New Strategy Needed for Preventing Proliferation of WMD Expertise from Former Soviet Union, Report Says

By Chris Schneidmiller
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Preventing former Soviet weapons scientists from selling their expertise to rogue nations or terrorists has been a neglected component of U.S. threat-reduction efforts, one Washington organization said in a recent call for a sweeping update to the program (see GSN, Nov. 6, 2006).

There were potentially more than 130,000 nuclear, biological and chemical weapons specialists operating in the Soviet Union during the peak years of the Cold War, according to a report from the Henry L. Stimson Center.  With the breakup of the communist superpower in 1991, many of these scientists faced the very real choice of going hungry or seeking buyers for sensitive information.

The U.S. Defense, Energy and State departments made scientific engagement part of a larger program to reduce the risks posed by the Soviet weapons complex.  Projects backed by the United States have provided tens of thousands of former weapons personnel with civilian opportunities, according to U.S. figures (see GSN, April 16).

However, finding peaceful work for scientists is the “least funded and most undervalued leg of the nonproliferation triad of weapons, materials and expertise,” argued Stimson Center senior associates Brian Finlay and Elizabeth Turpen.  Only 10 percent of the roughly $13 billion spent by Washington on threat-reduction activities has been directed toward this work, they said.

The disparity could arise from demands on program managers from their superiors and Capitol Hill to quantify the success of these programs, Finlay said last week in an interview with Global Security Newswire.  It is far easier to show the number of warheads deactivated — more than 7,000 to date — than the security of brainpower.

“They need a hard metric to measure success. … How many warheads did you chop up, how many tons of material did you get rid of,” Finlay said.  “How do you measure human capacity and the success you had in redirecting it?”

Interest has also waned as some potentially threatening scientists have retired, moved to the West or died, and as Russia’s oil-driven economic revitalization has strengthened its ability to pay its scientists.

The importance of the effort should not be underestimated, the report argues.  A recent Energy Department study found that 21 percent of Russian scientists were open to working for at least one of four rogue nations and that 13 percent felt that in some situations they could accept doing WMD research for an authoritarian government.

The U.S. intelligence community reportedly believes that there are still several thousand specialists in former Soviet states who could pose proliferation risks, the report says.

“I think there probably is an enduring threat from some of these scientists that they could go abroad,” Finlay said.  “They may be willing to move to Iran, they may be willing to move to North Korea,” he added.

Meanwhile, additional threats could also arise from a younger generation of scientists who work in civilian biological research or other sectors that are not covered by nonproliferation efforts but could have weapons applications.

“Human engagement” helps to ensure that nonproliferation programs in former Soviet states will be sustained as the United States and other Western nations curtail and ultimately end their financial support, the report says. 

These programs can help produce a new generation of science and technology specialists who believe strongly in nonproliferation and can push for funding within their respective nations, Finlay said.  They also stand to create “a domestic supply chain of industries” to provide material needed to maintain safeguards and other security infrastructure installed in the region.

Finally, a well-oiled scientific engagement program could provide an example for dealing with weapons specialists in nations such as Iraq and Libya, Finlay said.

The two analysts argue that what exists now is at best a partial answer to the threat.  Programs spread across the three U.S. agencies — and similar initiatives sponsored by Japan, the United Kingdom and other nations, along with the European Union — largely focus on providing grants that allow scientists to conduct research for clients from their current places of employment.

Developing projects on which these scientists can work, rather than permanent and sustainable employment, leaves open the question of whether they are engaged to the point at which they would not consider selling their expertise, Finlay said. 

He rejected growing opinions in Russia and the United States that scientific engagement programs have “outlived their usefulness.”  Rather than being eliminated, these initiatives should be augmented by a “public-private partnership” that would use funds from the Group of Eight Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and potentially from host nations to provide temporary funding for private-sector entities willing to provide continued employment for former WMD personnel, according to the Stimson report.

Participating firms could come from both former Soviet states and from the West, such as biotechnology companies that might want to hire one-time Russian biological weapons researchers.

While the G-8 program is set to expire in 2012, other U.S. and international entities could be brought in as “stakeholders” to sustain investment in companies employing former weapons personnel.  In the United States this could involve agencies ranging from the National Institutes of Health to the Food and Drug Administration, while on the global stage partnering entities might include the World Bank Group or the World Health Organization, venture capital funds and nongovernmental organizations.

Officials from the Defense, Energy and State departments did not respond to requests for comment on the Stimson Center report.

Finlay said the organization has received a mixed response as it took the proposal to Capitol Hill, federal offices, private firms and the nongovernmental community.  He acknowledged that the model is not likely to be picked up as the current presidential administration winds down. 

“What are the chances that a program like this might get some wings?  I don’t know,” Finlay said.  “It’s literally going to take an individual on the Hill that takes an active interest in this to actually move it.  Given that we’re not talking about a whole lot of money, we’re talking about a pilot effort that would potentially have low cost and high return, I think that the likelihood of finding someone like that could actually be pretty good.”

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