North Korea has apparently indicated its willingness to return to the six-nation negotiations on its nuclear program, Russian President Vladimir Putin said today (see GSN, Oct. 25).
“We hear there are signals that the country is ready to return to the six-sided process,” he said. First, however, Pyongyang needs a “guarantee of its national interests regarding its security and development of peaceful atomic power,” Putin added. While Putin called North Korea’s recent nuclear test “unacceptable,” he also appeared to direct criticism toward the United States. “I think that one of the reasons [for the test] is that not all participants in the talks process could find the right tone in the talks,” he said. “You never need to push a situation into a dead end. You never put one of the participants in negotiations in such a situation where it has almost no exit, except one — to escalate the situation” (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, Oct. 25). South Korea today confirmed that the test involved a nuclear device, the Yonhap News Agency reported. Seoul has detected the radioactive material xenon inside South Korea, according to the Science and Technology Ministry. Seismic wave analysis also contributed to the nuclear conclusion. There had initially been widespread speculation that the test had not involved a nuclear weapon, due to the limited yield of the explosion. The United States on Oct. 16 was the first country to publicly acknowledge the nuclear explosion (see GSN, Oct. 16; Yonhap News Agency I, Oct. 25). U.S. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack yesterday dismissed Pyongyang’s requests for direct talks with Washington as an “excuse” to stay out of the six-party talks, the Yonhap reported. McCormack also rejected reports that North Korea has not acknowledged seeking to develop nuclear weapons that use highly enriched uranium. North Korean officials reportedly acknowledged the program in a 2002 meeting with U.S. representatives. That led Washington to abandon the 1994 Agreed Framework under which Pyongyang was to receive light-water nuclear power reactors in exchange for ending its atomic weapons efforts. “I guarantee, you talk to everybody that was in that room on the American side, they heard that North Korea confirmed for them an HEU program,” McCormack said (Yonhap News Agency II, Oct. 25). The head of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff said yesterday that the United States could defeat North Korea in war, but that the present conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq would make the cost in lives higher, the Associated Press reported. “It would not be as clean as we would like it to be, but it would certainly be sure, and the outcome would not be in doubt,” said Gen. Peter Pace during a press conference. “We have 2 million folks who can start protecting this nation anywhere else we need them tomorrow, if we need them to,” Pace said. Such a war “would be more brute force, wherever we might have to go next, than it would be if we weren’t already involved in the war we have going on in Iraq and Afghanistan,” he said. “Why? Because you need precision intelligence to drop precision munitions. And a lot of our precision intelligence assets are currently being used in the Gulf region. So some of those would not be available if you had to go someplace else” (Robert Burns, Associated Press I/Yahoo!News, Oct. 24). Pyongyang might try to bolster its deterrent against a U.S. strike by launching a missile carrying a nuclear weapon, David Albright, director of the Institute for Science and International Security, said yesterday. Former Pakistani chief nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, who designed nuclear warheads that could be fitted on missiles, is known to have supplied nuclear material and expertise to North Korea and other nations. “You have to start to, at least not exclude, (asking) if North Korea can put a warhead on something like a Rodong missile,” Albright said at a Johns Hopkins University forum. “The U.S. is not going to be very scared if all you can do is blow up nuclear explosives in a hole underground,” he said. North Korea wants to prove it is able to launch a nuclear warhead, but using a bomber to deploy the device is not a reasonable option, Albright said. “So it’s stuck with missiles.” “What I dread is that if North Korea doesn’t believe that we are fearful of their nuclear deterrent, they may try the next step — launch a nuclear-tipped missile,” he said (Yonhap News Agency III, Oct. 25). Meanwhile, a South Korean task force met for the first time yesterday to study options for imposing on North Korea sanctions included in a recently approved U.N. Security Council resolution, AP reported. The task force is expected to consider the future of two cross-border projects that have supplied Pyongyang with much-needed cash. North Korea has received at least $900 million since the late 1990s from a tourism program and industrial complex, AP reported. South Korean Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok yesterday offered his resignation in the wake of the nuclear test (Jae-Soon Chang, Associated Press II/Leesville Daily Leader, Oct. 25). Pyongyang today threatened repercussions for South Korean sanctions, AP reported. “If North-South relations collapse due to reckless and imprudent sanctions against us the South Korean authorities will be fully responsible for it and will have to pay a high price,” North Korea said in a statement (Jae-Soon Chang, Associated Press III/Yahoo!News, Oct. 25).
By James Kitfield, National Journal
WASHINGTON — In the complex algorithm of diplomacy now at the center of the North Korean crisis and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s trip to Asia this week, no nation looms larger in the equation than China. Not only is it the chief source of food and energy for North Korea, but China has long acted as the diplomatic shield for the “Hermit Kingdom” on the U.N. Security Council. Beijing’s vote for punitive sanctions on North Korea in response to its recent nuclear weapons test thus signaled a potentially significant change in course for the rising power of Asia. For insights into these developments, National Journal Staff Correspondent James Kitfield spoke with Jeffrey Bader, an Asia expert and the director of the Brookings Institution’s new John L. Thornton China Center, which recently opened an office in Beijing. National Journal: In voting for a U.N. resolution to punish Pyongyang for its nuclear test, China broke with decades of tradition in support of its longtime ally. What set of calculations do you think drove China to split with North Korea? Jeffrey Bader: First with its missile test last summer and then with the recent nuclear test, North Korea has been following a policy that seemed to have little regard for China’s interests. The Chinese don’t tend to say it publicly, but one of their major concerns is the military posture of Japan. As Japanese strategic thinkers have come to see North Korea as a growing threat, they have increased cooperation with the United States on missile defense and strengthened the U.S.-Japan military alliance. They’ve also proposed amending the Japanese constitution and its provisions against war. Some Japanese officials have even openly discussed pursuing their own nuclear weapons program. All of this makes the Chinese very nervous. China doesn’t want North Korea stoking Japanese fears and provoking Tokyo to adopt a more aggressive military posture. That’s a major reason for China’s change of behavior toward Pyongyang. NJ: What are the other reasons? Bader: China is also worried that North Korea’s behavior could increase the risk of regime collapse, which would result in a refugee crisis on the Chinese border. That scenario also raises the possibility that South Korean troops would move north to restore order, and that Chinese troops might have to move south for the same reason, bringing their forces into proximity. China worries about that scenario. NJ: Did that concern drive China to join the six-party talks (China, Japan, the two Koreas, Russia, and the United States) even though the negotiations always threatened to force Beijing at some point to choose sides in the dispute over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program? Bader: Well, I think China became involved in the six-party talks largely because of U.S. pressure. The Bush administration decided after revelations of North Korea’s uranium-enrichment program that they would no longer pursue bilateral talks with Pyongyang. With that break-off and the resultant deteriorating relations between the United States and North Korea, I think China became concerned that either side might take more-provocative steps. So they saw the logic of trying to contain both countries through talks. NJ: Why do you think the talks themselves made so little progress? Bader: It became pretty evident over time that this was a process without much substance. The six-party talks maintained the illusion in the respective capitals that something was being done. But little was accomplished other than having a public forum of sorts. That is largely due to the fact that there has been a civil war within the Bush administration between those who wanted to put substance into the six-party talks, and test North Korea’s willingness to make a deal, and those led by Vice President Cheney, who felt that North Korea was part of the “axis of evil” and there was no point in negotiating with them. Cheney’s goal was to wait until North Korea surrendered its nuclear program, like Libya did, or the regime collapsed. NJ: So did China conclude that the U.S. approached the six-party talks in bad faith? Bader: I don’t think China would say the United States dealt totally in bad faith, but they didn’t believe that we put enough on the table initially to give North Korea sufficient incentive to back down. Over time, I think, the Chinese actually became frustrated with both sides. They weren’t happy with the U.S. policy of never getting involved in direct negotiations with the North Koreans. On the other hand, they believed that North Korea failed to take advantage of some opportunities presented by U.S. proposals. If you look at the substance of the package the Bush administration offered last year, for instance, I think China would say there were sufficient incentives there if we could find a way to sequence the freeze in North Korea’s nuclear program with the delivery of promised economic aid. Instead, we essentially asked North Korea to give up its nuclear program and its leverage first. NJ: Does China want to draw Pyongyang out of its economic and diplomatic isolation? Bader: Yes. The Chinese think that North Korea should follow the same gradual diplomatic opening to the world that China began pursuing in the 1970s. In that sense, Beijing wants North Korea to start acting like a more “normal” country, and not like this crazy relative in the attic. By “normal” I mean a country still ruled by a Communist Party, but with more-sensible international and domestic policies. NJ: Was Beijing’s recent assignment of a new ambassador to North Korea part of that “normalization” process? Bader: Yes. The Chinese actually appointed an old American hand as their ambassador to North Korea. Traditionally, that was considered a “special relationship” that was handled directly by the Chinese Communist Party. With that appointment, China was signaling that this is going to be a more normal relationship in the future and, like any other state, North Korea would deal with Beijing through the Chinese foreign ministry. NJ: While China went along with the U.N. resolution, doesn’t it oppose the United States’ strategic goal of a reunified Korean Peninsula? Bader: China shares the United States’ desire for a stable and nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, and both nations have an interest in the general stability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Neither wants to set a precedent for other countries such as Iran, who may think they can pursue nuclear weapons at no cost. At some point in this process, however, we’re likely to see the interests of China and the United States diverge on the issue of reunification. China is comfortable with a buffer state between itself and America’s ally South Korea. They worry that reunification could bring a preponderance of U.S. influence right up to their border. NJ: So the Chinese supported sanctions, but none that might seriously weaken a regime that can’t even adequately feed its own people? Bader: That’s why I think you didn’t see sanctions on China’s supply of food or oil to North Korea. I think China is also resistant to the idea of stringent financial sanctions on North Korea, which could also move it closer to collapse. Of course, given North Korea’s position as the most isolated country on earth, those were exactly the types of sanctions that might have bitten hard and possibly caused Pyongyang to change behavior. NJ: China has sent mixed signals about its willingness to enforce an embargo on items banned by the U.N. resolution, saying it would inspect trucks crossing its land border, for instance, but not take provocative actions such as boarding North Korean ships at sea. Do you think China can be counted on to enforce such an embargo? Bader: My expectation is that China will enforce the U.N. resolution, because they wouldn’t have signed off if they intended to flout it. Searching trucks at borders is also something that all countries do in connection with smuggling. So I think China will confiscate items that are barred by the U.N. resolution. That’s a different matter from asserting that they will find everything, however, nor will China want to risk closing the border and creating chaos on the other side. As for more-provocative inspections at sea, I imagine we’ll see a situation where the United States interprets the U.N. resolution as blessing its ability to board North Korean ships; and the Chinese won’t participate in that activity, but neither will they raise much of a fuss. Essentially I think they’ll turn their head. We saw a similar situation in terms of the U.N. resolution imposing sanctions on Iraq, which the United States interpreted as justifying its no-fly zones over Iraq. Other countries disagreed, but we went ahead and did it anyway. I can conceive of a similar situation developing over the North Korean arms embargo.
U.S.-funded security improvements at Russian navy nuclear facilities have been completed two years ahead of schedule, the U.S. Energy Department announced yesterday (see GSN, Sept. 7). The program sought to enhance protective measures over nuclear warheads and nuclear weapon-usable materials at 50 naval sites. “Denying terrorists access to nuclear material is our top priority. These upgrades to Russian navy sites make it much harder for terrorists to get their hands on dangerous nuclear material,” said Linton Brooks, head of the Energy Department’s National Nuclear Security Administration, in a press release. “The fact that we have done this a full two years ahead of schedule shows the importance the administration places on securing nuclear weapons and material at the source and for nonproliferation work in general.” The security improvements included the installation of intruder alarms, access restrictions and “hardened defensive positions,” according to the NNSA release. “We are also working closely with Russia to ensure that the upgrades we provide are sustained and maintained,” Brooks said (National Nuclear Security Administration release, Oct. 24).
International Atomic Energy Agency aid to Iran would be halted if the U.N. Security Council approves a resolution being crafted this week by France, the United Kingdom and United States, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, Oct. 24). The draft resolution, which could be presented to China and Russia later this week, would end the agency’s technical assistance to Iran in all areas, including medical and agricultural aid, nuclear safety information and other peaceful technologies, according to AP. There would, however, be an exception to allow the agency to provide technical and legal advice for the Russian-built nuclear power reactor at Bushehr that could begin operating next year, AP reported (see GSN, Sept. 26). The measures were designed to attract the support of China and Russia, both of which hold veto power in the council and have expressed strong reservations over imposing punishing sanctions against Iran (see GSN, Oct. 23). The United States has been pushing for a sanctions resolution following Tehran’s refusal to heed a council demand to end Iran’s uranium enrichment activities (George Jahn, Associated Press/Canada.com, Oct. 25). “The sanctions we’ll be looking at for Iran are not quite the same” as those approved for North Korea following Pyongyang’s nuclear test earlier this month, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton said yesterday. “The point to Iran is their continued effort to get nuclear weapons will result in their continuing international isolation” (U.S. State Department release, Oct. 24).
Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso today again pressed leaders to discuss whether their country needs nuclear weapons, in light of North Korea’s recent nuclear test explosion, Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, Oct. 18). “We need to discuss once again why Japan came to decide not to possess nuclear arms,” Aso told a foreign affairs committee of parliament. “On the assumption that North Korea really owns nuclear arms now, the situation of the Far East has changed drastically,” he said. “We should discuss if Japan can stay as it is.” Aso’s calls for debate on the nuclear issue have worried nearby nations that once suffered under Japan’s military, and met opposition from other leaders in Tokyo, AFP reported. Japan suffered the world’s only military use of atomic weapons, during the World War II strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and has fought nuclear proliferation for decades. “I’ve been saying that Japanese people should not discuss whether to go nuclear,” said Fumio Kyuma, head of the Japanese Defense Agency. “If Japan develops nuclear weapons, that would lead to a nuclear arms race in the region.” A South Korean official last week told the Hankyoreh newspaper that Seoul was studying its own options in the event that Japan pursued nuclear armaments. While calling for discussion, Aso pledged that the government would not undo its prohibition on the “possession, production and presence” of nuclear weapons on Japanese territory. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made the same pledge last week, but in stronger terms. “We will maintain the three principles as our national virtue. There should not be any change in the policy. The government will not debate it,” he said (Kyoko Hasegawa, Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, Oct. 25).
Large amounts of highly enriched uranium at the Y-12 facility in Tennessee are stored in dangerous conditions, according to a new study, the Knoxville News Sentinel reported yesterday (see GSN, Oct. 18). The study finds that the stored uranium poses both environmental and worker safety risks and urges the U.S. Energy Department to impose more rigorous oversight and to dispose of some of dangerous material as low-level nuclear waste. “A large fraction of HEU, which accumulated at the Y-12 site for more than 50 years, is still in insecure and unstable forms — posing increased environmental, safety and health risks,” says the report, written by former Energy Department policy adviser Robert Alvarez. He is now a senior scholar at the Institute for Policy Studies, and the study is scheduled to be published in an upcoming issue of Science and Global Security. “Between 1993 and 2005, more than 40 percent of the total collective dose to workers from internal depositions of radioactive materials in the DOE complex (nationwide) occurred at the Y-12 site,” the study says, citing 23 fires and explosions over the past 15 years. An Energy Department official said Alvarez’s findings were “based on old reports that are woefully out of date.” “We agree with Mr. Alvarez that Y-12 had been allowed to deteriorate during the 1990s, but he appears to ignore a major campaign this administration undertook, beginning in 2001, to invest hundreds of millions of dollars in upgrading the facilities and clearing out old, dilapidated structures and to improve security,” said Anson Franklin, a spokesman from the department’s National Nuclear Security Administration (see GSN, March 30; Frank Munger, Knoxville News Sentinel, Oct. 24).
While conducting a drug bust Friday, police in Los Alamos, N.M., discovered classified documents from the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Aug. 1). Police seized the documents, stored on a computer file, while searching the mobile home of a man suspected of domestic violence and selling methamphetamines, a police official said. After receiving an alert from the police, the FBI determined that the documents apparently came from a laboratory contract employee who is connected to the drug suspect, an FBI official said. The nuclear weapons laboratory has battled porous information security problems in recent years, drawing the criticism of some advocacy groups. “When you actually have those materials that are supposed to be protected inside the lab and you find them outside the lab in the hands of criminals, that should worry everybody,” said Danielle Brian, head of the Project on Government Oversight (Associated Press, Oct. 25).
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