By Elaine M. Grossman
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — Adm. William Fallon, head of the U.S. military’s Central Command, said late last month he is confident Pakistan would avoid ratcheting up tensions in its nuclear weapons standoff with India, despite some troubling signs (see GSN, June 25).
The top commander’s remarks, offered in an exclusive July 27 interview with Global Security Newswire, come as the government of Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf appears to be moving to dramatically increase the nation’s nuclear weapons production capacity. At the same time, Pakistan is renewing its condemnation of a pact the Bush administration has struck that promises U.S. aid for India’s nuclear energy program. The agreement, which has not yet been approved by either nation’s legislature, would grant New Delhi access to sensitive U.S. nuclear technologies in exchange for submitting its civilian nuclear reactors to international oversight (see GSN, Aug.3). The deal’s omission of any restrictions on India’s military nuclear production facilities has some Pakistani leaders fuming. In the latest statement on the matter, the Pakistani body that controls the nation’s nuclear weapons hinted a substantial response is in the making. “The U.S.-India nuclear agreement would have implications on strategic stability [in the region],” said Pakistan’s “nuclear command authority,” as Reuters reported Thursday from Islamabad. However, the top U.S. officer in the region remains unfazed. “I think that [the Pakistanis] would recognize that it is not in their best interest to end up increasing tensions with India, particularly in the business of nuclear weapons,” said Fallon, who assumed the post at Central Command in March. “I feel very confident that the leadership of both countries recognize this is not a place they want to go. And they have other, higher priorities than this.” For Musharraf, higher priorities might include a mounting military operation against radical Islamists in the largely ungoverned western frontier, according to the admiral. Al-Qaeda’s senior leaders also are believed to be in hiding in North Waziristan province, along the border with Afghanistan. During a June meeting in Islamabad, Fallon says he urged Musharraf to consider taking steps aimed at further easing tensions with India. “If the [Pakistani] army’s still very concerned about a strategic threat from India, they’re going to be loathe to want to get very involved in anything at their back door,” in terms of ridding militants and terrorists from the lawless tribal areas, Fallon said. In July, the Pakistani leader is believed to have shifted at least 20,000 troops from the Punjab region away from the Indian border, said Ahmed Rashid, a Pakistani journalist who has written extensively about militant Islam. An estimated half-million or more Pakistani forces patrol the boundary with India. Following a wave of terrorist bombings, the occupation of Islamabad’s Red Mosque by student militants and mounting political pressure from Washington, Musharraf in July deployed two additional brigades to the tribal northwest, the Washington Post reported yesterday. Yet it appears the Pakistani military also continues to retain a significant focus on its nuclear competition with India. Satellite photographs of construction at the Khushab nuclear site appear to show a partially completed heavy-water reactor that independent analysts say might be capable of producing enough plutonium for 40 to 50 nuclear weapons a year. That would constitute a 20-fold increase in Pakistan’s production capacity. The new plutonium production reactor, the country’s third, could also allow the production of a new generation of lighter and more powerful nuclear weapons, according to experts. “I think the [U.S.-Indian] deal confirms Pakistani military assumptions that India is going to grow its nuclear arsenal at an increased pace,” Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, told GSN today. “It appears, at least to me, that we have the makings of a more serious ... arms competition.” Critics say U.S. assistance for India’s nuclear energy program could allow the South Asian nation to redirect domestic fissile material to its weapons production program while using foreign supplies for the nation’s energy needs. With Musharraf’s focus already shifting to battling extremists, Fallon said he is “not particularly concerned” that the Pakistani leader would heighten nuclear tensions with India. “[Both] governments know there is too much at stake,” Fallon said. “They’re taking enough steps in the right direction that I think the leaders both recognize the incredibly negative aspects of a renewed arms race. That’s not their priority.” The two neighbors have undertaken a number of confidence-building measures in recent years, including a nuclear risk reduction pact signed in February (see GSN, Feb. 21). Pakistan also has proposed a “strategic restraint regime” to curb deployment of both nuclear and conventional weapons throughout South Asia, though India has not embraced that idea (see GSN, Aug. 23, 2006). Fallon explained the Pakistani denunciations of the new U.S.-Indian accord as something to be expected from a multidimensional culture facing an array of competing threats. “It’s a complex society and you’re always hedging,” he said. Pakistan conducted its first nuclear weapons test in 1998 just two weeks after India conducted its first tests since 1974. Each nation is now believed to have between 30 and 50 nuclear weapons. As neither nation has signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, few of their nuclear facilities have been subject to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
A senior Bush administration official last week defended the recently completed U.S.-Indian nuclear trade deal and expressed hope that Congress would approve the arrangement by the end of this year (see GSN, Aug. 3). Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns led the U.S. negotiating team that produced the text officially released last week. The agreement allows New Delhi to purchase U.S. nuclear materials and technology in exchange for placing India’s civilian nuclear sector under international monitoring. With the deal pending last year, the Congress approved a bill to exempt India from most U.S. nuclear nonproliferation rules, including those that have required Washington’s nuclear trade partners to have joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and to have all their nuclear facilities under international safeguards. In an interview with the Council on Foreign Relations, Burns explained why the Bush administration was ready to provide the exemption to India. The agreement “speaks to the modern-day needs of the Nonproliferation Treaty as well as what we need to do to strengthen it in the years ahead. You’ve got this anomalous situation where you’ve got countries inside the NPT, like Iran, cheating. And you’ve got countries outside the NPT, including the soon-to-be largest country in the world, India, not cheating but following the rules of the NPT,” he said. ”To strengthen the nonproliferation system for the future, it just makes every bit of sense to bring India into it and to do that in such a way that doesn’t strengthen its military arsenal, but does allow it to move forward to modern nuclear-plant construction with the latest technology,” Burns added. “It finally straightens out this situation we’ve had where India has been on the outside for 35 years. It allows them to put 14 of their 22 power reactors under safeguards and all future breeder reactors (a reactor that produces energy as well as new fuel),” he said. “And within 25 years, I think 90 to 95 percent of their entire establishment will be fully safeguarded. So the choice is: Should we isolate India for the next 35 years, or bring it in partially now and nearly totally in the future? I think that’s an easy choice for us to make strategically.” Burns also denied some critics’ claims that the deal skirts the intent of the congressionally approved exemption for India. The exemption, signed into law by President George W. Bush in December, requires the United States to cut off nuclear supplies if India tests a nuclear weapon. The text of the recent agreement, however, contains language that critics have said promises U.S. aid in finding alternative nuclear suppliers for India if U.S. supplies are ended. “If … disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs, the United States and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries to include countries such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India,” the agreement says. Burns denied that the language circumvents the spirit of the U.S. law. “That’s absolutely false,” he said. “I negotiated the agreement and we preserved intact the responsibility of the president under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 that if India or any other country conducts a nuclear test, the president — he or she at that time in the future — will have the right to ask for the return of the nuclear fuel or nuclear technologies that have been transferred by American firms.” Burns said that the administration could formally submit the deal for congressional approval “by November or December” if India can reach a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency by then. New Delhi must also persuade the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group to alter its nuclear trade guidelines that currently deny nuclear exports to non-NPT nations lacking safeguards over all their nuclear facilities. Burns said the IAEA safeguards agreement could be completed “in the next 30 to 35 days” (Robert McMahon, The Capital Interview, Council on Foreign Relations, Aug. 3).
North Korea could receive 50,000 tons of fuel oil from China this month during the second phase of denuclearization set by a February deal at the six-party talks Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, Aug. 2). The matter is expected to be discussed when diplomats meet this week for working-level talks on energy assistance, a diplomatic source told the Yonhap News Agency. North Korea received 50,000 tons of fuel from South Korea while it carried out the first phase of the agreement — halting operations at its Yongbyon nuclear complex under monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The second phase of the deal calls for Pyongyang to fully declare and disable its nuclear program. “We understand China will begin providing 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to the North in mid-August,” the source said. “A working group dealing with the energy and economic aid slated for Aug. 7-8 … will decide on detailed measures on the provision.” Nations participating in the six-party process ultimately could supply North Korea with a total of 1 million tons of oil and related aid for fully shuttering its nuclear program (Agence France-Presse/The Times of India, Aug. 5). South Korean negotiator Chun Young-woo said today that officials at this week’s meeting in the truce village of Panmunjom would “discuss … how to give energy aid to the North,” the Associated Press reported. He would not say what he expected to come out of the session (Associated Press I/Yahoo!News, Aug. 6). Four days of visits to military bases last week by North Korean leader Kim Jong Il could indicate he is preparing to make a decision on his country’s nuclear program, AP reported Saturday. The number of trips in a limited time span is unusual, according to AP. While the Chosun Ilbo newspaper indicated the trips could indicate further movement on the nuclear issue, one South Korean expert offered another explanation. “I think the main purpose is to boost the morale of soldiers during vacation season and ahead of” a U.S.-South Korean military exercise scheduled from Aug. 20 to 21, said Koh Yu-hwan of Dongguk University in Seoul. Pyongyang on Friday called the exercise an “unacceptable provocation” (Associated Press/Yahoo!News, Aug. 4).
U.S. President George W. Bush signed homeland security legislation Friday that calls on foreign seaports within five years to conduct radiation scanning on all U.S.-bound cargo, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Aug. 3). The legislation is primarily intended to institute additional antiterrorism recommendations from the Sept. 11 commission (see GSN, Jan. 17, 2006). It was approved overwhelmingly in the House and Senate. Supporters of the port requirement say it would help prevent terrorists from shipping a radiological or nuclear weapon to the United States. Critics say the measure is not practical and could damage trade. The law allows the homeland security secretary to indefinitely extend the deadline for certain ports in two-year increments. Along with the port measure, the law mandates inspections within three years of all cargo carried on passenger aircraft and would direct more security money to cities and states considered to be at higher risk for terrorist attacks. It also directs more than $4 billion over four years toward rail, transit and bus security; demands disclosure of funding directed toward intelligence agencies; and makes aid to Pakistan dependent on White House confirmation that progress is being made in that country against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Former commission Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton said that roughly 80 percent of the panel’s 41 recommendations have been met following approval of this legislation, AP reported (Deb Riechmann, Associated Press/San Diego Union-Tribune, Aug. 3).
Iran’s installation of uranium enriching centrifuges at its underground Natanz facility has slowed over the last two months, Reuters reported Friday (see GSN, Aug. 3). Iran appeared on its way to having 3,000 centrifuges operating by the end of July in its drive to achieve “industrial scale” nuclear fuel production. However, the country remains far short of that goal, according to diplomats who have been tracking U.N. inspections of the site. Outside analysts have been unable to determine the cause of the installation shortfall, but diplomats and nuclear analysts have suggested technical obstacles and political motives as sources for the slowdown. Iran has had difficulty operating significant numbers of centrifuges simultaneously for extended lengths of time at supersonic speed, a step necessary to enrich uranium in quantities sufficient to work as fuel or in weapons. Iran announced achieving “industrial capacity” after installing about 2,000 centrifuges in the first half of 2007, although analysts said it had still not overcome technical problems at the Natanz plant. Tehran ultimately aims to operate 55,000 centrifuges in 300 interlinked networks, or “cascades,” at Natanz. “Last week we were told that Iran had only 10 cascades running, with two more in vacuum-testing (without uranium feedstock inside) and some other centrifuges being tested for leakage,” a European Union diplomat told Reuters. “Iran has apparently deliberately slowed down the commissioning of centrifuges, which means they've made little progress since the last [International Atomic Energy Agency] report to us in May,” he said, referring to a report to the agency’s 35-nation governing board. “Whether this is a technical issue, or political signal, no one knows yet,” he said. One diplomat confirmed a continuation of the slowdown in centrifuge installation first discussed by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei on July 9. The diplomat said, though, there was no evidence of technical problems at the Natanz plant. “Iran rushed the commissioning in the spring to convey a fait accompli to Washington,” said the diplomat. “The slowdown is political too. They could speed up again whenever they want.” Iran is probably struggling over technical problems with its existing centrifuges, according to some independent nuclear nonproliferation analysts. “It never made any technical sense to install so many centrifuges before the cascades in the pilot plant were working well,” said Mark Fitzpatrick at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. “Perhaps the political leaders finally listened to their technicians that haste makes waste.” Meanwhile, Western nations have put off placing new sanctions on Iran until September while Tehran and the U.N. nuclear watchdog discuss strategies for reducing concerns about the nuclear program (see GSN, July 23). "The impression I get from governments is that they are pretty relaxed, that Iran has a pretty high failure rate with centrifuges, that it can't run them at high speed," said Gary Samore, director of studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. "The critical point is tens of thousands of centrifuges. Iran won't reach that for five to 10 years," he said, ruling out the possibility that Iran is running a secret enrichment facility (Mark Heinrich, Reuters I/The Scotsman, Aug. 3). An Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman yesterday denied any slowdown of the country’s nuclear program and reiterated that Tehran would not halt its atomic activities, Reuters reported. "Iran's nuclear activities continue as planned and scheduled," Mohammad Ali Hosseini said at a weekly news conference. The German publication Focus quoted top Iranian nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani as saying that it remained possible that Iran might suspend uranium enrichment in response to negotiations with European nations. However, Hosseini said the quote was inaccurate. “I have talked to Mr. Larijani and this report was not a correct reflection of his comments,” Hosseini said. “The suspension [of uranium enrichment] is unacceptable. It is completely ruled out.” (Reuters II/Jordan Times, Aug. 5) Meanwhile, IAEA negotiators were in Tehran today to lay the groundwork for future inspections of uranium enrichment sites, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, July 30). A new round of IAEA inspections would aim to clarify Iran’s nuclear intentions. Iranian officials have maintained that the country’s nuclear program is only intended for power generation, but Western nations have charged that its civilian nuclear program is a cover for producing nuclear weapons. “Negotiations between the four-member technical delegation of the IAEA, which arrived today, and Iranian nuclear authorities will begin in the next few hours,” said an unnamed official. The IAEA delegation headed by Michiro Hosaya is expected to meet with Iranian officials led by Mohammed Saeedi, deputy head of Iran’s atomic energy organization (Nasser Karimi, Associated Press/International Herald Tribune, Aug. 6).
A new Russian submarine-launched ballistic missile is expected to be commissioned next year following a final round of testing, the Associated Press reported yesterday (see GSN, June 29). “We have no doubt that the testing of the Bulava-M missile system will be completed successfully,” said Russian navy chief Adm. Vladimir Masorin. “We have no other alternatives. We hope that the missile will be adopted by the navy in 2008.” Masorin said the navy would conduct test launches of the Bulava missile twice more in 2007 and finish testing next year. The missile failed in three consecutive tests in 2006, endangering Moscow’s plans to commission new submarines scheduled to begin entering service in 2008, AP reported. Three new Borei-class nuclear submarines now being built are designed to carry the new missile. A successful test in June paved the way for Russian officials to approve manufacturing of the missile’s components in large numbers, Masorin said. “The manufacture of the units and stages that proved reliable will begin, and by the time the new strategic nuclear submarine … is commissioned, we will have a new missile,” Masorin said (Associated Press/International Herald Tribune, Aug. 5). Four of six flight tests of the Bulava-M in the last two years have ended in failure, the London Telegraph reported. Russian journalist Ivan Safronov determined that a 2006 test heralded as a success had in fact failed. Safronov fell to his death from an apartment building in March. The missile was designed to carry six individually targeted nuclear warheads for a range of up to 6,200 miles, and would potentially be able to overcome missile defenses. Russia has strenuously objected to U.S. plans to deploy missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic (see GSN, July 30; Adrian Blomfield, London Telegraph, Aug. 6).
The U.S. State Department on Friday lashed out at U.S. Representative and presidential candidate Tom Tancredo (R-Colo.) for saying threats against Islamic holy sites should be used to prevent potential nuclear strikes against the United States, Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, Aug. 3). “Let me just say that it is absolutely outrageous and reprehensible for anyone to suggest attacks on holy sites — whether they are Muslim, Christian, Jewish or those of any other religion,” department spokesman Tom Casey said of comments Tancredo made earlier in the week. “We and many of our friends, and Muslim friends and allies are all doing what we can to take on extremists and take on terrorism and to somehow suggest that an appropriate response to terrorism would be to attack sites that are holy and sacred to more than a billion people throughout the world is just absolutely crazy,” he added (Agence France-Presse I/Yahoo!News, Aug. 3). Tancredo fired back on Sunday, AFP reported. “Yes, the State Department — boy, when they start complaining about things I say, I feel a lot better about the things I say,” he said during a Republican presidential debate in Iowa. “My task as president of the United States is primarily to do one thing — by the way, not to make sure everybody has health care or everybody’s child is educated — my task is to do one thing: to protect and defend this country,” Tancredo added. “And that means to deter — and I want to underline ‘deter’ — any kind of aggression, especially the type we are threatened with by al-Qaeda, which is nuclear attack” (Agence France-Presse II/Yahoo!News, Aug. 5).
Indonesia last week prevented the United States from pushing through a nuclear nonproliferation declaration at the ASEAN Regional Forum on the grounds that the statement failed to include disarmament measures, the Jakarta Post reported (see GSN, July 30). Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda clashed with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte on Thursday over the possibility of issuing a declaration that did not address disarmament. The exchange took place during a meeting of 27 top foreign ministry officials at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations conference in the Philippines. Wirayuda stressed the importance of nonproliferation efforts in a statement after the meeting, but said that nonproliferation and disarmament measures should be carried out together. “There's a slightly different approach in the sense that to us nuclear nonproliferation should be seen in the full context, not in separation with other elements, namely disarmament and cooperation on nuclear technology,” Wirayuda said. “That's why we suggested that perhaps we should add more elements in the area of cooperation if we're going to develop it in the context of ARF.” U.S. officials reworded the proposal, but it was ultimately dropped because Wirayuda continued to insist that it include disarmament measures, said an official who attended the meeting (Abdul Khalik, Jakarta Post, Aug. 3).
Japan agreed Thursday to fund the dismantling of three decommissioned Russian nuclear submarines under a joint program for handling aging vessels in Russia’s Pacific Fleet, RIA Novosti reported (see GSN, May 16, 2006). Japanese officials visited the Russian province of Primorsky Krai on Aug. 1 to monitor the dismantlement effort. “A contract signed at the Zvezda military shipyard Aug. 2 … stipulates complete dismantling of three Victor 3 class nuclear submarines by the end of 2008,” said Japanese Vice Foreign Affairs Minister Sekiguchi Masakazu. The submarines would be disassembled under the “Star of Hope” program, a project fully financed by Japan that was started by former Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi during a 2003 trip to Russia. Russia has an estimated 30 decommissioned nuclear submarines in ports across the far eastern region of the nation, according to reports. “As far as I know, Russia has pledged to scrap all nuclear submarines decommissioned from the Pacific Fleet by the end of 2010, and Japan is willing to provide assistance to this project,” Masakazu said. Workers would remove spent nuclear fuel from the submarines’ reactors and move it into storage. They would seal and store the reactors. The hull of each craft would be cut into three sections, and the bow and stern would be removed for destruction. One of the Russian submarines has already been taken apart, Masakazu said. Japanese and Russian officials are discussing the dismantlement of a Charlie 1 nuclear submarine now docked at a Russian base on the Kamchatka Peninsula (RIA Novosti, Aug. 3).
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