Haas’ Keeports said, have raised employees’ awareness of the terrorism threat; made sites more able to “detect, deter and delay” potential intruders; and heightened controls on chemical containers during shipping and at ports. The American Chemistry Council supports passage of federal chemical security legislation, Kellogg said, noting that not all industry firms belong to the organization. Keeports and other speakers addressed “inherently safer processes” as a strategy for reducing the danger at chemical plants. The idea is to lower the risks posed by certain operations at plants that would be impossible to simply halt. That could range from reducing the amount of transportation and storage of chlorine to removing chemicals of concern from processes such as drinking water disinfection. There are significant barriers to this effort, Keeports said. It takes an extensive amount of time and money, potentially requiring construction of new plants, he said. Inherently safer technology also would not increase plant security, only reduce the effect of a chemical release. While they work with far smaller amounts of chemicals, academics also need to control access to hazardous materials at universities and promote a culture of security among their students, said Steven Oberg, environmental health and safety director at the University of Nevada, Reno. Industry, emergency agencies and community leaders also must work together to boost plant security and enhance the response capability, speakers said. “It’s a large order and a great deal remains to be done,” McQueary said.
Workers at the U.S. Army’s Newport Chemical Agent Disposal Facility in Indiana resumed destroying VX nerve agent late last month, the Terre Haute Tribune-Star reported (see GSN, Aug. 26). Facility spokeswoman Terry Arthur said a 180-gallon container was processed Aug. 26 by mixing the nerve agent with 800 gallons of water and sodium hydroxide. The liquid was to be tested for flammability and to confirm that the nerve agent was destroyed. “Everything did go smoothly on restart,” Arthur said (Tribune-Star, Aug. 30). Jeff Brubaker, Army project manager at Newport, said last week the facility made changes to VX destruction that lower the flammability of waste product created in the neutralization process, the Associated Press reported. Changes increased the flashpoint of the waste product to 141 degrees, with some batches having flashpoints of more than 200 degrees, Brubaker said. “Our analysis here shows that we were capable and successful in processing nonflammable hydrolysate,” Brubaker said (Associated Press I/WKTY, Sept. 2). Plans for disposal of the waste is drawing opposition from activists in four states, according to the Associated Press. Environmental and public advocacy groups in Indiana, New Jersey, Delaware and Kentucky have asked the Army to abandon a plan to move the waste product from the Newport facility to New Jersey for final disposal. In a letter to Assistant Army Secretary Claude Bolton, the groups ask for the Army to follow its original plan and destroy the waste at Newport, AP reported. “It is time for the Army to quit fooling around and seriously assess its options for treatment of the hydrolysate in an open, transparent manner,” the groups said in the letter. An Army spokeswoman said Bolton was unavailable to comment on the letter (Associated Press II/WKTY, Sept. 1).
The project manager for the Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility in Oregon expects to meet the 2012 treaty deadline for complete elimination of the site’s munitions, the East Oregonian reported yesterday (see GSN, Aug. 25). “I remember the first rocket taking us all day,” said manager Don Barclay. “A year later, we just processed the 30,000th rocket. ... We have accomplished quite a bit in the last year.” While operations at the facility have been hampered by small fires, the causes of which remain unknown, Barclay said he was pleased with progress over the last year. “Overall, as I look back, it’s been a tremendous success, especially from a safety perspective,” he said. Destruction of rockets filled with sarin is behind schedule, Barclay said, but added, “Overall we’re still in [the] ballpark of what we expected. ... We set a target of 66 months to complete operations; we may be four or five months behind, but still in the ballpark.” One-third of the sarin-filled rockets at the facility have been destroyed. Barclay said that he anticipates continued problems when destruction of rockets filled with VX begins. “For example, we still face the possibility of small fires in the explosive containment rooms while processing VX rockets,” he said. The facility will end its work by destroying mustard gas weapons. That effort is years away, but planning has already begun, Barclay said. The mustard gas stockpile is being studied to determine its metal content, which has hampered destruction at other facilities. The Umatilla facility does have an advantage over other destruction facilities when it comes to mustard gas destruction, Barclay said. “We have a Pollution Abatement System (PAS), which does not exist at the Tooele, (Utah), facility. We have demonstrated that the PAS filter system is an excellent metals scrubber,” he said. Barclay said destroying mustard gas during the winter could become problematic. “Mustard agent freezes at about 55 degrees and thus can’t be drained,” he said. “We may find ourselves processing mustard during winter months, and we are examining options for ensuring it’s thawed prior [to] disposal” (Hal McCune, East Oregonian, Sept. 6).
A report released last week by the U.S. National Research Council has found that monitors at U.S. Army chemical weapon storage sites adequately protect the public and workers, the Salt Lake Tribune reported (see GSN, Aug. 26). “The current airborne agent monitoring systems are adequate to safely protect the chemical demilitarization work force, the public, and the environment,” the report says. However, the report found that fewer false alarms of contamination, development of mobile monitors to track releases and additional monitoring measures could improve safety at the facilities. Army Chemical Materials Agency figures show there were up to three false alarms per day at the Deseret Chemical Depot in Utah during a two-month period. In July 2004, there were 73 false alarms. The National Research Council found that perimeter monitors at the facilities work well and have only once detected the release of a chemical agent. This occurred when a container detected the release of 80 gallons of mustard gas at Deseret. The public would only be placed at risk by a major incident at a facility, such as an explosion or fire, according to the council. The organization estimated the chances of such an event at one in 1.1 million, but recommended the Army explore the development of mobile detection equipment that could track a chemical plume if it were to occur. The council also suggested consideration of an additional monitoring level to alert workers of a leak even if they are not working on agent disposal (Robert Gehrke, Salt Lake Tribune, Aug. 30). The report came as the Chemical Materials Agency reported three leaks at facilities last week, according to agency press releases. Mustard gas was found leaking from two 155 mm shells on Aug. 31 at the Deseret facility (U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency release, Sept. 1). A single leak was discovered Aug. 29 in a Deseret storage igloo (Chemical Materials Agency release, Aug. 29). Workers found sarin nerve agent leaking last week in a storage structure containing 750-pound bombs at the Umatilla Chemical Depot in Oregon (Chemical Materials Agency release, Aug. 31). Meanwhile, workers at the Pueblo Chemical Depot in Colorado last week worked to discover the source of a mustard gas leak, according to the Pueblo Chieftain. Workers wore protective suits and wrapped munitions in plastic to individually monitor them. Facility spokeswoman Marilyn Thompson said that all rounds were already stored in metal containers because of previous leaks (John Norton, Pueblo Chieftain, Aug. 31).
Honduras ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention on Aug. 29, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons announced in a press statement yesterday (see GSN, Aug. 24). Honduras will become a treaty member state on Sept. 28, 30 days after the deposit of its instrument of ratification (OPCW release, Sept. 5). Meanwhile, Antigua and Barbuda deposited its instrument of accession to the treaty on Aug. 29 and will also become a state party on Sept. 28. With the addition of the two countries, the total number of treaty parties stands at 173 (OPCW release II, Sept. 5).
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India and Pakistan are expected to sign an agreement next month on advance notification of ballistic missile tests, Reuters reported (see GSN, Aug. 23). “I am affirming there is an agreement reached today and we will sign it when the foreign ministers meet in October,” Pakistani Foreign Secretary Riaz Mohammad Khan said after talks with his Indian counterpart on Thursday (Reuters, Sept. 1).
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U.S. officials are expected in India today for discussions on the potential sale of missile systems and F-16 fighter jets to New Delhi, Indian Express reported (see GSN, July 6). Lt. Gen. Jeffery Kohler, head of the Defense Department’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency, is leading the delegation to try to persuade Indian officials to purchase the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 missile system, according to the Express. India has indicated, though, that the PAC-3 does not meet its needs for a short-range missile system (Indian Express, Sept. 7).
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Unsecured radioactive materials have been discovered in two unidentified Southeast Asian countries, the Associated Press reported last week (see GSN, March 18). Researchers from Australia, which is part of an initiative to secure radioactive materials used in medicine and industry, discovered the material. The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization has been working with the involved countries to secure the material, said Ron Cameron, the organization’s operations chief. “These were sources that were no longer in use and nobody seemed to own,” Cameron said. “We're now working with them (the countries) to either send them back to the manufacturers or send them to a secure location.” Cameron said that defunct private companies that used radioactive materials sometimes “don't look after their source properly.” “So it gets left in a warehouse and eventually some people break into that warehouse,” he said. The material could be used to make a radiological “dirty bomb,” according to Cameron. “It is more likely that terrorists would steal a source rather than just come across one that [has] been abandoned or forgotten,” he said (Rod McGuirk, Associated Press/Washington Post, Aug. 29).
Experts have warned that radioactive materials could be smuggled into Vienna’s Schwechat airport because detection equipment is going unused, the Kurier newspaper reported Monday (see GSN, July 20). Austrian customs authorities in the airport do not check passengers or air freight for radioactive materials, according to the newspaper. A radiation detector at the airport has not been used since being tested one year ago. Radioactive iodine used to threat thyroid ailments was setting off the machine, said Josef Pammer, deputy customs chief at Schwechat. “In cases of alarm, we would have to immediately close the doors, and check out each individual passenger,” Pammer said. “This would lead to panic. The radiation detectors are unfortunately not yet sufficiently developed to enable them to distinguish between innocuous and dangerous radiation.” A radiation expert with the Lower Austrian Fire Brigade disagreed. “That is not correct,” the expert said. “With border monitoring, more harmless radioactive elements can very readily be distinguished from uranium or plutonium. Even within seconds.” Pammer dismissed this criticism. “The EU has long been tinkering with a workable law for monitoring radiation,” he said. “It would make more sense, however, to check freight and passengers on takeoff, rather than waiting till landing. The goal must be to prevent the export of radioactive substances” (Kurier/BBC Monitoring, Sept. 6).
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