By David Francis and David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — U.S. President George W. Bush’s fiscal 2007 Defense Department budget request asks for $372.1 million for Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, a 10-percent decrease from fiscal 2006 funding of $415.5 million (see GSN, Feb. 2).
The White House also is seeking $675 million for comparable Energy Department WMD threat-reduction efforts in fiscal 2007, an increase of $149 million from 2006 levels, according to White House figures. State Department threat-reduction funding, meanwhile, increased slightly from $71 million in fiscal 2006 to $75 million requested for fiscal 2007. The budget request numbers appear to continue an administration trend toward shifting threat reduction funding away from the Pentagon and toward the Energy Department (see GSN, Feb. 8, 2005). However, the president in a request released last week for supplemental, extra-budgetary fiscal 2006 funding, sought an additional $44.5 million for Pentagon threat reduction program’s efforts to secure nuclear warheads at Russian storage sites — the approximate amount of the reduced funding between fiscal 2006 and 2007. Christopher Hellman, a defense budget and policy analyst at the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, said that while he was disappointed to see the reduction in the Pentagon funding, the increase in the Energy Department’s threat reduction budget and the money in the supplemental request is welcome. “It’s not encouraging,” Hellman said of the Pentagon budget cuts, “but there may be more to the story that meets the eye.” Hellman was critical that the supplemental funding was not included in the budget request. He said it was a disingenuous way of increasing funding, as the supplemental budget does not go through the entire congressional committee approval process before being voted upon. “Why are we putting CTR money into an emergency supplemental instead of where it belongs?” he said. “It’s easier to pay for it this way. It won’t get questioned.” Overall, federal threat-reduction spending for the three federal agencies would climb if approved, from $1.013 billion for fiscal 2006 to $1.122 billion for fiscal 2007. John Isaacs, president of the Council for a Livable World, however, said the government is not spending enough on threat reduction. “We’ve got business as usual with the Bush administration when it comes to funding nonproliferation programs,” he said. Isaacs said that the 2001 task force headed by former Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker (R-Tenn.) and former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler, a Democrat, recommended $3 billion a year be spent on nonproliferation efforts (see GSN, Sept. 15, 2005). “The administration says [nonproliferation] is a top priority … and yet it is really slow-go business as usual,” Isaacs said. “Even $44 million [included in the supplement] is a drop in the bucket.” “We can be concerned about some possible nuclear weapons eventually launched by North Korea, we can be concerned by hurricanes in New Orleans, but a nuclear weapon in an American city is the greatest threat we face and the administration is doing nothing about it,” he added. Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) and then-Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) established the Cooperative Threat Reduction program in 1991 with the aim of ridding Russia and other former Soviet states of weapons of mass destruction. Spokesman Andy Fisher said Lugar was pleased with the president’s request for Pentagon threat reduction. He attributed the lower request to the completion of some CTR construction projects and the successes of major program initiatives. He also praised the inclusion of money in the 2006 budget supplement. “Everything is on track and fully funded for 2007,” Fisher said. Expert Criticizes DOE RequestOne nonproliferation expert said in a recent policy paper that $834.4 million designated for Energy Department nonproliferation and threat-reduction efforts actually constitutes a drop in funding when inflation is considered. An additional $11 million requested for fiscal 2007 is only a 1.3-percent increase over this year, which is below the rate of inflation, according to William Hoehn, Washington office director of the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council. The budget for homeland security and defense programs is significantly greater than the allocation for threat reduction programs, Hoehn said. The proposed full Defense Department budget for fiscal 2007 is $439.3 billion. The proposed Homeland Security Department budget is $42.7 billion. “The budget raises questions on the priority of threat-reduction programs vis a vis other national defense and homeland security programs (which command significantly larger budgets in the FY 2007 federal budget request),” he wrote. “Leaving aside this broader discussion, however, the macro-level budget constraints placed on the DOE nonproliferation budget nevertheless forced the agency to trade-off resources between individual WMD threat reduction programs — including freezing or cutting funds for efforts that could utilize additional resources. For these reasons, it is difficult to characterize the fiscal 2007 budget proposal as expansive, imaginative, or offering a single compelling theme.” Hoehn criticizes several elements of the Energy Department budget. The first is a decrease in programs that assist Russia in securing fissile materials, with $53.6 million set for 2007, down from $85.3 million in fiscal 2006. He said the department expects to have completed security enhancements at Russian facilities that store these materials by 2008, so it believes less money is needed. These estimates are problematic, Hoehn argued. “First, it is unclear to what extent the physical security upgrades at Russian sites will be ‘comprehensive’ security upgrades and which sites will receive only basic ‘rapid’ upgrades. The DOE data in the budget proposal does not specify which facilities will receive which types of upgrades,” he said in the policy paper. “Second, in changing the metric by which nuclear material security upgrades are measured, from amount of material to number of buildings secured, it is unclear whether the entire estimated 600 metric tons of Russian nuclear material outside of weapons will ultimately be addressed by the program.” The budget allocation for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which aims to reduce the amount of nuclear material available through reprocessing, also remain relatively flat in the DOE request for fiscal 2007, with an increase of $9 million to $106 million, Hoehn said. He argued that increased funding for repatriating Russian spent fuel was offset by decreased funds for programs within the United States for recovering radiological materials from other countries. Funds for a DOE program to place Russian weapons scientists in civilian jobs would decline from $39.6 million in this fiscal year to $28.1 million in 2007. “This budget — the smallest in recent years — reflects diminished commitment of both countries to the large-scale, long-term challenge of facilitating alternative, stable, commercially oriented futures for Russian and former Soviet WMD institutes and specialists,” Hoehn said. Hoehn did praise the budget for including increased funds for second-line defense mechanisms like radiation sensors at foreign ports. He said the 250-percent funding increase from $23.8 million to $83.9 million would allow for an additional 63 sensors to be placed at ports around the world. A fiscal 2007 funding increase from $46.7 million to $119.9 million for Energy Department assistance in shutting down the three remaining Russian facilities that create weapon-grade plutonium would allow the program to be completed one year ahead of schedule in 2010, Hoehn contended. Finally, Hoehn praised the increase in money for construction of plutonium disposition plants, although he said that they cannot move forward until the United States and Russia come to firm liability accord. Work on these plants has been stalled as the nations try to reach agreement on liability of U.S. workers at Russian plants. The facilities are being built to meet obligations of the 2000 U.S. Russia Plutonium Disposition Agreement, which requires each side to process at least 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium. The National Nuclear Security Administration, the Energy Department’s nonproliferation arm, did not return calls for comment.
U.S. port security experts said a United Arab Emirates company taking control of six East Coast seaports poses a small risk to U.S. entryways compared to other threats, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, Feb. 23). For examples, the president of maritime security firm SeaSecure said he saw a 5 1/2-foot-tall fence in West Africa that was meant to keep terrorists from sneaking bombs into containers destined for the United States. Kim Petersen said the United States should focus its concern on situation like the one he found in West Africa. “There are many, many problems that we face in maritime security — and they're not the United Arab Emirates,” he said. Also at issue is the role the companies that run the ports play in protecting against terrorism. Bush administration officials in recent days have argued that the Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection handle security. Port operators largely move containers off ships to trains or trucks. However, a former congressional aide said this overstates the role of federal agencies in protecting ports. “They've been saying that customs and the Coast Guard are in charge of security; yes, they're in charge, but they're not usually present,” said Carl Bentzel, who helped write a 2002 bill on port security. Terminal operators are responsible for guarding the port areas, although the Coast Guard must review security plans, the Post reported. The port operators are responsible for using X-rays on containers to see if the contents and manifest match, but customs agents handle any actual opening and examination of cargo. Several companies said local security firms provide guards for ports. Petersen and other security experts said not enough money is being spent on port security. “We've spent barely $700 million in federal grants to U.S. ports for security, compared with almost $20 billion for aviation security,” Petersen said. “And most important, we are doing an abysmal job in assisting ports in the developing world in improving security to even minimal acceptable standards.” Washington since 2001 has placed customs officials in 42 different ports around the world, giving them authority to inspect containers headed for the United States. However, these officials only cover 80 percent of the cargo that is delivered to U.S. soil. “If you're an al-Qaeda operative, you're going to send a bomb from a developing country where you know those safeguards don't exist. That's the key flaw. We should be investing now in the countries that pose a real threat to our national security, with more security grants. But many of these ports don't even have adequate fencing or lighting,” Petersen said (Blustein/Pincus, Washington Post, Feb. 24). Meanwhile, Dubai Ports said yesterday that while it planned to finalize the operations deal next week, it would “not exercise control” over the ports while the White House tries to alleviate congressional fears over the deal, the New York Times reported. “The reaction in the United States has occurred in no other country in the world,” said Ted Bilkey, Dubai Ports chief operating officer. “We need to understand the concerns of the people in the U.S. who are worried about this transaction and make sure that they are addressed to the benefit of all parties. Security is everyone's business.” The delay comes after Senator John Warner (R-Va.) told Dubai Ports that lawmakers needed more time to review the sale to avert a congressional block of the deal, according to the Times (Cloud/Sanger, New York Times, Feb. 24).
An Indian scientist was granted a U.S. visa yesterday, the Washington Post reported (see GSN, Feb. 23). Goverdhan Mehta said he was initially refused a visa over accusations of dishonesty and that his work could have chemical weapons applications. Mehta said yesterday that he had already canceled plans to accept a position as a visiting professor at the University of Florida, and that the State Department’s reversal would not change his decision. “The issues are much more than giving me a visa,” he said. “Humiliating experience apart, even the thought I could be denied a visa — I could not have imagined it.” A second Indian scientist, P.C. Kesavan, was also refused a visa unless he submitted detailed background information. “I feel humiliated about the whole process,” said Kesavan, a geneticist who specializes in radiation biology. “If this is the case, I am not so keen on coming to your country.” National Academy of Sciences official Wendy White said targeting scientists detracts from efforts to uncover real threats. “If you are looking for the needle in the haystack, you have made the haystack bigger,” she said. “The question we need to ask is ‘Are we more secure?’” (Shankar Vedantam, Washington Post, Feb. 24).
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