By Jon Fox
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — Testing conducted earlier this year on a next-generation radiation detector for U.S. ports was based on “biased” methodology and was not a rigorous examination of the technology’s capabilities, the Government Accountability Office said yesterday (see GSN, May 16).
What the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office describes as a calibration conducted prior to the testing of the machines, government auditors say may have favorably skewed the results of February and March testing in Nevada. According to the GAO report, vendors of the new radiation detectors — called Advanced Spectroscopic Portal monitors — had been shown six of the seven nuclear source materials prior to the testing and all of the masking and shielding materials used in the evaluations. In addition, nine of 16 configurations of nuclear, shielding and masking material used during earlier “dry runs” and “dress rehearsals” were the same combinations used during formal testing. The Government Accountability Office contends this allowed the vendors to adjust the machines to get better results than they otherwise would, and “it is highly unlikely that such favorable circumstances would present themselves under real world conditions.” The head of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, a division within the Homeland Security Department managing testing and deployment of the new detectors, said, however, that that is a “misrepresentation.” The detectors he said could not have been completely recalibrated in the time available between the dry runs and formal testing. The firms would have been unable to alter the complex computer programs that analyze the raw detector data in any significant way, Vayl Oxford said following a hearing of the House Energy and Commerce oversight committee. The dry runs were more like a calibration necessary to set the machines, he said. Oxford likened it to giving a working dog a scent. If the dog does not know what it is looking for it will not be able to find the target. The tests, he said, were not biased. “You take a brand new set of potential explosive dogs, you get them used to their handlers, you never expose them to explosives and you say ‘Go find explosives,’” he said following the tense hearing regarding the testing. “You’ve got to expose the systems that are doing the detection and identification to the threat materials of concern.” The GAO report also contends that the tests were not designed to test the limitations of the devices’ detection capabilities, “a critical oversight in DNDO’s original test plan.” The office, auditors said, did not use a “sufficient amount” of material that would mask or hide nuclear material that officials would likely encounter at U.S. ports. Oxford conceded that there was a concern that the new detectors could return a false negative result in very rare instances and that additional testing would be conducted before deploying the new technology in a primary detection role. At U.S. ports radiation detection is a tiered procedure, with secondary inspection taking place with additional machines if an alert is sounded. “The cases that have been brought to our attention are very minute numbers, one in a million,” Oxford said, noting that in the past 18 months there have been only 24 instances at ports involving a masking agent that would have resulted in a false negative with the new detectors. Oxford did not describe the specific scenario that could confuse the detectors but said in such particular case where the conditions for a potential false negative are present Customs and Border Protection officials could resolve the case with additional physical inspections. “We don’t have to have these machines become perfect. That’s why it’s hard for us to commit that we will test these to the outer limits because nobody will tell me what that is,” he said. “We could be here five years from now continuing to do tests because someone will define a new outer limit.” During the hearing, subcommittee Chairman Bart Stupak (D-Mich.), repeatedly called for “outer limit testing” of the new detectors. He also called for “blind testing” in which the vendors are completely unaware of what type of material might be in the containers. “We do it for the FDA, we do it for food safety, we do it for everywhere else; why shouldn’t we do it for radiation detection,” Stupak said. The Government Accountability Office and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office have been sparring for months over the next-generation radiation detectors. Federal auditors first assailed the office’s cost-benefit analysis as unsupportive of the planned $1.2 billion expenditure over five years for the new technology. The criticism of the testing appears to be the latest salvo in what seems to have become an increasingly acrimonious disagreement between the agencies over the new detection systems. GAO officials described difficulties eliciting information and test results from the Homeland Security division and during the hearing yesterday likened a fruitless back and forth between Oxford and Stupak over future testing plans to their own frustrations. “This gives you some idea of what we’ve been trying to deal with,” Gene Aloise, director of the GAO Natural Resources and Environment Division. The Government Accountability Office recommended that more testing and studies be conducted on the new monitors. DNDO officials indicated yesterday that over the next six to 12 months there would be a series of computer models to resolve questions about the machines but that testing would not be completed before a recommendation is made to the homeland security secretary to certify the detectors as effective. Congressional budget appropriators moved to hold fiscal 2007 funding for the new machines pending an official determination from the secretary that they are worth the high cost. The systems cost as much as $500,000, compared to the $180,000 each current detector costs (see GSN, Oct. 3, 2006). Lawmakers wrote language into both House and Senate versions of the fiscal 2007 Homeland Security appropriations bill requiring the secretary to find that new monitors represent a “significant increase in operational effectiveness” before funds are released. Oxford said that that certification has nothing to do with deployment strategy and that the detectors would see a limited deployment with about 130 machines going to secondary screening locations as questions about placing ASPs in primary screening locations are resolved. The original date for certification was set for late June, but that has been pushed back to accommodate more testing and the current projection for a decision is sometime in November. Oxford explicitly declined to say he would wait until all test results were in before giving the secretary his thoughts on certification. “I will not make that commitment today,” he said. The new machines are not intended to represent an increase in detection sensitivity but rather allow port officials to both detect material and identify what isotope is being picked up by the monitors. The current detectors, adapted from technology to stop radioactive scrap metal from going into processing plants, alert to the presence of radiation without determining what type is present. That leads to thousands of false alarms that must be resolved with secondary hand-held detectors. Materials such as kitty litter, granite and bananas can all set off the current detectors with trace amounts of natural radiation. With the new detectors the roughly 500 containers that officials have to pay serious attention to resolve false alarms at the port of Los Angeles/Long Beach each day could be reduced to 20 to 25, Oxford said. While Custom and Border Protection officials conceded that secondary inspections consume manpower and increase the officers’ workloads, they told GAO auditors that the current combination of deployed detectors and secondary scanning to resolve false alarms “provides the best possible radiological and nuclear screening coverage available with current technology,” the GAO reports states.
By Greg Webb
Global Security Newswire
VIENNA — A U.S. official yesterday clarified Monday’s announcement that the United States would remove 9 metric tons of plutonium from the U.S. nuclear arsenal, expressing confidence that the material would be in addition to 34 tons the United States has already committed to eliminate (see GSN, Sept. 17). U.S. Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman announced the move here in a speech to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s annual meeting. However, his remarks left it unclear whether the 9 tons would constitute an increase or simply a component of the 34 tons Washington has promised to immobilize or burn as mixed-oxide reactor fuel under a bilateral agreement with Russia. The United States plans to convert most of the material into nuclear fuel to be consumed in nuclear power plants. The new 9 tons would come entirely from U.S. nuclear warhead cores, or pits, Bodman said Yesterday, a top National Nuclear Security Administration official said he expected the 9 tons would in fact be added to the 34 already committed. “When the initial agreement was reached on the 34 metric tons, some amount, 0 to 4 tons, might have had to come from future declarations,” said William Tobey, NNSA deputy administrator for defense nuclear nonproliferation. “The reason for that was that some amount of the material, which was non-pit plutonium, was in a state that isn’t clear whether it could be run through the MOX facility. “So we had this plutonium, we knew we were going to dispose of it, we didn’t know whether it had some chemicals in it that would have made it impossible to put it through the MOX facility. But we didn’t know whether that was 0 or 4 tons,” he continued. “We’ve done further analysis since then and some more thinking on the material and the facility and exactly what its specifications are,” Tobey added. “We believe that there’s a good prospect that all or nearly all of this non-pit plutonium can go through the MOX facility. Therefore the 9 tons will likely be in addition to the 34 metric tons.” In the mid-1990s, the United States declared that 52.5 metric tons of plutonium under control of the Energy and Defense departments was no longer needed for defense purposes. Bodman’s announcement Monday increased that amount to 61.5 tons, leaving about 38 tons of plutonium in U.S. nuclear weapons program, according to nuclear weapons expert Matthew Bunn of Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
By Elaine M. Grossman
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — A key U.S. lawmaker said yesterday that congressional rejection of a White House plan to aid India’s nuclear energy program would constitute no more than a “hiccup” in relations between the two countries (see GSN, Sept. 18). Representative Jim McDermott (D-Wash.), who co-chairs the House India Caucus, decried the relative paucity of congressional debate over the Bush administration’s pact with New Delhi. The deal offers India access to sensitive U.S. technologies in exchange for opening its civilian nuclear reactors to international inspection. The bilateral agreement was finalized in late July but awaits the approval of the U.S. Congress. It remains uncertain when the pact will come up for consideration in the House or Senate, according to those monitoring the issue. Speaking yesterday at a Capitol Hill event sponsored by the U.S. India Business Alliance and the Congressional Task Force on U.S.-India Trade, McDermott said he was asked recently what would happen if the nuclear deal falls through. “I said, it’s a hiccup,” said the lawmaker, now in his 10th term in Congress. McDermott noted that the U.S.-India relationship has developed greatly over the past 16 years and has weathered storms before. In prepared remarks released after the gathering, McDermott reiterated what he last year termed “serious concerns” about the agreement. The issue “is complicated, controversial, and moving way too fast as far as I’m concerned,” he said. “I believe the administration over-promised and under-delivered, because a lot of my colleagues believe as I do that our role is to advise, not rubber-stamp.” However, Representative Joseph Crowley (D-N.Y.), speaking at yesterday’s event, argued that nixing the deal could ruin an important budding relationship between the United States and India. “It probably would be a little more than a hiccup if the 123 agreement isn’t entered into here,” he said. “I think there’s high expectations, especially over there [in India], that something will happen.” The “123 agreement” refers to a section of the 1954 U.S. Atomic Energy Act that lays out how the United States might cooperate on nuclear material transfers. This year’s pact has proved contentious in India, where lawmakers on both ends of the political spectrum have threatened to withdraw support for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s government. Indian communists have alleged the deal threatens national sovereignty by allowing undue U.S. influence over domestic affairs. At the same time, the nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party has opposed the agreement on the basis that it could threaten New Delhi’s nuclear weapons programs (see GSN, Aug. 23). Legislative action is not necessary in India for the deal to be enacted. However, lawmakers’ opposition in New Delhi could threaten Singh’s government, according to reports. Crowley conceded that few U.S. citizens are interested in how the pact fares in Washington. “I don’t think anyone would even notice, quite frankly, that the agreement wasn’t entered into, ultimately, at the end,” he said. “I don’t think the American people really have focused very much on this debate.” Also appearing at the event, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher responded to an audience member’s question concerning assertions that ongoing Indian support for the Iranian military could spoil the deal. The Hyde Act, passed by Congress in January 2006 in support of the Bush-Singh agreement’s broad outlines, calls on the White House to “secure India’s full and active participation in United States efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction.” “I think some of the fears are exaggerated,” Boucher said of reports that India has provided training to Iran’s navy. “Some of the training turns out to be sort of cadet level. Some of the exchanges don’t lead to a lot. I think we just need to have a realistic sense of what this is.” The State Department official added he is confident that “India can explain it, better than we can, what their relationships are and are not with Iran.” Another backer of the deal, Delegate Eni Faleomavaega (D-American Samoa), said India might be expected to go elsewhere for its growing energy needs if the United States fails to seize this opening. “We’re not the only country that can provide this nuclear technology,” said Faleomavaega, noting that Russia, France and Japan are potential competitors to the United States in the energy market. “They could go shopping somewhere else if they really wanted to. But they chose to deal with us.” However, McDermott blasted President George W. Bush for failing to coordinate with lawmakers as he pursued the agreement with New Delhi. “Part of the resistance in the Congress, I think, when you look at this whole nuclear agreement, is the fact that the president went and did it by himself and didn’t talk to a soul up here on the Hill,” McDermott said. “He came back, sort of presenting it fait accompli and [told lawmakers], ‘You will approve it.’ This government doesn’t work that way.”
South Korea has become the 12th nation to fully divest itself of U.S.-origin highly enriched uranium research reactor fuel, the National Nuclear Security Administration announced today (see GSN, Aug. 10). The U.S. agency removed 11 fresh fuel assemblies from two research reactors, and shipped them to the Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee for storage, according to a press release. The assemblies contained roughly 4 pounds of highly enriched uranium. “One of NNSA’s top priorities is to secure civilian nuclear sites by removing material, such as highly enriched uranium, which could be used by terrorists in a nuclear weapon. NNSA was able to remove completely all such material from the South Korean civil facilities,” agency nonproliferation chief William Tobey said in the release. The U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative seeks to reclaim U.S.-supplied fresh and spent nuclear fuel from other nations. Russia and the United States agreed in 2005 to press for repatriation of highly enriched uranium from research reactors around the world. The National Nuclear Security Administration has so far collected 1,139 kilograms of highly enriched uranium and 2,439 kilograms of low-enriched uranium from 27 nations. That would be enough material for 45 improvised nuclear weapons, the release states. South Korea joins Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Greece, Italy, the Philippines, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Thailand in halting use of U.S.-origin research reactor fuel (National Nuclear Security Administration release, Sept. 19).
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice today urged the international community to take tough diplomatic action to pressure Iran to halt its controversial nuclear activities, Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, Sept. 18). “We believe that the diplomatic track can work but it has to work both with a set of incentives and a set of teeth,” Rice said following remarks made on Sunday by French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner about a possible “war” with Iran. U.S. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said yesterday that U.S. officials are drafting a sanctions resolution that the U.N. Security Council plans to review on Friday. “What we’re doing is working on the elements of a resolution,” he said. “We put down on paper some of those ideas … what a resolution might look like.” Rice is expected to attend a Sept. 28 discussion on Iran in New York with her counterparts from China, France, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom. So far, the U.N. Security Council has enacted three resolutions against Iran. The resolutions, which include two sets of sanctions, were approved because of the country’s refusal to halt its uranium enrichment, which could yield a nuclear bomb ingredient. Iran has maintained that its nuclear program is intended solely for power production. “We hope that these meetings and any intervening discussions will move the ball forward,” McCormack said. “The process hasn't moved as quickly as we would have liked, but that is par for the course with the Security Council resolutions” (Agence France-Presse I/Google News, Sept. 19). Rice also warned International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei not to intervene in diplomacy after ElBaradei urged countries not to take premature military action against Iran, AFP reported. “Let me just start with the fact that IAEA is not in the business of diplomacy,” Rice said. “The IAEA is a technical agency that has a Board of Governors of which the U.S. is a member,” she said (Agence France-Presse II/Spacewar.com, Sept. 18). Meanwhile, U.S. Adm. William Fallon has urged Arab nations to unite against Iran to restrict what the United States considers the region’s greatest potential destabilizing force, the Associated Press reported yesterday. The highest ranking U.S. Central Command said during his current 10-day trip across the Gulf that Middle East leaders should put more pressure on Tehran. Fallon said “we are not looking for a new NATO-type alliance against Iran,” but the United States wants Iran to look to its Middle East neighbors and “see a group united in response to Iranian hegemonic behavior.” Some of the region’s smaller nations, such as Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, have significant cultural, economic and historical ties to Iran and expect to depend on the country for oil as their own supplies run out in future years. Many are also concerned that they could anger local Shiite Muslim communities by confronting Iran, which is predominantly Shiite. Saudi Arabia, however, has expressed concern about Iran extending its influence by building links to Shiite communities in Iraq and other Sunni-dominated nations (Brian Murphy, Associated Press/Google News, Sept. 18).
South Africa announced yesterday that it would not participate in a U.S.-led initiative to expand the global use of nuclear power, Reuters reported (see GSN, Sept. 17). Top energy officials said they feared the 16-nation Global Nuclear Energy Partnership would interfere with South Africa’s freedom to export enriched uranium. The nation has already demonstrated its enrichment capability when it produced material for six nuclear weapons that were later destroyed as the Apartheid-era government came to an end in 1994. South Africa now envisions reviving its nuclear programs by building new reactors and enriching its own fuel from uranium mined domestically. The United States has expressed hope that the multilateral partnership would provide a “viable alternative” to nations considering their own fuel production sites, which can also be used to produce nuclear weapon materials. With such discouragement, South Africa felt it could not participate, said Minerals and Energy Minister Buyelwa Sonjica, who spoke to reporters at the International Atomic Energy’s Agency’s annual meeting in Vienna. "We were concerned that some aspects of the GNEP declaration would conflict with our national policy,” she said. “It is a sovereignty issue, to do with our own nuclear fuel reserves and fuel supply," added Tseliso Maqubela, the ministry’s nuclear program director (Mark Heinrich, Reuters, Sept. 18). Ultimately, “we need to ensure that no unwarranted restrictions are imposed on the right of states to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,” Sonjica said in her speech to delegates. The GNEP partners signed a statement of principles Sunday that seeks to attract new partners by explicitly saying that no nation would be required to surrender any nuclear plans to participate in the partnership. “States participating in this cooperation would not give up any rights, and voluntarily engage to share the effort and gain the benefits of economical, peaceful nuclear energy,” says the statement’s second paragraph. Still, one U.S. official in Vienna yesterday acknowledged that “it wouldn’t make sense” for nations to participate in the partnership and build their own fuel production facilities because of the high cost of simultaneously developing indigenous technology while purchasing foreign equipment and materials. “The enrichment business is a tough business,” said William Tobey, deputy administrator for defense nuclear nonproliferation at the Energy Department’s National Nuclear Security Administration. “There are huge economies of scale, so unless you’re producing [enriched uranium] at fairly large rates, it simply doesn’t make economic sense.” The question of joining the partnership remains a dilemma for several other nuclear nations that were conspicuously absent from Sunday’s GNEP signing ceremony in Vienna. Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom are among the nations that have opted to stay away from the partnership for now, potentially reducing the likelihood that they would join at a later time. As outsiders, the holdouts would be unable to directly prevent the partnership from making policy decisions that could make membership less attractive (Greg Webb, Global Security Newswire, Sept. 19).
By Jon Fox
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The United States and Russia this week jointly celebrated the 20th anniversary of the establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in Washington and Moscow (see GSN, Sept. 4). The Washington center — pronounced “nerk” — transfers information back and forth with its Russian counterpart regarding arms control and regional treaty obligations. Its duties have been expanded to include bilateral communications with Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. “For 20 years, the NRRCs have helped make peace work. The relationship between the U.S. and Russian NRRCs has been a model one,” Paula DeSutter, assistant secretary of state for verification, compliance and implementation, said Monday during a commemorative ceremony at the State Department. The first messages were exchanged between the centers in 1988 and focused initially on notification requirements of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty and later the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. On occasion the centers have been used to exchange “goodwill” messages such as an alert when the Salyut 7 space station was falling from orbit or a notification following the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. “The U.S., and now Russian, national centers have proven their utility and flexibility time and again. Indeed, during the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, U.S. forces moved to ‘Defense Condition 3,’ our highest alert level,” DeSutter said. “The deputy secretary of state asked the NRRC to send a message to the Russian NRRC that this was due to our emergency and not directed at Russia, so Russian forces could stand down.” The ceremony honoring the 20th anniversary of the center now housed in a small room on the State Department’s third floor included a cake to mark the creation of the concept spearheaded by Senator John Warner (R-Va.) and former Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.).
Syria and North Korea blamed the United States yesterday for spreading what they called untrue allegations that the two countries have been colluding to develop Syria’s nuclear program, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Sept. 17). Syrian and North Korean officials said the allegations have been intended either to slow recent improvement in Pyongyang’s relations with the United States or to justify a Sept. 6 Israeli air strike inside Syria. “All this rubbish is not true. I don't know how their imagination has reached such creativity,” said Syrian Cabinet minister Bouthaina Shaaban. There is only one known small research reactor in Syria, and it’s nuclear program is believed to be extremely limited, AP reported. Officials for the International Atomic Energy Agency did not comment on the allegations, but a diplomat said it “didn’t know anything about Syria, and if there is something there, we should know.” In 2004, the agency investigated claims that Syria had obtained nuclear technology through the smuggling ring once led by top Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan (see GSN, June 25, 2004). The Khan network was found to have supplied nuclear technology to Iran and Libya, but no hard evidence has linked it to Syria, the diplomat in Vienna said (Albert Aji, Associated Press/Google News, Sept. 18).
Nations participating in the six-party talks are trying to set a new date to meet after North Korea pulled out of planned negotiations this week in Beijing, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Sept. 18). The exact reason for the delay has not been stated, but it came amidst reports of North Korean support for a Syrian nuclear facility (see related GSN story, today). Pyongyang has denied providing any such assistance to Damascus. “China was making all-out efforts to coordinate the dates and was close to setting the date for Wednesday but this had to be postponed due to North Korea’s schedule,” said Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Kaoru Yosano. The six nations have not yet approved a new meeting date, said Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu (Alexa Olesen, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, Sept. 18). The U.S. State Department said the next round of negotiations would address the issue of nuclear nonproliferation, the Yonhap News Agency reported. “When we talk about a denuclearized Korean Peninsula and North Koreans getting rid of their nuclear program, that means in all its aspects,” agency spokesman Sean McCormack said yesterday. “That means what you are doing on the ground as well as not engaging in behavior-related proliferation of these material, technology and know-how,” he said (Yonhap News Agency I, Sept. 19). The Bush administration wants to close out the North Korean nuclear issue before the next occupant of the White House takes office, national security adviser Stephen Hadley said Monday. “I think one of the things we need to do is keep up the pressure, because we would like to get this issue resolved so that the new administration does not have to deal with it,” he told the Council on Foreign Relations, according to the Yonhap News Agency. “We have to be careful that they (North Koreans) not try and just sort of run out the clock,” he added. Pyongyang in February agreed to shutter its nuclear program. It has halted operations at its primary nuclear complex but has not yet begun the second-phase work of declaring and disabling nuclear activities. Washington has said it hopes to see that occur this year (Yonhap News Agency II, Sept. 19).
Indian communists are expected to meet with representatives of the country’s ruling Congress party today to review leftist objections to a pending nuclear trade deal with the United States, Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, Sept. 18). This would be the second meeting of a 15-member committee created to consider the controversial deal under which New Delhi would allow international monitoring of its civilian nuclear sector in exchange for access to U.S. nuclear technology and material. The panel held one meeting earlier in September that was described as unsuccessful. According to some, the nuclear accord has become the greatest source of conflict within India’s governing coalition since it entered power in 2004 (Agence France-Presse/Spacewar.com, Sept. 19). Communist leaders said they do no plan to offer concessions at today’s meeting in order to reach a resolution over the nuclear deal, Reuters reported. They have maintained that the deal would undermine Indian sovereignty and they have threatened to withdraw crucial support from the Singh administration if it pursues negotiations with international governing bodies needed to put the deal into operation (see GSN, Sept. 13). The administration replied to issues raised last week during the panel’s first meeting. The communists said they have been preparing a “rejoinder” to the administration for the meeting today. “On many of the issues which are relevant, particularly those pertaining to energy policy, the defense of the government is very weak,” said lawmaker Nilotpal Basu, a senior leader of the Communist Party of India (Marxist). Party chief Prakash Karat yesterday asked the administration to put off pursuing the agreement for six months and said there could be a “political crisis” if it refused to do so (Reuters/Washington Post, Sept. 19). Meanwhile, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher yesterday promoted the deal’s importance in meeting India’s growing energy needs, the Associated Press reported. “The sooner we do it, the sooner we turn on the light bulbs so children can do their homework,” he said (Foster Klug, Associated Press/Google News, Sept. 18).
The operator of the U.S. Y-12 nuclear weapons plant in Tennessee could be fined $137,500 for violations of Energy Department nuclear safety rules, the National Nuclear Security Administration announced yesterday (see GSN, Sept. 6). The agency cited contractor BWXT Y-12 for violations in the areas of criticality safety evaluation, work processes, program management and quality improvement. “Each violation contains multiple examples of noncompliance with nuclear safety rules,” according to a press release. The firm found in April 2006 that “uranium mass had accumulated above stated limits in a vacuum system filter housing at Y-12’s uranium casting operations,” the release states. “It was later found that an unanticipated amount of lubricating oil had also accumulated in this filter housing.” The incident caused no injuries, but BWXT Y-12 was slow to find and fix the problem, the government said. The agency did take into account the company’s investigation of the incident and corrective efforts in determining the size of the proposed fine (National Nuclear Security Administration release, Sept. 18).
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