By David Ruppe and Jon Fox Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The Bush administration is urging Congress to pass nuclear export control exceptions for India by the end of the month, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said here yesterday (see GSN, July 5). Another senior State Department official said yesterday that the agency anticipates the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group would agree to a similar waiver of export controls by nuclear technology supplier countries for India. Group rules prohibit nuclear trade with Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty holdouts India, Pakistan and Israel, all of which are believed to be nuclear-armed. Trade with North Korea, which withdrew from the treaty several years ago, is also banned. With Bush administration urging, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee in decisive bipartisan votes last month approved draft legislation that would permit exceptions to U.S. export control laws for India despite its nuclear weapons arsenal and weapons program. “We are hard at work with both houses of Congress, especially with the India caucuses. And we are encouraging both the Senate and House to vote on the civil nuclear initiative this month, before the summer recess,” Rice said, speaking at a luncheon sponsored by the American Association of Physicians of Indian Origin and the Asian-American Hotel Owners Association. Supporters have expressed concern that Congress would not find time to consider the legislation in the weeks after its summer break or before lawmakers leave Washington to campaign for the November congressional elections. Approval of this legislation would open the door for the administration’s proposed nuclear cooperation arrangement with India. Included in the draft legislation approved by the committees, however, are requirements that Congress must approve the agreement to supply New Delhi with civilian nuclear material. Both committees’ drafts also require that the United States obtain nothing short of consensus from the Nuclear Suppliers Group for a rules waiver to allow nuclear trade with India. That could be a challenge, considering reports that a number of members have expressed concern that a waiver for India would undermine the international nuclear nonproliferation regime (see GSN, March 24). “We are confident … of ultimate success in that effort,” said John Schlosser, the State Department’s director of South and Central Asian affairs, speaking at a panel discussion of U.S.-Indian relations at the Heritage Foundation. Regime Versus TreatyIn describing anticipated security benefits, Rice drew a distinction between how the proposed new relationship would affect what she called the “international nuclear nonproliferation regime” and how it would affect the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The United States through the proposal aims to strengthen the “regime,” which she said the United States “greatly values and unequivocally supports.” The deal would require India to place 14 of its existing 22 nuclear facilities under monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency. “We desire to strengthen this regime, which is why we believe that India’s continued isolation from it is the wrong policy,” she said. She called the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty “the cornerstone” of the regime, but did not say the United States aimed to strengthen it with the proposal. She said, rather, “Let me be clear: We do not support India joining the Nonproliferation Treaty as a nuclear-weapon state; rather, the goal of our initiative is to include India for the first time ever in the global nonproliferation regime.” Critics have said the proposed deal would undermine the treaty, by violating the spirit and possibly the letter of its first requirement, which is a prohibition against assisting “in any way” countries not recognized as nuclear powers to obtain nuclear weapons. They have said that supplying India with civilian nuclear fuel could allow New Delhi to devote its domestic uranium resources entirely to weapons production — in effect aiding Indian weapons production. Rice in written comments to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in June said that such an outcome would not violate the treaty since U.S. trade to India would be solely to safeguarded facilities. Two experts wrote in a response that India used safeguarded items in the 1970s to make plutonium for its first nuclear bomb. That prompted Congress to pass the current law requiring full-scope safeguards as a condition of nuclear trade — the law the administration is hoping to waive. Rice said yesterday that by requiring India to put two-thirds of its existing and planned nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards “this initiative would be a net gain for the cause of nonproliferation worldwide.” Schlosser, who was director of export control and sanctions in the State Department’s nonproliferation office prior to his current post, said he believes the proposed agreement would “strengthen the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.” One expert rejected that argument today in an interview with Global Security Newswire. “The treaty is the fundamental cornerstone of that regime and what the administration is doing is chipping away at that cornerstone, by promising India the benefits of the treaty without India having to undertake any of the obligations of the treaty,” said Arms Control Association Research Director Wade Boese. “The largest part of the nonproliferation regime is the NPT, and if one is weakening that, what are the pluses that counter that or turn this into a net plus? … We really didn’t get anything new from India,” Boese said. Indian-American LobbyRice in her address said nuclear cooperation could bring multiple benefits to the United States and India. “By addressing India’s unique situation creatively and responsibly, our civil nuclear initiative will elevate our partnership to a new strategic level,” she said, adding it would also “enhance energy security,” “benefit the environment,” create opportunities for American jobs in the civil nuclear sector, and “add to the stability and security of our world.” Leaders from both the Indian-led organizations expressed support for the potential nuclear cooperation agreement. Hemant Patel, president-elect of the American Association of Physicians of Indian Origin, described potential passage of the nuclear legislation as “a watershed moment which will serve as a platform for the trusting and mutually beneficial strategic relationship between the two countries for years to come.” He described his organization as the largest ethnic medical association in the United States, with a constituency of more than 41,000 doctors and 10,000 medical students and residents. “One issue that remains significant is our pledge to do everything on our power as an association … to further Indo-U.S. relations,” he said. “We probably would not be nearly as far along as we are had it not been for the development of that [Indian-American] community as kind of political force in and of itself in the United States,” Schlosser said.
European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana met today with top Iranian nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani to continue discussions over a package of nuclear incentives offered to Tehran by the world powers, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, July 10). “We want to hear the response of the Iranians,” EU spokeswoman Cristina Gallach said yesterday. Solana is expected to meet with foreign ministers of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany tomorrow in Paris to discuss the outcome of the meeting, AP reported. A senior French official said today that no new deadline for Iran to halt sensitive nuclear activities would be set during this week’s summit of the Group of Eight industrial powers because China would not be present. EU officials have said Larijani is today likely to ask Solana for additional details of certain parts of the compromise offer and possibly put forth a counterproposal (Slobodan Lekic, Associated Press, July 11). Larijani today again rebuffed any talk of a deadline for a firm response from Tehran on the offer, Reuters reported. “We have expressed our view regarding the deadline. We are not used to acting before thinking,” he said. Another top Iranian diplomat added that “Iranians do not accept anything called a deadline” (Reuters/Tiscali, July 11). U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice yesterday warned Iran against using delaying tactics, the Washington Post reported. “We hope that the Iranians choose the path before them for cooperation, but, of course, we can always return to the other path should we need to. And that path … was, of course, the path to the Security Council,” she said. “Now, it’s our great hope that we are going to get an authoritative answer, but this is something that we're going to take up and consider when we meet in Paris.” British Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett said Tehran has yet to request further details on the world powers’ offer. “We keep hearing from Iran remarks made to others that there are ambiguities in the offer that still have to be resolved,” Beckett said. “But I’m not aware of any questions having been asked.” State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said Iran has had six weeks to respond. “This is not to come up with a final negotiated solution,” he said. “That’s what negotiation is about. This is about coming to the table.” “The Iranian tactic is transparently trying to string the whole thing out while not doing the one thing that is required — suspend uranium enrichment,” said a top European diplomat. “They are smiling and saying ‘We like it’ while in practice they are saying no” (Robin Wright, Washington Post, July 11).
The U.S. policy of pre-emption against threats to the United States involves more than military strikes, the White House said yesterday (see GSN, March 16). “I think there’s a misconception that pre-emption means war. It doesn’t,” said spokesman Tony Snow, according to Agence France-Presse. “Pre-emption means stopping somebody before they can do you harm. There are diplomatic ways to do that.” “Pre-emption also can be a diplomatic strategy. What you try to do, for instance, in the case of North Korea, is to pre-empt activity,” Snow said. “Pre-emption is not merely a military doctrine.” While U.S. National Security Strategy highlights diplomacy as its primary tactic, there’s no fine line drawn separating pre-emption from war, according to AFP. “If necessary, however, under long-standing principles of self-defense, we do not rule out the use of force before attacks occur, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack,” states the strategy released to the public by the White House in March. “When the consequences of an attack with WMD are potentially so devastating, we cannot afford to stand idly by as grave dangers materialize,” the strategy continues. “This is the principle and logic of pre-emption.” Snow maintained that with North Korea, “we are engaging in pre-emption at the diplomatic level by working as aggressively and assertively as we can, with our allies, to get the government in Pyongyang simply to abide by its past promises” to curb its weapons programs. “The United States has been working on a diplomatic track on Iran, it’s been working a diplomatic track on North Korea, and it worked diplomatic tracks on Iraq and Afghanistan,” the spokesman said. “And so there is no change. This is a president who has always seen diplomacy as the first and most important step to take in trying to prevent people from behaving badly” (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, July 10).
By Zerline Jennings Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — A British House of Commons committee has asked Prime Minister Tony Blair’s government to review threats facing the United Kingdom before deciding the future of its nuclear arsenal (see GSN, June 26). In a report issued last month, members of the Defense Committee said the threat of nuclear attack has diminished dramatically and therefore the United Kingdom should consider reducing its nuclear deterrent — or at least wait another 10 years before deciding whether to replace that nation’s existing submarine-launched nuclear missiles. The committee conducted the study as part of an effort to promote open debate on British nuclear weapons and to press for a parliamentary vote on the matter. In preparing its report, committee members interviewed experts at defense think tanks and universities and met with Bush administration officials and U.S. lawmakers during a May visit to Washington. “We have examined what other states and organizations could develop nuclear weapons capabilities in the 2025 to 2050 timeframe and how this might affect the strategic context in which decisions on the U.K. deterrent will be made. And we have sought to clarify the timetable within which these decisions will have to be taken and implemented,” the report states. British Prime Minister Tony Blair said recently that the government would decide this year whether to replace the country’s submarine-launched Trident nuclear missiles with a next-generation deterrent. Downing Street has not promised a parliamentary vote on the issue. British Labor Party lawmaker Brian Jenkins said a House of Commons vote should not be necessary because the Labor and Conservative parties both favor replacing the nuclear deterrent, AP reported. The report asks the government to explain the need for a nuclear deterrent during a time when “the most pressing threat currently facing the U.K. is that of international terrorism.” “Before making any decisions on the future of the strategic nuclear deterrent, the Ministry of Defense should explain its understanding of the purpose and continuing relevance of nuclear deterrence now and over the lifetime of any potential Trident successor system.” The Defense Ministry, however, refused to elaborate to the committee on its position in the report and opted not to participate in a seminar the committee conducted in December 2005. It told the committee “there is nothing further we could usefully say” and that it was not in a position to offer insight on future deterrent systems, according to the report. “Ministers have yet to begin to consider future deterrent options and it is likely to be some time before we can provide advice on the range of options that might be involved, including their costs,” the ministry said. The committee said the absence of the Defense Ministry participation undermines the report and debate, since the department would be able to provide further background and address any further inquiry, if and when the issue is voted on by Parliament. The report says the committee hopes the Defense Ministry will eventually respond “substantially” to the report and explain “its understanding of the purpose and continuing relevance of nuclear deterrence now and over the lifetime of any potential Trident successor system.” “If the (Defense Ministry) believes in the value of the nuclear deterrent as an insurance policy, rather than in response to any specific threat, we believe it is important to say clearly that is the reason for needing the deterrent,” the report states. Nuclear submarines have served as the backbone of the British nuclear deterrent for 40 years, the Birmingham Post reported. The government might consider replacing Trident with an air- or land-based system, but most experts expect it to maintain a submarine-based system. The British ballistic missile submarine arsenal consists of four Vanguard-class boats each capable of carrying 16 Trident missiles with as many as 12 warheads, according to the Post. This would be a maximum-capacity situation, however, as independent nuclear experts have estimated that the United Kingdom has about 200 warheads for its Trident missiles and probably arms most of the missiles with only three warheads. The United Kingdom typically keeps one submarine at sea at any one time, keeping two others in port ready for deployment and one in overhaul, according the Nuclear Notebook, published by the Bulletin for the Atomic Scientists.. “Trident was developed during the final decade of the Cold War, and was designed to counter the threat posed by the size and technical capabilities of the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal: We need to consider whether the form of the U.K’s current nuclear deterrent is best suited to today’s and tomorrow’s strategic challenges,” the committee said. “We will have to consider whether those states and nonstate actors posing such threats can, in reality, be deterred from instigating acts of aggression by either existing or new approaches to nuclear deterrence,” the committee states in the report. “We will also have to consider how the UK’s nuclear capability should be adjusted to meet new strategic realities.”
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill traveled to China today to discuss options for resuming stalled multilateral talks on North Korea’s nuclear program, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, July 10). “Obviously we’re in a rather crucial period,” Hill said. “The Chinese government has an important diplomatic mission going on and so we want to be in close consultation.” Beijing’s top nuclear negotiator, Deputy Foreign Minister Wu Dawei, is in Pyongyang today. He met with North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan, according to the Chinese Foreign Ministry. “China is gravely concerned about the current situation and we have expressed our position to the D.P.R.K. side over the past days,” said ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu (Audra Ang, Associated Press I/The Hindu, July 11). Meanwhile, the Bush administration yesterday criticized the Clinton-era policy of direct engagement with North Korea, AP reported. White House spokesman Tony Snow said former Energy Secretary Bill Richardson “went with flowers and chocolates, and he went with light-water nuclear reactors ... and a basketball signed by Michael Jordan and many other inducements for the ‘dear leader’ [North Korean leader Kim Jong Il] to try to agree not to develop nuclear weapons, and it failed.” “We’ve learned from that mistake,” Snow said. Jay Carson, a spokesman for former President Bill Clinton, dismissed the remark. “This is a serious issue for global security, and it’s unfortunate that the Bush administration’s TV spinmaster is manufacturing excuses for North Korea’s transgressions instead of looking at the last six years of inaction and the abandonment of diplomacy,” he said. Snow said, however, that the Clinton administration’s effort to “talk reason to the government of Pyongyang” was “at least a good faith effort on the part of some very smart people” (Associated Press II/USA Today, July 10).
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