Polonium Poisoning Spurs Fear of Terror Attack

The use of polonium 210 to kill former Russian intelligence officer Alexander Litvinenko has increased concerns that the radioactive material might be used in an act of terrorism, the Washington Post reported yesterday (see GSN, Dec. 14, 2006).

Many deaths and widespread panic could result from an explosive or airborne release of polonium, especially if it occurred in an enclosed area.  Even worse could be tainting of the food or water supply.

“You need a lot of material,” said nuclear physicist Peter Zimmerman, a science and security professor at King’s College London.  “But not more than it is reasonable to think could be diverted from the commercial stream.”

Russia conducts 97 percent of legal polonium production, generating roughly three ounces each year for domestic and foreign companies that use it to reduce static electricity.

Litvinenko’s death has heightened scrutiny on Russia’s production system and controls for polonium, the Post reported.  The International Atomic Energy Agency might enact increased controls of the isotope.  Zimmerman and other scientists would like to see other material used for anti-static purposes.

Russian officials there say there is no reason to fear that material could be diverted for malicious purposes from the production plant.

“I can say with complete certainty that no deviations from the rules of storage and transportation of nuclear materials, including polonium, have been discovered at any structures of our fuel and nuclear complex,” said Konstantin Pulikovsky, who leads the Federal Service for the Oversight of the Environment, Technology and Nuclear Management, according to RIA Novosti.

There were at least 15 incidents in which polonium was lost or stolen prior to 2006, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency.  Most occurred in the United States.

A request from a highly placed Russian official for polonium could lead to auditing safeguards being bypassed, said Nick Priest, a professor of radiation toxicology at Middlesex University.  Audits might also not be counted on to track all material, as more polonium than needed is created during production, and the leftover amount is not counted as part of the official supply, he said.

“When they do make these runs, they produce a large amount because it’s got a 138-day half-life and they don’t want to be making it all the time.  It’s not possible to maintain complete control by measurement at the source,” Priest said (Peter Finn, Washington Post, Jan. 7).

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