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U.S.-Indian Deal Raises NPT Questions, Report Says By David Ruppe WASHINGTON — The proposed U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation deal could put the United States in noncompliance with a core Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty obligation, according to a U.S. government analysis released last week (see GSN, June 28). “With the 1998 declarations by India and Pakistan of their nuclear weapons capabilities, it can be argued that supplying nuclear cooperation to these states raises Article 1 issues,” the report says. The treaty identifies only five countries as legitimate nuclear-weapon states: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Article 1 specifically requires that treaty members not “in any way … assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” Bush administration officials have argued that the deal being negotiated would not permit U.S. nuclear technology and material to aid India’s nuclear weapons program. All nuclear assistance would go to facilities India designates as civilian, which would be subject to international monitoring. Facilities India designates as military would not have safeguards. The report though cites an argument levied by the critics of the proposed deal, that foreign uranium sought by New Delhi for producing civil nuclear energy would free up limited Indian uranium supplies, allowing the country to significantly increase its weapons production. “There is no question that India will continue to ‘manufacture’ nuclear weapons and no question that more indigenous uranium would be available if external sources are allowed to be imported,” it says. That is a point conceded by the State Department in a recent written statement. The agency, however, countered that, “Nothing in the NPT, its negotiating history, or the practice of the parties supports the notion that fuel supply to safeguarded reactors for peaceful purposes could be construed as ‘assisting in the manufacture of nuclear weapons’ for purposes of Article 1.” Ten prominent critics challenged the administration’s arguments in a letter to Congress, writing that “partial safeguards in a state with a secret nuclear weapons program are more symbol than substance” (see GSN, June 21). The CRS analysis was invoked during a Senate Foreign Relations Committee markup of the bill today by Senator Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.), who urged colleagues to support an amendment by Senator Russell Feingold (D-Wis.) intended to prevent U.S. uranium exports from freeing up Indian uranium for more weapons. The amendment was defeated in a 13-5 vote (see related GSN story, today). The administration in a written statement to the committee this month said it did not believe that allowing uranium transfers to India that might free Indian uranium for weapons could be viewed as assisting India in the manufacture of India’s nuclear weapons. In support of the administration’s case, a study by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Senior Associate Ashley Tellis this week challenged the critics’ assertion that the U.S.-Indian deal would allow New Delhi to expand its nuclear arsenal by using its domestic uranium supplies. “India has the indigenous reserves of natural uranium necessary to undergird the largest possible nuclear arsenal it may desire,” said Tellis, who advised the State Department while it negotiated the deal with India. “Consequently, the U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear cooperation initiative will not materially contribute towards New Delhi’s strategic capacities in any consequential way either directly or by freeing up its internal resources.” The Congressional Research Service report addresses that argument, also made by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in April testimony, by noting while India does have enough national uranium for a massive arsenal expansion; it cannot use it for that purpose without drawing from energy production. “If, as Secretary Rice suggests, the military requirements are dwarfed by civilian requirements, then finding international sources for civilian requirements could result in a windfall for the weapons,” it says. The report also concludes that the deal could aid India’s nuclear weapons program by conferring “de-facto recognition” on India’s status as a nuclear weapons holder and from the inevitable transfer of personnel or knowledge between India’s civilian and military programs. Concerns about the deal’s Article 1 compliance, the report says, could “impact” the “confidence of NPT parties in their regime and their political willingness to take on new nonproliferation missions, roles and obligations.” “If elements of the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation initiative appear to encourage India’s nuclear weapons program, key states may be less willing to aid U.S. efforts to shore up the nonproliferation regime,” it says.
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