Lead Iranian nuclear envoy Saeed Jalili speaks to reporters yesterday after his first talks with EU diplomats (Bincenzo Pinto/Getty Images). Iranian Nuclear Talks “Constructive,” EU Says EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana expressed satisfaction with his first meeting yesterday with Iran’s newly appointed nuclear negotiator, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Oct. 23). “The meeting of today has been constructive,” Solana said.  “Very likely we'll have the opportunity of meeting again before the end of the month of November.”..Full Story

U.S. Additional Protocol Ratification Inches Forward By Jon Fox Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The United States is moving toward allowing more expansive international supervision of U.S. nuclear industry sites, but just when those additional inspections will become a reality remains unclear, the State Department said (see GSN, Dec. 20, 2005)...Full Story

GAO Pins Blame for Failed Anthrax Vaccine Contract By Elaine M. Grossman Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON –— The watchdog arm of Congress this week took the Health and Human Services Department to task for a failed $877 million effort to develop and produce a new anthrax vaccine that might be widely distributed in case of a bioterrorist attack (see GSN, April 6)...Full Story

	Wednesday, October 24, 2007

Iranian Nuclear Talks “Constructive,” EU Says EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana expressed satisfaction with his first meeting yesterday with Iran’s newly appointed nuclear negotiator, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Oct. 23). “The meeting of today has been constructive,” Solana said.  “Very likely we'll have the opportunity of meeting again before the end of the month of November.” Former lead Iranian nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani attended the discussions with Saeed Jalili, who replaced Larijani following his resignation on Saturday. Jalili pledged that Iran would continue negotiations with Solana over its nuclear program. “Negotiation and cooperation is our basic approach,” he said. Larijani said the negotiators focused on Iranian cooperation with the U.N. nuclear watchdog, which has sought details on Iran’s nuclear history, its progress in installing uranium-enriching centrifuges and other matters. Some Western observers who view Jalili to be more ideologically in-line with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad than his predecessor have suggested that Larijani’s departure could lead Iran to take a more defiant stance on its controversial nuclear activities, AP reported (Alessandra Rizzo, Associated Press I/Yahoo!News, Oct. 23). Larijani’s replacement by Jalili, a midlevel deputy foreign minister and ally of Ahmadinejad, has triggered considerable political opposition inside Iran, the New York Times reported today. “It is very disappointing that the government does not tolerate even views of a person like Mr. Larijani and would eliminate him in such a manner,” said Mohammed Hashemi, a former vice president and brother of former Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. A number of European officials who have dealt with both men said Larijani struck a conciliatory tone with negotiators during his two-year tenure — seeking out sympathy and common ground — while Jalili has masked inflexible positions with a friendly approach. “He doesn’t listen or pretend to listen,” said a European official who has worked with Jalili.  “It’s not a dialogue of the deaf.  It’s a monologue of the deaf” (Sciolino/Kiefer, New York Times, Oct. 24). Larijani, though, reaffirmed his support for the Iranian president and denied allegations that his resignation was fueled by political tensions with Ahmadinejad.  He said the turnover of responsibility instead owed to a generational shift. “The point is our country is a democracy.  There is rotation and circulation of forces and powers,” Larijani said.  “Jalili is a friend of mine, seven or eight years younger, energetic. … He will continue doing the work.  I will have my full support directed at him” (Rizzo, Associated Press I). At the talks, Solana was expected to again put forward a set of major political and economic incentives originally offered to Iran last year in exchange for halting its nuclear enrichment program, which could produce a key nuclear weapon ingredient, Agence France-Presse reported. “It's a case of finding out once more whether there is the possibility of starting negotiations” on the offer,” said Solana spokeswoman Cristina Gallach. She said the offer put forward by China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States “gives Iran all it requires for a civil nuclear program … and would open the way for a political relationship which would bring Iran out of its current isolation” (Agence France-Presse/Spacewar.com, Oct. 23). Solana and Iran’s nuclear negotiators are expected to hold separate discussions on the Iranian nuclear program today with Italian Premier Romano Prodi, AP reported (Alessandra Rizzo, Associated Press II/Google News, Oct. 24). Meanwhile, some Democrats in the U.S. Congress have expressed concern that a Monday request by U.S. President George W. Bush to fund modifications to B-2 “stealth” bombers to carry “bunker-buster” bombs could foreshadow a planned attack on Iran, Congressional Quarterly reported. Representative James Moran (D-Va.), a ranking member of the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, said he saw no use for the 30,000-pound Massive Ordinance Penetrator inside Iraq or Afghanistan, suggesting that the proposed $88 million aircraft upgrades were meant to enable B-2 bombers to carry the bombs to deep underground targets in Iran. “That’s a clear red flag,” he said, adding he would oppose the funding. The funding request was included in a supplemental $196.4 billion war funds bill that the Bush administration sent to Congress on Monday.  A summary sent with the budget proposal said the request to modify the B-2 bombers to transport the weapons would fulfill “an urgent operational need from theater commanders.” Defense Department reports, military analysts and contractors involved in the bomb’s development have indicated that the weapon is intended for use against the kind of heavily protected targets found primarily inside Iran and North Korea (John Donnelly, Congressional Quarterly, Oct. 23). Elsewhere, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown said yesterday that his government would pursue a new round of U.N. Security Council sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program, AP reported. “We are absolutely clear that we are ready, and will push for, further sanctions against Iran," Brown said. "We will work through the United Nations to achieve this.  We are prepared also to have tougher European sanctions.  We want to make it clear that we do not support the nuclear ambitions of that country." Brown did not directly answer a question about when he would become willing to intervene in Iran militarily. “I believe the combination of our willingness to go through the U.N. process, which we will do, and our ability to take sanctions as a European Union, sends the strongest possible message to Iran,” he said (Associated Press III/USA Today, Oct. 23). Back to top       U.S. Additional Protocol Ratification Inches Forward By Jon Fox Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The United States is moving toward allowing more expansive international supervision of U.S. nuclear industry sites, but just when those additional inspections will become a reality remains unclear, the State Department said (see GSN, Dec. 20, 2005). Included in enabling legislation for the U.S.-Indian civil nuclear agreement passed last year was a provision pushing for a U.S version of the Additional Protocol.  The 2006 Hyde Act, the law exempting India from decades-long policies of nuclear export control, calls for the implementation here of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s expanded inspection regime and affirms the president’s authority to put it into place. Implementation would allow the U.N. nuclear watchdog to visit additional civilian nuclear-related sites, such as uranium mines and enrichment equipment manufacturers.  Existing U.S. safeguards agreements restrict the agency’s access to such sites and technology. While the Indian deal seems to be stalled, possibly forever (see GSN, Oct. 22), the adoption of the Additional Protocol appears to be progressing, albeit more slowly than originally predicted by some. A Bush administration official estimated late last year that the first step toward the Additional Protocol, the development of new regulations at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and work within the Commerce Department, would be completed sometime this past summer. According to the State Department, however, the preliminary efforts needed before the president can sign instruments of U.S. ratification are not yet complete. The United States signed the Additional Protocol in 1998 and the Senate approved the document in 2004, but implementing legislation was not signed until last year. The State Department said the administration continues to work toward the goal of Additional Protocol ratification but could not predict when that might happen. The Energy and Commerce departments and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have all made steps to facilitate U.S. ratification, according to the State Department. The Energy Department has developed software to collect, store and update information for the department’s contribution to the U.S. declaration under the Additional Protocol. The Commerce Department has developed an Additional Protocol reporting system to collect and process nuclear industry submissions and compile that information for eventual transmission to the International Atomic Energy Agency.  The department also expects to soon circulate a draft regulation for comments from those in the U.S. nuclear sector. Details regarding the industry submissions and government regulation were not immediately available. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is also working to expand the scope of the NRC regulations that pertain to the reporting and access requirements of certain U.S. nuclear facilities. The U.S. version of the Additional Protocol is vastly different from those protocols and safeguards applied to non-nuclear-weapon nations.  In those cases, safeguards are intended to detect the diversion of civil nuclear material to secret weapons programs.  The protocols give the agency authority to look for clandestine nuclear activities at any declared or undeclared site. As a declared nuclear-weapon state, the United States is not required to offer the same transparency.  Any sites of “direct national security significance” to Washington are exempt from inspection, according to the original safeguards agreement and the protocol.  Inspections of U.S. such sites can only take place with the authorization of the U.S. government. Back to top       Analysts Locate Possible Syrian Nuclear Site Private analysts have identified a Syrian site that might have been the target of an Israeli raid last month that U.S. officials have said was intended to destroy an incomplete nuclear reactor, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, Oct. 22). The site is about 90 miles from the Iraqi border and lies along the Euphrates River.  That location and the nature of buildings seen in commercial satellite images suggest that the facility is indeed a nuclear site, said David Albright and Paul Brannan of the Institute for Science and International Security. U.S. and other officials familiar with the Israeli attack said the organization had quite possibly discovered the correct site. The commercial imagery, taken in August, shows a number of buildings, including one that has dimensions consistent with North Korea’s five-megawatt nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. “I’m pretty convinced that Syria was trying to build a nuclear reactor,” said ISIS chief Albright.  An ISIS release acknowledges, however, that many questions remain about Syria’s plans and intentions. Other experts questioned the certainty of Albright’s assessment. “You can look at North Korea's [reactor] buildings, and they look like nothing,” said John Pike, director of GlobalSecurity.org.  “They're just metal-skinned industrial buildings.” If Syria had begun to build a reactor, the move would violate the nation’s Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty obligations to report such construction to the International Atomic Energy Agency, according to agency sources.  The treaty requires nations to report their nuclear development plans in advance of construction, the sources said. Agency leader Mohamed ElBaradei also expressed frustration over the failure of nations to report their intelligence findings before the Israeli attack. “We have said, 'If any of you has the slightest information showing that there was anything linked to nuclear, we would of course be happy to investigate it,” he said in an interview with Le Monde.  “Frankly, I venture to hope that before people decide to bombard and use force, they will come and see us to convey their concerns.” He warned that military strikes can backfire by driving potential nuclear proliferators to enhance the secrecy of their efforts. “When the Israelis destroyed Saddam Hussein's research nuclear reactor in 1981, the consequence was that Saddam Hussein pursued his program secretly. He began to establish a huge military nuclear program underground," ElBaradei said.  “The use of force can set things back, but it does not deal with the roots of the problem” (Wright/Warrick, Washington Post, Oct. 24). Back to top       North Korea Said on Schedule for Denuclearization A top South Korean official said today he expects North Korea to easily meet its pledge to disable its plutonium-producing reactor by the end of 2007, Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, Oct. 23). Pyongyang “has a clear will for denuclearization,” said Baek Jong-chun, chief presidential secretary for foreign, security and unification policy. The Stalinist state agreed this month to fully declare its nuclear holdings and to disable three key facilities at the Yongbyon nuclear complex by the end of this year.  Significant disablement of the reactor should occur by mid-November, Baek said. South Korean Foreign Minister Song Min-soon also expressed confidence that the process would move forward quickly. “There is a consensus among countries concerned that when it comes to the disabling, the sooner the better.  North Korea has agreed to it,” he said.  Pyongyang stands to receive energy, diplomatic and security benefits for carrying out the work. The U.S. State Department said last week that experts would begin overseeing the process in early November.  The ultimate goal is to ensure that operations could not easily resume at the disabled plants (Agence France-Presse/Spacewar.com, Oct. 24). Back to top       New Commander Named for Troubled U.S. Nuclear Unit The U.S. Air Force has named a new commanding officer to lead the strategic bomber wing at Minot Air Force Base, N.D., where six nuclear weapons were mishandled in August, the Associated Press reported yesterday (see GSN, Oct. 22). Col. Joel Westa is set to take command later this month, replacing Col. Bruce Emig, who was relieved of the job following the incident in which the nuclear-armed cruise missiles were improperly secured for at least 36 hours. Col. Paul Bell retained his post as vice commander of the Minot base. “Although we’re disappointed in ourselves, we are committed to pressing forward and demonstrating that we are capable of performing all of our missions in a professional manner,” Bell said. The bomber wing has been “decertified from its wartime mission,” according to an Air Force statement, and about 65 Air Force personnel have been disciplined (James MacPherson, Associated Press/Air Force Times, Oct. 23). Back to top       U.S. to Deploy Radiation Sensors in Mongolia The United States plans to install radiation detection equipment at Mongolia’s airport and primary border crossings in an effort to prevent cross-border smuggling of nuclear and radiological material, the U.S. Energy Department announced yesterday (see GSN, Oct. 1). Under a “memorandum of understanding” signed by U.S. Deputy Energy Secretary Clay Shell and Mongolian Finance Minister Nadmid Bayartsaikhan, the National Nuclear Security Administration is expected to place radiation sensors at the Chinggis Khan International Airport in the Mongolian capital of Ulaanbaatar.  The agency also plans to deploy portal monitors at major border crossings to detect radiation sources being transported by vehicles, rail cars and pedestrians. The deployment is being carried out under the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Second Line of Defense program, which places radiation sensors at foreign ports, airports and border crossings and trains personnel to operate the equipment.  So far, the program has installed radiation detection equipment at more than 160 sites (U.S. Energy Department release, Oct. 23).. Back to top       Russia Scraps Nine Topol Missiles Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces said yesterday it had dismantled nine Topol mobile missile systems, increasing the total number of Russian missiles destroyed this year to 36, United Press International reported (see GSN, Oct. 2). Known is the West as the SS-25 Sickle, the Topol is a single-warhead ICBM roughly equivalent in size to the U.S. Minuteman 2.  Russia first fielded the missile in 1985. Disposal was carried out under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which the United States signed with the Soviet Union on July 31, 1991.  The treaty is set to expire on Dec. 5, 2009 (United Press International, Oct. 23). Back to top

GAO Pins Blame for Failed Anthrax Vaccine Contract By Elaine M. Grossman Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON –— The watchdog arm of Congress this week took the Health and Human Services Department to task for a failed $877 million effort to develop and produce a new anthrax vaccine that might be widely distributed in case of a bioterrorist attack (see GSN, April 6). Until now, blame for the contract’s cancellation has fallen largely on the vaccine manufacturer, VaxGen.  The government ended the contract in December 2006 when the company failed to meet a critical milestone in its effort to manufacture 75 million doses of the vaccine (see GSN, Dec. 20, 2006). VaxGen’s product — called a recombinant protective antigen anthrax vaccine — was to use genetic engineering technology to create a biochemical capable of triggering a human or animal immune response to anthrax, an infectious disease.  By contrast, the anthrax vaccine commonly administered to U.S. military personnel and others utilizes laboratory cultures of a nonvirulent strain of anthrax to produce a protective antigen. In the new report, the Government Accountability Office said the government and the company shared responsibility for the Project Bioshield failure: — Health and Human Service’s preparedness and response office awarded the contract to VaxGen in November 2004, when the small California biotechnology firm was just in the initial stages of developing the vaccine.  At the time, several “critical manufacturing issues” had yet to be sorted out.  Moreover, “the contract required VaxGen to deliver 25 million doses of the vaccine in two years, which would have been unrealistic even for a larger manufacturer.” — VaxGen “took unrealistic risks in accepting the contract terms,” including an “aggressive delivery time line,” a “lack of in-house technical expertise,” and the company’s “limited options for securing any additional funding needed.” — The government secured the contract before the Food and Drug Administration made known what kinds of data and testing would be required before the new vaccine would be eligible for use in an emergency. In a formal response submitted to the Government Accountability Office, Health and Human Services said it agreed with some findings and disagreed with others. Among the most notable comments is the agency’s insistence that VaxGen’s vaccine development was sufficiently mature by the time the contract was awarded. “HHS strongly disagrees with the assertion that VaxGen’s candidate [anthrax] vaccine was not sufficiently advanced to warrant a Project Bioshield contract award,” the agency said.  Existing development risks were “deemed to be appropriate given the urgency of the requirement” for a new vaccine in the wake of the 2001 anthrax attacks, according to the Oct. 4 response letter. Back to top       Senate Passes $30M Boost for Bioshield Office In a bid to better prepare the United States for a biological weapons attack, the U.S. Senate unanimously approved a $30 million boost in funding yesterday for the office that manages Project Bioshield, Senator Judd Gregg said (see GSN, April 27). The additional money would raise funding levels to U.S. President George W. Bush’s original request of $189 million for the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority, or BARDA. Gregg (R-N.H.) and Senator Richard Burr (R-N.C.) co-sponsored the amendment to the fiscal 2008 Labor, Health and Human Services and Education Appropriations bill. “Full funding of BARDA is essential to ensure that we are developing the anthrax vaccines and other life-saving countermeasures needed to fill the national stockpile and protect the American public in the event of a bioterror attack or other public health emergency,” Gregg said in a statement. “It takes 10 to 15 years and costs hundreds of millions of dollars to develop and gain approval of promising bioterror countermeasures.  Without full funding for BARDA, we’ll be taking a step backward in this effort,” said Gregg, a member of the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee (Senator Judd Gregg release, Oct. 23). Back to top

European Missile Defense Urgently Needed, Bush Says U.S. President George W. Bush yesterday emphasized the importance of deploying missile defense elements in Europe to counter the potential ballistic missile threat posed by Iran, the Washington Post reported (see GSN, Oct. 23). “The need for missile defense in Europe is real, and I believe it’s urgent,” he said during a speech at the National Defense University.  “Today, we have no way to defend Europe against the emerging Iranian threat, so we must deploy a missile defense system there that can.” U.S. officials believe that Iran will develop a long-range ballistic missile by 2015.  That could occur earlier if it receives foreign support, Bush said. The Congressional Research Service said in a July report that there is significant disagreement among experts with the U.S. stand on Iran’s missile capabilities.  The report says that “Iran has only flight-tested one medium-range missile, the single-stage Shahab 3, having a range of 1,300-2,000 kilometers.” U.S. lawmakers have questioned the need for deploying 10 missile interceptors in Poland and a radar base in the Czech Republic.  They sliced roughly $139 million from funding in the fiscal 2008 Defense Department budget request for development of the Polish site, the Post reported. The White House yesterday denied that Bush’s speech was at odds with Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ statement that the system could remain nonoperational until “definitive proof” had been found of an Iranian missile threat.  The proposal is intended to help address Russian objections to the U.S. plan. “We have not fully developed this proposal,” Gates said in Prague, “but the idea was we would go forward with the negotiations, we would complete the negotiations, we would develop the sites, build the sites, but perhaps would delay activating them until there was concrete proof of the threat from Iran.” White House spokesman Gordon Johndroe said “the program will go forward” (Abramowitz/Pincus, Washington Post, Oct. 24). Bush said yesterday that funding cuts could slow development of the European installations by “a year or more,” the New York Times reported.  One Democratic lawmaker said the focus instead should be on shorter-range missiles that could be used now against U.S. allies or military personnel in the Middle East and Europe. “There’s no need for us to rush ahead to deal with an emerging threat,” said Representative Ellen Tauscher (D-Calif.), “when we have such gaps now for the current threat.” Republican presidential candidates stand behind the U.S. missile defense plans, the Times reported. “We should move as quickly as we can to build missile defense,” former New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani said during a debate Sunday in Florida. Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) dismissed Russian President Vladimir Putin’s complaints about the planned European installations. “This is a dangerous person, and he has to understand that there’s a cost to some of his actions,” he said.  “And the first thing I would do is make sure that we have a missile defense system in place.” The issue rarely comes up among Democratic candidates.  In those limited instances, they generally characterize the effort as a waste of funding that could be used domestically or for more immediate threats, the Times reported (Steven Lee Myers, New York Times, Oct. 24). Back to top

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