German Chancellor Angela Merkel has set the agenda for next week’s G-8 summit in Heiligendamm (Marcus Brandt/Getty Images). G-8 Summit to Give Low Profile to WMD Proliferation Issues By Jon Fox Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — Nonproliferation issues are expected to take a back seat next week, when the world’s leading industrialized nations gather in Germany for the annual Group of Eight summit (see GSN, May 9). Previous G-8 meetings have advanced efforts to address WMD proliferation concerns, including a major initiative in 2002...Full Story

Iran Offers More Nuclear Transparency Iran offered yesterday to bolster its cooperation with international nuclear inspectors, a move that could be significant if truly implemented, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, May 31)...Full Story

Forensics Policy Debate Edges Toward Spotlight By Jon Fox Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — A year and a half ago, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration’s John Harvey stood in a hotel conference room six blocks from the White House and roughly outlined a weighty problem (see GSN, Oct. 20, 2006)...Full Story

	Friday, June 1, 2007

G-8 Summit to Give Low Profile to WMD Proliferation Issues By Jon Fox Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — Nonproliferation issues are expected to take a back seat next week, when the world’s leading industrialized nations gather in Germany for the annual Group of Eight summit (see GSN, May 9). Previous G-8 meetings have advanced efforts to address WMD proliferation concerns, including a major initiative in 2002. At the Kananaskis summit in Canada, G-8 leaders announced the Global Partnership against Proliferation of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, a $20 billion commitment to fund nonproliferation projects through 2012 (see GSN, July 14, 2006). During last year’s meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia, the United States and the host nation announced the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism following a bilateral session (see GSN, May 23). This year, under the agenda set by Germany, the focus has shifted.  “The main subject is economic growth in the developing world and in Africa in particular,” said Ulrich Sante, spokesman with the German Embassy.  Climate change is also near the top of the agenda. “Most people I’ve talked with are not really expecting anything of real imagination to come out of the G-8 nonproliferation statement,” said Jon Wolfsthal, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The United States had pushed to get Germany and the other G-8 nations to endorse another so-called “10 plus 10 over 10” plan in which the United States would contribute $10 billion and the other seven nations $10 billion combined over 10 years, similar to the nonproliferation initiative reached in 2002. “The Germans steadfastly resisted that because nonproliferation was not a priority for their G-8 leadership,” Wolfsthal said, adding that the U.S. proposal would have begun in 2012 when the current Global Partnership expired.  Wolfsthal expects some sort of statement on Iran to emerge from the meeting, “but you could write that in your sleep,” he said. “The key point is that nonproliferation seems to have fallen off the agenda of this year’s session,” said Richard Weitz, a senior fellow and nonproliferation expert at the Hudson Institute. Weitz suggested the lack of a focus on nonproliferation at the upcoming summit might be attributable to the fact that divisions among G-8 nations over U.S. plans for ballistic missile defenses in Europe and schisms over how to deal with Iran “do not appear ripe for resolution.” Another, more sanguine, suggestion might be that with a number of additional nations signing on to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in recent weeks “it is not clear what else the G-8 could do at the moment to advance it along,” he said. German Chancellor Angela Merkel presented the summit’s agenda, which Sante said was set some time ago, to the Bundestag just last week. It was disappointing and surprising to some given Germany’s integral involvement in addressing nonproliferation issues in the past, Wolfsthal said. He added that the summit would probably rise above increasingly strident relations between Russia and the United States over U.S. plans to install missile defense bases in Poland and the Czech Republic. “I don’t expect it to be a major meltdown,” Wolfsthal said.  Germany, he said, has acted as the intercessor between Russia and the United States in the past and will work hard to see that the meeting proceeds smoothly. Back to top

Iran Offers More Nuclear Transparency Iran offered yesterday to bolster its cooperation with international nuclear inspectors, a move that could be significant if truly implemented, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, May 31). Iranian nuclear envoy Ali Larijani met yesterday in Madrid with EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana to discuss ways to restore high-level talks to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis. “This is the first time they made such a serious offer without preconditions,” said one official, adding that Larijani had said the nation could resolve outstanding questions in “a short timetable.” While the offer could potentially ease international concerns over Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, Larijani did not agree to meet a Western demand for Iran to freeze its uranium enrichment program (George Jahn, Associated Press/PR-Inside.com, June 1). “We cannot say that there has been a fundamental breakthrough, but what we can say it that we have advanced in many important subjects,” Solana told reporters after yesterday’s four-hour meeting (Burnett/Cooper, New York Times, June 1). The two diplomats agreed to meet again two weeks (Jahn, Associated Press). Back to top       Forensics Policy Debate Edges Toward Spotlight By Jon Fox Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — A year and a half ago, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration’s John Harvey stood in a hotel conference room six blocks from the White House and roughly outlined a weighty problem (see GSN, Oct. 20, 2006). “The problem is we want to avoid nuclear detonation on U.S. soil with no clear origin,” he said. It was a question about deterrence in a post-Cold War era where Mutually Assured Destruction can become obsolete in the face of stateless terrorism. “Once a terrorist gets his hands on a nuclear explosive, we don’t necessarily believe we can deter him from using it … for obvious reasons,” he said, addressing a national security conference. What Harvey, director of the administration’s policy planning staff, was suggesting was that the terrorism may not be deterrable, but the nuclear element could be. Harvey’s goal is to “dissuade rogue states from transferring nuke warheads to terrorist groups.” The question of just how to deter that transfer, or the transfer of fissile material that could fuel a bomb, has been gaining increased attention since Harvey’s speech and seems poised to move further into the spotlight in the coming year. Keeping fissile materials or warheads out of the hands of terrorists could hinge on what experts call nuclear forensics and attribution — the idea that technicians and scientists could sift through the debris of a nuclear attack and determine where the bomb’s material came from. The American Association for the Advancement of Science is in the very early stages of a study on nuclear forensics, and the Homeland Security Department has plans for a White House exercise exploring forensic capabilities after a domestic nuclear explosion. With robust forensics and attribution capabilities — paired with a declared retaliatory policy — the United States could, in effect, hold nuclear states around the world accountable for a nuclear transfer. For such a dissuasive policy to work, Harvey noted that the United States would have to provide some “selected insights” into the capability of the U.S. forensics program.  However, Washington would also need to be careful to avoid releasing sensitive information that could help producers of fissionable material disguise their product. That concern is apparent in the infrequent and cryptic nature of the public comments from government officials on anything related to the U.S. ability to conduct nuclear forensics. The Evolving Policy Debate Despite the sensitive nature of the issue, however, the topic has been migrating closer to the spotlight.  An upcoming report from the Preventive Defense Project, a joint research initiative between Stanford and Harvard led by former Defense Secretary William Perry and former Assistant Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, is expected to touch on post-explosion forensics and attribution. “The whole issue of nuclear terrorism and how to prevent it, deter it, deal with it if it happens is getting more attention,” Michael May, a professor of engineering at Stanford and expert on nuclear issues, said recently in an e-mail.  “It has moved forward to the extent of raising it higher in the consciousness of those people who have to do something about it.” How well or how quickly the United States could pinpoint the source of fissile material following an attack of nuclear terrorism, however, still remains difficult to determine based on official comments. While there have been optimistic statements made to the press, some experts have cautioned that attribution capabilities are still lacking.  In February 2006 a defense document obtained by the New York Times described an “initial integrated operational attribution capability for accurate and rapid attribution.” Contradicting that view, experts and some in the scientific community have suggested there are certain cases where pinpointing the source of nuclear material would simply be impossible and there remains work to be done in the area (see GSN, July 28, 2006). The science of nuclear forensics was deployed during the Cold War but earnest research into the attribution of a domestic nuclear event began in 1999, spearheaded by the Defense Department and its Defense Threat Reduction Agency.  Then following the North Korean nuclear test in October 2006 the subject received a more thorough airing in the media than it ever had before (see GSN Oct. 17, 2006). That month, Stanford’s May, Jay Davis, founding head of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and Raymond Jeanloz, a professor of planetary science at the University of California, Berkeley and nuclear expert, jointly published an article in Nature. They wrote that an isotopic signature would be available within hours after a terrorist nuclear detonation, but determining where that material came from hinges on already having a database of existing nuclear signatures.  It is that database that some experts suggest remains incomplete. Scientific analysis can indicate how long it has been since plutonium has been reprocessed, where uranium was mined based on its composition and even the process that was used to enrich it.  Such information might not conclusively identify a source but could eliminate possibilities, they note. In their article May, Davis and Jeanloz propose creating an international data bank that would “greatly reduce the time between this most terrible of events and the ability to respond to it.”  Pulling together such a database of nuclear information would require extensive international cooperation. The United States has developed its own database based on its nuclear weapons test programs and monitoring of atmospheric nuclear tests conducted during the Cold War.  U.S. officials continue to add information to the database, but comments from the head of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Vayl Oxford, carefully avoid any specificity about the completeness of that catalogue. Oxford’s office, a division within the Homeland Security Department, launched its National Nuclear Forensics Center in October 2006, just before the North Korea nuclear test.  Staffed with Defense Department, Energy Department and FBI officials in addition to the DHS staff, the center is working on an “integrated plan” to respond to a nuclear event, Oxford said during a May 24 address (see GSN, May 25). “I’ve challenged them to come up with a forensics and attribution exercise at the Cabinet level by March 2008,” he said.  “We need to know by then how well we stand in the community, and there’s been a lot of dialogue on whether we can do this or not do this.  We need to challenge the community to show where we are in about a year’s time.” Collecting and Analyzing Nuclear Fingerprints In developing the U.S. forensics and attribution capability, the DNDO national forensics center is coordinating efforts with the national laboratories to make the U.S. nuclear database as complete as possible, Oxford said. “You need to do a lot of that detailed science characterization of the material upfront,” he said.  “Our job is to make sure that that knowledge base exists so that in a pinch you have something to reference.” In actually conducting forensics work Lawrence Livermore and Savannah River national laboratories function as “hubs” for the efforts, farming out specialized analysis to other national laboratories. Across the science complex, a core group of 30 to 50 scientists would collaborate on nuclear forensic cases, according to a February article in Science & Technology Review, a journal published by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The utility of nuclear forensic techniques could, however, be degraded by the proliferation of one type of uranium enrichment technology through the black market network once led by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan.  With the same centrifuge technology transferred from Pakistan to Iran and North Korea, the signature of highly enriched uranium from a number of locations could be difficult to differentiate, former Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci has suggested (see GSN, June 21, 2006).  The deterrent affect of attribution could be eroded as a result. Despite increased focus on the need for such a U.S capability the science has not progressed quickly and remains roughly where it was last year or the year before, said Charles Ferguson, a science and technology fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations. “In general, I think the technological problems are pretty well known,” he said.  “Ideally, you’d like have a library of nuclear materials from every country.  I think in practice we’re never going to get to that level.” With the hope of increasing that library, Oxford said U.S. officials plan to discuss the issue with the the International Atomic Energy Agency.  In addition, nuclear forensics will be the subject of talks between the Homeland Security Department and its international counterparts during a pair of linked security conferences to be held next month in Miami and Kazakhstan. The study from the American Association for the Advancement of Science is to be chaired by Michael May but has yet to be rigidly defined, AAAS project director Benn Tannenbaum said. Tannenbaum said the idea was sparked by the May, Davis and Jeanloz piece from late last year and the hope is the study can provide a survey of the forensics and attribution landscape. “It’s going to frame what kind of questions you should and could be asking,” he said.  “Can you use forensics as tool for nonproliferation?” A Line in the Sand Publicly, very little has been advanced by the White House regarding the the use of attribution to deter nuclear transfers and terrorism.  The most explicit comment came on Oct. 9, following the North Korean detonation of a sub-kiloton nuclear explosion. President George W. Bush drew a clear line for North Korean leadership.  The rogue regime had already demonstrated at least a limited nuclear capability, and Bush warned that a nuclear transfer to a terrorist group would spur repercussions. Such a transfer would be “considered a grave threat to the United States, and we would hold North Korea fully accountable for the consequence of such action,” he said.  Determining the North Korean provenance of any nuclear material could come through intelligence gathering or, if material was actually intercepted or used, through nuclear forensics. A more explicitly spelled out or expansive policy could be problematic, putting the United States in what some call a “commitment bind.”  If a bomb were to go off on U.S. soil and it was determined to be a stolen Russian warhead, attacking Moscow in return would be an unattractive option, Ferguson points out. Of course, as Harvey noted a year and a half ago, such a declared retaliatory policy could prompt a nation to be more forthcoming about a missing weapon.  Simply put, “you lose a weapon, you better tell us,” he said. Even given the deterrent possibilities of attribution technology, keeping the material locked up and secure remains the most favorable option to prevent a nuclear terrorism event, both Ferguson and May point out. “I think we have to come up with a whole suite of responses to encourage countries to secure their material more effectively,” Ferguson said. Still, May said, it is important to prepare for the possibility of a domestic nuclear attack, and attribution plays into that. “Prevention is best, and locking up the material is moving forward slowly, I understand,” May wrote in an e-mail.  “But preparing to deal with it can make a huge amount of difference in the consequences of what would be in any case a catastrophe.  Not only can thousands of lives be saved with good preparation, but the country’s democratic institutions would have a much better chance of surviving also.” Back to top       All Russian Border Posts to Get Radiation Detectors Russia and the United States have accelerated plans to install radiation detectors at all Russian border crossings, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration announced today (see GSN, May 25, 2006). Under the revised effort, officials would erect detectors at all 350 air, sea and land border posts by 2011, according to a release.  If successful, the detectors’ installation would be completed six years ahead of original plans intended to detect and deter nuclear smuggling. “As our counterproliferation and antiterrorism partnership with Russia grows stronger, the security provided for through this agreement will not only make Russia safer, but it will also increase the security of the United States and our allies in the region,” NNSA Acting Administrator Bill Ostendorff. The two nations have agreed to share the costs equally (NNSA release, June 1). Two hundred border posts would be completed by the end of this year, the New York Times reported.  The United States spent $40 million on the project through 2006 and expects to spend another $100 million by the end of 2011 (C.J. Chivers, New York Times, June 1). Back to top       Korea Refuses to Budge on Banking Dispute North Korea yesterday rejected a U.S. suggestion that Pyongyang begin to freeze its nuclear program before resolving a lingering financial dispute, Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, May 31). North Korea has refused to start implementing the first stage of a February denuclearization pact until it receives about $25 million once frozen under U.S. pressure by the Macau-based Banco Delta Asia.  U.S. officials have sought to free the money, but so far no other bank has been willing to accept the funds, reportedly fearing U.S. repercussions. Yesterday U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill urged North Korea to believe that Washington was genuinely trying to resolve the problem and to begin shutting down its plutonium production reactor. The recommendation was not accepted. “Our position has been clear from the beginning," said Kim Myong Gil, deputy chief of North Korea’s U.N. mission in New York.  “The issue of BDA has to be solved first.” Kim did acknowledge, however, that “the U.S. side is making efforts” to address the money problem (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, June 1). Back to top

Tuberculosis Traveler Apologizes A U.S. man apologized today for flying on several commercial airliners despite being treated for a drug-resistant form of tuberculosis, the New York Times reported (see GSN, May 31). Andrew Speaker, a 31-year-old Atlanta lawyer, flew to Greece for his wedding earlier this month after being advised by doctors to avoid commercial travel.  His trip involved several flights within Europe in addition to his original departure leg to Paris and his return to Montreal. He is now isolated in a Denver hospital room, where he is expected to remain for several weeks, according to the Times.  Despite his diagnosis with the contagious disease, Speaker has shown few symptoms and officials said he is unlikely to have infected others. Still, health officials have criticized his decision, as did fellow passengers, many of whom are being encouraged to be tested. “He stepped on a plane with 487 people, one of the largest aircraft that Boeing makes, and he put us all at risk, just so he could go get married,” said Jason Vik who was on Speaker’s flight to Paris. “I don’t expect those people to ever forgive me. I just hope they understand that I truly never meant them any harm,” Speaker told ABC’s “Good Morning America” today. He said doctors had urged him not to take his long-planned wedding trip, but they did not order him to remain in the country. Doctors told him that he was not contagious or dangerous, Speaker said of a meeting that he said was recorded by his father, also a lawyer. “My father said, ‘OK, now, are you saying, prefer not to go on the trip because he’s a risk to anybody, or are you saying that to cover yourself,’” he said. “And they said, we have to tell that to cover ourself, but he’s not a risk.” Once in Europe, Speaker ignored a more direct order from health officials not to board any more airliners and U.S. customs officials were given his name and commanded to detain him if he tried to re-enter the country. Nevertheless, a U.S. border agent at Plattsburgh, N.Y., allowed Speaker to drive into the country after assessing that he did not look sick, the Times reported. Adding to the story, Speaker’s father-in-law is a tuberculosis scientist who has worked at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, according to the Times. “My son-in-law’s TB did not originate from myself or the CDC’s labs, which operate under the highest levels of biosecurity,” said Robert Cooksey, adding that he “was not involved in any decisions my son-in-law made regarding his travel” (Altman/Holusha, New York Times, June 1). Back to top       Pentagon to Conduct Biological Safety Test The U.S. Defense Department plans to test a biological agent sensor system at its Pentagon headquarters tomorrow, the Washington Examiner reported today (see GSN, April 20, 2004). The planned activity, calls for using a truck to disperse a harmless dust in the parking lot, exposing up to 50 volunteers to the simulated weapon agent. Officials are then to use sensing equipment to screen the volunteers. The system is part of a five-year effort to install a biological detection system that can automatically adjust the Pentagon’s air-circulating systems if sensors detect a lethal agent, according to the Examiner (Maria Hegstad, Washington Examiner, June 1). Back to top

U.S. Lawmakers Plot Chemical Plant Security Moves By Chris Strohm Congress Daily WASHINGTON — U.S. lawmakers who support giving states the power to pass and enforce chemical security laws that are stricter than federal regulations might have lost one battle last week, but are now considering the fiscal 2008 Homeland Security appropriations bill for the next step in their campaign (see GSN, April 3). A provision that would give states the authority to go beyond federal chemical security laws was originally inserted into the supplemental spending bill for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  But the provision, which was strongly opposed by the chemical industry, was removed from the final version of the bill before it was sent to President George W. Bush and signed into law last week. That has shifted attention to the Homeland Security appropriations bill, according to aides. “It’s an obvious vehicle,” said an aide to Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.) who has been one of the staunchest advocates for the provision. The aide said Lautenberg remains committed to getting the provision through Congress. “He’s going to push it so that it becomes law,” the aide said. “It’s not a question of if but when. It will be there, it’s just a matter of what the vehicle is.” Democrats on the House Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee have already inserted such a provision into their version of the fiscal 2008 Homeland Security spending bill. Republicans have vowed to oppose it, though, as the bill moves through a full committee markup in June and goes to the House floor. It is not yet clear how much support there will be for attaching a similar provision to the Senate’s version of the Homeland Security spending bill, which has yet to be marked up. Supporters say the provision is needed to override new regulations from the Homeland Security Department. Those regulations, set to take effect in June, say state governments cannot pass laws that conflict with or frustrate federal rules when it comes to regulating security at facilities that make, store or process chemicals. The chemical industry has heavily opposed any legislative attempt to give states the power to pass stronger regulations. Indeed, one of the top goals during a major gathering of the National Association of Chemical Distributors this month was to lobby lawmakers on the issue. “NACD is pleased that Congress dropped the chemical security provisions from” the emergency supplemental bill, NACD President Christopher Jahn said in a statement. “This is a victory not only for the chemical industry, but for the entire nation. The new Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards are scheduled to take effect in less than two weeks.” He added: “For the first time since the 9/11 terrorist attacks almost six years ago, high-risk chemical facilities throughout the nation will be required by law to conduct vulnerability assessments and implement site security plans. Congress needs to give the new regulations a chance to work before changing the rules.” But Lautenberg’s aide noted that governors support legislation that would give their states the power to pass laws that go beyond the federal regulations. The National Governors Association recently sent top House and Senate appropriators a letter in support of such legislation. “As governors, it is our duty to protect the citizens of our states,” the letter said. “State and local governments have primary responsibility for zoning [and] housing chemical facilities, and regulating their operations. It is critical that states retain their authority to supplement the federal chemical security program with additional security protections deemed necessary by the state.” Back to top

Bush Backs European-Based Missile Defense Plans U.S. President George W. Bush yesterday defended his plans to deploy missile defenses in Eastern Europe, the Associated Press reported.  His comments followed scathing remarks yesterday from Russian President Vladimir Putin, who accused Washington of restarting a Cold War-style arms race (see GSN, May 31). Putin and other officials have criticized U.S. plans to put missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic, both former Warsaw Pact nations (see GSN, May 14).  U.S. officials, however, have repeatedly stated that the defenses are not intended to and would not defeat Russian strategic missiles. “The Cold War is over,” Bush told reporters yesterday.  “We're now into the 21st century, where we need to deal with the true threats, which are threats of radical extremists who will kill to advance an ideology, and the threats of proliferation.” Bush spoke on the eve of a trip he plans next week in Europe, where part of his mission is discuss the missile defense issue with Putin. “He thinks it's aimed at him. It's not,” Bush said.  “Russia is not hostile. Russia is a friend.” Rather, the defenses would be designed to address the threat of Iranian ballistic missiles, he said. “I'm deeply concerned about Iran having a nuclear weapon that could fly toward Europe, or, for that matter, toward any other allies,” Bush said. “And we don't want to ever have ourselves in a position where the world could become blackmailed. And, therefore, one way to deal with this issue is through a missile defense system” (Jennifer Loven, Associated Press/San Diego Union-Tribune, June 1). Back to top

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