By Jon Fox
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — A former Bush administration official who was part of the delegation that confronted North Korea about its clandestine uranium activities in 2002 said yesterday that intelligence about that program remains “essentially” the same (see GSN, Feb. 28).
Michael Green, an Asia expert on the National Security Council from 2001 to 2005, argued that congressional testimony from veteran intelligence official Joseph DeTrani given in February was misconstrued by the media as the administration backpedaling on North Korea’s uranium enrichment activities. “I don’t think there is any evidence in anything said publicly to back that up,” Green said during a presentation at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. “I think it’s projecting the Iraq intelligence experience — as abysmal as it was — on North Korea inappropriately.” In February, DeTrani, North Korea mission manager for the national intelligence director, spoke up from beside his boss to clarify a point before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Asked about confidence in the intelligence that led to the 2002 confrontation and North Korea’s subsequent abandonment of the Clinton-era agreement to contain plutonium-based nuclear activities, DeTrani said the intelligence community had once had “high confidence” that Pyongyang was acquiring materials for a “production-scale” uranium enrichment facility (see GSN, March 7). Today U.S. intelligence officials still have confidence that such a program is in existence but at “the mid confidence level,” DeTrani said. Observers would be mistaken, however, to consider his statement as a move to downgrade the intelligence community’s assessment of North Korea’s highly enriched uranium program, Green said. With assistance from the South Koreans, U.S. officials had very detailed information about North Korea procurement activities based on plans acquired from the nuclear smuggling network once led by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, according to Green (see GSN, May 9). “What the intelligence community did not know was where it was or how far along the North Koreans were in building this capability,” he said. “But there was no doubt and no dissent on the question of their procurement of everything needed to create a highly enriched uranium facility.” Offering his own clarification of DeTrani’s much-reported statement, Green said DeTrani was indicating there was “high confidence” about North Korea’s procurement activities and “mid confidence” about the program itself. That, he said, is “essentially the same assessment” the administration got in 2002. “I don’t think we know more about HEU, but I think it would be a mistake to conclude we know less,” Green said. Green said there is no question North Korea has the intention to develop a HEU program, and the regime certainly purchased components through a black market network. What remains unclear, he said, is what Pyongyang has done with the material and how far along they may be. Shortly after his testimony and the ensuing reporting, DeTrani issued a statement that appears to step back, or at least clarify, what he told Congress, noting “considerable misinterpretation” in news reports. “The intelligence in 2002 was high quality information that made possible a high confidence judgment about North Korea’s efforts to acquire a uranium enrichment capability,” he wrote. “The Intelligence Community had then, and continues to have, high confidence in its assessment that North Korea has pursued that capability.” Questions about intelligence in 2002 are significant because the confrontation in Pyongyang over U.S. belief in a uranium program initiated a process resulting in Washington suspending the 1994 Agreed Framework that had frozen North Korea’s plutonium production program. North Korea followed the U.S. decision by restarting its Yongbyon nuclear reactor and significantly expanding its inventory of weapon-usable plutonium, enough experts have suggested for more than 10 nuclear devices. In February of this year, North Korea agreed in principle to shut down Yongbyon again in a deal some officials have criticized for looking too much like the scuttled Agreed Framework. In the intervening time, however, North Korea tested a nuclear weapon (see GSN, Oct. 16, 2006). Green, who accompanied Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly on the 2002 trip to North Korea, said North Korea’s first deputy foreign minister, Kang Sok Ju, “essentially acknowledged” a uranium program but not explicitly. “Korean is a language where you can talk around things very effectively,” he said. Green described Kang as enumerating a list of demands to be met if the United States wanted to discuss any highly enriched uranium activities in North Korea. Pyongyang has since claimed that the U.S. interpretation of that meeting was the result of translation problems. Regarding the implementation of the Feb. 13 six-party plan for North Korean denuclearization, Green said he expects North Korea will eventually close the Yongbyon reactor but suggested Pyongyang will forge ahead with uranium enrichment plans. Releasing the $25 million that had been frozen as a result of U.S. action in the Macanese bank Banco Delta Asia could hand the initiative back to North Korea, Green said (see GSN, May 14). “I think we risk making it easier for them to get back to business.” Rather than North Korea simply collecting the $25 million in cash, money the United States claims is derived from counterfeiting and drug-related activities, Pyongyang has insisted on having the money wired to another financial institution, Green said. If it succeeds, the transfer would tear down a wall that has separated North Korea from the international financial community since its funds were frozen in Macao. Banks avoided dealing with the regime out of concerns that they too would be targeted for punitive financial measures by the United States. Alleviating that problem could afford North Korea the means to once again begin procuring equipment for a uranium centrifuge facility, Green said. “You can’t buy some of these very expensive dual-use items by trading mushrooms. You have to have front companies, you have to use cash, you have to have credit.”
By Jon Fox
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — A National Academy of Sciences panel has recommended that Congress withhold production and deployment funding for a Defense Department program to modify Trident missiles to carry conventional warheads (see GSN, March 9). The Conventional Trident Modification program has drawn concerns from lawmakers who have noted that submarine-launched ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads could be indistinguishable from nuclear-armed missiles. Launching a conventionally armed missile for a nuclear attack could accidentally spur an adversary to launch a nuclear counterattack. This “ambiguity” issue has not been adequately addressed, the panel writes in its nine-page interim report. The panel expects to produce a final, more comprehensive, report in early 2008. Pentagon officials have argued that conventionally armed intercontinental ballistic missiles would provide the United States with a “Prompt Global Strike,” allowing it to quickly and precisely attack anywhere in the world. To currently deliver such a strike without using nuclear weapons, the U.S. military must depend on forward-deployed forces, according to the report. In addition to expressing the ambiguity concerns, U.S. lawmakers have questioned whether such a conventional strike capability could lead to a lowered threshold for using force and if U.S. intelligence capabilities are sufficient to accurately identify remote targets. In the fiscal 2007 defense spending bill, only a fraction of what the president had requested to support Trident modification was approved. The fiscal 2008 defense spending plan recently drafted by the House Armed Services Committee prohibits any money being spent on the “operational deployment” of Trident missiles equipped with conventional payloads. The Senate has yet to complete its version of the same bill. The Trident missiles carried on U.S. submarines comprise the mainstay of the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent force, and the conversion program calls for equipping each of the 12 deployed ballistic-missile submarines with two conventionally armed Tridents. In 2006, a Pentagon review of military force structures called for fielding such conventionally armed ballistic missiles on submarines to create an initial global strike capability within 2 years. While recommending that Congress not fund full production or deployment of modified Trident missiles, the committee did support full research and development funding for the program. Trident modification is “not the optimal solution for the longer term,” but within the next 6 years it represents the only “viable, truly global” option for a prompt global strike capability, the committee writes. The panel supports the Pentagon’s $120 million request for research in fiscal 2008, saying it is needed to maintain the potential to deploy a modified ballistic missile in the next 3 to 5 years. “Although there are issues about how — and indeed whether — CTM should be deployed and used that have not yet been adequately addressed, the technical feasibility of CTM has been demonstrated and the design is sound and well thought out,” the panel writes. The committee recommends a funding level that maintains the possibility for an initial capability three years down the line as well as supporting research into a global strike missile that could be launched from the deck of a ship. In light of outstanding questions, the panel reserved endorsement for complete funding. “There remain policy issues,” according to the report, “including dealing with the ambiguity issue and consideration of alternative (albeit less developed) systems that should be fully addressed before committing to … deployment.” Other options in more nascent stages of research and development include hypersonic “boost-glide” vehicles launched from the continental United States and higher-speed cruise missiles deployed from bombers. While these options constitute a greater technical challenge to develop, the panel notes their value in that they are less likely to be mistaken for nuclear-armed missiles, could be routed around sensitive overflight areas and could be diverted in midflight for retargeting. The committee recommended providing a “modest amount of research funding” for these other prompt global strike options proposed by the Army and the Air Force. Noting two separate purposes for a prompt strike capability — limited, time-critical attacks, such as killing a top-ranking terrorist, and strikes at the leading edge of a major combat operation — the panel concluded such weapons would be more valuable for limited attacks. “Given the pace of terrorism’s spread and the consequent uncertainty about where terrorist operations will occur, coupled with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a truly global capability may soon be required, if it is not required today,” the committee writes. Another instance in which a prompt global strike would be of use would be a rogue nation preparing to launch a ballistic missile from a location beyond the immediate reach of conventional forces, the panel notes. In the case of leading the way for a major military operation, the committee was less convinced that conventionally armed ballistic missiles or other similar weapons would be of much use, or necessary. “Almost by definition, many operations requiring this type of capability would have been anticipated with strategic warning and a buildup of regional forces,” they write. Plus, the tense international political atmosphere that goes along with a lead up to such an operation “would increase the risk that a strike might be construed as a nuclear attack or a precursor to a nuclear attack.” The fiscal 2007 defense spending bill requested that the National Academies conduct their evaluation.
This week’s revelation that Iran has attained better-than-expected progress on its uranium enrichment program would not affect U.S. diplomatic goals, Bush administration officials said yesterday (see GSN, May 15). Top international nuclear official Mohamed ElBaradei said this week that Iran has mastered basic enrichment technology, and he suggested that other nations might need to concede Iran that capability. “We do not agree with the assertion that the world must accept whatever advances Iran has made on its nuclear work,” said a U.S. official involved in Iran policy. “Just because you get it doesn’t mean you get to keep it” (Wall Street Journal, May 16). “We do believe that we are on the right course, that there is still time to resolve this diplomatically,” added State Department spokesman Tom Casey. The U.S. goal is to persuade Iran to “ultimately change their behavior and … reverse this program,” he said (Bob Drogin, Los Angeles Times, May 16). One nuclear expert said the new development showed Iran was “making slow but steady progress” toward perfecting the use of uranium enrichment centrifuges. “We think Iran has been moving faster than (the U.S. government) has anticipated,” said David Albright, head of the Institute for Science and International Security (Associated Press/International Herald Tribune, May 15). “It's been obvious for several months that Iran knows how to run a centrifuge,” he added. “They don't know how to run 3,000, but they're going to learn” (Drogin, Los Angeles Times). Still, Washington should maintain its aim of persuading Iran to freeze its enrichment program, Albright said. “Iran is steadily moving toward nuclear weapons capability, and the negotiations are not working, and we may have to settle into an extended crisis where we need to sanction Iran and further isolate them,” he said. “But this doesn't mean war. ... You have to resist the urge to strike out militarily, which could even be worse than Iran gaining nuclear weaponry,” he added (Associated Press). Bolton Weighs InSuch a military option was promoted yesterday as a “last option” — but one that should be seriously considered — by former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton. Iran has “clearly mastered the enrichment technology now. ... They're not stopping, they're making progress and our time is limited,” he told the London Daily Telegraph. “It's been conclusively proven Iran is not going to be talked out of its nuclear program. So to stop them from doing it, we have to massively increase the pressure. "If we can't get enough other countries to come along with us to do that, then we've got to go with regime change by bolstering opposition groups and the like, because that's the circumstance most likely for an Iranian government to decide that it's safer not to pursue nuclear weapons than to continue to do so. And if all else fails, if the choice is between a nuclear-capable Iran and the use of force, then I think we need to look at the use of force.” “If the choice is them continuing [towards a nuclear bomb] or the use of force, I think you're at a Hitler marching into the Rhineland point,” Bolton continued. “If you don't stop it then, the future is in [Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s] hands, not in your hands, just as the future decisions on their nuclear program would be in Iran's hands, not ours.” Bolton acknowledged that military strikes could have unpredictable repercussions. “It's very risky for the price of oil, risky because you could, let's say, take out their enrichment capabilities at Natanz, and they may have enrichment capabilities elsewhere you don't know about.” Nevertheless, the risks could be worth taking. “Imagine what it would be like with a nuclear Iran. Imagine the influence Iran could have over the entire region. It's already pushing its influence in Iraq through the financing of terrorist groups like Hamas and Hizbollah” (Toby Harnden, London Daily Telegraph, May 16).
Myanmar’s agreement yesterday to buy a nuclear research reactor from Russia has raised little concern about nuclear weapons proliferation, Reuters reported today (see GSN, May 15). “Few objective observers question the ruthlessness of the military government in Rangoon or its determination to cling to power,” said Australian security expert Andrew Selth, a research fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute in Australia. “However, an attempt to acquire a nuclear weapon seems completely out of character for a government that, ever since independence, has had a long history of active participation in global disarmament initiatives” (Aung Hla Tun, Reuters/Malaysia Star, May 16). Yesterday’s deal, signed in Moscow by Russian atomic energy chief Sergei Kiriyenko and Myanmar’s science and technology minister U Thaung, was largely a memorandum of understanding that would require significant future negotiations to be implemented, officials said. “So far, a political decision has been taken that says yes, we can do this,” agency spokesman Sergei Novikov said. “This agreement simply opens the door so a contract can be concluded.” Earlier reactor plans for the 10-megawatt reactor were scuttled in 2003, Novikov said (see GSN, May 16, 2002). Russia was unwilling at that time to work with Myanmar’s inability to pay cash for the reactor before the project began, according to the Moscow Times. Now, however, Russia’s financial situation has improved and officials are more flexible, the Times reported (Miriam Elder, Moscow Times, May 16). Russia sought yesterday to ease proliferation concerns by reassuring that the reactor would be monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency, although an agency official said the Vienna institution has not yet been informed of the deal. “If Myanmar was to operate a nuclear facility, it would be subject to IAEA safeguards inspections” because the nation is party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the official said. That assurance would ease concerns in neighboring Thailand, said Thai Foreign Ministry spokesman Piriya Khempon. “As long as it is under the close supervision of the IAEA,” Thailand would not object, he said (Aung Hla Tun, Reuters).
A former U.S. nuclear weapons laboratory contract worker pleaded guilty yesterday to a misdemeanor charge of taking home classified nuclear weapons information, the Santa Fe New Mexican reported (see GSN, May 9). Last October, local law enforcement officials discovered the material in the home of 23-year-old Jessica Quintana, an employee of a subcontractor at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. She now faces a possible sentence of up to one year in prison and a $100,000 fine for pleading guilty to the charge of unauthorized removal and retention of classified information, according to the New Mexican. Federal prosecutors have not objected to her request for a sentence without jail time. Quintana attorney Steve Aarons said his client was happy to avoid a felony charging by reaching a plea agreement with prosecutors on the misdemeanor charge. “We’re relieved that we’re moving forward,” he said. The incident began after Quintana was working on a project to convert aging paper documents into electronic format and took home both electronic storage devices and hard copies because of a heavy workload, Aarons said. Her former employer, Information Assets Management Inc., was partly to blame for the situation, he said. “The subcontractor took on way too much work, and nobody was supervising anybody,” he said. In addition to losing her job, Quintana has also lost her high-level Q security clearance, the New Mexican reported. The laboratory has sought to play down the significance of the material found in her home. “The majority of the material was classified at the lowest levels and was 20 to 30 years old,” said a statement released in November. “None of the documents in question were classified top secret. None of the materials included any of the most sensitive nuclear weapons information.” The incident was the latest in a string of embarrassing security lapses at the laboratory that have led the Energy Department to demand better management. The laboratory yesterday said it has made security upgrades. “A guilty plea validates that this case was clearly a criminal act, and violated lab policies and regulations already in place. However, this incident pointed to much needed change at the laboratory. Since last autumn, we have made very significant progress changing the way we access and use classified materials, particularly electronic media,” the statement says (Andy Lenderman, Santa Fe New Mexican, May 16). Seeking “the bright side,” Aarons said that the classified information removed by Quintana never left her home. “We’ve learned some lessons about this without actually compromising national security. … No one has been permanently harmed here,” he said. “To think that you could just walk out with 200 pages and not get checked” (Felicia Fonseca, Associated Press/International Herald Tribune, May 16).
Security guards at a Texas nuclear weapons facility elected Monday to remain on strike by rejecting a contract proposal from the site’s contractor, the Amarillo Globe-News reported (see GSN, April 17). The guards walked out last month after disputing new requirements for their performance at the Pantex site near Amarillo, where U.S. nuclear weapons are assembled and disassembled. The Pantex Guards Union voted overwhelmingly to reject the latest proposal from contractor BWXT Pantex, said union vice president Cary Raulston. “People were unhappy with the wages and with the insurance premiums,” Raulston said. “They just feel like they are not being compensated for the extra work that they have to do.” Site officials said replacement guards have secured the site well and new personnel would relieve the replacements soon.
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