Construction to Begin Today on U.S. Biodefense Site

The U.S. Homeland Security Department is today scheduled to break ground for its controversial National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center at Fort Detrick, Md., the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Aug. 24, 2005).

The $128 million, 160,000-square-foot laboratory is to be the first agency site working solely on biodefense upon opening in 2008. It is expected to study biological threat vulnerabilities and consequences, and to conduct forensic analysis of evidence, according to AP.

The center will incorporate the National Bioforensic Analysis Center and the Biological Threat Characterization Center, which are already operating at other locations. The Agricultural Biodefense Center at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center in New York and the Biodefense Knowledge Center at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California are considered part of the center, but would not be incorporated into the new facility.

Critics have expressed concern that the center’s work could be considered biological weapons research.

There is little difference beyond intent between offensive and defensive research, said Michael Stebbins, director of the Federation of American Scientists’ Biosecurity Project.

Jason Kray, a member of a local activist group, also criticized the facility.

“I do not trust the Army to operate (NBACC) in a safe, ethical or legal manner,” he said (Associated Press/WTOP Radio, June 26).

NBACC scientific director Bernard Courtney said biologists at the center would create pathogens to match strains that terrorists are producing and then prepare countermeasures, the Baltimore Sun reported today.

He added, however, that the center is prepared to engineer a modified disease organism only once there is credible evidence that terrorists are pursuing it.

Some arms control experts have expressed concern that such efforts could lead to development of new vaccine-resistant pathogens.

Scientists could end up “in essence creating new threats that we’re going to have to defend ourselves against,” said Alan Pearson, director of the Biological and Chemical Weapons Control Program at the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation (Douglas Birch, Baltimore Sun, June 26).

Back to top

National Guard Works to Improve Response to Attacks

The Virginia National Guard plans to develop a task force to support the response to a potential attack involving an unconventional weapon, officials said Friday (see GSN, April 18).

Guard units around the nation are preparing to work with state and local agencies in the event of a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attack, the Washington Post reported.

“The idea is to help in any kind of weapons-of-mass-destruction kind of attack,” said Jack Harrison, a National Guard spokesman.

About 500 soldiers and airmen with experience in medical triage, chemical decontamination, explosive detection and other areas would put in 18 months of training for the task force, said Lt. Col. Chester Carter III, a spokesman for the Virginia National Guard.

“We would support the first responder,” he said. “What we would do is bring to the table an additional tool in such an event.”

The U.S. Defense Department developed the nationwide program, the Post reported. The National Guard selected 17 states for the task force program. Harrison said personnel in 12 states have gone through the training and are “mission-ready” (Sandhya Somashekhar, Washington Post, June 24).

Back to top

Ex-CIA Officer Accuses Bush Administration of Ignoring Warnings About Iraq WMD Source

A former CIA officer said senior agency officials repeatedly ignored his warnings about a source for much of the intelligence on prewar Iraq’s alleged WMD programs, the Washington Post reported yesterday (see GSN, Nov. 29, 2005).

Former CIA European operations chief Tyler Drumheller said he warned his superiors about allegations of mobile biological weapons laboratories that originated with an Iraqi defector, code-named Curveball, who was suspected of being mentally unstable and unreliable. 

Despite his efforts, Drumheller said, Curveball’s claims were a key point when then-Secretary of State Colin Powell made his case for the invasion before the U.N. Security Council.

“We thought we had taken care of the problem, but I turn on the television and there it was, again,” he said, referring to Powell’s speech.

Former CIA Director George Tenet, in a briefing with Powell before the speech, backed the validity of Curveball’s claim, according to people who attended the session.

“No one mentioned Drumheller, or Curveball,” said Lawrence Wilkerson, Powell’s chief of staff at the time. “I didn’t know the name Curveball until months afterward.”

In late 2002, Drumheller was asked to seek U.S. access to Curveball from a European intelligence agency, the Post reported. The agency in question is believed to have been the German intelligence service

A German official told Drumheller that Curveball was unreliable.

“He said: ‘I think the guy is a fabricator,’’ Drumheller said. “He said:  ‘We also think he has psychological problems. We could never validate his reports,’” Drumheller recalled. He said he warned his superiors in late 2002, which led to “a series of the most contentious meetings I’ve ever seen.”

Analysts with the CIA’s Center for Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control believed Curveball’s descriptions included too much detail to have been faked, Drumheller said.

“People were cursing. These guys were absolutely, violently committed to it,” he said. “They would say to us, ‘You’re not scientists, you don’t understand.’”

In January 2003, CIA headquarters wanted to know if Curveball’s allegations were reliable enough to include in a U.S. official’s speech. Berlin, Drumheller said, refused to guarantee Curveball’s information.

“They said, ‘We have never been able to verify his claims,’” Drumheller said. “And that was all sent up to Tenet’s office.”

A few days later, he was handed the text of Powell’s speech, the Post reported.

Drumheller said he objected to John McLaughlin, then the CIA deputy director. McLaughlin said Curveball was “the only tangible source” for the biological weapons trailers and that he would quickly investigate.

McLaughlin, however, later said in a statement that he had no recollection of the meeting.

“If someone had made these doubts clear to me, I would not have permitted the reporting to be used in Secretary Powell’s speech,” he said.

Drumheller said he also received a phone call from Tenet the night before Powell’s speech.

“I said: ‘Hey, boss, you’re not going to use that stuff in the speech . . . ? There are real problems with that,’” Drumheller said. He said Tenet told him not to worry.

Tenet also denied in a later statement that he had ever discussed the matter with Drumheller (Joby Warrick, Washington Post, June 25).

Back to top

U.K. Expects Terrorists to Use WMD

British intelligence chiefs are positive that Islamic terrorists will target London or another major western city with a radiological “dirty bomb” or another type of weapon of mass destruction, the Sunday Daily Telegraph reported yesterday (see GSN, March 29, 2004).

Eliza Manningham-Buller, director general of the British intelligence service MI5, said in 2003 that al-Qaeda previously possessed the technical know-how to produce an “unconventional weapon.”

Al-Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden and other operatives of the terrorist group have threatened to use such weapon. An Algerian man connected to al-Qaeda was sentenced to 17 years in prison last year for a foiled poison plot (see GSN, April 18, 2005; Sean Rayment, The Sunday Telegraph, June 25).

Meanwhile, the military group linked to the Palestinian Fatah political party said yesterday that it would use biological and chemical weapons against Israel in the event of an invasion of Gaza, Israel Today reported.

A letter sent by the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades to the Ramattan News Agency said: “With the help of Allah, we are pleased to say that we succeeded in developing different types of biological and chemical weapons, this after a three-year effort.

“We say to (Israeli Prime Minister Ehud) Olmert and (Defense Minister Amir) Peretz: Your threats of invasion do not frighten us. We will surprise you with new weapons you have not faced until now. As soon as an [Israeli Defense Force] soldier sets foot on Gazan land, we will respond with a new weapon” (Israel Today, June 26).

Back to top

MOX Program Faces Obstacles

By Chris Schneidmiller
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The effort to dispose of nearly 70 tons of weapon-grade plutonium in the United States and Russia is under fire in this budget season from U.S. lawmakers displeased by lack of progress in the program and its spiraling cost estimates (see GSN, May 26).

The House of Representatives last month passed an energy bill that would strip all funding for the program in fiscal 2007. Other legislation has cut support for the Russian effort and demanded reports on the project from the Energy Department.

“It’s clearly a program in trouble. Whether it’s the end of it, I don’t know,” said William Hoehn, Washington office director for the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council.

The Energy Department’s National Nuclear Security Administration said it is preparing the congressionally requested information, and that the program should not yet be counted out.

“It is still very early in the budget process, and no decisions on MOX funding are final. NNSA is working with Congress to ensure that the president’s request is fully funded,” spokeswoman Julianne Smith said by e-mail. “NNSA has sufficient funds to begin construction of the MOX facility, and is proceeding with plans to begin construction this fall.”

Moscow and Washington in 2000 each agreed to eliminate 34 metric tons of surplus plutonium by converting the material into mixed-oxide fuel that could be used in nuclear power plants. Fabrication facilities were to be built and operated in tandem. 

The start of construction of both plants has been delayed by disagreements on the level of liability protection to be given to U.S. contractors working on the Russian site. That issue is reported to be resolved, though no formal announcement has been issued.

Now impeding progress is Moscow’s demand that the United States and its allies supply full funding for a MOX fabrication facility in Russia and a light-water reactor that would burn the fuel. Should that fail to occur, Russia favors using a different type of reactor that could produce more plutonium than it eliminates. 

Meanwhile, the anticipated price to design and build the U.S. plant at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina has risen from $1 billion to $3.5 billion, the House Appropriations Committee said. The start of plutonium disposition has been pushed back from 2009 to 2015, according to the Energy Department inspector general.

These developments have not pleased legislators.

“To date, Congress has appropriated $1.37 billion for the domestic MOX program facilities without any nonproliferation benefit accrued to the U.S. taxpayer,” the Appropriations Committee said in its report on the fiscal 2007 energy and water development bill.

“With the Russian government abandoning the MOX-light water reactor strategy for surplus Russian plutonium, it is clear to the committee that there is no longer any justification for proceeding unilaterally with the U.S. MOX program,” it added.

The Energy Department for fiscal 2007 requested $603 million for fissile materials disposition, of which nearly $400 million was to be directed toward MOX program and construction costs in the United States, one expert said. The $34.7 million requested to support the Russian effort would be covered by previous appropriations.

The Appropriations Committee directed that there be no funding next year for the Russian MOX project or for construction of the U.S. MOX conversion plant. Design work and other commitments here are also to be quickly ended.

Funding cut from the MOX project would be redirected to other programs, with $111 million going toward development of a plutonium immobilization site at Savannah River. There, the material would be mixed with high-level radioactive waste to become “self-protecting from a lethality standpoint,” a committee staff member said. The committee also called for a report that would include cost estimates for “all reasonable domestic plutonium disposition alternatives.”

Other committees have taken less sweeping action. The House Armed Services Committee cut funding for construction of the U.S. site from $289 million to $174 million, due to concerns about the project and the existence of millions of dollars of unused funding from prior years, a panel aide said. To receive anything more than $50 million, though, Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman must first certify that the MOX plan is the most fiscally and technological efficient alternative for disposition, and respond to cost, management and schedule issues raised by the DOE inspector general.

The panel recommended cutting the entire $34.7 million outlay for construction of the Russian facility. However, $10 million left from previous budgets could be supplied after Bodman certifies that Washington and Moscow have come to agreement on a disposition plan “consistent with the intent” of the 2000 pact.

“That plan could be something other than MOX,” the aide said.

The Senate Armed Services Committee backed full funding for projects in both countries, but set stipulations on delivery of most of the money. The energy secretary must provide details of the technology to be used in Russia, along with the type, cost and schedule for U.S. assistance to that program. An independent estimate is to be prepared on the cost of the U.S. facility and Bodman is required to certify in writing that the Bush administration plans to use MOX technology even if Russia does not.  

The Senate Appropriations Committee has yet to take action on the energy bill. The panel’s Energy and Water Subcommittee is scheduled to meet tomorrow for its markup session of the House Appropriations legislation passed last month.

Ultimately, House and Senate negotiators will meet in conference committees to prepare compromise funding plans for consideration by President George W. Bush.

The growing concerns about MOX plans has promoted reconsideration of other plutonium disposition technologies that had fallen by the wayside, said Matthew Bunn, senior research associate at Harvard University’s Project on Managing the Atom.

“To a large degree we’re almost back to where we were … a decade ago,” he said. “We’re sort of back to discussing the basics of what sort of reactors or other technologies we should use, if we’re going to move forward at all. There are starting to be some people who are talking about, let’s just store it, let’s not bother with disposition at all.”

The fight is not yet over. Senate Appropriations Energy and Water Subcommittee Chairman Pete Domenici (R-N.M.) and the congressional delegation from South Carolina can be expected to push to reinstate funding for the MOX project, Bunn said.

“We do not feel that we have closed the door on the U.S. MOX project as part of a mosaic of nonproliferation cooperation with the Russians,” said the House Armed Services Committee aide. “One has to say, if you don’t do MOX what are you going to do?”

While the international community is not likely to pay for the entire Russian program, planning continues for eliminating plutonium there with partial support from Moscow, NNSA spokeswoman Smith said. An agreement on liability should be signed “in the near future,” she said.

Moscow is willing to take up some of the financial burden of the project if allowed to use the technology of its choosing — which is not expected to be the more proliferation-resistant light-water reactor. The fast-neutron reactors it favors generate more energy, but without modifications would also produce more weapon-grade plutonium than is consumed, Bunn said. Modifications made to reverse that ratio could also be someday undone.

“The question is, as soon as the agreement expires, are we going to have helped Russia put in place giant plutonium production factories,” he said. “There’s a bunch of serious policy issues that I hope someone in the government is seriously working their way through as we speak.”

With $570 million set aside from prior years, the National Nuclear Security Administration plans to pour concrete this fall for the U.S. MOX site, Smith said. Equipment purchases and software design will proceed alongside construction.

Bunn said he could not predict what would ultimately happen to the program. He argued, though, that the initiative as it stands would have limited effect on the danger posed by weapon-grade plutonium. Russia has 170 tons of separated plutonium, while the United States has just less than 100 tons. Both countries would maintain their ability to produce more plutonium.

“If you’re only going to do 34 tons and then dust off your hands and walk away, I think it’s not worth the money,” Bunn said. 

The program would not necessarily be closed after reaching its present goal, the House Armed Services Committee aide said.

“I don’t think anybody’s ruled out … going further than that, once we have this thing going,” he said.

Back to top

IAEA Issues Assessment on Iran’s Nuclear Activities

U.S. officials, after viewing an International Atomic Energy Agency technical assessment on Iran’s nuclear work, remain convinced that Tehran should be barred from conducting any uranium enrichment efforts, Agence France-Presse reported yesterday (see GSN, June 23).

A confidential document prepared by agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei says that even small-scale enrichment would move Iran toward “successful long-term sustained centrifuge operation.”

Washington asked ElBaradei to clarify what Tehran would learn if it operated centrifuges without introducing uranium hexafluoride; what research and development, beyond enrichment, could be linked to the fuel cycle; and what kind of inspection regime is needed to ensure complete verification.

A Western diplomat said Iran could learn a great deal from activities short of enrichment. This “helped the United States, Britain and France argue persuasively in favor of full suspension as a precondition,” the diplomat said.

The agency said centrifuge experiments, even without the introduction of uranium hexafluoride, could help Tehran learn about “life expectancy ... of key mechanical components” and data “needed for the development of more advanced centrifuge systems.”

However, “the question that was posed to ElBaradei in Washington was merely a technical question and in no way indicated any change in position or any intention to change position” by the United States, said a second Western diplomat.

One diplomat close to agency said small-scale enrichment by Iran should not be used as an excuse to undermine negotiations.

“The United States will push very hard until the last minute in the hope of getting the Iranians to give in but at the end of the day they will accept some form of enrichment activity” to open the door to negotiations, said the diplomat (Michael Adler, Agence France-Presse I/Yahoo!News, June 25).

Germany said Saturday that it would resume nuclear negotiations with Iran only if Tehran stops enriching uranium, Reuters reported.

“I can only reiterate and urge Iran to implement very quickly a suspension of enrichment to enable negotiations to begin again,” German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said after meeting with his Iranian counterpart, Manouchehr Mottaki.

Mottaki complained of some ambiguities in the incentives offer.

“The packaged offer by the six countries is being very seriously examined by Iran. We see very positive points in this offer. There are also naturally unclear points and we will have questions,” he said (Louis Charbonneau, Reuters, June 24).

Iranian officials yesterday urged patience as Tehran formulates its response to the offer, but also warned it could use its oil reserves to disrupt world markets, the Associated Press reported.

“If the country’s interests are attacked, we will use oil as a weapon,” state television quoted Oil Minister Kazem Vaziri Hamaneh as saying.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi said key state agencies were studying the world powers’ nuclear offer.

“The package contains legal, political and economic dimensions. All its dimensions have to be studied,” Asefi said. “We recommend to Europeans that accuracy should not be sacrificed for the sake of speed.”

“The reason that there can’t be a speedy response is that we have to hold serious discussions on the contents,” he said. “We are taking it seriously” (Ali Akbar Dareini, Associated Press/Washington Post, June 25).

A Japanese Foreign Ministry official said today that foreign ministers from the Group of Eight industrialized nations, scheduled to meet Thursday in Russia to prepare for next month’s summit, would urge Iran to accept the offer for nuclear talks, AFP reported.

“If we do not receive some positive response from the Iranian side by the date of the foreign ministers’ meeting, I guess the G-8 will strongly urge the Iranian government to respond quickly and positively to the offer,” the official said (Agence France-Presse II/Yahoo!News, June 26).

Back to top

U.S. Congress Likely to Approve India Nuke Deal

U.S. lawmakers are this week expected to approve legislation needed to implement a civilian nuclear technology sharing agreement with India in their first vote on the deal, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, June 23).

“There appears to be pretty strong support” in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for legislation to be introduced by Senators Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) and Joseph Biden (D-Del.), said Lugar spokesman Andy Fisher.

There is also “tremendous support although not necessarily unanimous” backing for legislation before the House International Relations Committee, said Lynne Weil, spokeswoman for the panel’s ranking Democrat, Representative Tom Lantos (Calif.).

However, the House panel’s members could postpone a vote to change U.S. law until a final pact with New Delhi is formulated, congressional aides said.

The U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 prohibits nuclear trade with nations that are not party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (P. Parameswaran, Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, June 25).

Indian Minister of State for Industry Ashwani Kumar said Saturday that the United States is aware that relations with New Delhi would deteriorate if the deal were to collapse, the Press Trust of India reported.

“There is an understanding in the U.S. that [the] relationship with India would regress if the deal does not go through,” he said.

Kumar said he believed the U.S. Congress would approve the necessary legislation within 45 to 60 days (Press Trust of India/New Kerala, June 23).

New Delhi on Friday dismissed attempts by Lantos and other U.S. lawmakers last week to link approval of the agreement to India’s policy on Iran’s controversial nuclear ambitions, Reuters reported.

“There have been a number of U.S. senators and congressmen who have expressed different views concerning the Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement,” said an Indian Foreign Ministry spokesman.

“We have been negotiating the nuclear deal with the U.S. administration on the premise that it is an agreement about civil nuclear energy cooperation on the basis of mutual benefit,” he said (Reuters/Washington Post, June 23).

Back to top

U.S. Senators Urge Bilateral Talks With North Korea

Senior members of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday urged the Bush administration to consider negotiating directly with North Korea over its nuclear and missile programs, Reuters reported (see GSN, June 23).

“It would be advisable to bring about a much greater intensification of diplomacy, and this may involve direct talks between the United States and the North Koreans,” committee Chairman Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) told CBS’s “Face the Nation.”

Senator Joseph Biden (Del.), the panel’s top Democrat, told CNN’s “Late Edition” that bilateral talks “may not work, but, my Lord, it sure ... is a better way of approaching this and finding what the bottom line is than this brinksmanship.”

“We need to talk directly with North Korea,” Senator Chuck Hagel (Neb.), the No. 2 Republican on the committee, told CNN. “The sooner we do that, the sooner we’re going to get this resolved” (Jeremy Pelofsky, Reuters/Yahoo!News, June 25).

Back to top

U.K. Lawmakers May Not Get Say on Nuclear Deterrent

The British Parliament has yet to learn if it will have the chance to vote on the government’s plans to replace its Trident missiles with a next-generation nuclear deterrent, the London Independent reported Friday (see GSN, June 22).

Ninety-three Labor Party lawmakers demanded a full vote on the matter. The office of Prime Minister Tony Blair, however, said only that a “proper debate” would be conducted.

Finance Minister Gordon Brown, the man pegged to replace Blair, supports giving the final say on the matter to the government Cabinet, led by Blair and Commons Leader Jack Straw. Supporters of updating the nuclear deterrent fear the project could be undone if put to a vote, the Independent reported.

“As Gordon Brown has said it is absolutely right that we make the right long-term decisions for our national security, including retaining our independent nuclear deterrent,” said Northern Ireland Secretary Peter Hain. “It is important that the detail of how we implement this manifesto commitment should be the subject of full debate in the party and in Parliament”

Straw told Commons lawmakers there would be a White Paper on the nuclear weapons system prior to a parliament debate “in a form which shows proper respect for this House.” He did not pledge a vote on the issue (Andrew Grice, The Independent, June 23).

However, Defense Secretary Des Browne left the door open for a Commons vote in the House of Commons, the Liverpool Daily Post reported today.

“We need to marshal the facts, we need to marshal the issue, we need to marshal the arguments and the options,” Browne said. “It is the responsibility of government ministers to make decisions, then those decisions, of course, can be subject to a parliamentary debate” (Daily Post, June 26).

He said, though, that it was “too early to decide” if a vote would actually occur, the London Daily Mail reported Friday (Tim Shipman, Daily Mail, June 23).

Critics said Gordon Brown’s support for replacing the Trident missile could decrease his chances to become the next prime minister, the Independent reported.

“It means a lot of people who were happy to see Brown take over as leader will now think there’s got to be a contest and we’re not willing to support him,” said former Cabinet minister Clare Short. “I won’t support him.  I mean this is outrageous, unless he changes his mind” (Grice, Independent).

Back to top

Russian Troops to Get More Topol-M Missiles

Russia’s Strategic Missile Troops are to receive additional stationary and mobile Topol-M missile systems, Deputy Defense Minister Alexei Moskovsky said Saturday, ITAR-Tass reported (see GSN, April 17).

“The state order for Topol-M systems remains at the same level of six to seven systems a year,” Moskovsky said. “Under the state program, the number of such systems supplied to the Strategic Missile Troops will be growing.”

“Developing the strategic nuclear forces is a priority for the state’s armament program,” he said. “Everything that has to do with the strategic deterrent forces has been planned in the armament program almost without a deficit” (ITAR-Tass, June 24).

Back to top

Cyanide Gas Plot Not Much of a Threat, Experts Say

Experts said the device al-Qaeda developed to disseminate fatal cyanide gas in the New York City subway system was not likely to inflict many casualties, United Press International reported today (see GSN, June 20).

“What you would get, in all probability, is a big bang, a big splash but very little gas,” said Milton Leitenberg, of the University of Maryland. Leitenberg is a 40-year veteran in arms control and chemical and biological weapons issues.

He said that in “a best case scenario” for the terrorists, the weapon might kill most riders in one subway car. However, “every calculation (one can make about casualties) relies on a whole series of assumptions. … It’s basically a guessing game.”

Ron Suskind wrote in The One Percent Doctrine that, “In the world of terrorist weaponry, [the cyanide dispersal device] was the equivalent of splitting the atom. Obtain a few widely available chemicals and you could construct it with a trip to Home Depot and then kill everyone in the store.”

“That is the stupidest statement I have heard in many years,” Leitenberg retorted. He said the concentrations of the main chemicals in household products were so minimal that by using them “you would get next to nothing.”

“You would have to obtain the ingredients from a chemical supplier” or steal them from a laboratory, he said.

One counterterrorism official said, “If this is such an amazing weapon, and the design for it is out there, why has no one every used it?”

The chemical reaction involved in such a weapon could actually destroy the device, Leitenberg and other scientists said (Shaun Waterman, United Press International, June 26).

Back to top

North Korea Silent on Missile Plans

North Korean officials in a recent meeting with the ambassador from New Zealand refused to say whether Pyongyang actually plans to launch a long-range ballistic missile, the Associated Press reported Saturday (see GSN, June 23).

Ambassador Jane Coombs said she discussed Wellington’s “grave concern” over escalating tensions surrounding the North Koran missile test preparations to Kim Yong Nam, Pyongyang’s second in command, and other officials.

“They did not confirm that such a test was imminent but equally nor did they deny that such a test was imminent,” Coombs said (Audra Ang, Associated Press I/CBS News, June 24).

Meanwhile, former U.S. Vice President Walter Mondale on Friday expressed support for a pre-emptive strike on the Taepodong 2 missile, AP reported.

“I think it would end the nuclear long-range dreams of this dangerous country,” he said.

Pyongyang’s goal of developing a long-range missile is “one of the most dangerous developments in recent history,” he said

“Here’s this bizarre, hermit kingdom over there with a paranoid leader getting ready to test a missile system that can hit us,” Mondale said (Associated Press II/Washington Post, June 23).

Seoul today toughened its rhetoric on the launch preparations, Reuters reported.

“Whatever the nature of the launch object, it is wrong for North Korea to escalate tension this way,” said South Korean national security adviser Song Min-soon.

“Of course, if North Korea goes ahead with the launch, the government will take measures that will match the seriousness of that,” Song said in a statement (Jack Kim, Reuters I, June 26).

South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon is scheduled to discuss the issue with Chinese officials today in Beijing, Reuters reported (Reuters I/Washington Post, June 25).

Japan announced yesterday that it would consider a number of retaliatory actions if the missile is launched, AP reported.

“All options are on the table,” Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso told public broadcaster NHK. “I believe public opinion would condone sanctions, even on oil or food” (Bo-Mi Lim, Associated Press III/Yahoo!News, June 26).

While some experts have said North Korea is under pressure to launch the missile quickly if it has been fueled because certain fuels could cause corrosion, others believe such damage to the missile could take a matter of months, AP reported.

“The fuel can corrode the components in the missile, but that would take months not days,” said Duncan Lennox, editor of Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems. “We don’t know precisely what fuel they’re using.”

Analysts also disagree on the Taepodong 2’s potential range, with estimates varying between 3,700 and 9,900 miles, according to AP.

Other experts question whether North Korea has managed to miniaturize a nuclear warhead for the missile.

“At this point, we have encountered no information that indicates North Korea has the technology,” Japanese Senior Vice Foreign Minister Yasuhisa Shiozaki said last week.

However, Robert Dujarric, a senior associate at the U.S. National Institute for Public Policy, said the United States was able to create an atomic weapon small enough to fit in a cannon bay only eight years after testing its first nuclear bomb (Joseph Coleman, Associated Press IV/Yahoo!News, June 24).

Some analysts now believe a missile launch is not likely to occur because the move damage North Korea’s relations with neighboring nations, Agence France-Presse reported.

A launch “would push China and South Korea — in South Korea there will be elections next year — towards a more anti-North Korean point of view,” Dujarric said. “So far China has made the decision it is better to have North Korea, despite its problems, than getting rid of it.”

Narushige Michishita, a Korea specialist at the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo, said Pyongyang was likely using the preparations as an attention-grabbing ploy.

“I tend to think ... they are not going to launch a missile this time around,” he said.

“They can launch a missile any time later,” Michishita said. “To use their small number of bargaining chips to the best outcome, they have to divide them into smaller pieces and use them one at a time rather than use everything at once” (Agence France-Presse/China Post, June 25).

Back to top

U.S. Missile Defense System Could Work, Obering Says

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — A senior U.S. defense official Friday said he was confident that the developmental U.S. long-range missile defense system would be able to intercept an enemy ICBM like the one North Korea reportedly is preparing to launch (see GSN, June 22).

“Based on the testing that we have done to date, I am confident that we could hit a long-range missile that would be fired at the United States,” said Missile Defense Agency Director Lt. Gen. Henry Obering, at an event hosted by the National Defense University Foundation.

Asked how confident he was, Obering said, “In my mind it’s a much higher confidence than what has been described by our critics.”

He conceded, though, that another senior Pentagon official does not appear to share his confidence. Operational Test and Evaluation Director David Duma, in a January 2006 report, downgraded his 2005 assessment of the system’s potential capability, writing it “may” rather than “should” have some defensive capability against a limited attack. 

Duma wrote in the report that “flight tests still lack operational realism,” citing the technological “immaturity” of some components of the system. He also cited failed and delayed flight tests and concluded that a lack of flight test data “limits confidence in assessments of defensive capabilities.”

The Ground-based Midcourse Defense System so far is five-for-10 in flight-intercept test attempts using prototype interceptors, has not successfully hit a target since 2002, and has not done so using the interceptor types now deployed in silos.

Asked about Duma’s assessment, Obering suggested they share a “difference of opinion.”

“What I’m telling you is what I have seen from our testing for the last several years of what those capabilities are. … From what I have seen and what I know about the system, of those capabilities I’m very confident,” he said.

Obering said the military would not say whether the system has been made operational in response to the suspected North Korean test plan, calling such information classified.

He said that switching the system from a research and developmental test configuration to an operational state involves, among other things, substituting military personnel for contractors at the consoles of system equipment.

Obering said repeatedly at the event that he believed those elements of the system that have been deployed to date, including 11 interceptors based in Alaska and California, are “militarily useful.”

He acknowledged though that U.S. military commanders have not yet produced a planned comprehensive determination on the utility and capability of the system for defending the United States against an ICBM attack, called a “military utility assessment.”

“To my knowledge, there is one in the works,” he said.

Such capability evaluations, drawing on data from testing, are intended to underpin decisions by the defense secretary on ordering fielded elements of the system into operation. They are also used to develop key protocols for using the system.

“Imagine if we had a rifle and we weren’t sure how good it was.  How would you train with it?  How many shots should you fire?  That’s the problem the U.S. military has with missile defense.  They don’t know how to design rules of engagement.  Should they fire one interceptor from Fort Greely [in Alaska] or all nine?” said Philip Coyle, a senior adviser to the Center for Defense Information who was the Pentagon’s top testing official during much of the 1990s.

The U.S. Government Accountability Office in a May report said the U.S. Strategic Command produced an initial military utility assessment for the system last year. However, the report said the assessment was “limited” in scope “due to the system’s immaturity at that time.”

Similarly, two U.S. Strategic Command officials last July, following the initial assessment, wrote in a PowerPoint slide presentation on conducting a military utility assessment that the system suffered “performance uncertainty.” They cited a “lack of end-to-end test data under operationally realistic conditions.”

“That’s what we’ve been saying, that’s what [Duma] has been saying. That’s what the GAO has been saying.  That’s what just about everybody has been saying.  And it’s true,” Coyle said.

“The scope of the assessment had to be limited by the fact that nobody knows what the system can do,” he said.

Spokesman Richard Lehner said the agency could not comment on the contents of the April 2005 Military Utility Assessment as it “is classified since it gives specifics about both capabilities and utility.”

Defense officials in congressional testimony in March said that more realistic flight testing is needed and planned before the military could assess the system’s capability with the current interceptor configuration, and better estimate how many interceptors to fire at a given threat.

The “fundamental technical unknown at this point is to demonstrate the intercept capability on the ground-based interceptor,” Duma said then.

Testing planned for 2006 “will allow us to optimize the use of our inventory and maybe change our techniques and procedures to get the most out of the missiles we have,” Lt. Gen. Larry Dodgen, director of the U.S. Army Missile and Space Command, told lawmakers in March (see GSN, March 15).

Back to top

U.S. to Deploy PAC-3 Missiles in Japan

Japan has agreed to allow the United States for the first time to deploy Patriot Advanced Capability 3 missiles on U.S. military bases there, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, May 23).

A Japanese Defense Agency spokeswoman said the schedule and locations for the deployment have not been determined.

The Yomiuri Shimbun reported today that Washington plans to deploy three or four Patriot batteries on Okinawa by year’s end, according to AP (Mari Yamaguchi, Associated Press/China Daily, June 26).

Tokyo and Washington on Friday also signed an agreement to prevent export of Japanese missile components via the United States, Agence France-Presse reported.

Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso and U.S. Ambassador to Japan Thomas Schieffer signed the deal, which requires the United States to obtain prior consent from Tokyo before exporting Japanese-manufactured Standard Missile 3 parts to third countries, Jiji Press reported (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, June 23).

Back to top