Smallpox Containment Could Thwart Attack, Study Says

U.S. researchers believe a  major act of bioterrorism involving release of the smallpox virus could be contained with mass vaccinations, the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Center in Seattle announced Monday (see GSN, Oct. 19).

The study, led by Fred Hutchinson researchers, found that an epidemic could be prevented through the standing U.S. policy of post-release surveillance, containment of victims, and vaccination of hospital workers and close contacts of people who become infected.

Such an approach within two days of detection of the first case would contain a “large attack if up to 500 people were infected,” said Ira Longini, the study’s lead author, in a press release.  Longini said that a failure to move quickly on containment of victims and limited vaccinations contacts would make containment efforts ineffective.

While mass vaccinations would slightly reduce deaths in the case of a smallpox attack, the rate of adverse reactions to the vaccine — severe illness or death —would undo any real benefit, the researchers found.  One person in 10,000 would have a severe reaction and one in 1 million would die, Longini said.

The researchers published their findings in the International Journal of Infectious Diseases (Fred Hutchinson Cancer Center release, Oct. 16).

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Kim Reportedly Promises Not to Conduct Another Nuclear Weapon Test

North Korean leader Kim Jong Il reportedly told a visiting Chinese official yesterday that he regrets detonating a nuclear device and does not plan additional tests, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Oct. 19).

“We have no plans for additional nuclear tests,” Kim told Chinese State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan, an official in Beijing told the Yonhap News Agency.

Kim also said “he is sorry about the nuclear test,” according to the Chosun Ilbo newspaper.

Pyongyang might also be amenable to resuming the six-party talks on its nuclear program.

“If the U.S. makes a concession to some degree, we will also make a concession to some degree, whether it be bilateral talks or six-party talks,” he said, according to the newspaper (Burt Herman, Associated Press I/Yahoo!News, Oct. 20).

North Korea’s lead nuclear negotiator, however, was less frank in an interview with ABC News on the question of further tests.

“I think you can closely watch what happens,” Kim Kye Gwan said.

“We’ve not said there’d be another test.  Others have said that,” he added.

Kim declined to confirm whether Pyongyang possesses sufficient plutonium to produce 11 nuclear weapons.  “That’s military information,” he said (Diane Sawyer, ABC News, Oct. 20).

The apparent failure of North Korea’s Oct. 9 test is likely to push the regime to try again, according to an analysis published yesterday.

Pyongyang reportedly told Beijing before the test that the weapon had a four-kiloton yield, Reuters reported.  The actual yield is believed to have been less than one kiloton.

“If, as the seismologists have concluded, the yield of the explosion was much less than the design yield, the North Korean government can have little faith in its nuclear weapon stockpile (and) its weapons team will regroup,” physicists Richard Garwin and Frank von Hippel wrote in Arms Control Today.

“This imperfect test may well lead North Korea to test again,” they wrote.

Even a one-kiloton device would be a “terrifying weapon,” according to Garwin and von Hippel.  The fire and radiation it unleashed could kill people in a 1-square-mile area (Reuters/Yahoo!News, Oct. 19).

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice arrived today in China during her multicountry tour to promote adherence to the U.N. Security Council resolution approved Saturday that includes sanctions against North Korea.

Rice said she and Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing discussed sanctions.  “We also talked about the importance of leaving open a path to negotiations through the six-party talks,” she said.

Tang told her that his trip to Pyongyang “has not been in vain,” AP reported (Joe McDonald, Associated Press II/Yahoo!News, Oct. 20).

If North Korea tests another nuclear device or fails to resume talks in the next few weeks, China could respond with reductions in oil shipments or other measures, the New York Times reported.

Between 80 and 90 percent of North Korea’s oil imports come from China.  A drop-off could cause further damage to its staggering economy.

Customs officers in the trading post at Dandong are already inspecting cargo heading to North Korea.  The sole Chinese air carrier to Pyongyang has halted flights to the city and Chinese banks have curtailed some transactions with North Korean entities.

“I believe that Chinese leaders are firmly resolved to roll back the nuclear program and not accept it as an accomplished fact,” said Zhang Liangui, a Korea expert at the Communist Party’s Central Party School (Joseph Kahn, New York Times I, Oct. 20).

South Korean officials, in meetings yesterday with Rice, expressed reluctance to suspend two collaborative projects with North Korea, the Washington Post reported.  They fear that such moves could heighten tension or even lead to war.

Seoul has held off decisions on pulling out of the Mount Kumgang tourist resort and the Kaesong Industrial Park (Glenn Kessler, Washington Post, Oct. 20).

Japan is also holding off on inspecting cargo from North Korea, Agence France-Presse reported today.

“We would like to wait and see the [Chinese] diplomatic efforts in pressing North Korea to abide by the United Nations Security Council resolution,” said Defense Agency chief Fumio Kyuma (Agence France-Presse, Oct. 20).

Meanwhile, the United States yesterday was monitoring a “suspicious ship” after it left a North Korean port, a U.S. official told AFP.

“The United States is aware of a vessel that has left a North Korean port,” the official said.  “There are some suspicions.  I would be careful of the certitude of the vessel’s cargo.”

CNN reported that the vessel previously had shipped weapons.  The United States was likely to seek to inspect the ship when it docks, according to CNN (Agence France-Presse II/Sunday Times, Oct. 19).

The North Korean practice of sailing ships under the flags of other nations could be a boon and a complication to efforts to board those vessels in search of illicit weapons material, the New York Times reported.

Pyongyang might move weapons or weapons parts by land through China or Russia, and then put the material on a ship in one of those countries.  Ports in other nations might not be watched as closely as those in North Korea, meaning a ship flying a foreign flag could be difficult to detect after sailing away.

However, Western nations that suspect a North Korean ship is carrying illicit material under another nation’s flag could simply ask that other nation for permission to board.  Most other nations would be more amenable to such a request than Pyongyang, said Jonathan Pollack, an Asian and Pacific studies professor at the Naval War College in Rhode Island (Keith Bradsher, New York Times II, Oct. 20).

The high levels of secrecy in North Korea make it nearly impossible to identify the scientists there who would have led the regime’s nuclear weapons effort, AP reported today.

“There’s no A.Q. Khan,” said Bertil Lintner, author of a book on the North Korean leadership.

Khan is regarded as the father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.  He also admitted to operating a black market network that supplied nuclear parts and information to Iran, Libya and North Korea.

“With Pakistan and other countries, they’ve got ‘Mr. Bomb,’” said Peter Beck, an analyst with the International Crisis Group.  “It’s possible at some point this person will be identified, but it’s only if the North wants (the world) to know.”

Two scientists believed to be among those who paved the way for the North Korean nuclear program after 1945 are dead.  Another notable figure is believed to remain in the North.

One scientist, identified as Kyong Won Ha, reportedly defected along with up to 20 North Korean military and science officials during what has been called “Operation Weasel.”  The Australian newspaper in April 2003, around the time of the operation, labeled him the “father of North Korea’s nuclear program.”  It reported at different times that he was believed to be in the United States or Spain.

One researcher in Seoul said Kyong had a “very important role” in Pyongyang’s nuclear program, and most likely remained in North Korea.  However, others in Seoul said there were not familiar with Kyong or knew of him only through medial reports, AP reported (Kelly Olsen, Associated Press III/phillyBurbs.com, Oct. 20).

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U.S. to Replace, Repair Nuclear Weapons Sites

The United States plans to repair or replace eight nuclear weapons facilities to pave the way for development of a new stockpile of 2,200 deployed warheads, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, Sept. 26).

The new or rehabilitated sites in coming years would be used to develop and manufacture the new weapons and to dismantle their predecessors, according to the multiyear program announced yesterday.

The existing facilities, some dating back to the Manhattan Project that initiated the U.S. nuclear arsenal in the 1940s, are “inefficient, old and expensive” and “not sustainable for the long term,” said Thomas D’Agostino, defense programs chief at the National Nuclear Security Administration.  The sites are largely in California, New Mexico, Texas and Tennessee.

The White House intends to replace 6,000 Cold War-era nuclear warheads with 2,200 Reliable Replacement Warheads that would remain usable for decades, the Post reported.  The “Complex 2030” plan also calls for consolidating plutonium-handing operations at one location that could produce 125 nuclear bomb triggers each year.  Further, it would strip the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California of all highly enriched uranium. 

Lawrence Livermore and the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico both developed designs for the new warhead.  The National Nuclear Security Administration is expected to select a design for production in December.

The new design must be based on previous nuclear packages in order to avoid underground nuclear testing to confirm its functionality.

As part of an environmental impact review of the eight sites, public comment will be taken on “Complex 2030” and two other nuclear stockpile plans opposed by the White House.

The “No Action Alternative” plan preserves “the status quo as it exists today and is presently planned,” according to a notice in the Federal Register.  It would maintain existing programs and delay decisions on the arsenal.

The “Reduced Operations and Capability-Based Complex Alternative” calls for production of 50 plutonium triggers each year at the new plutonium facility and for maintaining existing weapons manufacturing technology without upgrading production sites (Walter Pincus, Washington Post, Oct. 20).

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D.P.R.K. Test Spurs U.S. to Discuss Nuclear Attribution

By Jon Fox, Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON – Spurred in part by North Korea’s recent test, the U.S. government is beginning to speak out about its ability to trace the source of nuclear material, which experts say could be crucial tool in deterring atomic terrorism (see GSN, Oct. 17).

Last week, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff told the director of the U.S. nuclear detection agency to begin speaking more openly about the program.  However, precise capabilities still remain closely guarded.

Speaking on Oct. 9, after North Korea detonated what would later be determined to be a plutonium-fuel nuclear device with a yield of less than one kiloton, President George W.  Bush appeared to set a red line at which Pyongyang would face serious consequences for its nuclear program.

“The transfer of nuclear weapons or material by North Korea to states or nonstate entities would be considered a grave threat to the United States, and we would hold North Korea fully accountable for the consequences of such action,” he said.

Nuclear attribution — tracking weaponized plutonium or uranium back to its point of origin, either before an explosion or after — could be a crucial element in holding any state accountable for a leak, sale or transfer of such material.

Experts, though, have questioned the U.S. capability to trace and identify the sources of nuclear material, and government officials have been reluctant to discuss the program.  Without robust attribution technologies, a statement like that made by the president last week could appear empty.

A technology that is rarely discussed in the media, attribution was forced toward the spotlight last week by North Korea’s test and the president’s response.  In Washington Post on Oct. 11, columnist David Ignatius wrote:  “To make this accountability principle work, the United States needs a crash program to create the ‘nuclear forensics’ that can identify the signature of fissile material of every potential nuclear state.”

Sometime last week, Secretary Chertoff picked up a newspaper and read an article addressing questions of attribution and nuclear accountability.  “He read it and said, ‘Aren’t we doing something in this area?  And if we are, we should be getting the word out,’” Vayl Oxford, head of the agency’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, told Global Security Newswire yesterday.

Chertoff then gave Oxford the go-ahead to begin talking more openly about U.S. attribution programs.

“There hasn’t this kind of emphasis on this for a while, publicly,” Oxford said.  Still, he said “when you start to talk about this, it’s very sensitive.”

Oxford carefully avoided most specifics about U.S. capabilities, such as what the timeframe might be to track any nuclear material back to its nation of origin in the wake of an act of nuclear terrorism.

The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office was created April 2005 to centralize the far-flung government efforts to prevent nuclear smuggling, and on the first of this month Oxford launched the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (see GSN, Aug. 3).

 “There was never a concerted government effort, which is what we’re trying to bring to the table at this point,” he said.

The new forensics center’s staff of eight, housed with the detection office on Vermont Avenue, does not go into the field to collect samples of nuclear material for analysis, Oxford said.  For nuclear events overseas — either in the case of an intercept of nuclear material or a device going off — the Defense Department would field a team to collect samples.  Domestically, the Energy Department would provide experts to assist the FBI in its investigation.

Oxford’s forensics center is “not in the attribution business,” he said.  “We are a support function to attribution.”  The new center is responsible for developing techniques to analyze nuclear material and expanding the database of samples that could be used for comparison against intercepted or detonated material.

Determining the isotopic fingerprint of either plutonium or highly enriched uranium is of little value unless there is a catalogue of data to check it against.  It would be like having a fingerprint with no criminal to match it to, according to Ashton Carter, assistant defense secretary under President Bill Clinton.

The United States has been compiling such a catalogue of nuclear data, but there remain doubts from experts about just how complete it is.

Oxford said there is a “vast array” of sources for nuclear material that in a perfect world he would like to have noted in the U.S. attribution database.  He declined to discuss specifics, such as the present size of the catalogue.

“It’s really hard to gauge that at this point,” he said.  “They continue to add to the library with every opportunity.  The harder question that I couldn’t answer either is when do feel like it is complete.  I don’t think this is one of those things that are ever quite complete.”

Government officials, he said, are analyzing data from the North Korean test and “that then will feed this knowledge base.”

“We’ve got to stay as far in front of this issue as we can.  This is not something you react to after the fact,” he said.

A more complete catalogue and confidence in U.S. attribution capabilities could help dissuade a nation inclined to transfer nuclear material to another state or a terrorist organization.  “It has a certain deterrent effect that says if you do something we’re going to know where it came from,” Oxford said.

Still, some experts who acknowledge the crucial nature of attribution technology say the U.S. database needs bolstering.

Carter, speaking here yesterday, said the U.S. catalogue of nuclear fingerprints is incomplete.  “That is, there would be circumstances where a bomb would go off and we couldn’t pin down where it came from,” he said.

U.S. capabilities are improving, he said, suggesting in many cases the United States could pinpoint nuclear origins in about 72 hours.  “It’s a little bit of deterrence in a world where we’re afraid nuclear weapons are going to be used in a way where deterrence isn’t given a chance,” Carter said.

“The significance of attribution is important,” he said.  “What we’re telling the North Koreans is we know what your stuff smells like.  If one goes off and it smells like you, we’re coming after you.”

While attribution could play a central role in deterring an unconventional delivery of a nuclear device, it is not foolproof, said nuclear weapons expert Michael May, a professor at Stanford University.

In the era of the Cold War and the threat of an ICBM strike, there was no question about tracing an attack back to the origin.  With the threat of nuclear terrorism, there is the possibility of a device exploding and the United States being unsure where it came from.  May also says the U.S. nuclear database is incomplete.

Attribution is “really kind of an overall detective process,” he said.  “It isn’t foolproof but it can be very helpful.”

There might be instances in which weapon-grade nuclear material from one reactor closely resembles material from another, he said.  That could be the case with the North Korea plutonium used in the recent test, likely taken from the North Korean facility at Yongbyon.

“It may well be that it would be hard to distinguish that reactor from similar reactors elsewhere; it’s a fairly widespread type of reactor that is usually used to make weapons-grade plutonium,” he said.

May also raised questions about attribution’s deterrent effect.  “We’re talking about terrorism now.  If it comes from a state, we’ll know damn well where it came from,” he said.  “If it’s surreptitious there’s a whole chain. … The question is who in that chain can be deterred by attribution.”

Perhaps a nation fearful of retaliation could be deterred from selling or transferring nuclear material.  However, deterring the actors becomes less likely the farther the material moves from its origin, May said.

“Down the chain they couldn’t care less if you could attribute the original material,” he said.  “The deterrent effect is there, but it’s partial. It’s not black and white.”

In the wake of an act of nuclear terrorism, there might remain an element of uncertainty about the provenance of the material, even with attribution technology.  Part of what Oxford’s office is doing is educating policy-makers about the gray areas they could be faced with, he said.

“These are always not something you can script, so you have to exercise (policy-makers) to understand the uncertainty they’ll have to deal with,” Oxford said.

To effectively harness attribution technologies “you need all the precision you can get to enhance the decision-making process,” he said. “You can’t be close in this case.”

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Iranian Nuclear Effort has Consequences, Israel Says

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said yesterday that there would be a “price to pay” for Iran’s continued development of its nuclear program, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Oct. 19).

Iranians “have to be afraid” of the consequences of a continued nuclear program, Olmert said while returning to Israel from Russia.

In 1981, Israel destroyed an Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirik before it became operational.

Olmert said Israel would not accept a nuclear Iran, adding that “there comes a time when you have to do damage control.”

Israel in 1981 destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak.

“A red line must be drawn that cannot be crossed,” he said.  “Time isn’t standing still … and perhaps there will be a need to do something in the future.”  He did not specify what that “red line” may be, AP reported (Amy Teibel, Associated Press/MyFoxColorado.com, Oct. 20).

Meanwhile, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad returned to rhetoric denying Israel’s right to exist, Reuters reported.

“Our nation has previously announced that this regime is illegitimate from its foundation.  It is fabricated.  It has been imposed on the nations of the region, and it cannot survive,” he said in a speech televised from a rally near Tehran.

Western nations believe Iran is pursuing a nuclear program with an ultimate aim of weaponizing uranium.  Tehran insists its intentions are purely peaceful and part of a civilian nuclear energy program.  The result has been a standoff with Iran refusing to freeze its uranium enrichment program before negotiations on the nuclear issue.

“Our nation is in favor of talks and negotiations, but the world should know that the Iranian nation will not retreat one iota from its right,” he said (Reuters, Oct. 19).

A resolution on Iran’s nuclear program could go before the U.N. Security Council next week, AP reported.  It is expected to include sanctions, following Tehran’s refusal to heed the council’s demand to freeze uranium enrichment activities.

The document from France and the United Kingdom is likely to seek to ban the import and export by Iran of material and equipment that could be used to produce unconventional weapons, AP reported, citing anonymous sources (Edith Lederer, Associated Press, Oct. 20).

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 “Bunker Buster” Passes Tests

An experimental “bunker-buster” warhead in recent testing displayed the capability to penetrate hardened, underground enemy facilities, United Press International reported (see GSN, March 24).

The RATTLRS warhead remained intact after being slammed into a large concrete block in “sled” testing.

Defense contractor Lockheed Martin is developing the light-weight, supersonic RATTLRS cruise missile as a substitute for heavier bunker busters.  The missile could be fired from aircraft, surface vessels and submarines.

Flight testing of the missile is scheduled for late 2007, Lockheed said in a press release.

The Bush administration has fought Congress over plans to develop a nuclear bunker buster.  The Energy Department said the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator program, as of March, had been “closed out” (United Press International, Oct. 19).

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U.S. Army Blocked From Shipping CW Disposal Waste

A defense spending bill signed Wednesday by President George W. Bush prohibits the U.S. Army from dumping waste produced by VX nerve agent disposal in the Delaware River until the plan can be studied in greater detail, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, July 28).

The Army has planned to ship hydrolysate waste from the Newport Chemical Agent Disposal Facility in Indiana to a DuPont plant in New Jersey.  DuPont would process the waste and deposit it in the river.

The law requires the Government Accountability Office to review studies of the plan before shipments can begin, AP reported.  That means dumping would likely not begin before February.

The Army has faced strong criticism from environmentalists and officials in Delaware and New Jersey, who have pledged court and legislative action if necessary to block waste shipments.

“I do not think there is any answer that can be given to satisfy our concerns,” U.S. Representative Frank LoBiondo (R-N.J.) said yesterday (Associated Press/phillyBurbs.com, Oct. 19).

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Kurdish Farmer Testifies to Iraqi Chemical Attacks

A Kurdish man testifying at the genocide trial of former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein yesterday described the chemical weapons attack on his village in 1988, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Aug. 24).

Smoke from nearby bombings rolled into Abdullah Saeed’s village in northern Iraq, he said.

“People in my village were screaming that they were contaminated by chemical weapons,” said Saeed, 79.  “We loaded children, women and other persons contaminated by chemical weapons onto three trucks and fled to another village.”

Iraqi forces stopped the trucks and the villagers were transported to a detention center in the south of the country.

Saddam and six co-defendants face charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity for their roles in Operation Anfal, a campaign of attacks launched against the Kurdish population in 1987 to 88.

Saddam and one co-defendant also face charges of genocide.  All seven could be executed if convicted (Associated Press/Boston Herald, Oct. 19).

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NFL “Dirty Bomb” Threat a Hoax

A 20-year-old Milwaukee man has admitted that the online threat to detonate radiological “dirty bombs” at seven National Football League stadiums this weekend was a hoax, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Oct. 19).

The man told the FBI the threat was the result of his “writing duel” with a Texas man over who could come up with the most frightening threat.  The Texas man backed up his account.

The Oct. 12 posting on a Web site that links to a variety of online forums said radiological weapons would be driven by trucks to NFL stadiums in Atlanta, Cleveland, Houston, Miami, New York, Oakland and Seattle.

“This is a hoax,” said FBI Special Agent Richard Kolko.  Football fans “should be reassured of their security as they continue to attend sporting events this weekend.”

It was not immediately known whether charges would be filed, AP reported.  The Milwaukee man “was released, but we’re not saying that he won’t be charged,” said FBI agent Douglas Porrini (Emily Fredrix, Associated Press/ABC News, Oct. 19).

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New Detectors Installed at Mexico-Arizona Border

U.S. Customs and Border Protection on Oct. 11 began operating portal radiation detectors at an Arizona border crossing with Mexico to scan cargo for material that could be used in a nuclear or radiological weapon, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Oct. 3).

So far, the 8-foot-tall machines deployed in downtown Nogales have not detected any instances of nuclear smuggling (Associated Press/ABC15.com, Oct. 20).

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