Iranian officials yesterday maintained their measured response on the possibility of a negotiated settlement on the country’s controversial nuclear program, the Washington Post reported (see GSN, June 7). “We do not predict a difficult situation for the country,” said Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, following delivery by EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana of an incentives package aimed at curbing Tehran’s atomic efforts. “Shuttle diplomacy, if it is in good faith, will allow us to find grounds for understanding,” Mottaki said. Tehran is expected to consider the proposal over the next several weeks, and Solana will probably meet at least once more with Iranian officials. One expert predicted that any negotiations would be difficult, the Post reported. “There’s going to be hard negotiations behind the scenes — on both sides,” said Nasser Hadian-Jazy, a political scientist at Tehran University. “Iran will try to preserve at least one of the enrichment cascades already spinning in Iran. The West will ask for the zero option.” He said that, of the top Iranian officials, statements by Supreme National Security Council chief and lead nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani would be the most significant. “What Larijani would say is the most important thing because that will represent the consensus of all the faces within Iranian polity,” Hadian-Jazy said. Iran’s top clerical leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is expected to make the final decision. He is believed to be deeply skeptical of the Bush administration’s intentions, according to the Post. “Yes, he has a deep mistrust,” said a European diplomat. “But at least the ayatollahs in Washington have shown a little flexibility. It would be nice if those here would do the same” (Karl Vick, Washington Post, June 8). IAEA Report ReleasedInternational Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei today released a written report describing the agency’s latest efforts to chart Iran’s past and present nuclear activity. The report complains that Iran has continued to withhold information that could be used to clarify several facets of Tehran’s nuclear program. Issues that remain unresolved include the origin of traces of highly enriched uranium found on Iranian centrifuges, the level of research activity on more advanced centrifuges, and the implications of documents in Iran’s possession that describe ways to cast uranium into weapon-usable shapes. The report also details recent Iranian nuclear activity, including the resumption this week of activity at the nation’s uranium conversion facility as well as efforts this week to begin enriching uranium in a 164-centrifuge “cascade” (Marina Malenic, GSN, June 8). U.S. StrategyMeanwhile, Bush administration officials said yesterday that it would be a minimum of several years before the possibility of allowing Iran to enrich uranium could come up for discussion in potential international negotiations, the New York Times reported. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said world powers are firm that Iran must suspend uranium enrichment activities as part of the offer. “That condition would have to hold throughout the duration of any potential negotiations,” he said. Iran would also have to allow IAEA inspectors to confirm that it had no undeclared nuclear facilities and that it had answered all of the agency’s outstanding questions. However, the package does not provide for a mechanism to lift the enrichment suspension, European diplomats and Bush administration officials said. “This is a small conceptual step because [U.S. officials] accept the notion that someday in some circumstances — maybe in 30 years when the mullahs disappear — there could be the end of a moratorium,” a European official said. The diplomats said foreign ministers from the world powers agreed the Security Council would have to vote on Iran’s nuclear program before enrichment could resume, the Times reported. That point is not contained in the package presented to Tehran. The package calls for Iran to prove the economic need for the nuclear effort, which could take more than a decade. “It means they’re not getting there anytime soon,” said Robert Einhorn, assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation under President Bill Clinton. Einhorn called the U.S. decision opening the door for Iranian enrichment a “wise move and a tactical shift.” Critics said concessions such as potential assistance on a light-water nuclear energy reactor project could produce a nuclear Iran. “Apparently Tehran has gone from being a charter member of the ‘Axis of Evil’ to the newest market for the Bush administration’s nuclear salesmen,” said U.S. Representative Edward Markey (D-Mass.). “Unless President [George W.] Bush is now willing to take Iran off the list of state sponsors of terrorism, he cannot legally ship a nuclear reactor to Iran” (Cooper/Sciolino, New York Times, June 8). Solana said yesterday that consideration of enrichment would have to follow the conclusion of negotiations, the Associated Press reported. “In principle ... they will have to stop now, we will have to negotiate with no process of enrichment in place,” he said. “After the finalization of the negotiations we will see what happens.” Solana said the offer has “no specific timeframe,” but that he expected a response from Tehran within “weeks” (George Jahn, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, June 8). Solana said his meeting with Iranian officials on Tuesday to present the incentives package had been “constructive,” AFP reported. “I don’t say that everything has been resolved but I’m more optimistic today than a month ago,” he said. “I hope they will call me back soon and give an answer to the proposal.” “I am ready to go back to Tehran if it is necessary,” he said (Agence France-Presse II/IranMania.com, June 7). Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov yesterday expressed hope that Iran would accept the compromise package before the end of June, the Moscow Times reported. “We did not establish any time limits, but expect that by the end of the month, if not earlier, the Iranian side might respond to the proposal,” Lavrov said (Oksana Yablokova, Moscow Times, June 8). Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad today said there would be no talks over the technology Tehran wants to employ in its nuclear work, AFP reported. “We will negotiate about common concerns and for clearing up misunderstandings in the international atmosphere but we will never negotiate about what kind of technology we want to use,” he said (Agence France-Presse III/Yahoo!News, June 8). One nuclear expert said that Iran has not made great strides in mastering uranium enrichment, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported yesterday. “It appears that the enriched uranium that Iran produced and that was trumpeted by Ahmadinejad a few weeks ago was actually made from Chinese-supplied uranium hexafluoride,” said Shannon Kile of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. “So I think the preponderance of evidence suggests that Iran is still probably having a lot of technical problems, and they’re a long way away from having mastered the complete nuclear-fuel cycle as was claimed.” “In terms of the uranium-conversion process, they still seem to be having trouble producing uranium hexafluoride, and they are having trouble making that of a sufficient purity that they can run [it] in their machines,” Kile added. Kile said Iranian technicians were also having difficulty with operations of centrifuge cascades. “The ones that they have gotten to operate have operated at a very low level of efficiency,” he said. He added that Iran’s uranium reserves are seen as insufficient to sustain any indigenous nuclear program (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 7).
By Marina Malenic Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — Two U.S. nuclear proliferation experts have found that the pending U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear technology-sharing deal could improve relations between the two nations, but urged Congress to require several measures before passing legislation to allow the deal (see GSN, June 5). In a Council on Foreign Relations report by Michael Levi and Charles Ferguson, fellows for science and technology, the two encourage lawmakers to reinforce the agreement’s nonproliferation provisions and to endorse the deal’s basic framework, but offer final approval for the pact only when those nonproliferation measures are set. “Congress should issue a set of bottom-line requirements for the formal U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement, for India’s inspection agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and for new [Nuclear Suppliers Group] rules that would allow nuclear commerce with India, and enforce those requirements by refusing to pass final legislation enabling nuclear cooperation until the agreements are in place and are satisfactory,” says the report. The authors said the agreement would strengthen the relationship between the two nations and, in turn, bolster the U.S. strategic position in Asia at a time when U.S. policy-makers have expressed concern about a rising China. “Legislation passed with broad support will benefit both the U.S. and India in the long term,” the report says. “American exclusion of India from nuclear commerce has long grated on New Delhi, proving an irritant in the bilateral relationship, and removing this point of friction would no doubt strengthen the relationship,” it says. Levi and Ferguson also said blocking a resumption of Indian nuclear testing should remain a nonproliferation priority. They advised Congress to “reserve the bulk of its political capital for a handful of top-tier objectives. It should focus on preventing Indian nuclear testing and fundamental changes in Indian nuclear strategy, rather than on blocking growth in the number of Indian nuclear weapons.” The report says a modest increase in the size of New Delhi’s nuclear arsenal would be less likely to spark an Asian arms race than would a resumption of nuclear testing. U.S. analysts have warned that an Indian nuclear test could open the door to new testing by China and Pakistan. A small number of nuclear tests by China, according to analysts, would be enough to perfect Beijing’s warheads, allowing for more effective targeting of the United States. Congress should “focus on obtaining cooperation … in controlling the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies, instead of on measures that would shape the development of nuclear technology in India itself,” the report says. The report urges Congress and the Bush administration to reinforce India’s commitments to strengthening export controls through technical assistance and expert exchanges; provide incentives to limit fissile material production; and press India to label future reactors as civilian and place them under inspection
The nuclear black market launched by former top Pakistani atomic scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan remains a model for other potential proliferators to emulate, two experts said Monday (see GSN, May 12). David Sanger and William Broad, investigative reporters for the New York Times, said elements of the network could continue to operate, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported. “What is uncertain here is not only which countries purchased [the technology], but what’s left of the network, even with the head cut off? Clearly there are a lot of elements of the network that can operate by themselves, and we have still seen Iranians, for example, importing a fair bit of goods from around Europe,” Sanger said during a Council on Foreign Relations panel discussion. “We don’t know whether each of the pieces of this were Khan-related or not. But you have to remember that this was a prototype business, it showed a business model that others can replicate,” he said. Sanger and Broad said Khan’s work might have furthered the nuclear efforts of Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Syria. Broad warned that private corporations might someday be able to acquire nuclear technology from a government and sell it to a third party. “Pakistan, in the semi-stable structure that it's in today, may not be that way tomorrow,” he said. “We know from history that other states that had nuclear weapons went through periods of incredible turmoil, revolution. Soviet Union, China, South Africa; a peaceful revolution, but they had nukes, and that was an open question for a while. So things change.” Broad also said nuclear personnel trained in uranium enrichment could also be involved in leaks. “We are moving into the second nuclear age, where some of the estimates are that maybe by 2050 we’ll have a nuclear infrastructure around the world of 1,000 nuclear reactors going. Today there’s what, 250? Just an enormous increase,” Broad said. “With that comes a whole kind of nuclear commerce, nuclear infrastructure. People, lots and lots of people who are learning the intricacies of the ‘star guard.’” The equipment needed to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium is also easier to operate and smaller than prior technologies, Broad said. “There’s another generation of even more efficient smaller technologies up around the bend,” he said. “It’s called laser-isotope-separation. It’s not real efficient for making commercial fuel but it looks like it could be pretty good for special circumstances where you want to enrich some uranium for a bomb. It’s something that the Iranians looked at.” The reporters said it was more likely that a terrorist group would seek to acquire ready-made fissile material rather than to produce the material. They also said there was no evidence that al-Qaeda has obtained such material. Sanger said the more pressing concern is how authorities should react if they discover that a group has and could be preparing to use a nuclear device. “If you think this went to the hands of a terror group, do you retaliate against the country that knowingly or unknowingly slipped this to the terror group? Do you retaliate against the civilian population for the act of a small group of terrorists? It’s a much more complex political calculation than it was in the simpler days of the Cold War, where you said: ‘If you take out New York, we take out Moscow,’” he said (Nikola Krastev, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 7).
Nuclear experts are scheduled to meet this month in Norway to discuss efforts to eliminate use of weaponizable highly enriched uranium at nuclear power plants, the International Atomic Energy Agency said in a press release (see GSN, Nov. 8, 2005). The U.N. atomic watchdog and the government of Norway are hosting the event, scheduled from June 17 to 20 in Oslo. The conference will allow experts “to take stock of technical and other issues influencing global efforts to remove highly enriched uranium from the world’s research reactors,” the release states. More than 100 research reactors globally continue to use highly enriched uranium. Given the dangers of proliferation and nuclear terrorism, efforts have been made to promote use of more proliferation-resistant low-enriched uranium that would allow research reactors to continue to operate at high performance levels, the IAEA release states. “One objective [of the meeting] is to establish international consensus on technical issues and associated implications concerning the replacement of HEU with LEU for various civilian uses,” the agency said. “Another is to agree on the way forward for a more concerted international effort in the framework of existing international agreements, organizations and assistance programs” (International Atomic Energy Agency release, June 7).
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