By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — A massive detonation of conventional explosives planned for the Nevada Test Site in June will model a low-yield nuclear weapon strike against a hardened tunnel, a Defense Department official told Global Security Newswire yesterday (see GSN, March 31). The Energy Department test, dubbed “Divine Strake,” involves detonating 700 tons of ammonium nitrate fuel oil, the equivalent of 593 tons of TNT, just below ground level and above a tunnel dug into limestone. Conducted on behalf of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency for its “Tunnel Target Defeat Advanced Concept and Technology Demonstration,” the test is intended to provide data on how the shock from a low-yield nuclear weapon would damage hardened, underground facilities. Test results are intended for supporting U.S. Strategic Command war planning against underground facilities, according to a fiscal 2007 DTRA budget document. “Yes … the event that is described [in the budget document] is Divine Strake,” DTRA spokeswoman Irene Smith said after checking with agency officials. “There are no nuclear tests planned or desired,” Smith said. Initial news accounts last week said the test was intended to assess the impact of using a massive conventional bomb against fortified underground targets. Analysts quickly began to question that explanation. Divine Strake appeared to be the “full-scale” Tunnel Target Defeat nuclear simulation, wrote Western States Legal Foundation Program Director Andrew Lichterman in a blog. “There is no conventional weapon with that kind of kick,” Albuquerque Journal science writer John Fleck wrote in a blog on Friday. “According to the DOE’s Nevada site office, that’s the equivalent of half a kiloton [of] TNT — a small nuke blast, far larger — far larger than any conventional weapon.” “It is much more than was reported,” wrote Federation of American Scientists analyst Hans Kristensen, in an analysis of the test on his Web site yesterday. “Divine Strake is neither a bomb nor conventional. Instead, the test is a detonation of a pile of chemical explosives to simulate a ‘low-yield nuclear weapon ground shock’ effect,” he wrote, quoting from a DTRA budget document that describes the test. “Everybody is interested in whether this is going to create a mushroom cloud. … They’re completely missing the important part of this, which is, we don’t have to test nuclear weapons anymore. We can calibrate this and develop these [nuclear weapons] capabilities without it,” he said. ImplicationsCritics have charged that U.S. work on low-yield nuclear weapons capabilities could increase the potential such weapons are used, because low-yield weapons could produce fewer unintended casualties and because they could be used for a variety of battlefield missions beyond deterrence against a nuclear attack. Bush administration officials have said there is a need to develop improved capabilities for striking potential adversaries’ hardened, underground facilities and in a 2004 report to Congress argued that low-yield weapons could bolster U.S. deterrence by suggesting a lower threshold for using nuclear weapons (see GSN, April 16, 2004). Congress in 1993 banned research and development of low-yield nuclear weapons, those with yields less than five kilotons. After taking office, the Bush administration pressed to have the ban repealed. Congress in 2003 instead amended the law to allow only early research and development without explicit congressional approval. The Tunnel Target Defeat program is not intended to produce a new nuclear weapon, but rather to determine what yield might be ideal for destroying hardened facilities while minimizing casualties, according to the budget document. The test is intended to “improve the warfighter’s confidence in selecting the smallest proper nuclear yield necessary to destroy underground facilities while minimizing collateral damage,” it said. “Better predictive tools will reduce the uncertainties involved in defeating very hard targets and therefore reduce the need for higher-yield weapons to overcome those uncertainties,” spokeswoman Smith said. The test is intended to help military planners “fine-tune the capabilities we already have,” Kristensen said. “The explosive power of Divine Strake will be approximately 593 tons of TNT equivalent, or roughly 0.6 [kilotons]. This is about half as powerful as the lowest yield option on the nonstrategic B61 nuclear gravity bomb, and suggests that Divine Strake may be intended to fine-tune use of the B61 bomb,” he wrote on his Web site. “These are tactical nuclear weapons that have that low yield,” he said. The Energy Department in a draft environmental impact statement dated last November, says the test was designed with a number of potential enemy facilities in mind. “As a number of potential adversarial military targets are based in similar limestones, [Divine Strake] needed to be sited in a similar geological setting to actual military targets,” it says. The test Tunnel Target Defeat program is part of a larger effort by the Bush administration to develop a capability to hold “all potential adversarial targets at risk, as an integral part of the nation’s policy of deterrence,” the statement says In particular, it implements a directive by President George W. Bush in summer 2004 ordering the U.S. Strategic Command to extend its rapid “Global Strike” capabilities to include both tactical and strategic adversarial targets,” the statement says. Planning for the exploring such a capability began before the Bush administration took office, Lichterman wrote, citing a 2000 Defense Department document his organization obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. The program though should be of particular concern in light of Bush administration policies, he wrote. What “the U.S. is continuing to develop is [an] ability to plan and fight wars with nuclear weapons — a part of the broad U.S. nuclear weapons research effort that receives little attention or debate,” Lichterman wrote. “Large scale physical simulations to study the effects of low-yield nuclear weapons would appear particularly provocative, the more so in the context of a policy and practice of ‘pre-emptive’ — really, preventive — warfare,” he wrote, citing the Bush administration’s policy allowing for military attacks against countries suspected of posing a future threat.
Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said today that his country is open to talks on its plans for large-scale uranium enrichment, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, April 3). “For industrial-scale production of nuclear fuel, which is the next stage (of enrichment), we are ready for negotiations,” Mottaki said. Tehran also today confirmed that it has tested a second radar-avoiding missile. Some experts, however, suggested that the technology might be Russian and also questioned its effectiveness. A Russian lawmaker today criticized Iran’s recent missile tests, Russian news agencies reported. The tests “are counterproductive and do not create the necessary atmosphere of trust at the consultations and negotiations around the Iranian nuclear program,” said Konstantin Kosachev, the head of the parliamentary foreign affairs committee, according to ITAR-Tass. “It is clear that Iran is demonstrating its muscle in order to forestall any discussions of a possible operation using force against Iran,” RIA Novosti quoted him as saying. “I would welcome more flexibility from Tehran in connection with the well-known Russian proposal on joint uranium enrichment, and not place bets on the demonstration of some new types of weapons,” he added (Associated Press/Ha’aretz Daily, April 4). A U.S. State Department spokesman yesterday expressed concern about Iran’s missile tests, Agence France-Presse reported. “The fact that in three days you’ve had the test of a missile, as well as the reported test of a torpedo of new capability, demonstrates a weaponization program by Iran that does nothing to reassure Iran’s neighbors or the international community,” said deputy spokesman Adam Ereli. “It certainly is of concern” (Agence France-Presse I/The Australian, April 3). International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors are scheduled to arrive in Iran next week for a regular inspection, IRNA reported yesterday. Iran’s ambassador to the agency, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, told IRNA the inspectors are scheduled to visit Natanz and other facilities. “Despite the March (U.N. Security Council) resolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran has not suspended its cooperation with the agency and the IAEA inspectors have paid regular visits to the country,” Soltanieh said. “There will be no halt with regards to Iran’s carrying out its undertakings towards the IAEA,” he said (IRNA/BBC Monitoring, April 3). Meanwhile, Russia launched an Iranian microsatellite in October and plans to launch another in the next few weeks, the New York Times reported today. Some Western experts have said the move marks a new stage in Iran’s effort to master a range of sophisticated technologies that could ultimately support its nuclear program. “It may appear tempting to dismiss Iranian efforts” as relatively crude, said John Sheldon, a British analyst at the Center for Defense and International Security Studies. “But Iran has already demonstrated a persistence and patience that would indicate it is prepared to play a long game in order to achieve its ambitions.” A credible nuclear arsenal, Western analysts said, includes the ability to launch a missile accurately, similar to the way a rocket launches a satellite. Iran has indicated its intention to eventually launch satellites on its own, the Times reported. “The real issue is that they have a very large booster under development,” said Anthony Cordesman, a military analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. U.S. officials have not yet protested Iran’s space program or discouraged Russia from providing assistance, according to the Times. However, a senior U.S. official said Washington was “taking another look” at asking Moscow to end the assistance as leverage in the nuclear standoff. China, India, Italy and North Korea have also assisted Iran with its space and rocket programs, the Times reported. Iran first purchased Russian Scud missiles and then learned how to manufacture its own variation, the Shahab 1. By 1991, the missile’s range had been extended to about 300 miles in the Shahab 2 version. A Shahab 3 was eventually made using a North Korean prototype. Charles Vick, a GlobalSecurity.org expert on Iran’s missile program, said one strategy for preparing long-range missiles — able to put satellites into space or reach other continents — was to stack all three versions, producing a tall missile with two stages and a range of nearly 2,000 miles (Broad/Sanger, New York Times, April 4). A top Russian military official said yesterday that all nuclear weapons located in Ukraine during the break-up of the Soviet Union were transferred to Russia, Interfax news agency reported. Some Ukrainian officials had alleged that 250 nuclear warheads were missing and allegedly sold to Iran. “I don’t comment on statements of this kind, which have no real grounds. At least the Russian General Staff is not in possession of information to the effect that Ukraine sold or handed over 250 nuclear warheads, let alone to Iran,” said the chief of Russia’s General Staff, Yuriy Baluyevskiy. German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier yesterday held talks in Washington with U.S. officials on the Iranian nuclear standoff, AFP reported. White House spokesman Scott McClellan said President George W. Bush discussed the issue by telephone with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who is scheduled to visit Washington next month. Steinmeier and U.S. national security adviser Stephen Hadley discussed Iran, the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal and other issues, said German Foreign Ministry spokesman Martin Jaeger. Steinmeier and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice are today expected to address the possibility of direct talks between Tehran and Washington regarding Iraq, according to AFP (Agence France-Presse II, April 3). Elsewhere, former U.N. chief weapons inspector Hans Blix said yesterday that Iran is a least five years away from developing a nuclear weapon, AP reported. Blix dismissed the possibility of a U.S. invasion of the country. “But there is a chance that the U.S. will use bombs or missiles against several sites in Iran,” he was quoted by the Norwegian news agency NTB as saying. “Then, the reactions would be strong, and would contribute to increased terrorism.” Blix said there is still time for a negotiated settlement. “We have time on our side in this case. Iran can’t have a bomb ready in the next five years,” he said (Associated Press/Yahoo!News, April 3).
India this week is hosting visits by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher and Russian nuclear agency head Sergei Kiriyenko, the Indo-Asian News Service reported (see GSN, April 3). Kiriyenko is expected to arrive Thursday for discussions on building four additional nuclear power plants in Tamil Nadu, while Boucher is set to arrive Friday for talks with Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran and other officials on the proposed U.S.-Indian nuclear technology sharing deal. Boucher’s visit is the first by a U.S. official since President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed the deal last month in New Delhi. Boucher said India has “an important role to play” in the region. U.S. legislation to allow the deal to be implemented has been submitted to Congress, but lack of support from lawmakers has caused speculation that the deal would not move forward until next year (Manish Chand, Indo-Asian News Service/Hindustan Times, April 4). Meanwhile, the United States yesterday confirmed that two Iranian warships docked at Indian ports last month, but dismissed the visits as having no relevance to the nuclear deal, Reuters reported. State Department spokesman Adam Ereli said the Iranian layover was a “limited type of event, and doesn't suggest Indian training or Indian contribution to [any] Iranian military capabilities.” “Our understanding is that ... there were ship visits by two ships with naval cadets from Iran into Indian ports. They were not training programs. They were ship visits with naval cadets,” he added (Reuters/New York Times, April 3).
The U.S. Governmental Accountability Office found that following consultations with industry the Nuclear Regulatory Commission loosened security regulations it had proposed for nuclear reactors, the New York Times reported today (see GSN, Feb. 23). According to a report due to be released today, the changes “created the appearance that the changes were made based on what the industry considered reasonable and feasible to defend against rather than an assessment of the terrorist threat itself.” However, GAO auditors did not go as far as to say the changes were “based solely on industry views.” The auditing agency cited two deletions made by agency commissioners to an expanded list prepared by NRC staff of the types of weapons a reactor would have to be prepared to defend against. The audit report did not specify what weapons were removed, but people close to the process said they were rocket-propelled grenades and .50-caliber sniper rifles. Representative Chris Shays (R-Conn.) requested the report. It did not make any determination regarding the present level of security at plants other than to say that most sites have not conducted drills since the new requirements came into effect on Oct. 29, 2004. Only 27 of 103 working reactors, spread over 65 sites, have performed security exercises simulating an assault on the facility, according to members of the House Government Reform national security subcommittee, which is chaired by Shays. “These GAO findings paint a decidedly mixed picture of nuclear power security today,” Shays said in a statement. “While documented progress has been made in strengthening reactor security standards, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission seems unable to fortify itself against the dangers of an overly cozy relationship with the industry.” “The regulated should not even appear to be able to dictate security standards to the regulator,” he added. Spokesman Eliot Brenner said the commission rewrote security rules shortly after the 2001 terrorist attacks. These revisions included detailing characteristics of groups that might attack a reactor, called the “Design Basis Threat.” He acknowledged that making changes to the Design Basis Threat during consultations with industry might create the appearance that industry was influencing the process. David Lochbaum, a member of the Union of Concerned Scientists and a nuclear industry critic, said his group was often forbidden from speaking informally with members of the commission because these members were the arbiters of the rules. However, Lochbaum said that industry members spoke with commissioners informally on security matters after staff had made recommendations. “How did the commissioners decide to overrule their staff?” he asked. Brenner said he was not aware of any communication between industry representatives and commissioners. Instead the communication was with NRC staff, he said (Matthew Wald, New York Times, April 4).
British defense officials and industry representatives are in talks on options for updating the country’s nuclear arsenal, the Financial Times reported today (see GSN, March 15). Parliament, meanwhile, has begun a formal debate over whether to replace the United Kingdom’s four Trident submarines. There are questions about whether the country could afford the estimated $26-35 billion price tag, according to the Times. While the Trident system is made up of three components — four Vanguard-class submarines, Trident missiles leased from the United States and nuclear warheads — the submarines are “the big question in the replacement debate,” said Lee Willett, head of military capabilities at the Royal United Services Institute think tank. Building a new submarine can take 14 years and is very costly, according to the Times (James Boxell, Financial Times, April 4).
The United States yesterday did not endorse Australia’s agreement to sell uranium to China, but said the deal contained adequate safeguards against use of the material in nuclear weapons, Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, April 3). “I would note that it’s subject to an agreement on safeguards, which addresses the issue of how the fuel will be used,” said State Department deputy spokesman Adam Ereli. He would not state whether the United States supports the deal. “Well, it’s not a question of the U.S. supporting or not supporting. This is a deal between Australia and China,” he said. Ereli noted that China is a Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty member state. “So this is an agreement that I think meets every reasonable standard. And that’s how we see it,” he said (Agence France-Presse I/Yahoo!News, April 3). Australia today said that it had also contracted to supply Taiwan with uranium and that China was not troubled by the agreement, AFP reported. Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said that two mining companies would sell uranium to Taiwan by way of the United States. None of the material has yet been shipped. China, which considers Taiwan a renegade state, had no problem with the indirect sales, Downer said. “China always seemed comfortable with the idea,” he said. “As a matter of fact I understand from my department in more recent times they've said they’re pleased that we have this arrangement in place because it strengthens the overall security and safeguards of any civil nuclear industry in Taiwan.” Australian Greens said the sale would destabilize the region and that the involvement of the United States undermined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. “Taiwan cannot sign the nuclear NPT because it is not a state, but selling uranium via third parties undermines international safeguards and restricts Australian oversight of how Australian uranium is used,” said Greens Senator Christine Milne (Agence France-Presse II/InteractiveInvestor.com, April 4).
A private security conference in Japan next week is expected to provide an opportunity for meetings between officials from the six nations involved in North Korea nuclear disarmament talks, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, March 29). Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, the top U.S. negotiator on the issue, and representatives from China, Japan, Russia, North Korea and South Korea are expected at the conference on Monday, said Michael Boyle, spokesman for the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo. Hill does not plan to conduct bilateral meetings with the North Korean delegation, Boyle said. Hill “expects to meet with the heads of the Japanese and South Korean delegations to the six-party talks on the margins of those meetings,” Boyle said (Joseph Coleman, Associated Press/International Herald Tribune, April 4). China said today that the mutual mistrust between North Korea and the United States continues to delay resumption of the six-party talks, the German press agency reported. “The problem is lack of mutual trust between the D.P.R.K. and the United States, and the failure to resolve their disputes,” said Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao. “As the major mediator of the six-party talks, China has all along made arduous efforts to resume the talks, (but) the key parties are the D.P.R.K. and the United States,” he said. Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan arrived in Pyongyang today to discuss “bilateral and military issues” with his North Korean counterpart, according to Liu (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, April 4).
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