By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The U.S. Congress last month approved a bill allowing the Defense Department this year to conduct a controversial earth penetrator research test, despite opposition from minority Democrats (see GSN, Dec. 15, 2005). In approving a massive $441 billion fiscal 2006 defense authorization bill, Congress denied authorization for $4 million in funding requested by the Bush administration for the Energy Department to conduct a major “sled test” of a mock Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP). However, in report language accompanying the final version of the bill approved on Dec. 18, House and Senate leaders authorized $4 million for the Defense Department to conduct such a test as part of a new, related “penetrator study.” A senior Air Force official said last month that the test could support efforts to develop a nuclear penetrator. The report says House and Senate conferees “agree to authorize no funding for the RNEP study under the Department of Energy, but instead authorize a related study effort within the Department of Defense.” “The conferees agree to authorize $4.0 million … to conduct a sled test and a study on the physics of penetrating geologic media, to be completed by the end of fiscal year 2006,” it says. Both houses subsequently approved the version of the bill agreed to in the report and it now awaits the president’s signature. Two ViewsThe test, which involves slamming the mock warhead into a huge block of concrete, is considered necessary for assessing whether it is feasible to develop a weapon better able to withstand slamming into solid earth before detonating than an existing conventional penetrator. Critics have called the program — with a potential price tag of hundreds of millions of dollars — a waste of money. They argue that a nuclear penetrator would not likely be used because of potential casualties, and that it undermines U.S. nuclear nonproliferation efforts. Supporters have said a sturdier penetrator is needed for reaching deeply buried foreign facilities. Senate Democrats unsuccessfully sought to include in the report a provision barring any testing that could support the feasibility assessment of a nuclear penetrator. Nevertheless, after Congress approved the report, Representative Ellen Tauscher (D-Calif.) suggested in a press release that the bill would only allow for study of conventional penetrators. “I’m pleased that the FY 2006 Defense Authorization bill will not allow the creation of new nuclear weapons, but instead provides our military with resources to destroy hard and deeply buried targets with conventional weapons,” she said. Supporting that notion, Congress on Dec. 18 also approved the fiscal 2006 defense appropriations bill report containing language that specified the Defense Department study be a “conventional” one. However, an Air Force official said in a Defense Daily report on Dec. 6 that the sled test in fiscal 2006 is intended to determine the feasibility of the nuclear penetrator and that the Defense Department planned to complete the nuclear feasibility assessment by fiscal 2007 if money could be secured. “There is some misunderstanding that the Defense Department has dropped the nuclear part of the [Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator]. Without the nuclear portion, the RNEP is not very attractive,” Billy Mullins, deputy director of strategic security for the Air Force, told Defense Daily. “The defense appropriations conference report approved by Congress last month specifies on page 289 that the Defense Department appropriation is for a conventional penetrator study,” said Arms Control Association Executive Director Daryl Kimball. “The reality is that the sled test that this money would support would produce data that is relative not only to a conventional penetrator but [to] a nuclear penetrator. But the DOD should be mindful that the legislative intent of Congress is that the RNEP program is not authorized,” he said. Senate Armed Services Committee ranking Democrat Carl Levin (Mich.) in a Dec. 22 floor statement urged the Pentagon to use the $4 million only for studying conventional penetrators. “I hope and urge the department to use at least the $4 million to support conventional, non-nuclear weapons development,” he said.
Iran yesterday announced it would only consider a compromise nuclear offer from Russia if the deal acknowledged Tehran’s right to enrich uranium domestically, Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, Dec. 23, 2005). “As we said before we want to have enrichment inside Iran ... and any proposal which is based on this principle will be studied,” said government spokesman Gholam Hossein Elham. “We are studying the Russian proposal based on this framework,” he said. Moscow has proposed enriching uranium on Iran’s behalf in Russia, ensuring that nuclear material would not be diverted to weapons work. Top Iranian nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani criticized the proposal without fully eliminating it from consideration, AFP reported. “It is an idea, not a structured proposal, we don’t see it as mature and it has serious problems,” Larijani told state television. “The (Russian) plan could be complementary and supporting, there are technological benefits, we have to examine them. It is not rigid and there is room for maneuver,” he added (Farhad Pouladi, Agence France-Presse/Middle East Online, Jan. 2). Javad Vaeedi, deputy head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, said Wednesday that Tehran would “seriously and enthusiastically” study the Russian offer, the New York Times reported. The change in tone from previous regime statements should not be taken as a signal that Tehran has changed its policy on uranium enrichment, said David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security. “The trouble is that when they say they’ll give it serious study, it doesn’t mean they’ll accept it,” Albright said. “Iran’s problem is that just to turn down the Russian proposal adds a lot of support to those who want to bring the matter to the Security Council.” “They’d seemed to be hardening over the last several months, so I’d be surprised if this statement was a real change of position,” he said. Vaeedi’s tone could be aimed at persuading the EU to resume talks and blocking China or Russia from supporting sanctions, according to the Times (Bernstein/Sanger, New York Times, Dec. 29, 2005). Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency chief Sergei Kiriyenko is scheduled to visit Iran next month to discuss the completion the Bushehr nuclear plant as well as Moscow’s uranium enrichment proposal, the Associated Press reported Friday (Associated Press/Washington Post, Dec. 30, 2005). Meanwhile, Iran has developed a mixer-settler, a device used to separate uranium from its ore to produce uranium oxide, or yellowcake, AFP reported. “The mixer-settler can be used effectively in the fuel cycle for producing zirconium and uranium,” one engineer who helped develop the machinery told state television Sunday (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, Jan. 1). Iran on Sunday warned of harsh retaliation to any attack on its nuclear or military installations, the Associated Press reported. Larijani, however, dismissed discussion of such an attack as “psychological warfare.” “Iran has prepared itself ... they will get a crushing response if they make such a mistake,” Larijani told state television. “If there is any truth in such talks, Israel will suffer greatly. It’s a very small country within our range. Our (defense) preparedness is a deterrence,” he said. CIA Director Porter Goss, FBI Director Robert Mueller and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice have all recently visited neighboring Turkey, boosting speculation about plans for a possible military strike against Iran, according to AP (Ali Akbar Dareini, Associated Press/Billings Gazette, Jan. 1). Turkey yesterday denied reports of U.S. requests for permission to use Turkish military bases for possible strikes on Iran, Reuters reported. “This speculation has no connection with reality,” Turkey’s Foreign Ministry announced in a statement. “Turkey considers that the problems in its region should be resolved by dialogue and negotiations. It believes our region does not need any new problems and that everyone should fulfill their responsibilities with this aim in mind,” the statement says (Reuters, Jan. 2). Top Israeli military commander Gen. Dan Halutz dismissed the notion of an imminent strike against Iranian nuclear facilities, the Australian reported today. “I don’t think an operation by the Israel defense forces against the Iranians will be necessary soon,” he said. “All political options for halting the Iranian program must be exhausted before other options are considered” (Abraham Rabinovich, The Australian, Jan. 3).
The U.S. government since 2002 has been using radiation detectors to monitor Muslim sites around Washington, D.C. and in at least five other cities, U.S. News and World Report reported last month (see GSN, Nov. 9, 2005). Sites monitored for potential nuclear weapons activity include homes, businesses, mosques and warehouses. Surveillance of these sites was often conducted without search warrants or court orders, even as agents entered private properties, according to sources familiar with the program. Some personnel involved in the monitoring questioned whether the program was legal and were subsequently threatened with job loss. Federal officials maintain that warrants are not needed to conduct the radiation monitoring, a claim disputed by some legal scholars. News of the radiation surveillance follows the recent revelation of a secret National Security Agency spying program in which U.S. citizens were monitored without warrants or court orders. The FBI and the Energy Department’s Nuclear Emergency Support Team operate the radiation watch program. At one point, three vehicles in Washington monitored 120 primarily Muslim sites each day. This occurred daily for 10 months and continues during high-threat periods. The program has also been used in Chicago, Detroit, Las Vegas, New York and Seattle, according to U.S. News. Surveillance in the Washington area included mosques and offices in Virginia and Maryland. Participants in the program “were tasked on a daily and nightly basis,” and Energy Department and FBI officials met often to update the list of sites being monitored, according to a source close to the program. “The targets were almost all U.S. citizens,” said the source. “A lot of us thought it was questionable, but people who complained nearly lost their jobs. We were told it was perfectly legal.” However, questions exist about the legality of monitoring without a search warrant. Up to 15 percent of the surveillance was conducted from private property like driveways and parking lots in order to obtain accurate radiation readings. Government officials said that no warrant is needed to monitor from areas that could be accessed by the public. “If a delivery man can access it, so can we,” said one official. David Cole, a constitutional law expert and professor at Georgetown University, disputes this claim. He said that while public mosques and businesses might be acceptable for surveillance, private homes and offices are not. “They don't need a warrant to drive onto the property — the issue isn't where they are, but whether they're using a tactic to intrude on privacy. It seems to me that they are, and that they would need a warrant or probable cause,” he said. Cole said the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 2001 that police needed a warrant to use heat sensors to detect lamps used to grow marijuana in private homes. However, officials close to the monitoring program said that radiation detectors differ because they are testing air. “This kind of program only detects particles in the air, it’s nondirectional,” one official said. “It's not a whole lot different from smelling marijuana.” Officials also deny the program targets Muslims. “We categorically do not target places of worship or entities solely based on ethnicity or religious affiliation,” said an official. “Our investigations are intelligence driven and based on a criminal predicate” (David Kaplan, U.S. News and World Report, Dec. 22, 2005). Ibrahim Hooper, a spokesman for the Council on American-Islamic Relations, said news of the surveillance came as a “complete shock” to his group and to the Muslim community, the Associated Press reported. “This creates the appearance that Muslims are targeted simply for being Muslims. I don't think this is the message the government wants to send at this time,” he said. Justice Department spokesman Brian Roehrkasse said that the Bush administration “is very concerned with a growing body of sensitive reporting that continues to show al-Qaeda has a clear intention to obtain and ultimately use chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear” weapons. To counter these threats, Roehrkasse said the government “monitors the air for imminent threats to health and safety,” but does so only in response to specific threats. “FBI agents do not intrude across any constitutionally protected areas without the proper legal authority,” he said (Larry Margasak, Associated Press/Baltimore Sun, Dec. 23, 2005).
North Korea today announced it would boycott multilateral nuclear disarmament talks until Washington lifts sanctions imposed for Pyongyang’s alleged illegal financial activities, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Dec. 23, 2005). “While under U.S. sanctions, it’s impossible to sit face-to-face and discuss abandoning our nuclear deterrent,” said the official Rodong Sinmun newspaper. Meanwhile, the pro-Pyongyang Choson Sinbo newspaper in Japan stated that North Korean leader Kim Jong Il is “determined to go on an all-out offensive” and will take a “resolute measure” on the nuclear standoff, the Yonhap News Agency reported. Koh Yu-hwan, a North Korea expert at Dongguk University in Seoul, said Pyongyang could be considering boosting its nuclear arsenal or testing a missile. A nuclear test was unlikely, though, according to Koh, “as it would provoke China and other neighboring countries too much” (Associated Press/Washington Post, Jan. 3). Elsewhere, a top U.S. nuclear scientist has claimed that North Korea is working to restart a reactor that could produce 10 atomic bombs worth of plutonium per year, the London Times reported yesterday. Former Los Alamos National Laboratory director Siegfried Hecker, who visited North Korea twice in the past two years, also said Pyongyang reprocessed 8,000 fuel rods last summer to produce up to 14 kilograms of plutonium. “They have the plutonium,” Hecker told the London Times. “We have to assume the North Koreans can and have made a few nuclear devices.” During his first trip to the country in 2004, Hecker visited the Yongbyon nuclear facility and was shown a small steel receptacle that contained a wooden box. “They slid open the box and inside were two glass jars — two marmalade jars, actually — with screw-on tops,” he said. One contained powder, the other a thin scrap of metal, the “stuff you would use for the bombs,” according to Hecker. Hecker said he then told the Yongbyon director that the material was not very warm, to which the official replied, “Well, Dr. Hecker, that’s because the plutonium 240 content is low, which means that it’s good bomb-grade plutonium.” “I held the plutonium and it passed the test,” Hecker said. On his second visit, the Yongbyon director told Hecker that the North Koreans had been reprocessing up to another 14 kilograms of plutonium. Hecker expressed concern that the regime in Pyongyang, which is facing another financial crisis, could sell nuclear material to terrorists. “Forty kilograms of plutonium, some number of briefcases anywhere in basements, in one of the 15,000 tunnels in North Korea — nobody will find it,” he said (Michael Sheridan, The Times, Jan. 2).
The U.S. Oak Ridge National Laboratory transportation security group has been supporting efforts to secure nuclear materials in Russia, the Associated Press reported Saturday (see GSN, Dec. 16, 2005). Oak Ridge researchers have been working with Russian scientists for almost 20 years. The recent focus has been on improving the rail system in Russia, which transports plutonium, uranium and weapons components around the country. “Under the old Soviet system, with closed borders, they didn't have a real problem or issue. Nobody crossed the line under the Soviet system. They knew what would happen,” said Oak Ridge engineer Gary Sullivan. “But once they opened the borders, theoretically at least, that all changed.” Older rail cars that carry sensitive materials have undergone security upgrades, including the addition of steel reinforcements and warning sensors. Oak Ridge scientists have helped design the next generation of rail cars being manufactured in Russia and have helped with the installation of technologies to track and secure nuclear materials. “Some of these systems were developed jointly with us, but it's all designed and built in Russia by Russians,” said Sullivan, although the U.S. government does provide funding for these and other nonproliferation projects in Russia. “We don't want it growing mushrooms,” Sullivan said, referring to mushroom clouds (Associated Press/Tennessean, Dec. 31, 2005).
India and Pakistan on Sunday exchanged lists of their respective nuclear facilities, Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, Dec. 23, 2005). The information was provided under the auspices of a 1988 agreement in which the countries pledged not to attack each other’s nuclear installations, Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry announced (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, Jan. 1).
Former Russian Nuclear Energy Minister Yevgeny Adamov was extradited to Russia on Friday to face an investigation into U.S. allegations that he embezzled millions of dollars in nuclear safety aid delivered by the United States to Moscow, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Oct. 6, 2005). The United States had sought Adamov’s extradition from Switzerland, but a Swiss court ruled he would be returned to Russia. Adamov was indicted in the United States last year on conspiracy, money laundering and tax evasion charges. Russian prosecutors made a formal pledge to Switzerland’s Justice Ministry that they would investigate the U.S. charges, AP reported (Associated Press/Washington Post, Dec. 30, 2005).
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