Investigators with the Government Accountability Office found various security vulnerabilities along the U.S.-Canadian border that terrorists could exploit to bring an unconventional weapon into this country, agency officials said yesterday in congressional testimony (see GSN, Aug. 16, 2006). “That border is so long. Security on the border has not really increased too much since the French and Indian War, frankly,” said John Cooney, GAO assistant director for forensic audits and special investigations. Senate Finance Committee members expressed deep worries regarding security on the U.S. side of the border, the Ottawa Citizen reported. “They’re simply wide open, waiting to be crossed by anyone carrying anything — even a dirty bomb or a suitcase-type nuclear device,” said Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa). “Quite frankly, it’s hard to believe there’s been so little progress in plugging these gaping security holes.” Agency investigators late last year assessed security at four locations along the nearly 5,000-mile border, along with three areas at the U.S. border with Mexico. “In three of the four locations on the U.S.-Canada border, investigators carried a duffel bag across the border to simulate the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband,” the agency said. Similar efforts were not attempted at the Mexico border due to “safety considerations.” The agency reported a number of other security problems. Investigators found that state roads near or parallel to the border “were unmanned, unmonitored or both.” In one instance, U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers could not find investigators even after receiving reports of suspicious activity, the Citizen reported. In another case, it took guards 20 minutes to respond after security cameras caught investigators taking photographs of a closed port of entry. The guards then failed to verify the identities of the GAO personnel or to search their vehicle. “The border is not as secure as it should be in the near future and in the long term,” acknowledged Customs and Border spokesman Ronald Colburn (Sheldon Alberts, Ottawa Citizen, Sept. 28). The government has made a number of improvements in recent years to security at the U.S.-Canadian border, one expert told the committee yesterday. He said, though, that more needs to be done. There were fewer than 400 agents patrolling that border at the time of the Sept. 11 attacks. The number has since grown to roughly 1,000, bolstered by more than $122 million in security technology, said Kenneth Luongo, executive director of the Partnership for Global Security. He also noted that Customs and Border Protection has more than doubled the number of inspectors and has opened or plans to open air and marine branches in five border states. “These improvements to northern border security are well advised yet insufficient to deal with the dangers that vast miles of unprotected border pose for the U.S.,” Luongo said (Kenneth Luongo testimony, Sept. 27).
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said yesterday that Russia wants to give the U.N. nuclear watchdog time to investigate Iran’s past nuclear activity before the U.N. Security Council enacts new sanctions against the country, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Sept. 27). His comments came before high-level talks planned today to examine a proposed sanctions resolution on Iran for its refusal to halt its uranium enrichment program, which could yield a nuclear bomb ingredient. “Interference by means of any sanctions would undermine the International Atomic Energy Agency's efforts," Lavrov said yesterday. “The U.N. Security Council measures on Iran should be balanced and respond to the steps taken by Tehran itself that obliged to answer all questions.” Lavrov said later that the has made “obvious” progress in dealing with Iran and that Security Council action against Iran should be “commensurate with what Iran is actually doing and as long as Iran is doing something which satisfies part of the demands of the Security Council, I believe we have to caliber our action in the Security Council and elsewhere." U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Zalmay Khalilzad argued yesterday that Tehran’s work with the U.N. nuclear watchdog “cannot be used as a shield to protect Iran from its violation, lack of cooperation, lack of implementation of the demands of the Security Council.” Russia and China have both refused to consider new sanctions against Iran before the end of the year, when the International Atomic Energy Agency is expected to report on information Iran has shared about the history of its nuclear program, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner said yesterday. “I think that it would be very difficult to convince the Russians and the Chinese before," he said. “We’ll do our best to convince them, but honestly, the position was difficult to tackle” (Edith Lederer, Associated Press I/ABC News, Sept. 28). The United States in meetings today intends to discuss with other nations what the new sanctions would cover and when they would be implemented, Reuters reported U.S. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack saying. “The main topic of conversation is two-pronged: one, what are the elements of a resolution and two, the timing,” he said. “Looking at the comments from Foreign Minister Lavrov, you still have agreement on the basic strategy, and that is to use the Security Council to pressure Iran to change their behavior,” he said. In an effort to build consensus around the proposed sanctions, Rice has planned to meet first today with her counterparts from China, France, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom and then only with the representatives for the three European powers. If China and Russia prevent agreement on a third round of U.N. sanctions, the United States would urge the European nations to enact independent measures to cut Iran off from European trade and investment. However, some European officials reluctant to enact unilateral sanctions on Iran have said that such penalties would split the international community in a way that Iran could use to its advantage. British Foreign Secretary David Miliband pointed out that investment in Iran has already been cut by 40 percent this year (Paul Taylor, Reuters/Washington Post, Sept. 28). Meanwhile, an opposition group said yesterday that Iran has been working on a secret underground nuclear weapons complex near the Natanz uranium enrichment facility, AP reported. The National Council of Resistance of Iran disclosed the information, which could not be confirmed, during a news conference in Paris. The group revealed information on the Natanz plant and another nuclear site five years ago that led to the discovery of nearly 20 years of clandestine Iranian nuclear work and created current international concerns that Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons. However, much of the information the resistance group has presented since that time on a purported secret Iranian nuclear weapons program has not been confirmed. The group said it was unsure how Iran would use the alleged facility, and it did not present hard evidence supporting its existence. The group said it has submitted the claim to the International Atomic Energy Agency, but IAEA officials said they would not comment on the matter (Associated Press II/The Hindu, Sept. 27).
By Jon Fox
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — Global cooperation between law enforcement agencies and a coordinated nuclear detection network is needed if the world hopes to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD material, according to a report released this month by the National Defense University (see GSN, Sept. 27). Such global coordination should be organized through an existing international institution, take authority from U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 and involve the expertise of both Interpol and the International Atomic Energy Agency, according to experts working with the university’s Center for Technology and National Security Policy. “All of the means of national and international law enforcement should be brought to bear,” the report’s authors wrote. The 2004 U.N. resolution formally recognizes the threat of WMD materials trafficking and requires nations to create effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to thwart and prevent such trade. The measure also encourages wealthier countries to financially assist other nations in implementing their own preventive measures. The report suggests that using an existing international organization to put Resolution 1540 into practice “would provide a means for exchanging technology, sharing intelligence, correcting flaws in the operation of the [antismuggling] system and encouraging best practices, sharing of resources, and expert training.” “Nuclear smuggling and terrorism, like other forms of contraband smuggling and terrorism, are first and foremost law enforcement problems,” states the report written by James Goodby, Timothy Coffey and Cheryl Loeb. Interpol should be a “key player” in any international law enforcement cooperation, and the U.N. nuclear watchdog is well positioned to offer technical assistance and expertise, they said in the report, noting that “due to special aspects of nuclear smuggling and terrorism, law enforcement will, on occasion, need rapid access to specialized expertise and equipment.” The ultimate goal would be the rapid deployment of detection equipment at prime locations selected as a result of intelligence gathering and risk analyses. “This effort would complement and coordinate existing nuclear detection activities, not replace them,” the report states (See GSN, June 15). Since Sept. 11, 2001, the United States has embarked on an ambitious path to equip domestic seaports and some land crossings with radiation detection devices. In congressional testimony this month, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff said that by the end of this year the United States would have the ability to scan “almost” 100 percent of cargo containers arriving at “major” domestic seaports and by the end of next “nearly” all land and sea ports of entry will have the radiation portal monitors. Plastic scintillation detectors, the current deployed technology, are relatively cheap and highly sensitive but have no ability to discriminate between the materials that set off alarms. The trace amounts of radiation thrown off by the potassium in a shipment of bananas produce the same alerts as radioactive cobalt that could be used in a radiological “dirty bomb.” To cut down on these false alarms, the Homeland Security Department has been advocating a five-year, $1.2-billion plan to deploy next-generation radiation detectors that use sodium iodide technology to not only detect radiation but identify the source. The new detectors, or Advanced Spectroscopic Portal monitors, cost roughly three times as much as current equipment. Lawmakers and the Government Accountability Office have raised questions about how well Homeland Security has tested the efficacy of the machines. GAO auditors have also said that the DHS cost-benefit analysis of the new equipment does not seem to support its deployment (see GSN, Sept. 19). “The tradeoff to be made here is between increased cost but improved identification capability (using sodium iodide) and lower cost and higher sensitivity but increased false alarms (using plastic),” according to the National Defense University report. The authors, however, also noted the question swirling around the new detectors and recommend “a thorough evaluation of the existing technologies.” The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, a division within the Homeland Security Department, has indicated that testing of the new technology would continue but maintains that the deployment of the next-generation technology should begin.
Diplomats are not yet ready to set a schedule for fully disabling North Korea’s nuclear program, the top South Korean negotiator at the six-party talks said today (see GSN, Sept. 27). Differences remain as delegates from six nations prepare a document detailing the nuclear declaration and disablement measures Pyongyang must carry out under a February denuclearization agreement, Bloomberg reported. “The road toward denuclearization is steep and dangerous,” said South Korean envoy Chun Young-woo. “There are many opinions in the process of drawing up directions for this road. It will take more than just hours to finalize an agreement. We need further discussion to narrow our differences.” U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill said that Pyongyang “has agreed to some steps” recommended by Chinese, Russian and U.S. experts who visited the Yongbyon nuclear complex earlier this month. Their job was to offer strategies on how North Korean nuclear facilities could be permanently shuttered. “We look at some of the things they’ve agreed to and, frankly, we’d like more and they’d like less,” Hill said. Negotiators are preparing a joint statement to be released before the scheduled close of the four-day meeting Sunday. South Korea has offered proposals on the document, Chun said, but “we don’t know what the structure of the final text will be.” Discussion of fuel deliveries promised in the February agreement is scheduled for tomorrow, Bloomberg reported. South Korea has already delivered 50,000 tons of the total planned 1 million tons, and China this month began shipping another 50,000 tons to North Korea. Diplomats are also expected to address U.S. allegations that North Korea operated a secret uranium enrichment program alongside its known plutonium weapons activities (Heejin Koo, Bloomberg, Sept. 28). “I think the idea is to lay out a road map [for nuclear disablement] until the end of the year,” Hill said. One leading issue is the scope of the programs to be included in that effort, he said North Korea’s existing stockpile of weapon-grade plutonium is also likely to be covered in the end-of-session statement, the Associated Press reported (Alexa Olesen, Associated Press, Sept. 28). “We don’t have an agreement on what constitutes disabling yet,” Hill said (Lindsay Beck, Reuters/Washington Post, Sept. 28). Meanwhile, the U.S. national intelligence director said last month that North Korea is capable of conducting another nuclear blast, Inside Missile Defense reported. The October 2006 test explosion produced a yield of less than one kiloton, leading many observers to deem it a dud. However, the blast provided “clear evidence of (North Korea’s) nuclear weapons program,” the intelligence director said in an unclassified report to Congress. “Analysis is still ongoing to answer more questions about the test and its implications for North Korea’s nuclear program,” the report states. “There are probably no technological barriers to North Korea conducting another nuclear test if it were inclined to do so.” Pyongyang prior to the test “could have produced up to 50 kg of plutonium, enough for at least a half-dozen nuclear weapons,” the report states. “Additional plutonium is contained in the fuel of the reactor at Yongbyon.” The report gives “high confidence” to the U.S. assessment that North Korea had sought uranium enrichment capabilities. “The degree of progress towards producing enriched uranium remains unknown, however,” it says (John Liang, Inside Missile Defense, Sept. 26).
The U.S. Energy Department has certified a nuclear warhead rebuilt with the first replacement plutonium “pit” for entry into the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration said yesterday (see GSN, July 3). The W88 nuclear warhead employs the replacement plutonium core — the trigger for the nuclear weapon — and a replacement gas transfer system. The agency disassembled the weapon and examined its components using experimental tools and models run on supercomputers. It was then reassembled at the NNSA Pantex Plant in Texas using a pit produced by the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. The project was part of the U.S. Stockpile Stewardship Program “to ensure the reliability, safety and security of … nuclear weapons without underground testing,” according to a NNSA press release. “Rebuilding this W88 was an enormous undertaking that took NNSA over a decade and required the tremendous scientific and engineering expertise of the entire nuclear weapons complex,” NNSA Administrator Thomas D’Agostino said in the release. “I am proud that we were able to get the job done and accomplish this great feat with the W88” (U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration release, Sept. 27).
A U.S. Air Force general has asked for more time to investigate the unauthorized transfer of nuclear weapons aboard a B-52 strategic bomber last month, Inside Missile Defense reported Wednesday (see GSN, Sept. 24). Maj. Gen. Doug Raaberg has led the inquiry into the Aug. 29 flight, when six nuclear-tipped Advanced Cruise Missiles were mistakenly loaded on to the bomber by ground crews who reportedly thought the missiles were unarmed. The United States has not flown bombers loaded with nuclear weapons since the late 1960s, when the practice was ended after a series of aircraft crashes. Crews at Minot Air Force Base, N.D., mistakenly loaded the missiles for a flight to Barksdale Air Force Base, La., where they were scheduled to be decommissioned. Raaberg “has been at Minot, he is now at Barksdale and, yes, he has asked for some extra time to get his report right,” Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne told reporters Monday. Wynne and another senior Air Force official did not say when the report was now expected, Inside Missile Defense reported (Carlo Munoz, Inside Missile Defense, Sept. 26). Meanwhile, U.S. Representative Ellen Tauscher (D-Calif.) plans to hold hearings on the subject within the next two weeks, the Washington Post reported today. Tauscher heads the House Armed Services subcommittee on strategic weapons. “We are going to be looking into inventory controls of the weapons,” she said. According to nuclear experts, nuclear-armed weapons are never supposed to be stored among conventionally armed weapons, but such a situation apparently led to Minot crews placing the wrong weapons on the bomber. “You can’t leave them in the same facility (as missiles with nuclear warheads) and expect people to tell the difference,” Tauscher said (Walter Pincus, Washington Post, Sept. 28).
U.S. presidential candidate Bill Richardson this week announced his intention to make major cuts to U.S. nuclear weapon and missile defense programs if he wins next year’s election (see GSN, April 27). Highlighting his plans are reductions to the number of nuclear warheads in the U.S. arsenal, an end to Bush administration efforts to develop a new nuclear warhead design, and cuts to U.S. missile defense programs, including the cancellation of the Airborne Laser program (Bill Richardson release, Sept. 26). Richardson is governor of New Mexico, home to two U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories that would probably face significant funding losses if his plans were implemented. “The governor is aware this may have an impact in New Mexico,” said campaign spokesman Tom Reynolds. “We’re looking beyond parochial politics with an emphasis on the greater good for the country” (Jones/Fleck, Albuquerque Journal, Sept. 27). Nuclear ArsenalUnder Richardson’s plan, the United States would negotiate with Russia to cut each nation’s nuclear arsenal to below 1,000 warheads. That number would involve 600 deployed warheads and another 400 in reserve. Under the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, the Bush administration committed to reducing to number of deployed strategic warheads to less than 2,200 by the end of 2012 (see GSN, July 3). The treaty does not address reserve weapons or tactical nuclear weapons, all of which would be removed from service under Richardson’s plan (see GSN, July 10). The move would still leave “us with an ample nuclear deterrent against any foreseeable threat,” according to the Richardson press release. “These reductions will enhance our credibility as we lead global negotiations to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and get all nations to improve the security of fissile materials.” In addition, the plan calls for canceling efforts to develop the Reliable Replacement Warhead, a Bush administration initiative to design and deploy a new nuclear weapon (see GSN, July 25; Richardson release). “Our concern here is our credibility around the world,” Reynolds said. “Developing new nuclear weapons at home does not help our credibility negotiating with countries like Iran in terms of limiting or reducing their nuclear (plans)” (Jones/Fleck, Albuquerque Journal). Richardson would also like to gut U.S. missile defense programs by cutting $8 billion a year from their budget (see GSN, Sept. 12). In particular, he would cancel the Airborne Laser program, “which has suffered from cost overruns and test failures,” according to his release (see GSN, Sept. 4; Richardson release). The package of reductions would save more than $57 billion a year, Reynolds said. “We are facing new threats. We don’t have tank columns marching across Europe — we have closely affiliated terror cells and nontraditional actors,” he said. “We need a military that’s prepared to face these threats” (Jones/Fleck, Albuquerque Journal).
Huntsville, Ala., has tapped an abandoned mine to become part of the most sophisticated nuclear fallout shelter plan in the United States, the Associated Press reported yesterday (see GSN, March 2). The mine could hold as many as 20,000 people in the event of a nuclear attack. Planners hope to find additional space in churches, libraries, university dormitories and research halls. Combined, the shelters would provide shelter for every inhabitant of Huntsville and neighboring Madison County. “It would be a little trying, but it's better than the alternative,” said Andy Prewett, a manager with mine owner Land Trust of Huntsville and North Alabama, which is providing the space at no cost. While Huntsville is a relatively small city far from areas considered at high risk of terrorist attack, the city’s emergency management planner said that a nuclear bomb detonation could spread radioactive fallout over hundreds of miles. “If Huntsville is in the blast zone, there's not much we can do. But if it's just fallout … shelters would absorb 90 percent of the radiation,” said Kirk Paradise, who developed experience planning fallout shelters during the Cold War. The United States cut funding to its fallout shelter program in 1992, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Homeland Security Department after Sept. 11 developed a metropolitan protection program with provisions nuclear fallout shelters. However, no city has planned a shelter system as extensively as Huntsville, which developed the plan with a $70,000 federal grant. So far, the emergency management agency for Huntsville and Madison County has marked 105 locations as fallout shelters capable of holding an estimated 210,000 people. The agency has been seeking 50 additional sites to serve as shelters for 100,000 more people. Many cities have adopted a “shelter-in-place” strategy advising residents to seal a room in their homes using plastic and duct tape if a biological, chemical or nuclear attack takes place. Huntsville officials said such a strategy would work best in a radiological “dirty bomb” attack, but more complete shelters would be needed to absorb nuclear weapons fallout (Jay Reeves, Associated Press/Google News, Sept. 27).
A Russian official said yesterday that Russia has intelligence indicating that terrorists have been attempting to acquire nuclear weapons, the Russia and CIS Military Newswire reported (see GSN, Sept. 27). “We know for sure, with evidence and facts in hand, about this steady interest and a goal pursued by terrorists to obtain what is called nuclear weapons and nuclear components in any form,” Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Safonov said at a conference in Moscow on preventing acts of nuclear and radiological terrorism. Safonov urged nations to take action to prevent facilitators of Islamic terror operating in technology and information sectors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, adding that more could be done to prevent nuclear terrorism than other terrorist attacks. “Measures against nuclear terrorism are very closely related to the problem of nonproliferation of nuclear materials now,” he said. One Russian lawmaker called for a national body dedicated to safeguarding against nuclear terrorism. Anatoly Kulikov argued that responsibility for preventing nuclear terrorism is currently spread across dozens of Russian agencies, committees and ministries. Kulikov expressed concern that many different agencies transport Russian nuclear materials around the country thousands of times each year, complicating efforts to secure the materials (Russia and CIS Military Newswire, Sept. 27).
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