The United States today confirmed that the North Korean test explosion last week involved a nuclear device (see GSN, Oct. 13).
“Analysis of air samples collected on Oct. 11, 2006, detected radioactive debris which confirms that North Korea conducted an underground nuclear explosion in the vicinity of P’unggye on Oct. 9, 2006. The explosion yield was less than a kiloton,” according to a statement from the Office of the National Intelligence Director (Office of the National Intelligence Director release, Oct. 16). The sample containing the radioactive particles was reportedly taken Tuesday over the Sea of Japan by a U.S. WC-135 aircraft, the Associated Press reported. The low-kiloton strength of the blast throw further doubt on Pyongyang’s claims that its test was successful. “The betting is that this was an attempt at a nuclear test that failed,” a senior Bush administration official said last week. “We don’t think they were trying to fake a nuclear test, but it may have been a nuclear fizzle” (Burns/Gearan, Associated Press I/RedOrbit, Oct. 13). U.N. SanctionsThe U.N. Security Council agreed unanimously Saturday on a set of sanctions against North Korea, the New York Times reported. The resolution prohibits the sale or transfer of WMD material to North Korea, along with preventing weapons officials in Pyongyang from traveling overseas or accessing assets outside their country. It allows countries to inspect cargo entering or exiting the country, though China quickly announced that it would not conduct such inspections. The resolution also does not authorize use of military force to stop ships sailing in international waters. North Korean Ambassador to the United Nations Pak Gil Yon was present for the vote and blasted the decision. Pyongyang “totally rejected” the resolution, he said, adding that further U.S. pressure would be considered an act of war and would lead North Korea to take “critical countermeasures.” He then stormed out of the room (Warren Hoge, New York Times I, Oct. 15). The efficacy of the sanctions were in question yesterday, given China’s reluctance to conduct inspections of material heading into North Korea and South Korea’s intention to maintain economic projects with the Stalinist state, the Times reported (Norimitsu Onishi, New York Times II, Oct. 16). U.S. officials indicated yesterday they would push Beijing, Pyongyang’s main trading partner, to follow through on the inspections, the Los Angeles Times reported. “China has got a heavy responsibility here,” said U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton. “I’m quite certain that China is going to live up to its responsibilities,” said Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (Paul Richter, Los Angeles Times, Oct. 16). Today, Chinese officials were conducting inspections of trucks heading into North Korea along the countries’ 880-mile border and had boosted work on a border fence, AP reported. “The inspections are routine and conducted by quarantine officials,” said an officer at one crossing. Reporters at the border city of Dandong said they saw officials open trucks for inspection. They had not seen such efforts last week, AP reported. Officials in Beijing would not say whether the resolution prompted the inspections. Japan, which on Friday levied unilateral sanctions against North Korea, is considering additional penalties, according to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Australia also plans to bar all North Korean ships from its ports except in the event of a major emergency. “I think that will help Australia make a quite clear contribution to the United Nations sanctions regime,” said Foreign Minister Alexander Downer (William Foreman, Associated Press II/Yahoo!News, Oct. 16). Analysts today questioned the impact the sanctions barring trade in weapons and luxury goods would have on North Korea’s leaders, Reuters reported. “The regime has shown it doesn’t mind if its people feel the pain,” said a diplomat in Seoul. “North Korea is already very familiar with poverty,” said former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung. “The country can also get support, at least in order to survive, from countries such as China.” The sanctions, though, might prompt Pyongyang to conduct another nuclear test, analysts said (Reuters/New York Times, Oct. 16).
By Bruce Stokes, National Journal
WASHINGTON — William Perry was the secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997. During his tenure, the United States came within hours of bombing North Korea’s nuclear facilities, but the Clinton administration subsequently negotiated a freeze on North Korea’s plutonium production. Earlier this year, when North Korea was preparing to test its Taepodong 2 long-range ballistic missile, Perry and former Assistant Defense Secretary Ashton Carter wrote an op-ed piece for The Washington Post in which they advocated a pre-emptive strike to destroy the missile before North Korea could launch it. Now, in light of North Korea’s underground test of what most likely is a nuclear weapon, Perry thinks such military action may no longer be effective. “We have blown it,” he says. Perry, who teaches at Stanford University, talked with National Journal Staff Correspondent Bruce Stokes on Oct. 9 about the implications of North Korea’s actions. National Journal: How did we get into this mess? William Perry: “Inattention” is the simplest answer. Part of it is inattention on the part of the United States, and part of it is a very strong, long-term desire on the part of the North Koreans to have nuclear weapons. The North Koreans have been trying since the 1980s to get a nuclear weapon. And they have never really given up their aspiration to do that. The [George H.W.] Bush administration and the Clinton administration were both successful in putting significant roadblocks in front of that plan but never caused them to give up their aspirations. This administration, then, has simply not paid attention to the problem or done anything significant to deal with the problem. It has not set red lines or cautioned [the North Koreans] that if they crossed those red lines they would have a serious confrontation with the United States. And, in the absence of that kind of diplomacy or constraint, North Korean aspirations to have a nuclear weapon have gone full-speed ahead. NJ: How could the United States have prevented this? Perry: Serious diplomacy. Continuation of the diplomacy that was started under the Clinton administration. If that was not agreeable to the Bush administration, they should have come up with their own diplomatic program. But, apparently, they had none. We went to the six-party talks [involving North and South Korea, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States], but until the last round made no serious proposal, nor did we even have serious discussions with the North Koreans at those talks. At the last meeting, a year ago September, our ambassador, Christopher Hill, made a serious proposal, got some level of agreement, and then, after he returned to Washington, had to back off that agreement. I think the problem within the administration is that they have been divided over whether to negotiate, with the State Department, both under Colin Powell and under Condoleezza Rice favoring negotiation, and in the last six-party talks making a serious attempt at it. But other parts of the administration, probably led by Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense [Donald] Rumsfeld, favored regime change. And they have successfully blocked any attempts at serious negotiation. NJ: What are the implications of North Korea’s recent nuclear test for regional and global security? Perry: There is a very real danger now that this will be the beginning of a nuclear arms race in the Asia-Pacific region. There will be great pressure in Japan to move closer toward a nuclear weapons program. There may even be pressure in South Korea and Taiwan. It is hard to say how those governments are going to react. But it certainly increases the incentive for all of those countries to move toward nuclear weapons. Much of our diplomacy now should be directed toward trying to keep that from happening. NJ: What can we offer those nuclear-aspirant countries to keep them from developing nuclear weapons? Perry: They need to have rather strong confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella. They need to know that our nuclear umbrella is not just a means of retaliating against North Korea if it used nuclear weapons against Japan. The Japanese have to have some reason to believe that our nuclear umbrella will actually provide a strong deterrent against North Korea’s taking action. NJ: Why should the Japanese still believe in the deterrent value of our nuclear umbrella? Perry: That is exactly why we will find it a challenge to get Japan to accept this. There is some reason for Japan to think that the U.S. government is not taking this seriously. And we have demonstrated that we have very little influence over North Korea. NJ: What can the United States, Japan, China, and other countries do to prevent North Korea from arming its warheads with nuclear weapons? Perry: We can make strong declaratory statements that there will be consequences if they do those things. But our statements about consequences probably don’t carry much weight in North Korea these days. We’ve made those statements in the past about consequences. We said long ago that we would not tolerate them having nuclear weapons. And they have them. We said testing was unacceptable. And they are testing. So, based on our history, I think any declaratory statements we make today would not have much relevance to the North Koreans. NJ: Are there any meaningful sanctions we can take against North Korea that we haven’t already taken? Perry: I think we have taken every sanction against North Korea that we know how to take at this point. The country that is in a position to take sanctions is obviously China, which so far has steadfastly refused to do that. NJ: Is there any chance that the Chinese might change their position? Perry: I don’t think so. We had an opportunity to come to an agreement with China some time ago about how to deal with North Korea. But we were apart from China on what the appropriate tactic with North Korea should be. China believed, I think correctly, that the U.S. policy toward North Korea is regime change. And the Chinese do not favor regime change in North Korea. So until and unless the United States and China can reach an agreement on a way of dealing with North Korea, then I do not think it is likely that we will get China to take meaningful and effective sanctions against North Korea. NJ: Some take all of this as a sign of desperation by Kim Jong Il, a sign of the weakness of the regime. Does that make sense to you? Perry: I have a hard time reaching that conclusion. He is taking this action in defiance of not only the United States but also his one friend in the world, China. He is basically giving in to pressure from the North Korean army, which has wanted to conduct such tests for many, many years. So, it seems to me it is an indication that the military arm in North Korea is prevailing. It is a clear indication that their desires to have nuclear weapons and to have them tested and to have them made operational are being achieved. NJ: Is a U.S. military strike against North Korea now the answer? Perry: What would we strike against is the question. Many, many years ago we had the option of striking the nuclear plant at Yongbyon and destroying their plutonium program at its source. But that fuel has subsequently been made into plutonium. The plutonium has been put into bombs, and we know not where the bombs are. So we could still strike Yongbyon to keep them from generating more plutonium in the future. But they already have perhaps eight to 10 nuclear bombs. So, much of the damage has already been done. We could at one time have struck their intercontinental ballistic missile on its launch facility. That would have put a significant crimp in their ICBM program. But that would have had nothing to do with their nuclear bomb program. They would still have their nuclear bombs secure. So I do not know of any way of striking them to get at the nuclear bombs that they already have. NJ: Should we be watching for any other events in the days and weeks ahead? Are there any other shoes to drop? Perry: There may likely be another test. It would indicate that they are seeking to get the technical data needed in order to make a refined design small enough to fit onto the warhead of a missile. NJ: All in all, you sound very pessimistic. Perry: I am very pessimistic. I think we have blown it. We had many opportunities in the last six years to contain this problem, and either by wrong actions or inaction we have let ourselves get into the situation we are in today.
Widespread technological expertise and the growing number of atomic weapons states threaten to undermine the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the New York Times reported yesterday (see GSN, Oct. 12). The reported North Korean nuclear test last week (see related GSN story, today) would, if confirmed, raise the number of acknowledged or widely suspected nuclear states to nine — China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Western nations believe Iran is also seeking nuclear weapons. Up to 40 nations possess the technical skill, and some the nuclear material, to build the bomb, atomic officials say. The increasing use of nuclear power — which involves much of the same technology needed to produce weapons — is expected to promote the diffusion of nuclear technology. More countries would then be able to produce nuclear fuel or even weapons fuel, the Times reported. Egypt has plans to resume its nuclear power program (see GSN, Sept. 25). Argentina, Australia and South Africa are making preparations for uranium enrichment, and other countries are considering the matter. “These dangers are urgent,” nuclear proliferation expert and former Senator Sam Nunn said last month at a forum in Vienna. “We are in a race between cooperation and catastrophe and, at this moment, the outcome is unclear.” The International Atomic Energy Agency has sought to limit nuclear weapons proliferation while promoting nuclear power around the world. It continues to assist Iran and Pakistan in the latter initiative, and supported North Korea’s power efforts until about a decade ago. Acquiring weapons fuel is the hardest part of the equation for would-be nuclear powers. The nuclear black market once operated by chief Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan (see related GSN story, today), illustrates the increased ease with which such material might be obtained. Khan has acknowledged supplying centrifuge plans and parts to Iran, Libya and North Korea. He visited at least 18 other countries before his operation was halted in 2004. The nuclear threat posed by North Korea and potentially Iran could push worried neighbors such as Japan, South Korea, Egypt and Saudi Arabia to seek their own atomic weapons. All have some level of nuclear infrastructure. “When additional countries get the bomb, it does create new pressures,” said Matthew Bunn, a senior research associate at Harvard University’s Project on Managing the Atom. “But each country is unique and there’s little risk that the dominoes will fall quickly, especially if we take steps to prevent it” (Broad/Sanger, New York Times, Oct. 15). IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said today that up to 30 nations could acquire nuclear weapons technology “in a very short time” in the absence of improved international measures, the Associated Press reported. “We are dealing with almost virtual weapons states,” he said, referring to nations that could with relative ease turn nuclear energy programs into weapons efforts. “The knowledge is out of the tube … both for peaceful purposes and unfortunately also for not peaceful purposes,” ElBaradei said during a conference in Vienna on preventing proliferation (Associated Press I/NASDAQ.com, Oct. 16). Industry participants at a forum in Australia on nuclear power argued today that the industry does not pose a threat to nuclear nonproliferation, Reuters reported. “We could have a 20-fold increase of nuclear energy use around the world and it would not either increase or decrease the problems posed by countries like North Korea and Iran. They are separate geopolitical areas and must been seen as such,” said John Ritch, director general of the World Nuclear Association. Ritch also played down the threat that terrorists could obtain material from a reactor to use in a nuclear or radiological weapon. “Nuclear power plants are essentially fortresses. It is very difficult for a terrorist to contemplate a way to obtain material from a nuclear power plant and put it to malicious use,” he said. “The most plausible danger of a radiological device … is that certain kinds of radiological material might be obtained from hospitals or other users,” Ritch added. There are now 442 nuclear power reactors in operation around the world, with nearly 30 under construction (Reuters/New York Times, Oct. 16). The five first nuclear weapons states — China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States — have failed to promote nuclear nonproliferation, former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev said yesterday. He said inadequate efforts have allowed four other nations to become nuclear powers, AP reported. Other technologically capable nations might also think that if the original five “are preserving and modernizing their nuclear weapons, why should we be hostages to this situation,” Gorbachev said. “This is not good that this is happening,” he said (Richard Pyle, Associated Press II/phillyBurbs.com, Oct. 16).
The United States hopes that U.N. sanctions imposed this weekend against North Korea will serve as warning to Iran, a U.S. official said yesterday, but Iranian officials and other analysts suggested that Tehran is unlikely to modify its nuclear plans (see GSN, Oct. 13). The U.N. Security Council agreed Saturday to sanction North Korea after the nation’s apparent nuclear test last Monday. The council banned trade in most military equipment as well as luxury goods. “I hope the lesson [Iranian leaders] learn is that if they continue to pursue nuclear weapons, they will face the same kind of isolation and restrictions that we have just imposed on the North Koreans,” said U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton. “[Iranian leaders] could enjoy a completely different relationship with the United States if they would suspend their uranium enrichment activities.” The permanent members of the Security Council and Germany have discussed meeting this week to negotiate a sanctions package against Iran, which has ignored a council demand to suspend its sensitive nuclear activities (Foster Klug, Associated Press I/Washington Post, Oct. 15). A top Iranian lawmaker, however, threatened yesterday that Tehran would reduce its cooperation with international nuclear inspectors if the Security Council imposed sanctions. “Taking such a step will undoubtedly limit the space for International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors and they will be denied the current opportunities,” said Alaeddin Borujerdi, head of the parliamentary national security commission. Borujerdi urged the European Union to return to the negotiating table to discuss a long-term solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis. The European nations “will miss a valuable opportunity if they leave the talks and they will suffer more losses than Iran by this decision,” he said (Agence France-Presse I/Yahoo!News, Oct. 15). The North Korean sanctions would have no effect on Iran’s nuclear program, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said today. “Some Western countries have turned the U.N. Security Council into a weapon to impose their hegemony and issue resolutions against countries that oppose them,” he said. “Mounting threats and pressures against Iran’s peaceful nuclear activities won’t cause even one iota of hesitation in the will of the Iranian nation to continue this path” (Ali Akbar Dareini, Associated Press II/San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 16). The council’s agreement to sanction North Korea does not signal that it is prepared to do the same to Iran, according to nonproliferation analysts. China and Russia are less likely to back the U.S.-led effort against Tehran, they said. “I would not say this is going to transfer to another Iranian sanctions resolution as the two situations are different,” said nonproliferation specialist Joseph Cirincione, of the Center for American Progress. North Korea has proclaimed a nuclear weapon capability while Iran asserts its nuclear program is entirely peaceful. “The stakes are higher for China in Iran,” Cirincione said. “It has an economic stake in Iran and its relations are tied with the entire Muslim world.” For its part, “Russia will point out that Iran’s case is far less egregious than North Korea’s and may well argue that if (the Security Council) takes a confrontational approach,” Iran might withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, said International Crisis Group analyst Karim Sadjadpour (P. Parameswaran, Agence France-Presse II, Oct. 15).
Texas A&M University has finished converting a nuclear research reactor from using weapon-usable highly enriched uranium fuel to low-enriched uranium, the U.S. Energy Department announced Friday (see GSN, Aug. 10). The university’s one-megawatt TRIGA reactor is the first U.S. reactor to be converted under a six-year plan signed by Canada, Mexico and the United States in 2005. Under the plan, the United States would convert six reactors (see GSN, Aug. 23, 2005), Canada would convert three (see GSN, June 19) and Mexico would convert one (see GSN, Nov. 23, 2004), all by 2011, according to a release from the department’s National Nuclear Security Administration. “This domestic reactor conversion will also help us significantly as we work with others to convert research reactors as part of our global effort to minimize the use of HEU in civilian nuclear applications around the world,” said Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman (see GSN, July 19) in the press release. “By the end of the year, we will have converted six U.S. and international research reactors, a good record by any measure” (U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration release, Oct. 13).
A Japanese firm has admitted that it illegally exported machinery that could be used to produce nuclear weapon materials, the Associated Press reported Saturday (see GSN, Sept. 28). In statement released Friday, Mitutoyo Corp. also announced that four former employees charged last month had admitted to the illicit sales of precision measurement equipment that could aid the manufacture of uranium enrichment centrifuges. Among those employees were former company President Kazusaku Tezuka and former Vice Chairman Norio Takatsuji. “We deeply apologize for having lacked a law-abiding consciousness as a company,” the statement says, admitting that the company had a long history of shipping its equipment without proper export licenses. The company said it would not contest any charges in court and would cooperate with the continuing investigation (Carl Freire, Associated Press/International Herald Tribune, Oct. 14).
Disgraced Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan yesterday returned to his house in the capital city of Islamabad following prostate cancer surgery last month, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Oct. 3). “His doctors have reported him to be healthy. They have allowed him to go back home,” said federal Information Minister Muhammad Ali Durrani. The one-time nuclear black market operator underwent surgery on Sept. 9, and then stayed at his sister’s home in Karachi, AP reported. He “was weak and he walked slowly,” said his sister, Ruzia Hussain Khan (Associated Press/Khaleej Times, Oct. 15). Khan is again under house arrest following his return, the Dawn newspaper reported (Dawn, Oct. 15).
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