By Elaine M. Grossman Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — A top-ranking officer at the U.S. Defense Department said last week he believes that virtually no U.S. president would use a nuclear weapon in conflict, even if it were a bomb variant with very limited destructive power (see GSN, April 4, 2006). In his first wide-ranging interview since becoming vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine Corps Gen. James Cartwright also told Global Security Newswire he thinks a new generation of conventionally armed, long-range weapons could substitute for nuclear arms in a sizable portion of the U.S. military’s global targeting plan. As the first Marine to lead U.S. Strategic Command — a three-year assignment he concluded in early August — Cartwright initiated several sweeping changes, among them the assumption of expanded responsibilities and the delegation of some of his own command authority to an array of subordinate organizations (see GSN, Dec. 2, 2005). Having spent his career as a naval aviator, well outside the traditional fraternity of nuclear weapons officials and scholars, he also questioned the validity today of strategies developed during the Cold War. For starters, he replaced the focus on land-, sea- and air-based nuclear weapons with the idea of a “new triad” composed of nuclear and conventional offensive strike systems; active and passive defenses; and a military infrastructure capable of responding to atomic attacks. Now Cartwright is in an even stronger position to turn some of his iconoclast views into U.S. military policy. As vice chairman, he leads a top military panel that reviews Pentagon plans for new weapon systems and capabilities, which will offer him a broad “opportunity to look at alternatives,” the general said. During the Oct. 18 interview at his Pentagon office, Cartwright weighed in on a perennial debate over the possibility that very low-yield nuclear weapons should be developed that, if used, might limit unintended damage or the spread of radiation. “People who have to be accountable for using these weapons do so with a great deal of consideration,” he said. “And the yield ... I don’t think that’s as critical of an attribute as some would make it out to be.” Cartwright called the notion of a temptingly low-yield weapon — generally defined as 1 to 10 kilotons — a “good academic argument,” one “that deals more with the ‘what if.’” Theoretically, if a “grave” threat to the United States emerged that could be deterred only by a low-yield nuclear weapon, the general might be persuaded to support its development, he said. However, to date, “I haven’t seen anything that approaches that,” Cartwright said. He acknowledged that a number of policy advocates — some of whom were appointed by President George W. Bush to positions at the Defense and Energy departments — have seriously pondered the merits of using nuclear weapons. “But none of them have had the responsibility or the accountability” to launch such weapons, Cartwright said. “I don’t want to put myself in the shoes of a president, but who is not going to take [as] incredibly serious the use of a nuclear weapon?” For those who are accountable, he added, “it is not just a little bit [of] a weapon of mass destruction. It is a weapon of mass destruction. It is going to change not just that country’s future, but all of our futures when we start using these things, big or little.” Early in his tenure as head of Strategic Command, the general said he was determined to build long-range conventional weapons that might offer a U.S. president a more viable alternative to nuclear weapons under certain circumstances. “My priority is not reduced yield,” Cartwright told a reporter in April 2005. “It’s to take the accuracy to the point where conventional can substitute for nuclear. That’s my first priority.” Cartwright’s primary concern ultimately became a front-burner Pentagon effort to modify a small number of submarine-launched, nuclear-armed missiles to carry conventional warheads. Congress has largely rejected the idea of a conventional Trident D-5 missile. However, many lawmakers have expressed support for the general idea of building non-nuclear “prompt global strike” weapons capable of hitting an urgent target anywhere around the world within 60 minutes of a launch order (see GSN, Oct. 10). National security experts have said targets for which prompt global strike weapons might be most useful could include a terrorist located temporarily at a safe house or a rogue nation’s nuclear missile being readied for launch. Cartwright noted last week that such weapons, once built and deployed, should be employed only sparingly, in part because they would be expensive. The project to install just 96 conventional warheads on 24 Trident missiles had an estimated price tag of $503 million. “This is a very expensive round,” Cartwright said. “This is not replacing a squadron of F-16s. … Its value is the deterrent value. So you want to be very selective about how you might use this.” Still, the general anticipates a day when precise, long-range conventional weapons could assume a growing part of the nation’s targeting plan. “I believe there is a large target set out there for which we can go at with conventional,” Cartwright said. “In some cases, the conventional is good enough for all levels of warfare. In some cases, you may want to have a choice between conventional and nuclear.” While current concepts for conventional long-range weapons largely employ “kinetic” warheads — those whose destructive force relies on mass, speed and precision — the general said follow-on arms might also include an explosive element for greater utility against hard-to-get targets. “If you add explosives in the future, you can come up with intermediate steps of higher energy but still substantially below the nuclear threshold,” Cartwright said. “You may have some of these that you are trying to [launch] into hardened structures. You may have some that are designed to go against soft and dispersed activities, whether they be formations or they be groups of buildings or whatever. … But you may want more than one choice.” Before the president can reach for long-range conventional weapons as an alternative to nuclear arms, though, the concept must be proven, Cartwright acknowledged. “You have to … demonstrate the capability so that it’s credible,” he said. U.S. policy-makers must assess how strong of a deterrent to unwanted adversary actions such a conventional capability might pose, Cartwright explained. “What does it deter and how much of the larger energy equation do you need vs. the smaller energy equation?” he asked. The general said the rapid spread of ballistic missiles to nations around the world underscores the pressing need for a more usable — or, in his words, more “credible” — deterrent than nuclear weapons currently offer a U.S. president. “The proliferation of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles — independent of what’s on top of them — [changes] the calculus because they act so quickly” in conflicts with neighboring nations, Cartwright said. In past generations, world powers had ample time to react to regional skirmishes, saying in effect, “OK, you shot at your neighbor. I’m going to sail my armada and I’ll be there in a month,” in Cartwright’s words. Now, he said, “it’s over in minutes.” With new conventionally armed, long-range missiles in hand, the United States might “get inside the time line,” delivering “an offensive punch to say, ‘Stop it.’ And convince them, persuade them, that ‘stop it’ is the answer and now let’s talk, rather than just level the place.”
By Jon Fox Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — A U.S. Air Force official said Friday that a “lack of attention to detail” produced a series of mistakes that led to six nuclear-armed cruise missiles being inadvertently transported via bomber across the United States (see GSN, Oct. 18). Following a six-week investigation of the Aug. 30 incident, Pentagon officials found what they described as “an erosion of adherence to weapons-handling standards” at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota and Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana (see GSN, Sept. 7). The nuclear-armed munitions, packed into a rack for aircraft loading, were attached to a B-52 bomber at Minot and flown to Barksdale before they were eventually discovered 36 hours later. The flight was part of a program to decommission the particular model of missile that is equipped to carry the W-80 nuclear warhead. Flights with nuclear-armed bombers were abandoned by the United States in 1968 over concerns about accidents in the wake of two crashes in Spain and Greenland (see GSN, June 20, 2005). The warheads on each missile slated for retirement are supposed to be replaced with an inert metal slug before flight, but Air Force Maj. Gen. Richard Newton told reporters Friday that problems began with the breakdown of the “formal scheduling process.” Such procedures allow officials to conduct proper maintenance on the missiles and also ensure that each set of missiles are indeed scheduled for transport, Newton said. In this case, however, the “scheduling process was broken and not followed,” he said. That lapse led to two racks of six missiles each — what the Air Force calls “pylons” — being picked up at a storage area for transport on the morning of Aug. 29. The proper scheduling process that tracks the status of the missiles had been “subverted in favor of an informal process that did not identify this pylon as prepared for flight,” Newton said. Once the transport of the incorrect missiles was put in motion, a series of oversights and errors by crews allowed the blunder to go undiscovered until the bomber eventually touched down in Louisiana. Airmen failed to examine all the pylons in the storage area, failed to examine the missiles before attaching them to a transport trailer, failed to verify the status of the missile racks before loading them onto the plane and failed to check a computer database that would have alerted them to the error, according to Newton. The radar navigator for the aircraft also failed to spot check both missile racks before transport the following morning. Only the missiles that had their nuclear warheads swapped out for metal dummies were checked. The nuclear-armed missiles, on the other side of the plane, went unexamined. “Those factors and disregard for procedures collectively contributed to this serious incident,” Newton said. “It was a lack of effective supervision, a lack of effective leadership and the fact that they were not following, nor did they adhere to these very strict checklist guideline procedures.” Last week the wing commander and maintenance group commander at Minot and the operation group commander at Barksdale received administrative action and were relieved of duty (see GSN, Sept. 6). Disciplinary action has also been taken against officers ranked lieutenant colonel and below, but Newton offered no specifics. He indicated officials would continue to review the case to determine if additional disciplinary measures are necessary. The group in charge of tactical munitions ferry missions has been decertified and is currently not permitted to perform such transports. All such Air Force transport missions have been suspended.
Ali Larijani has resigned from his post as Iran’s senior nuclear negotiator Saturday, seemingly giving President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad greater freedom to control Tehran’s dialogue with the West over his country’s controversial nuclear program, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Oct. 19). Government spokesman Gholam Hossein Elham gave little explanation for Larijani’s departure, saying only that he wanted to concentrate on “other political activities.” “Larijani had resigned repeatedly. Finally, the president accepted his resignation,” Elham said. Larijani was widely considered more flexible than Ahmadinejad in nuclear negotiations with the international community, and their views often came into conflict, AP reported. “Larijani had become frustrated with Ahmadinejad's rhetoric. The two didn't share identical views on how to deal with the outside world,” said Iranian political activist Jahanbakhsh Izadi. While it was not clear if Larijani’s resignation was forced, his replacement with the less experienced Deputy Foreign Minister Saeed Jalili was interpreted in the West as a move intended to give Ahmadinejad greater control over nuclear negotiations, according to AP. Larijani held frequent talks with EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana in an effort to peacefully defuse the nuclear standoff. Ismail Moghaddam, a reformist lawmaker in Iran, said Larijani’s efforts were undermined by Ahmadinejad’s defiant statements. “Larijani's talks with Solana were promising and could have led to a political settlement but Ahmadinejad and his group are seeking adventurism and didn't want talks to succeed,” he said. Larijani’s resignation also suggested that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has final authority in all government decisions, might have shifted his views toward those of Ahmadinejad, AP reported (Ali Akbar Dareini, Associated Press I/Google News, Oct. 21). According to Ali Ansari, author of Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Next Conflict in the Middle East, the resignation proved that Ahmadinejad is “still very much in the driver's seat (and) the consequences for Iranian foreign policy are going to be fairly dire,” the Christian Science Monitor reported. “It plays right into the hands of American hard-liners,” he said. “The whole Iranian political scene is in shock,” said Farideh Farhi, an Iran specialist at the University of Hawaii. “That puts a lot of pressure on Mr. Khamenei right now to come in and explain, justify, and more importantly, calm down the political environment.” “Mr. Khamenei has been put on the spot because [it] either says that he is out of control — that he doesn't have control over what is happening in the country —or he is on the side of Mr. Ahmadinejad,” Farhi said (Scott Peterson, Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 22). However, Iran’s Foreign Ministry said yesterday that Larijani would accompany his replacement to nuclear talks with Solana scheduled to begin tomorrow in Rome, AP reported. “Based on the supreme leader's and president's suggestion, Mr. Larijani, alongside Mr. Jalili, will attend the negotiation with Solana on Tuesday,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammad Ali Hosseini told reporters during his weekly news conference. He added that although Larijani has resigned, Iran's "nuclear policy, strategy and aims are unchangeable” (Associated Press II/Google News, Oct. 21). Meanwhile, Iran opened new discussions Saturday with the U.N. nuclear watchdog focusing on the nation’s uranium-enriching centrifuges, Agence France-Presse reported. The International Atomic Energy Agency has sought information on how Iran acquired parts for the P-1 centrifuges at its Natanz uranium enrichment facility as well as details on Iran’s progress in developing its more efficient P-2 centrifuge model. “The negotiations started today and are ongoing. By night it will become evident how long the discussions will last,” state media quoted deputy Iranian atomic energy chief Mohammad Saeedi as saying (Agence France-Presse/Economic Times, Oct. 20). Elsewhere, U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney said yesterday that the United States and other countries would prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weaponry, AP reported. “Our country, and the entire international community, cannot stand by as a terror-supporting state fulfills its grandest ambitions,” Cheney said in an address to the Washington Institute for Near East Studies. “We will not allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon,” he added. According to Cheney, it was obvious that Iran has intended to develop nuclear weapons technology and that “the regime continues to practice delay and deceit in an obvious effort to buy time” (Matthew Barakat, Associated Press III/Google News, Oct. 21).
North Korea in a matter of days might begin to meet its pledge to disable facilities at its plutonium-producing Yongbyon nuclear complex, Reuters reported today (see GSN, Oct. 19). “We expect the disabling of the North’s nuclear facilities to start as early as next week,” a South Korean official told the Yonhap News Agency. Pyongyang agreed earlier this month to fully declare its nuclear holdings and disable the facilities by the end of 2007. In return for denuclearization, it stands to receive 1 million tons of fuel oil or related assistance, along with diplomatic and security benefits. A report last week indicated that disablement would begin within three weeks under the watch of U.S. experts (Reuters/Washington Post, Oct. 22). Sources say disablement of key facilities at Yongbyon — a 5-megawatt reactor, a reprocessing plant and a fuel fabrication facility — could involve a 10-step effort, Yonhap reported today. Spent fuel rods from the reactor would first be “canned” to ensure they are not reprocessed for production of weapon-grade plutonium. That would create a serious roadblock to future efforts by North Korea to acquire plutonium, said David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security. North Korea is believed now to hold about 50 kilograms of plutonium. Albright warned, though, that nuclear disablement should not be considered a permanent situation. “You can do a lot of things to disable (nuclear facilities), but no matter what, for most of them to be politically acceptable, you could only delay the restart by about a year,” Albright said. “All of these things can be fixed within a year, sometimes within a few months,” he added (Yonhap News Agency, Oct. 22). Meanwhile, officials from Pyongyang and Seoul met today to discuss supplying energy aid to North Korea, the Associated Press reported. Issues expected to be addressed included energy facilities, equipment and supply strategies, along with shipments of oil and associated technology. The session comes in advance of working-levels meetings on energy involving all nations in the six-party talks — China, Japan, Russia, the United States and both Koreas (Hyung-Jin Kim, Associated Press I/Straits Times, Oct. 22). Elsewhere, the speaker of North Korea’s parliament, Choe Thae Bok, met yesterday with Syrian Prime Minister Naji Otari, AP reported. The meeting in Damascus covered “mutual cooperation between the two countries and ways of developing them in economic, commercial and social fields,” according to Syrian state media. North Korea has been linked to development of a suspected Syrian nuclear site that was the target of a Sept. 6 Israeli air raid (see related GSN story, today; Associated Press II/Washington Post, Oct. 21).
U.S. officials urged Israel to “confront, not attack” Syria after learning that Damascus was evidently building a nuclear reactor with North Korean assistance, a senior U.S. official told ABC News last week. Israeli officials nevertheless ordered the last month’s air raid on the site, opting to refuse the advice of U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Defense Secretary Robert Gates (see GSN, Oct. 19). Israeli officials were extremely confident of the site’s nuclear destiny after securing interior photographs either from a plant worker or a spy planted in the work force, ABC reported. U.S. satellite imagery backed up the Israeli evidence. “It was unmistakable what it was going to be,” said a senior U.S. official with knowledge of the photographs. “There is no doubt in my mind.” Still, it was clear that Syria would need a long time to complete the reactor, and U.S. officials recommended holding off any military action until the reactor was closer to completion, according to ABC (Martha Raddatz, ABC News, Oct. 19).
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s administration today said it would delay pursuing a civilian nuclear trade agreement with the United States for four weeks after it was unable to reach a compromise with Indian communists who have opposed the deal, Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, Oct. 18). Representatives from Singh’s ruling Congress party met today with communists who have threatened to withdraw support from the government and push for early elections if the administration attempted to put the deal into effect. Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee said the deal would not be “operationalized” prior to the next planned discussions on Nov. 16. The administration seemed to concede defeat over the deal last week when Singh expressed an unwillingness to end his term in power early to pursue the nuclear deal. He was also said to have expressed disappointment about resistance to the deal during a separate meeting with Indian communists. D. Raja, the deputy head of the Communist Party of India, said before the talks that the communists would ask the government “to state its position clearly, to tell us whether the nuclear deal is on hold or not.” Sitaram Yechury, a top official of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), which has also opposed the nuclear deal, said the communists would reconsider their position based on the outcome of talks today. Yechury called on Singh’s administration to clarify “how it wishes to proceed and on that basis, we will take our future decisions.” Political analyst Neerja Chowdhury said that one of three possible intentions has guided Singh’s recent statements about the nuclear deal. “One is that he has had enough. He is feeling let down by his alliance partners within the government and the communists,” she said. “The second is that the Congress is keeping the talks going with the communists as a face saver to saying that the deal has been shelved. “The third is that the Congress could keep the talks going” before December elections in India’s western state of Gujarat, she said. Several opinion polls have suggested that Singh’s Congress party could win enough seats in India’s parliament to form an independent government, but Indian opinion polls have proven unreliable in the past. “If Congress does well in the (Gujarat) polls, the government could call for elections,” catching its communist allies off-guard, Chowdhury said (Elizabeth Roche, Agence France-Presse/Google News, Oct. 22). Meanwhile, the Canadian government said it is considering whether to vote for an arrangement that would allow members of the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group to export nuclear equipment to India although the country has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the CanWest News Service reported. “Canada is considering the proposed exemption for India from the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines in accordance with Canadian interests and principles,” said Bernard Nguyen, a spokesman for Canada’s Foreign Affairs Department. Nguyen added, however, that Canada has not changed its decades-old stance against conducting nuclear trade with India. “Canada's current nuclear nonproliferation policy and multilateral commitments prohibit nuclear cooperation with India, at this time,” Nguyen said (Mike De Souza, CanWest News Service/National Post, Oct. 20).
The Los Alamos National Laboratory has reached a milestone in its effort to consolidate the storage of classified information at the nuclear weapons research site, officials announced last week (see GSN, Oct. 1). Workers have begun to operate a Super Vault Type Room, a prototype facility designed to protect electronically saved classified documents, such as computer discs and CDs. The facility replaces eight other lower-security vaults and storage sites, according to a laboratory release. “A key component of our plan to reduce the inherent risks of using classified electronic media is a combination of reducing the overall number of items and consolidating them into as few areas as possible,” Paul Sowa, the laboratory’s associate director for safeguards and security, said in the press release. The New Mexico laboratory has been plagued by security lapses over the past several years, leading officials to step up efforts to prevent the loss of classified information. The facility has vastly reduced the use of portable electronic storage devices, known as Accountable Classified Removable Electronic Media, the release says, dropping to about 4,000 items from a high of 80,000 just four years ago. In addition, the number of workers allowed to use those devices has been cut by 90 percent. “By limiting employees' physical contact with A-CREM and converting data to electronic files, we eliminate the risk of losing track of those items, or information, because they never leave the vault,” said laboratory official Alex Kent in the release. The new vault conceptually resembles a commercial bank by using a small number of staffers who have access to the vault to retrieve storage devices and deliver them to laboratory workers. The vault uses bank-like security glass and delivery drawers that are large enough to hold laptop computers, according to the release (Los Alamos National Laboratory release, Oct. 16).
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