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U.S. House, Senate Slow Administration Effort to Deploy Conventionally Armed Ballistic Missiles
A Bush administration effort to arm submarine-launched ballistic missiles with conventional warheads has met significant opposition in the U.S. Congress, Inside the Pentagon reported yesterday (see GSN, March 8). In its fiscal 2007 budget request, the administration asked to pursue the Conventional Trident Modification program, a $503 million effort to place four conventional warheads atop a total of 24 missiles deployed across 12 Trident submarines. The submarines, capable of carrying 24 missile each, would continue to carry nuclear-armed missiles in their remaining launch tubes, according to Inside the Pentagon. The missiles would enable the United States to strike anywhere in the world within 60 minutes against such targets as terrorists on the move or stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. Russian officials have expressed concern that other nations would have trouble distinguishing a conventionally armed missile from a nuclear-armed one following a launch (Elaine Grossman, Inside the Pentagon, May 11). “You can imagine, a rocket is fired, especially from a submarine, and no one knows what kind of warhead it is carrying,” said one Kremlin official. “It is not written on the rocket whether it has a conventional or nuclear warhead” (Buckley/Sevastopulo, Financial Times, May 12). Any confusion could have lethal consequences, said Russian President Vladimir in his annual state of the nation address this week. “The launch of one such missile may trigger an inadequate response from nuclear powers, including a full-scale retaliatory strike with the use of strategic nuclear forces,” he said. U.S. House and Senate lawmakers have expressed similar concerns. The U.S. House Armed Services Committee cut the administration’s entire $50 million request for two procurement accounts for the program and more than half of a $77 million research and development account. “The committee is concerned that the development of this conventional ballistic missile capability for a submarine that has historically carried nuclear-armed ballistic missiles could cause a missile launch misinterpretation regarding which type of warhead a ballistic missile may be carrying,” the committee report on the fiscal defense authorization bill says. Similarly, the Senate Armed Services Committee approved the Pentagon request in full, but “fenced in” nearly all of it until the administration submits a report “addressing nuclear ambiguity issues,” according to a committee statement. In late March, two Pentagon officials testified to the Senate that they are consulting international military officials to find ways to reduce any confusion following a missile launch. Such measures could include prelaunch notifications or identifying differences in how the missile trajectories might differ, Inside the Pentagon reported (Grossman, Inside the Pentagon).
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