North Korean figure skaters celebrate Kim Jong Il’s birthday last week (Getty Images). Reactors Loom Over Korea Talks By Jon Fox Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The issue of light-water nuclear reactors for energy-starved North Korea was not specifically addressed in last week’s nuclear deal, but the success of the six-party bargain could hinge on the provision of the power plants, according to a former State Department official who recently returned from Pyongyang (see GSN, Feb. 14)...Full Story

U.S. Panel Develops Scientific Codes of Conduct By Chris Schneidmiller Global Security Newswire SAN FRANCISCO — A federal panel of scientists and experts has developed preliminary criteria for identifying research that could enable acts of biological terrorism, along with a code of conduct for those performing such studies (see GSN, Feb. 22, 2006)...Full Story

Iran Boosts Nuclear Program as U.N. Deadline Nears With a U.N. Security Council deadline approaching tomorrow, Iran and Western powers moved to bolster their opposing positions in the Iranian nuclear crisis (see GSN, Feb. 16)...Full Story

	Tuesday, February 20, 2007

Reactors Loom Over Korea Talks By Jon Fox Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The issue of light-water nuclear reactors for energy-starved North Korea was not specifically addressed in last week’s nuclear deal, but the success of the six-party bargain could hinge on the provision of the power plants, according to a former State Department official who recently returned from Pyongyang (see GSN, Feb. 14). Under the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea froze its plutonium-producing reactor at Yongbyon and opened its facilities up to international inspectors in return for half a million tons of fuel oil annually and the construction of two proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors by the international community. That deal eventually fell apart after the United States confronted Pyongyang in 2002 with apparent evidence of a uranium-enrichment program, the second avenue to a nuclear weapon. North Korea pulled out of the Agreed Framework, and by 2003 all work on the two proliferation-resistant reactors had stopped.  Neither were anywhere near completion (see GSN, Oct. 7, 2005). The demand for the reactors, however, will probably reappear, said Joel Wit, a former State Department official involved in orchestrating the Clinton-era deal. Wit, who recently met with high-ranking officials in Pyongyang, said he came away from the trip convinced that the light-water reactors will be integral in a newly struck agreement advancing from its infancy to North Korea’s nuclear program being verifiably shut down. While he praised the denuclearization action plan reached last week in Beijing, he cautioned that there remains the serious risk that this agreement could fail.  “There are just too many moving parts,” he said last week during a discussion at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. To negotiate what could become choppy diplomatic waters, Wit said the United States and the other parties to the deal will need to consider what they are willing to offer in terms of civilian nuclear power. Implementation of the agreement brokered between the six parties — the United States, North Korea, South Korea, China, Russia and Japan — is set to progress in phases, with the first including a shutdown of the Yongbyon facility (see GSN, Feb. 15). The second phase will require North Korea to declare all its nuclear facilities and programs, and the third will include discussion of security cooperation in Northeast Asia as well as energy and economic cooperation. “Without a clear view of this third phase I don’t think the North Koreans are going to move much further,” Wit said.  “I know right now we’ve given very little thought to some of the aspects of the third phase, particularly whether we would give North Korea — the five parties — a light-water reactor project.” While the agreement includes the provision to North Korea of 1 million tons of fuel oil with a 50,000-ton initial shipment, Wit pointed out that the even the initial batch would consist of just a few tankers.  During his trip to the North Korean capital, officials made it clear that they want a steady flow of electricity. “They said the light-water reactors were the central issue,” he said.  “That is going to be one of the critical issues that remain to be addressed, and I think that is going to determine whether this agreement has legs or whether it collapses.” State Department officials have described the most recent agreement with North Korea as an extension of the joint statement that emerged from six-party talks in September 2005.  That document reasserted a North Korean right to peaceful nuclear energy but stated that other parties involved would discuss providing light water reactor technology only “at an appropriate time.” Later, a statement from negotiator Christopher Hill fleshed out when that might be.  Discussion of a light-water reactor would only come after Pyongyang has verifiably eliminated any nuclear weapons and all nuclear programs, rejoined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, cooperated with International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and demonstrated a “sustained commitment to cooperation and transparency.” More than a year later, it seems that any discussion of peaceful nuclear energy would not resume in the near future.  “This is not an issue for today or even for several phases in the future,” Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told reporters last week.  “I think everyone understands that there is work for the D.P.R.K. to do in terms of … dismantling the existing program and getting back into good graces.  It’s put that way carefully and for a very important purpose.  It is obvious that the light-water reactor is not a part of the early stages here.” Charles Pritchard, a former White House North Korea advisor under both presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, said the issue of peaceful energy production will likely come up when the United States is pushing for something Pyongyang is reluctant to concede. “At that point I think you will find that the North Koreans will then once again raise the issue of the light-water reactor,” Pritchard told Global Security Newswire.  “They will insist that they have that right as they did in September 2005.” While North Korea’s right to peaceful nuclear technology was acknowledged by the United States in 2005, Pritchard said that does not mean the administration would be pleased to see it happen nor does it mean Washington would participate in providing any reactors. “The bottom line is that they kicked that can down the road — both the U.S. and the North Koreans — and I would expect the North Koreans to use it to their advantage in later rounds,” he said. Robert Einhorn, a former assistant secretary for nonproliferation at the State Department and international security expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said there is no question that North Korea would look for energy assistance but it is not clear that it would specifically demand light-water reactors. He suggested the possibility that Pyongyang, rather than pushing for reactors on North Korean soil, might accept energy piped across the border from the south. “I’m sure there’s a nuclear lobby there that may continue to be committed to nuclear power, but I think we may just have to wait and see,” Einhorn said. Back to top       Iran Boosts Nuclear Program as U.N. Deadline Nears With a U.N. Security Council deadline approaching tomorrow, Iran and Western powers moved to bolster their opposing positions in the Iranian nuclear crisis (see GSN, Feb. 16). In late December, the council issued a 60-day deadline for Iran to freeze its sensitive nuclear activities.  The deadline arrives tomorrow with Tehran showing no signs of heeding the demand.  Also expected this week is a report on Iran’s activities from International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei.  In the past few years, Western officials have leaked alarming details of Iran’s nuclear advances in the days before ElBaradei has released his reports (Greg Webb, Global Security Newswire, Feb. 20). This time, diplomats have reported that Iran has recently moved nine tons of uranium hexafluoride gas from its Isfahan uranium conversion facility to Natanz, according to Agence France-Presse.  That quantity of feedstock would be sufficient to produce enough weapon-grade uranium for one nuclear bomb, according to one diplomat. “Running centrifuges with UF6 is not the act of a country that seeks compromise,” said nonproliferation expert Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.  He called the transfer “provocative.” Furthermore, Iran plans to install one centrifuge “cascade,” containing 164 centrifuges, each week until it meets its goal of having 3,000 centrifuges at Natanz, according to report of Nonaligned Movement diplomats who visited Iran earlier this month (Michael Adler, Agence France-Presse I/Khaleej Times, Feb. 19). For its part, Iran has sought to appear open to diplomacy, with top nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani scheduled to meet ElBaradei today in Vienna, AFP reported. “The Iranians know ElBaradei’s report in general is negative because they have not stopped enrichment, and want something in the report to say that Larijani made a last-minute visit here,” said a diplomat. ElBaradei said he would use the meeting as “a last-ditch effort to try to convince them that it is in their interest to find a way to go into negotiations” (Michael Adler, Agence France-Presse II/Yahoo!News, Feb. 20). Bushehr Delays Meanwhile, Russia disclosed yesterday that it would delay completing construction of a nuclear power plant in Iran because Tehran has not met the contract’s payment schedule, the New York Times reported today(see GSN, Dec. 13, 2006). The delay in finishing the plant at Bushehr, and delivering the first nuclear fuel, could last up to one year, according to Russian officials and experts.  Russia had previously promised to deliver the first batch of fuel next month, the Times reported (see GSN, Sept. 26, 2006). “The accounts are not being paid,” said Ivan Dybov, spokesman for Russia’s nuclear agency.  Iran has sought to change the payment terms by paying Russia in euros rather than dollars, according to the Times. An Iranian official acknowledged a dispute but said that Iran had not missed any payments. “We will try to come up with a solution for the financial problem of the Russian contractor, which is their problem, not the problem of the Iranian side, in the next few days,” said Muhammad Saeedi, deputy director of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization (Andrew Kramer, New York Times, Feb. 20). Back to top       IAEA Prepares to Visit North Korea U.N. nuclear inspectors could visit North Korea within weeks to begin implementing an agreement reached last week under which Pyongyang would freeze its nuclear activities, the Korea Herald reported today (see GSN, Feb. 16). “We are in the process of establishing contact with Pyongyang, said International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei during a trip to Ireland Friday.  “I would hope our people would go there in a few weeks to try to establish the technical parameters of how we do the inspections, monitoring and verification.” The first visit could come before the agency’s governing board begins its first meeting of the year next month (Korea Herald, Feb. 20). Meanwhile, North Korea may have taken a significant step toward easing a major point of contention with the United States. Pyongyang has enacted a new law to ban money laundering and other illicit financial transactions, Agence France-Presse reported today. Charging North Korea with counterfeiting U.S. currency and other money laundering activity, the United States has acted to freeze North Korean assets, particularly at the Macau-based Banco Delta Asia.  The move has been cited by North Korean negotiators as a major obstacle to resolving the nuclear crisis, and the new rules might be designed to ease U.S. pressure, the South Korean National Intelligence Service indicated. “The North Korean enactment seems aimed at settling the BDA issue by introducing a transparent institution to meet the international standards in its financial transactions,” according to the service (Agence France-Presse/Sharewatch.com, Feb. 20). One U.S. analyst, however, expressed doubt Friday that North Korea would ever end its alleged counterfeiting practices. “It’s not stopping,” said David Asher of the Heritage Foundation.  “North Korea is not going to voluntarily back out of the dark side of their system” (Yonhap, Feb. 17). Back to top       Additional Protocol Becomes Law in Kazakhstan Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev has signed a law approving the nation’s Additional Protocol to its nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the presidential press service reported yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 5). “The purpose for signing the protocol is to ensure transparency of nuclear-related activities in the country, facilitate the improvement of the international security system, consolidate this country’s status as a nuclear-free state and demonstrate [the] stability of Kazakhstan’s policy in the area of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons,” according to a parliamentary report (Interfax, Feb. 19). Back to top       ElBaradei Calls on U.S. to Ease Iran Nuclear Crisis U.N. nuclear head Mohamed ElBaradei yesterday urged all parties to make compromises to allow a long-term resolution to the Iranian nuclear crisis, but called on the United States in particular to make significant policy changes, the Financial Times reported (see GSN, Feb. 16). ElBaradei, chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency, reaffirmed an earlier call for a diplomatic “timeout,” in which the Iran would freeze its nuclear activities and the U.N. Security Council would suspend economic sanctions it agreed to impose in December. The goal is to find a way “to present a package in a balanced way and whereby the Iranians would feel that they have not lost face and the international community would feel that their requirements had been satisfied,” he told the Times in a 40-minute interview. While calling for movement from all sides, ElBaradei said the United States and other Western powers must act to ease Iran’s security concerns. “Even if the Iranian program is for peaceful purposes, there is no question that at the back of their minds this is a deterrent, that it has a deterrence value,” he said. Therefore, “the Iranian issue will only be resolved when the U.S. takes a decision to engage Iran directly,” ElBaradei said, urging Washington to offer Iran security guarantees. U.S. and British efforts to modernize their nuclear arsenals were not helping, he added. “When you see here in the U.K. the program for modernizing Trident [ballistic missile submarine], which basically gets the U.K. far into the 21st century with a nuclear deterrent, it is difficult then for us to turn around and tell everybody else that nuclear deterrents are really no good for you, it does not increase your security, because all the weapon states, without exception, are either modernizing, or thinking about developing new weapons not only for deterrence purpose, but actually usable [ones],” ElBaradei said (see GSN, Jan. 26; Daniel Dombey, Financial Times, Feb. 20). Back to top

U.S. Panel Develops Scientific Codes of Conduct By Chris Schneidmiller Global Security Newswire SAN FRANCISCO — A federal panel of scientists and experts has developed preliminary criteria for identifying research that could enable acts of biological terrorism, along with a code of conduct for those performing such studies (see GSN, Feb. 22, 2006). The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity formed in 2004 to provide guidance to U.S. agencies on reducing the opportunities for terrorists to benefit from biological science while minimizing restrictions on research intended to benefit the public. Concerns have been raised in recent years about a number of research projects on diseases and biological agents, including recreations of the polio virus and the 1918 influenza virus that killed up to 50 million people (see GSN, Jan. 19). Two NSABB members were at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science on Monday to present draft documents produced by panel working groups. The first addressed “Criteria and Consideration for Identifying Dual-Use Research of Concern.” Much scientific activity has the potential to be misused.  Research becomes of particular concern when it “can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied by others to pose a threat to public health, agriculture, plants, animals, the environment, or materiel,” the draft document states. NSABB member Paul Keim noted two specific criteria during a panel discussion on biosecurity — that the results could be immediately misapplied and that they would have broad consequences. “The goal of this is not to make scientists feel guilty about doing research, we want scientists to do research,” said Keim, pathogen genomics director at the Translational Genomics Research Institute in Arizona.  “But we need them to be aware that sometimes this information and technologies can be misused.” The document addresses seven areas of research that deserve significant consideration before being conducted or published.  These are research projects that would: — Boost the threat posed by a biological agent or toxin, such as by augmenting its virulence, stability or transmissibility; — Impair a host’s immunity or the effectiveness of an immunization “without clinical and/or agricultural justification”; — Enhance a pathogen’s resistance to vaccines or other countermeasures, or its ability to avoid detection; — Heighten the stability, transmissibility or ability to disperse a biological agent or toxin; — Increase the number of species or populations that could be infected by a disease; — Enhance the host population’s susceptibility to a biological agent; and — Develop a new pathogen or toxin or recreate an extinct agent. “We’re not saying you can’t do them, we’re not saying you shouldn’t do them,” Keim said.  “You ought to be thinking about the fact that you’re doing something that’s going to have some dual-use research concern.” A code of conduct serves as one tool for raising awareness regarding dual-use research and to promote “responsible research behavior,” the board said. Scientific societies, professional organizations and institutions often develop codes of conduct for their members.  None has yet been disseminated on a more general basis across the life sciences. Codes “articulate shared values, and are really important as an educational code, a way to promote responsible conduct,” said NSABB member Murray Cohen, chairman of the Frontline Healthcare Workers Safety Foundation. A NNSAB working group devised a draft code that calls on scientists to: — Assess whether their research has dual-use potential and report that as necessary; — Remain educated on the literature, guidance and regulations regarding dual-use research; — Help others identify and manage dual-use research; — Become role models for responsible behavior, particularly when themselves conducting research of concern; and — Stay alert for misapplication of research. Applicable entities could take the finalized code wholesale, or use it as the basis for development of their own policy, Cohen said. There is likely to be opposition from life scientists, who are used to working with minimal constraints, to what could be perceived as additional rules coming from the biosecurity board, said Peter Aldhous, San Francisco bureau chief for New Scientist magazine.  “Biologists are never going to love anybody who they think is charged with saying that their research should have more oversight and regulation,” he said. It can be difficult to separate risks from benefits in research, Aldhous said.  For example, developing an improved vaccine requires the same knowledge basis as preparing a pathogen to overcome the immune system. Nonetheless, he endorsed the board’s work and encouraged efforts to erase misconceptions about the effort and to raise awareness among scientists.  A culture of responsibility and self-regulation is needed in the research community, Aldhous said, and the board cannot produce that alone.  Educational institutions, government agencies and others must also raise awareness of dual-use biological science. The board has been seeking input from the scientific community as it conducts its work, and will continue to do so, Keim and Cohen said.  A series of open forums is planned. Both Keim and Cohen mentioned the end of 2007 as a possible, though not necessarily certain, time for the board to finish its work. “This is still a work in progress.  We’re still a long way from putting out the final document,” Keim said. Back to top

Army Audit Faults CW Destruction Process U.S. Army auditors have warned that poor project management could prevent the United States from meetings its 2023 target for destroying all of its chemical munitions, the Deseret Morning News reported yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 2). Despite a 2012 international treaty deadline (see GSN, Dec. 11, 2006), the Army has said publicly that it cannot finish the job before 2023 (see GSN, Nov. 21, 2006). However, a report issued five months ago by the Army Audit Agency, but just obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request, has questioned whether even the later target can be met. The report finds that chemical weapon destruction contractors are inadvertently rewarded for delaying the destruction process. “Contractors had little incentive to — and weren’t sufficiently penalized for failing to — prevent or minimize cost and schedule growth,” the report says. The report urges better oversight of contractors and improved payment methods, including possibly a flat fee for each weapon destroyed (Lee Davidson, Deseret Morning News, Feb. 19). Back to top       Vaccine Study Underway for Chemical Agents Dynport Vaccine Company has begun a safety trial for a drug that might prevent and even treat effects of some chemical agents, including sarin, soman and VX, Dynport announced Sunday (see GSN, Aug. 7, 2006). Study plans call for testing 40 volunteers to test the safety of the drug, called “BioScavenger.” “Confirming the safety of this product in humans is a crucial step toward an FDA-licensed chemical nerve agent prophylactic,” said Dynport President Robert House (Dynport release, Feb. 18). Back to top

Dirty Bombs Present Quick Threat, Extended Challenge By Chris Schneidmiller Global Security Newswire SAN FRANCISCO — A radiological “dirty bomb” might detonate without killing anyone immediately, its area of major impact limited to a few hundred meters, experts said Saturday (see GSN, Jan. 8). That is the good news regarding a weapon that also might cause casualties, fire and panic; leave emergency personnel with no time to plan their response; and require a complicated cleanup of dangerous radioactive material in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. “Radiological dispersal devices” would use conventional explosives to spread radioactive materials, with the target almost certainly being an urban area.  The contents of such a weapon could come from the military, industrial or medical sectors, including isotopes used to treat cancer. The intention of such “weapons of mass disruption” would likely be to cause terror and financial damage rather than large numbers of deaths.  The explosion itself is likely to be more immediately lethal than the radioactive material it disperses, according to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  “At the levels created by most probable sources, not enough radiation would be present in a dirty bomb to kill people or cause severe illness,” the agency said in a fact sheet. “Dirty bombs are a curious type of terrorist weapon.  It is certainly possible that a dirty bomb would cause zero prompt casualties,” Ivan Oelrich, Federation of American Scientists vice president for strategic security programs, said in introducing speakers at a panel discussion at the American Association for the Advancement of Science annual conference. The Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico has studied the dispersal of material from a dirty bomb for more than two decades, conducting more than 500 test explosions. Major pathways for exposure include inhalation and what Sandia senior scientist Fred Harper called “groundshine” — fragments of radioactive material that end up on the ground. Particles must be smaller than 10 microns in order to enter the respiratory system, Harper said during his presentation.  However, the smaller the particles the more likely they are to rise above the breathing space of most people in the blast area; a Power Point slide showed 5-micron particles quickly floating to building levels. After a distance of 500 meters, particles would have become too diluted to cause acute radiation sickness, said panel speaker Stephen Musolino, a health physicist at the Brookhaven National Laboratory in New York, who has conducted dirty bomb research with Harper. Most fragments of radiological material would also likely be found within 500 meters, based on variables such as size, initial velocity and aerodynamics, Harper said. The amount of radioactive material in a dirty bomb is not likely to be large, meaning the range at which it could cause acute illnesses would be restricted to a few city blocks.  Material is also not likely to be evenly distributed within that area. “Pretty much everything bad happens within 500 meters, and to a large extent they don’t happen,” Musolino said.  “That’s good news for the public and that’s good news for the first responders.” However, the aftermath of an explosion possibly involving radioactive material in a city setting “could be an extreme emergency, mass casualties and fire may be involved, panic may result, and critical infrastructure (electric and gas utilities, communications) … imperiled thereby worsening the crisis and putting many more people at risk of injury or inhibiting the responders,” Musolino and Harper wrote in a 2006 paper offering guidance to first responders for the first 48 hours after a dirty bomb attack. As the radioactive material will have been released by the time a dirty bomb attack is identified, emergency personnel will not have time to analyze the situation, the researchers said.  That means they must have already developed and codified their immediate response actions and trained for such an event. Among the paper’s recommendations were: — If all that is known about a blast is that it involved a radiological material, the “high” or “hot” zone should be established at 500 meters at all distances from the attack site.  That zone is likely to be constricted as information about the material used in the weapon becomes known; — Designate in advance multiple exit/triage/decontamination points for evacuating citizens.  Most people would not have been exposed to a “medically significant” amount of radiation, but some will need fast decontamination; and — Generally avoid shutting down the ventilation systems to large urban buildings in the area of a dirty bomb detonation.  Some ventilation filters could remove more than 90 percent of weapons material, while deactivating the system could cause a “chimney effect” in which unfiltered air is sucked into a building. Musolino and Harper prepared the report with input from more than 200 fire and hazardous materials, health and hospitals, law enforcement, private sector, and decision-making personnel. New York City has nearly finished preparations based on the research, and numerous other governments have expressed interest in the recommendations, Musolino said. “I’ve had reprint requests from around the world,” he said. Cleanup Removing radioactive material from a contaminated site would present a host of additional problems, said Argonne National Laboratory scientist Michael Kaminski. Obstacles include identifying areas in which decontamination is needed, and then gaining access to those “hot spots,” Kaminski said. “Just like dust seems to find a place in your house where you never seem to get it clean … you can end up with contamination that’s in the crevices of buildings or covering trees, it’s on the sidewalks, it’s in the niches of windows,” he said. There is not likely to be one technology capable of cleaning large areas and tight spaces, Kaminski said. The cleanup itself presents its own set of challenges, including the penetration of radioactive material into porous building structures and the race against time before the radiation embeds itself permanently into the structure.  “This happens over days,” Kaminski said. There are a number of decontamination techniques that could be used following a dirty bomb explosion.  Soil, plants and trees could theoretically simply be hauled away.  For fixed structures, the technology includes solvent washes; a paint-like polymer that could be applied and then removed, taking loose contamination with it; and carbon dioxide, sand or water blasting. Kaminski leads a team of scientists at Argonne developing a super-absorbing gel that could be applied to structures, drawing out the radioactivity and catching it with nanoparticles.  The gel would then be vacuumed off and recycled. After the decontamination has occurred and any runoff collected, the success of the project must be validated to ensure it is safe for people to return to the area, Kaminski said. “Inevitably, no matter which way it goes and how well the technology does, it’s going to be a costly event,” he said.  “It’s a question of doing decontamination so that we can reach levels that are safe.” The last speaker, Committee to Bridge the Gap head Daniel Hirsch, charged that the Homeland Security Department’s radiation cleanup criteria is likely to cause a spike in cancer cases through long-term exposure to radioactive material left after an attack (see GSN, Jan. 4, 2006). The agency’s guidelines rely on “benchmarks” developed by advisory groups such as the International Commission on Radiological Protection, Hirsch said.  The commission advises there be no mandatory cleanup until the radiation dose approaches 10 rem annually, and that generally no cleanup is necessary if the dose is less than one rem per year, he said. Exposure to 10 rem of radiation annually would be roughly equal to receiving 1,700 chest X-rays per year, Hirsch said.  That level of exposure over 30 years would cause an additional one in three people to contract cancer, he said, citing National Research Council research.  Lower levels of radiation exposure, accordingly, would be expected cause fewer cases of cancer. “What government is supposed to be doing is protecting the public and also reducing the power that terrorists might have in causing harm in the United States,” Hirsch said.  “To have guidance like this, in some measure enables the terrorists, it increases the destructive power of their actions.” Musolino responded that Hirsch was taking the ICRP and DHS guidelines out of context, and that the U.S. agency does not recommend allowing up to 10 rem of radiation to remain following a radiological incident.  The Homeland Security guidance recommends using the “optimization” process for determining the necessary amount of cleanup, based on input from federal, state and local agencies and what is necessary to ensure “the protection of the local public health and welfare,” according to a 2006 DHS fact sheet.   Back to top

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