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Scientists Urge Limited Funds for Non-Nuclear ICBM By Jon Fox WASHINGTON — A National Academy of Sciences panel has recommended that Congress withhold production and deployment funding for a Defense Department program to modify Trident missiles to carry conventional warheads (see GSN, March 9). The Conventional Trident Modification program has drawn concerns from lawmakers who have noted that submarine-launched ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads could be indistinguishable from nuclear-armed missiles. Launching a conventionally armed missile for a nuclear attack could accidentally spur an adversary to launch a nuclear counterattack. This “ambiguity” issue has not been adequately addressed, the panel writes in its nine-page interim report. The panel expects to produce a final, more comprehensive, report in early 2008. Pentagon officials have argued that conventionally armed intercontinental ballistic missiles would provide the In addition to expressing the ambiguity concerns, In the fiscal 2007 defense spending bill, only a fraction of what the president had requested to support Trident modification was approved. The fiscal 2008 defense spending plan recently drafted by the House Armed Services Committee prohibits any money being spent on the “operational deployment” of Trident missiles equipped with conventional payloads. The Senate has yet to complete its version of the same bill. The Trident missiles carried on While recommending that Congress not fund full production or deployment of modified Trident missiles, the committee did support full research and development funding for the program. Trident modification is “not the optimal solution for the longer term,” but within the next 6 years it represents the only “viable, truly global” option for a prompt global strike capability, the committee writes. The panel supports the Pentagon’s $120 million request for research in fiscal 2008, saying it is needed to maintain the potential to deploy a modified ballistic missile in the next 3 to 5 years. “Although there are issues about how — and indeed whether — CTM should be deployed and used that have not yet been adequately addressed, the technical feasibility of CTM has been demonstrated and the design is sound and well thought out,” the panel writes. The committee recommends a funding level that maintains the possibility for an initial capability three years down the line as well as supporting research into a global strike missile that could be launched from the deck of a ship. In light of outstanding questions, the panel reserved endorsement for complete funding. “There remain policy issues,” according to the report, “including dealing with the ambiguity issue and consideration of alternative (albeit less developed) systems that should be fully addressed before committing to … deployment.” Other options in more nascent stages of research and development include hypersonic “boost-glide” vehicles launched from the continental While these options constitute a greater technical challenge to develop, the panel notes their value in that they are less likely to be mistaken for nuclear-armed missiles, could be routed around sensitive overflight areas and could be diverted in midflight for retargeting. The committee recommended providing a “modest amount of research funding” for these other prompt global strike options proposed by the Army and the Air Force. Noting two separate purposes for a prompt strike capability — limited, time-critical attacks, such as killing a top-ranking terrorist, and strikes at the leading edge of a major combat operation — the panel concluded such weapons would be more valuable for limited attacks. “Given the pace of terrorism’s spread and the consequent uncertainty about where terrorist operations will occur, coupled with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a truly global capability may soon be required, if it is not required today,” the committee writes. Another instance in which a prompt global strike would be of use would be a rogue nation preparing to launch a ballistic missile from a location beyond the immediate reach of conventional forces, the panel notes. In the case of leading the way for a major military operation, the committee was less convinced that conventionally armed ballistic missiles or other similar weapons would be of much use, or necessary. “Almost by definition, many operations requiring this type of capability would have been anticipated with strategic warning and a buildup of regional forces,” they write. Plus, the tense international political atmosphere that goes along with a lead up to such an operation “would increase the risk that a strike might be construed as a nuclear attack or a precursor to a nuclear attack.” The fiscal 2007 defense spending bill requested that the National Academies conduct their evaluation.
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