U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates yesterday expressed concern over the long-term reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile (Carnegie Endowment photo). Gates Sees Stark Choice on Nuke Tests, Modernization By Elaine M. Grossman Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — In a major policy address yesterday, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates laid out a stark choice for the nation between testing the existing nuclear arsenal or modernizing it with new weapons (see GSN, Sept. 24)...Full Story

Experts Question N. Korean Willingness to Disarm The goal of eliminating North Korea’s nuclear weapons might never be achieved, according to many analysts in Asia and elsewhere, who have argued that the best outcome might be persuading Pyongyang to permanently stop producing additional nuclear material, the McClatchy-Tribune News Service reported yesterday (see GSN, Oct. 28)...Full Story

IAEA Finishes Lab Tests of Syrian Samples, Seeks to Continue Investigating Nuclear Allegations Nuclear inspectors have completed their analysis of soil and air samples collected in Syria earlier this year and have concluded that they should continue to examine allegations that the nation had a covert nuclear program (see GSN, Oct. 3)...Full Story

	Wednesday, October 29, 2008

U.S. Candidates Vary on Nuclear, Chemical Security The two major U.S. presidential contenders offer differing approaches to protecting their country from terrorism involving nuclear or chemical materials, the Bergen County, N.J., Record reported yesterday (see GSN, Oct. 28). Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) has promised he would cooperate with U.S. partner states to shatter terrorist networks around the world while preventing such groups from obtaining nuclear bombs or other devastating weapons. Senator Barack Obama (D-Ill.) has called for a comprehensive four-year effort to secure all nuclear weapons storage sites in the world, and to boost the capabilities of other nations to track and interdict illicit transfers of WMD material. To bolster the security of dangerous industrial chemicals, McCain has recommended establishing a new system of chemical plant vulnerability reviews and requiring plant operators to fix potential weaknesses. Obama has called for better training at chemical plants and new precautions to limit the dispersal of dangerous chemicals from such facilities.  He also wants chemical sites to replace hazardous agents and technologies with safer alternatives when possible. In a bid to bolster transportation security, McCain has said he would tap advanced technologies and data analysis techniques to improve cargo and passenger screening on ships and airline flights before they reach the United States.  Obama has proposed placing additional federal security personnel at airports, boosting aviation security spending and creating a new terror watchdog list.  He has also advocated scanning all U.S.-bound cargo shipments for potential WMD ingredients and improving efforts to share cargo information internationally (Peter Sampson, The Record, Oct. 28). Back to top       U.S. Steps Up Smuggling Crackdown The United States charged more than 145 individuals and firms in the past fiscal year with smuggling military and dual-use technology abroad, the Justice Department announced yesterday (see GSN, June 17). Under the 1-year-old National Export Enforcement Initiative, a wide variety of U.S. agencies have begun to improve their cooperation to prevent the illicit transfer of sensitive U.S. material, including WMD technology. “Keeping U.S. weapons technology and other restricted materials from falling into the wrong hands and from being used against our allies, our troops overseas or Americans at home is a top counterintelligence priority of the Justice Department,” Assistant Attorney General Patrick Rowan said in a press release.  “Through this multiagency initiative we are making America a far more hostile target for those that seek to obtain our sensitive technology through illegal means.” “On a daily basis, foreign states as well as criminal and terrorist groups seek arms, technology, and other materials to advance their technological capacity, weapons systems and, in some cases, weapons of mass destruction programs,” the release says.  “With America producing the most advanced technology in the world, it has become a primary target of these illicit technology acquisition efforts.” The 145 prosecutions was an increase from 110 in fiscal 2007, and 43 percent of the recent batch involved illicit exports to China or Iran (see GSN, June 10).  Both nations have sought to acquire U.S. missile technology, the release says, and an additional fact sheet indicated that Iran sought software to improve its chemical acquisition capabilities (U.S. Justice Department release, Oct. 28). Back to top       Canada to Adopt WMD Scanners for Olympics Canada plans to deploy a network of remote-controlled detectors capable of scanning city blocks for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials, the Vancouver Sun reported today (see GSN, Aug. 8). The “Safesite” sensors, designed to identify more than 37 weapons agents, are part of an effort to guard against WMD attacks at the 2010 Winter Olympic Games in Vancouver. “It is a fact of reality for this type of event that as much as we can hope nothing happens, there is always a risk," said Henry Buckley, vice president and general manager of Acklands-Grainger, an equipment supplier contracting for the upcoming Olympics.  "It's incumbent upon all of us that we are prepared effectively." Buckley’s firm discussed WMD threats in a recent meeting with security and disaster preparedness officials.  While the Safesite sensors are used at the White House and routinely deployed at Super Bowls, the National Defense Department is the only Canadian organization that uses them, the Sun reported. Al-Qaeda and some extremist organizations are considered threats to the Olympic Games, according to police officials.  Al-Qaeda has already identified the 2012 Summer Olympics in London specifically as a target, according to the Sun. The detection system costs several hundred thousand Canadian dollars; Canada’s provinces and national government are already struggling to address an expanding security budget expected to fall between $400 million and $1 billion in Canadian currency (Jeff Lee, Vancouver Sun, Oct. 29). Back to top

Gates Sees Stark Choice on Nuke Tests, Modernization By Elaine M. Grossman Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — In a major policy address yesterday, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates laid out a stark choice for the nation between testing the existing nuclear arsenal or modernizing it with new weapons (see GSN, Sept. 24). Speaking at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Gates said one of the two controversial options must be implemented if the United States is to retain a safe, secure and reliable nuclear deterrent. He also stated in the clearest terms yet his view that U.S. leaders would not have enough confidence to further shrink the atomic stockpile unless they could either field new weapons or submit aging nuclear arms to underground tests. “To be blunt, there is absolutely no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization program,” the defense secretary said. At the same time, Gates voiced little enthusiasm for underground explosive testing, asserting for the first time that he would support ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty if “adequate verification measures” could be devised. Gates’ preferred option for maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent force is developing and fielding a modern nuclear weapon.  Yet that option has appeared increasingly remote on political grounds.  For two years in a row, Congress has eliminated funding for the Bush administration’s proposed effort, the Reliable Replacement Warhead (see GSN, July 10).  Debating Options Advocates have portrayed the RRW effort as capable of ultimately replacing all the aging warheads in the arsenal with one that is more safe and affordable to maintain, secure from theft and misuse, and reliable over time. In rejecting RRW plans, though, lawmakers have argued that building new weapons could undercut U.S. efforts to curb the proliferation of nuclear arms around the globe.  Critics in Congress also have called on the executive branch to lay out a broad nuclear weapons strategy before they would consider approving the development of any new warheads. The reason why Congress has “so far refused to fund” the RRW program beyond a conceptual phase “lies in a deep-seated and quite justifiable aversion to nuclear weapons, in doing anything that might be perceived as lowering the threshold for using them, or as creating new nuclear capabilities,” Gates said.  “Let me be clear:  The program we propose is not about new capabilities.”  Rather, “it is about safety, security and reliability,” he said.  “And it deserves our urgent attention.” In place of an RRW effort, Capitol Hill has supported continuing a “Stockpile Stewardship Program” to monitor the aging stockpile for potential problems, such as malfunctions or corrosion.  Lawmakers have also backed efforts to update selected technologies built into nuclear arms as they undergo periodic refurbishment. To date these approaches have maintained U.S. confidence in the atomic stockpile, Gates acknowledged yesterday, but he warned, “The problem is the long-term prognosis — which I would characterize as bleak.” “At a certain point, it will become impossible to keep extending the life of our arsenal — especially in light of our testing moratorium,” he said.  “It also makes it harder to reduce existing stockpiles, because eventually we won’t have as much confidence in the efficacy of the weapons we do have.” The head of the Arms Control Association in Washington questioned Gates’ assertion that a return to testing would be needed if a new weapon is not fielded. Daryl Kimball cited a 2002 National Academy of Sciences panel finding that test explosions “are not needed to discover” age-related defects — which primarily affect the weapons’ non-nuclear components — and thus testing “is not likely to be needed to address them.” Other critics similarly questioned Gates’ view that the stockpile stewardship effort is insufficient and that modernization efforts would not result in new capabilities. Even more limited changes to the current stockpile that fall short of a full RRW effort “have already added capabilities, and an enhanced life-extension program would be able to do that any time,” said Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists (see GSN, Sept. 12). Alone In Not Modernizing The defense secretary sounded many of the same themes contained in a September white paper on nuclear weapons in the 21st century, issued jointly with Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman. Among the arguments the paper advanced was the notion that the United States stands alone among major nuclear-armed nations in failing to update its stockpile. “Currently, the United States is the only declared nuclear power that is neither modernizing its nuclear arsenal nor has the capability to produce a new nuclear warhead,” Gates told the audience yesterday. He identified Russia and China, in particular, as improving and expanding their stockpiles.  While neither nation is a U.S. adversary, “we cannot ignore these developments,” he said. Those two nations, though, are addressing challenges with their respective nuclear arsenals that the United States does not share, according to Kristensen, who directs his organization’s Nuclear Information Project.  “Unlike Russia and China, U.S. nuclear weapons are reliable and modern, and the multibillion dollar Stockpile Stewardship Program has been capable of extending significantly the life of existing warheads,” he said.  “Is the secretary's point that we need to produce nuclear weapons just because the others do?” Sharon Squassoni of the Carnegie Endowment agreed that Gates’ focus seemed misplaced. “Presumably our modernization should be based on the threats we need to deter, not whether other nuclear-weapon states are modernizing their forces,” she said. David Trachtenberg, a former Defense Department policy official during the Bush administration, saw it differently. “Becoming the only nuclear-weapon state not modernizing its nuclear force may actually encourage other countries to go nuclear, as our adversaries seek to capitalize on our distaste for nuclear weapons and see an opportunity to offset U.S. conventional superiority, and our allies question the credibility of our extended nuclear deterrent,” he said.  “Creating incentives for others to go nuclear is bad policy.” Arms Reductions Gates argued that an additional benefit of boosting confidence in the nuclear force through a modernization program is that it could lay the groundwork for additional stockpile cuts.  With an influx of fresh technology, the United States would no longer need to keep large numbers of warheads in reserve, the thinking goes.  Currently, the nation maintains extra nuclear weapons as a hedge against the possible discovery of a defect that renders useless one or more types of U.S. warheads. Noting that the United States and Russia agreed in the 2002 Moscow Treaty to reduce to a level of 1,700 to 2,200 deployed warheads on each side, Gates said “we can probably do better than that” during the next administration.  He predicted that the next president — whether it is Senator Barack Obama (D-Ill.) or Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) — would sit down with Moscow to extend the terms of current agreements or negotiate a new pact.  Many national security experts have pushed Washington to at least agree with Moscow on extending the verification provisions of the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which is set to expire in late 2009.  That accord required the United States and Russia to each reduce their long-range nuclear arsenals to no more than 1,600 delivery vehicles and 6,000 warheads, levels that were reached in late 2001. “I believe we should go for another agreement with the Russians.  I believe it could involve further cuts in the number of deployed warheads.  I believe we do need the verification provisions,” Gates said.  “But I think it ought to be an agreement that is shorter, simpler and easier to adjust to real-world conditions than most of the strategic arms agreements that we’ve seen over the last 40 years.” Future arms talks might include other nuclear powers, he said. The United States has already begun a “rudimentary” dialogue with China that might sometime later evolve into nuclear arms negotiations, he said.  Gates cited the Cold War experience with Moscow as providing a model of sorts for such Sino-American exchanges, noting the value of what equated to “a quarter-century seminar between the United States and the Soviet Union on how each thought about nuclear weapons, nuclear war, strategic planning, [and] how they intended to use these weapons.” “We learned a great deal,” he said.  “One of the things that I believe very strongly is that the arms control process itself contributed to a safer world.” Nuclear Testing Kimball, the Arms Control Association executive director, welcomed what he saw as Gates’ small step away from White House policy regarding the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.  President Bill Clinton signed the pact in 1996, but the Senate subsequently rejected the treaty. “Gates’ qualified support for ratification of the CTBT — if it can be adequately verified — is something of a departure from the Bush administration’s standard opposition to the CTBT, and that is refreshing,” he said, referring to the treaty by its acronym.  “In the decade since the Senate considered the treaty, verification capabilities have only improved. … Combined global and national technical monitoring capabilities make the CTBT effectively verifiable.” However, in conditionally backing ratification of the test ban treaty, the defense secretary was not breaking any new ground, his spokesman told Global Security Newswire yesterday.  “I think he was really restating administration policy,” said Geoff Morrell.  “The problem the administration has with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is, among other things, verification.  I think what he was saying is if there were adequate verification controls, that is something that we could embrace.” In fact, Morrell suggested, it is unclear whether detection technologies and techniques exist that could afford the United States sufficient confidence that no nations were cheating on the pact by conducting secret underground nuclear blasts. “The real hang-up is whether it can be verified,” he said. An informal U.S. nuclear test moratorium has been in place since the early 1990s, but the United States remains one of nine nations preventing the treaty from entering into force.  A top U.S. general recently said he would like to keep the testing option open (see GSN, July 22). Trachtenberg, the former Bush administration defense official, said verification is “not the issue.” “A bad treaty doesn’t become a good one simply by being verifiable.  There are a host of reasons why we might need to test in the future, but a CTBT would prevent us from doing so,” he said.  “Although we have maintained a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing since 1992, our testing restraint has not dissuaded others from seeking to acquire nuclear weapons.  It is difficult to see how a CTBT would do so.” Kristensen agreed that a desire to retain an option to test — particularly if the United States develops a new weapon — is what has prevented the administration from embracing the pact. The question facing Bush’s national security team has been “whether the U.S. should or could sign away a testing option when it is about to embark upon a wholesale replacement of its nuclear arsenal with RRWs that have not been operationally deployed before,” Kristensen told GSN.  “Gates’ verification focus is probably easier to overcome than the other obstacle.” Gates has not actively pursued the development of verification measures for a test ban treaty during his nearly two-year tenure as defense secretary.  Asked why the matter has arisen only as President Bush prepares to leave office, Morrell pointed to the well-known priorities Gates established from the start — conventional military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. “Messy Realities” The bulk of Gates’ speech yesterday was devoted to arguing that nuclear weapons will continue to play a crucial role in protecting U.S. national security, well into the future.  While he noted recent calls for the elimination of nuclear weapons, the defense secretary spelled out his view that the goal is unrealistic today. “We must deal with the messy realities of the world in which we live,” Gates said.  “As long as other states have or seek nuclear weapons — and can potentially threaten us, our allies and friends — then we must have a deterrent capacity that makes it clear that challenging the United States in the nuclear arena — or with other weapons of mass destruction — could result in an overwhelming, catastrophic response.” Another reason nuclear weapons must endure is uncertainty about tomorrow’s security needs, he said. “We simply cannot predict the future.  Who can tell what the world will look like in 10 or 20 years?” Gates said.  “We have to be prepared for contingencies we haven’t even considered.” For the time being, the nation could decrease its reliance on nuclear weapons by developing and fielding more capable conventional weapons and defenses against enemy missiles, he said. The Defense Department’s embrace of a “New Triad” — nuclear and conventional offensive weapons, missile defenses and a responsive national security framework — is “to reduce our emphasis on nuclear weapons for deterrence and provide the president more non-nuclear deterrence options and responses to potential crises,” he said. As with his other remarks, the defense secretary’s overarching perspective drew both praise and criticism. “Despite its seductive appeal, nuclear abolition is not sound policy in a dangerous world,” Trachtenberg said.  “Secretary Gates deserves credit for pointing out clearly the continuing importance of nuclear deterrence and the choices we must make if we are to preserve its efficacy in the long term.  The question is, will anyone pay attention?” Kristensen thought, though, that Gates’ world view had not adjusted to today’s realities. “The speech struck me as surprisingly traditional.  No visions for how to move forward,” he said.  “It was almost the kind of speech one would have expected to hear from a secretary of defense back in 1993.” A Growing Issue Gates’ speech came in advance of two major reviews. A congressionally mandated bipartisan panel on the U.S. strategic nuclear posture is set to report its recommendations by Dec. 1 (see GSN, March 20).  Former defense secretaries James Schlesinger and William Perry lead the commission. The Bush administration presented the findings of its Nuclear Posture Review — a congressionally required scrub of atomic weapons policy — to Capitol Hill in early 2002 (see GSN, Jan. 10, 2002).  Next year, a new administration is expected to conduct a Nuclear Posture Review of its own. Since the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks, the Bush administration has been largely focused on conventional combat issues.  However, Gates has spoken periodically about nuclear weapons over the past year in response to two major lapses in operational oversight. The Air Force mistakenly shipped mislabeled ICBM fuses to Taiwan in 2006, an error that was discovered only this year (see GSN, March 25).  Last year, a bomber aircraft crew transported six cruise missiles across several U.S. states, unaware that the weapons were armed with nuclear warheads (see GSN, Sept. 5, 2007). Gates’ dissatisfaction with how the prior Air Force secretary and chief of staff handled the issue contributed to their dismissals in June (see GSN, June 6). The service’s new leaders, Secretary Michael Donley and Gen. Norton Schwartz, last week unveiled a plan for “reinvigorating” their nuclear weapons sector (see GSN, Oct. 27). Among the 100 changes envisioned by the so-called nuclear “roadmap” are the creation of:  a new command, headed by a three-star general, to oversee all ICBMs and nuclear-capable bomber aircraft; a new general-officer position at the Air Force’s Pentagon headquarters to be “accountable” for policy oversight and integration; and a new panel, called the “Nuclear Oversight Board” and chaired jointly by the Air Force secretary and chief of staff, to track roadmap implementation. The service’s problems in handling nuclear weapons properly “are being remedied as I speak,” Gates said. Back to top       Experts Question N. Korean Willingness to Disarm The goal of eliminating North Korea’s nuclear weapons might never be achieved, according to many analysts in Asia and elsewhere, who have argued that the best outcome might be persuading Pyongyang to permanently stop producing additional nuclear material, the McClatchy-Tribune News Service reported yesterday (see GSN, Oct. 28). “When you talk to the specialists, even government people, off the record, you hear, ‘We don't have a better solution and if we can keep this thing frozen, that's the best we'll have,’” according to Ralph Cossa, head of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a branch of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Participants in the 5-year-old negotiations involving China, Japan, Russia, the United States and both Koreas say publicly that disarmament and full denuclearization remains the goal.  The nations signed an agreement last year under which Pyongyang pledged to give up its nuclear sector in exchange for various economic, diplomatic and security benefits.  While there has been progress toward this goal, the process has proved difficult and has at times appeared near collapse. “No one dares declare that we are prepared to accept a part of the nuclear program in North Korea," said international relations expert Shi Yinhong, of People's University of China. However, the nations in talks with North Korea might be willing to achieve partial success rather than see the whole effort fail, Shi said. “Everyone with common sense knows that this statement of denuclearization is not complete,” he said.  Nonetheless, diplomats “will pretend that it is good and wonderful … and declare it in ambiguous language and say (the talks have) made progress,” according to Shi. “It would be extremely difficult to denuclearize North Korean weapons unless the North Korean military is sure there's no threat from the outside, particularly the United States," said former South Korean national security adviser Moon Chung-in. It is smart to focus on preventing North Korea from developing new nuclear capabilities and to put off addressing its present arsenal for a time, Moon said. The talks must not be allowed to fail, according to some top scholars. "The alternative would be terrible.  Look at Iran," said career Chinese diplomat Wu Jianmin, addressing the U.S. stand that military action remains an option to deal with Iran’s nuclear activities.  “A diplomatic solution may not be very fast.  (But) it's much better for the world.” (Tim Johnson, McClatchy-Tribune News Service/Yahoo!News, Oct. 28). Meanwhile, the top U.S. and Japanese nuclear negotiators yesterday said they were united on the need for a workable program to verify North Korea’s nuclear capabilities.  Pyongyang earlier this month agreed to a verification protocol — likely to include site visits and collection of samples — in exchange for being taken off the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism.  However, the six nations have not yet met to discuss the plan intended to move the denuclearization process forward. “We agreed that it is very important to turn a recent U.S.-North Korean deal on a verification mechanism into a neatly-documented six- party accord,” Japanese envoy Akitaka Saiki said after meeting with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill in Washington. “For that to happen, we also agreed that it is essential to hold a six-party heads-of-delegation meeting as soon as possible," Saiki added, noting that China is working to schedule a session in Beijing. Saiki reaffirmed that Japan would not provide energy assistance to North Korea — one of the rewards promised under the nuclear deal — until Pyongyang fully resolves the question of its abduction of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s.  North Korea, which has claimed that all abductees died or have been sent home, has not yet followed through on its agreement to look into the matter (Kyodo News/Breitbart.com, Oct. 28). Hill acknowledged that Washington has appealed to other nations to supply Japan’s portion of the 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil and related assistance, Agence France-Presse reported. “We've been in contact with other countries on it," he said. Hill declined to offer specific names, although Australia and the European Union have been reported as possible suppliers. "We welcome the participation of other countries.  So we're proceeding on that basis," Hill said (Agence France-Presse/Spacewar.com, Oct. 29). Japan might seek to pressure North Korea on the abduction issue by enacting increased sanctions, Reuters reported.  Tokyo recently extended existing economic penalties against Pyongyang by six months. "What is important is whether we can generate enough pressure to make North Korea really feel troubled," Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Iwao Uruma said during a meeting today, according to Kyodo News.  “It is necessary to devise ways to apply pressure in the future” (Yoko Kubota, Reuters/Yahoo!News, Oct. 29). Elsewhere, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il is reportedly back in the hospital after suffering “a serious problem,” the Associated Press reported.  Kim is believed to have suffered a stroke in August and then undergone brain surgery, though Pyongyang has denied all reports regarding his ill health. Some observers have said that North Korea’s halt and temporary reversal of disablement of some nuclear facilities in August suggested that Kim was not in control of the government at the time.  Pyongyang ultimately reversed course again and resumed disablement at the Yongbyon nuclear complex. The latest report came from South Korean intelligence, according to the Dong-a Ilbo newspaper. Kim Jong Nam, Kim’s oldest son, is also reported to have brought a French neurosurgeon back to Pyongyang to treat the leader (Jean Lee, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, Oct. 29). Back to top       IAEA Finishes Lab Tests of Syrian Samples, Seeks to Continue Investigating Nuclear Allegations Nuclear inspectors have completed their analysis of soil and air samples collected in Syria earlier this year and have concluded that they should continue to examine allegations that the nation had a covert nuclear program (see GSN, Oct. 3). In June, Syria permitted the International Atomic Energy Agency to visit a site bombed by Israel last year (see GSN, June 25).  U.S. intelligence officials presented evidence in April indicating that the destroyed facility was a nearly operational reactor designed to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons.  The plant was constructed with North Korean assistance, the U.S. officials said (see GSN, April 25). Syria has denied any undeclared nuclear activity, but it raised suspicions by razing the bombed site quickly and erecting a new structure over the old.  Damascus has also denied IAEA requests to visit additional sites that could be related to the razed facility. Preliminary IAEA analysis of samples taken in June showed no presence of uranium fuel or graphite, tons of which would have been needed to operate a reactor (see GSN, Sept. 22). The final analysis, however, left the door open for more study, according to diplomats in Vienna. “There is enough evidence there to warrant a follow-up,” said one diplomat. IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei is planning to release an official report shortly before the next scheduled meeting of the agency’s governing board on Nov. 27, according to another diplomat (George Jahn, Associated Press/Google News, Oct. 29). At the board’s September meeting, ElBaradei resisted Western nations’ pressure for a quick report, telling them, “you will get an assessment as fast as we can and when we are ready” (see GSN, Sept. 25). ElBaradei has criticized parties on all sides for their behavior surrounding the issue, complaining that Israel destroyed the alleged nuclear facility instead of allowing the agency to examine it and decrying Syria’s subsequent razing of the bombed site (Greg Webb, Global Security Newswire, Oct. 29). Back to top

Galveston Biolab Safe From Storms, Officials Insist Officials are defending a planned biological defense laboratory’s ability to withstand the strong storms that regularly land in Galveston, Texas, the New York Times reported today (see GSN, Sept. 17). The University of Texas Medical Branch’s Galveston National Laboratory was built to safeguard the deadly biological agents it would house from Category 4 hurricanes; the building incorporates concrete pylons driven 120 feet below the surface and special low-pressure laboratories designed to push contaminated air through a filtration system if their entrance doors are forced open.  “The entire island can wash away and this is still going to be here,” said James LeDuc, deputy chief of the facility set to open Nov. 11.  “With Hurricane Ike [in September], we had no damage.  The only evidence the hurricane occurred was water that was blown under one of the doors and a puddle in the lobby.” The site’s secure laboratories and auxiliary generators are placed well above expected flood levels in the seven-story building, but scientists would still respond to any oncoming hurricane by suspending their experiments, decontaminating their workspaces and freezing deadly agents at 70 degrees below zero, Associate Research Director Joan Nichols said. If the facility’s backup power generators failed, the freezers would keep the lethal diseases inactive for roughly four days, Nichols said. Still, critics see the site’s location as an unnecessary risk.  The facility is expected to handle anthrax, bird flu, Ebola, plague, tularemia, typhus and West Nile virus. “It’s crazy, in my mind,” said Jim Blackburn, a Houston-based environmental attorney.  “I just find an amazing willingness among the people on the Texas coast to accept risks that a lot of people in the country would not accept.” A much stronger storm than Hurricane Ike will eventually rock the laboratory, some critics argued.  While Ike’s winds reached only 100 mph, the storm flooded most buildings on the island and has forced a nearby medical center to close for more than a month, the Times reported (James McKinley, New York Times, Oct. 29). Back to top

Russia Eliminates 30 Percent of Chemical Weapons Russia has destroyed about 30 percent of its chemical warfare agents, Interfax reported yesterday (see GSN, Oct. 3). “According to the [Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons], as of now Russia has scrapped 11,600 metric tons of poisonous substances of the first grade, which amounts to 30 percent of the stock,” OPCW special projects chief Krzysztof Paturej said during a meeting in Moscow.  “The rates of chemical disarmament in Russia are the highest among other states.” An OPCW spokesman today put the specific disposal figure for Schedule 1 chemicals, those manufactured and stockpiled specifically for use as warfare material, at 29.7 percent. Russia originally possessed 40,000 metric tons of chemical agents banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention.  That was the world’s largest stockpile, topping those held by the other declared chemical-agent possessors, Albania, Libya, India, the United States and a nation widely assumed to be South Korea (see GSN, Oct. 17). Paturej indicated that Russia is capable of meeting the April 2012 treaty deadline for full elimination of its chemical arsenal, Interfax reported.  Some experts have questioned the nation’s ability to keep to that schedule (Interfax, Oct. 28). Canada is expected to sign an agreement to support construction of a Russian chemical weapons disposal plant in the republic of Udmurtia, RIA Novosti reported yesterday.  Talks are planned between the two nations’ foreign affairs agencies (RIA Novosti, Oct. 28). Back to top       Activists Lash Report on CW Waste Shipments Environmentalists worry that a recent report from a U.S. research panel could help pave the way for shipments of massive amounts of potentially hazardous  waste from two chemical-weapon repositories, Defense Environment Alert reported this month (see GSN, Oct. 1). The National Research Council report states that, with appropriate safety measures in place, it is reasonable to transport hydrolysate from the Blue Grass Army Depot in Kentucky and the Pueblo Chemical Depot in Colorado to other locations for final disposal. “The experience to date with the off-site shipment and treatment of mustard and nerve agent hydrolysates from the Aberdeen [Md.] and Newport [Ind.] Chemical Agent Disposal Facilities indicates that off-site transportation and disposal of these materials is a safe and technically viable course of action,” the report states. Panel members urged the Army to “consider such an option now, before the [Blue Grass and Pueblo] plants are built and operating, to maximize the benefit of such a change.” Hydrolysate is produced through chemical neutralization of warfare materials such as mustard blister agent, sarin and VX nerve agents.  The Kentucky and Colorado storage depots are both years away from beginning disposal operations. The Defense Department has not yet decided how it will eliminate wastewater produced at the two sites, Defense Environment Alert reported. One activist affiliated with the Chemical Weapons Working Group argued that the report disregards many concerns noted by the organization and other environmental groups and instead focuses on adhering to a consistent disposal schedule.  They argue that shipments could cause safety problems and bring hazardous waste to communities such as Veolia, Texas, home of the incinerator used to destroy waste from the Indiana plant. However, two sources with knowledge of National Research Council procedures said the report only promotes waste shipment as one potential method of handling the material. Peter Lederman, chairman of the panel that authored the report, said the group’s analysis determined only that shipping the waste is “safe and technically feasible,” and “obviously there are economic considerations that we did not go into.”  Still, “we think it would speed [disposal] up and save money,” he said (Defense Environment Alert/Chemical Weapons Working Group, Oct. 14). Back to top       Blue Grass Depot to Host Emergency Response Drill Authorities are set to respond to a simulated chemical-weapon emergency today in an annual drill at the Blue Grass Army Depot in Kentucky, the Richmond Register reported (see GSN, Oct. 28). The exercise, organized by the Madison County Emergency Management Agency/Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program, is expected to involve depot and county personnel as well as local police, fire, health and  medical officials. Monitors are expected to view and evaluate the mock response. “Each year we strive to improve our readiness to deal with possible emergencies in Madison County,” said Carl Richards, head of the county’s Emergency Management Agency (Richmond Register, Oct. 28). Back to top

Gates Rebuts Russian Missile Defense Concerns Russian opposition to U.S. missile defense plans in Europe are only political, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said yesterday, arguing that Washington has made good-faith efforts to assuage Moscow’s concerns (see GSN, Oct. 21). Top-level Russian officials have decried the U.S. effort, claiming that the plans to deploy 10 U.S. interceptors in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic would threaten Russia’s strategic missiles (see related GSN story, today). Gates rejected that argument. “The Russians know perfectly well this isn't aimed against them,” he said in a speech at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  “We have gone a long way toward providing the necessary assurances to Russia that this system is not aimed at them but is aimed at a very limited threat coming from Iran.” The Bush administration has offered to allow Russian “representatives at both the sites, in the Czech Republic and in Poland, if those governments agree to it, having technical monitoring of what is going on, at both of those sites, having a common data-sharing center in Moscow,” he said. Furthermore, “I've proposed to President [Vladimir] Putin, now Prime Minister Putin, that we would not operationalize the sites until the Iranians had tested a missile that could reach most of Western Europe, not to mention a good part of Russia,” he added. “We have offered transparency in a variety of ways.  And to tell you the truth, the Russian military has shown some interest in this.  But I think that for political reasons, the Russians have chosen to make an issue of it,” Gates said. “The notion that the Russian arsenal is any way put in jeopardy, by 10 interceptors, I think, is laughable on its face,” he continued.  “I've also talked to them very directly about, well, here's your worry, breakout, that someday we would change the configuration of these sites and expand them, in a way that might put your deterrent at some risk; said, we can reach agreements on that, and because you'll be there, you'll know if we're going to start to do anything” (Greg Webb, Global Security Newswire, Oct. 29). Back to top       Czech Lawmakers Debate U.S. Missile Defense Base Lawmakers in the Czech Republic are considering whether to sign off on a plan to have their nation become home to a U.S. missile defense radar base, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Oct. 2). The Czech government has approved two treaties necessary for establishment of the installation.  However, final approval must come from both houses of parliament. There has been significant opposition from Czech opposition parties and residents to the base, which the Bush administration says is part of an effort to counter missile threats from Iran. Debate began today in the lower house of parliament and could stretch on for some time, AP reported (Associated Press/International Herald Tribune, Oct. 29). Meanwhile, the head of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency today inspected the possible site of the facility in Poland that would house 10 missile interceptors, thenews.pl reported. The base could be operating by 2011 or 2012, said Lt. Gen. Henry Obering.  It would be limited to roughly 500 personnel. Obering and other U.S. and Polish officials visited the vacant Redzikowo airport near the Baltic coast.  Warsaw and Washington could sign a deal for use of the site by Nov. 19, according to Polish Vice Minister Stanislaw Komorowski (thenews.pl, Oct. 29). Back to top

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