By Greg Webb
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The United States has retrieved 52 kilograms of highly enriched uranium spent fuel from overseas nuclear reactors in the past 12 months, the National Nuclear Security Administration disclosed today. The announcement revealed the latest progress of a program designed to repatriate material the United States provided to friendly nations between the 1950s and 1970s when there was little perceived risk of terrorists stealing weapon-usable nuclear materials (see GSN, Sept. 19, 2007). During the fiscal year that ended Sept. 30, NNSA officials coordinated the return of all “eligible” highly enriched uranium spent fuel from four nations: Argentina, Germany, Portugal and Romania. The most recent batch, 10.3 kilograms from Germany, was delivered Sept. 23 to the U.S. Savannah River Site in South Carolina, according to an NNSA spokeswoman. The eligible designation applies to types of fuel that the United States either has the technology or plans to develop the technology to dispose of safely. “The complete removal of all eligible U.S.-origin highly enriched uranium from Argentina, Portugal, Romania and Germany is another milestone in NNSA’s cooperative effort to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation and demonstrates the U.S. government’s strong international commitment to nonproliferation,” said NNSA Administrator Thomas D’Agostino in a prepared statement. ArgentinaThe fiscal 2008 transfers began with completing the removal of 6 kilograms of HEU spent fuel from Argentina in December 2007, according to Kelly Cummins, NNSA director of former Soviet Union and Asian threat reduction. Argentina retains about 2 kilograms of additional, “noneligible” uranium that Buenos Aires has promised to blend down to less dangerous enrichment levels, she said. The total of about 8 kilograms corresponds somewhat with an independent estimate of Argentina’s holdings by the Institute for Science and International Security. That 2005 study determined there were 8.8 kilograms of HEU material at the nation’s RA-6 reactor site. The study also reported, however, the presence of an additional 13 kilograms of HEU material used for producing medical isotopes (see related GSN story, today). GermanyGermany had two transfers in fiscal 2008, starting with 8.8 kilograms from a research reactor in June and finishing with last month’s shipment of 10.3 kilograms from the same site, Cummins said. Some U.S.-origin material is set to remain, but the United States intends to support the return of a batch of Russian-origin highly enriched uranium, she said. The ISIS study estimated that Germany has significantly more than 1 metric ton of highly enriched uranium. Portugal and RomaniaNNSA officials orchestrated a joint shipment of HEU spent fuel from Portugal (6.6 kilograms) and Romania (15.3 kilograms) that was completed in August, Cummins said. Portugal is now completely free of highly enriched uranium and Romania has some Russian-origin material that it plans to repatriate with U.S. assistance, she added. Consequences of TheftThe United States began to recognize the risk of shipping weapon-usable material overseas in the 1970s when it became clear that security measures at many research reactors were inadequate. Before then, the United States typically exported nearly weapon-grade uranium when it offered fuel assistance to foreign research reactors, Matthew Bunn of Harvard University’s Managing the Atom project told Global Security Newswire today. “Most U.S.-origin material tends to be in the 90-percent range or the 70-percent range,” he said, describing the proportion of the uranium 235 isotope in the material. Uranium in U.S. nuclear weapons has generally been enriched to 90 percent or more. In 1978, Washington began a take-back program to retrieve much of the material from foreign research reactors. More recently, the U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative programs was created to aid the repatriation of both U.S.- and Russian-origin highly enriched uranium. It has supported several such transfers over the past few years, including the fiscal 2008 projects (see GSN, July 18). The project’s aims, however, are complicated by a poor understanding of how much material is held overseas, Bunn said. “Remarkably, [the Energy Department] simply does not know how much U.S.-origin HEU exists in foreign countries,” says his annual report, Securing the Bomb 2007. The department, however, is completing an effort to estimate the amount, Bunn said today.
By Chris Schneidmiller
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — Relying on highly enriched uranium to produce medical isotopes leaves the United States vulnerable to acts of nuclear terrorism and a drastic shortage of one crucial material in coming years, experts warned yesterday (see GSN, June 19, 2006). As there is no reasonable alternative to using technetium 99m for a widespread cardiac diagnostic test, the answer to these risks lies in employing facilities that produce the nuclear isomer without also creating a proliferation threat, they argued. Four non-U.S. companies use highly enriched uranium to produce 95 percent of the global supply of technetium 99m, said Andrew Einstein, a clinical medicine professor at Columbia University in New York. The United States each year sends 20 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium to a reactor at Chalk River, Ontario, where it is used to create much of the U.S. supply of technetium. The problem is that the waste produced through this work retains 95 percent of the original highly enriched uranium, creating the danger that it could be put to bad uses in the wrong hands. There are increasing signs that terrorist organizations hope to use an improvised nuclear weapon, said Cristina Hansell, director of the Newly Independent States Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Their intent is to craft a devastating weapon rather than a less-lethal radiological “dirty bomb,” she said. “For that sort of device, highly enriched uranium is the material of choice. Plutonium is a fissile material but it [takes] a lot more complex technology to create a device that would make that explode efficiently,” Hansell said during a Capitol Hill discussion organized by the American Association for the Advancement of Science. “Using that simple gun-type device you need highly enriched uranium.” Terrorists are unlikely to enrich uranium themselves, so they would have to find an available source, Hansell said. Civilian sites around the world contain roughly 50 metric tons of weapon-grade uranium and generally have lower levels of security than military sites, she said. The amount of material needed for a weapon would drop as the enrichment level increased. Major producers of technetium use material that is enriched to 93 percent, “easily weapons-useable material,” according to Hansell. There has been significant progress around the world in converting research and other reactors to using low-enriched uranium, which would not provide fuel for nuclear explosions, Hansell said (see GSN, Oct. 3). However, “the portion of HEU that’s going to medical isotopes is increasing as these other uses are decreased and more and more medical isotopes are needed,” she added. That need is growing even as the supply of technetium faces significant drop-offs in the next few years, Einstein said. The 51-year-old National Research Universal reactor at Chalk River is not expected to last beyond 2014; Canada terminated the project for a replacement facility and no new plant is anticipated, he said. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., which operates the Chalk River site, did not respond by deadline to a request today for comment. Meanwhile, the Dutch reactor that is the United States’ second-highest supplier of the parent compound of technetium shut down in August and will resume operations no earlier than this month. The subsequent shortage of technetium in the last two months in Europe and the United States “is really a harbinger for the future,” Einstein said. There are no good options for conducting the stress tests used to diagnosis heart problems without the isomer, he said. The four potential alternatives have a variety of drawbacks, including an increased potential for causing cancer in patients, failing to detect some cases of cardiac disease and death due to the invasive nature of one procedure. Possible AnswersThere are potential legislative responses to this twinned terrorism and medical threat, said Alan Kuperman, a public affairs professor at the University of Texas at Austin. He said, though, that Washington’s record to date is mixed. The “original sin” of U.S. HEU proliferation was the Atoms for Peace program that in the 1950s began providing weapon-grade uranium to other nations for reactor fuel and medical isotope production, according to Kuperman. In some years through the 1970s, the United States sent 3 tons of uranium to other nations, enough for “dozens, dozens, dozens” of weapons, he said (see related GSN story, today). “We exported this stuff, bomb-grade uranium, like doughnuts or something. It’s just remarkable,” he said. Washington began to reverse the trend in the 1970s through a program to produce low-enriched uranium fuel that would meet the same civilian needs without the threat of being used in weapons. Some existing reactors were converted for LEU use while new plants were built with that specification. Among those to resist the effort were producers of medical isotopes, Kuperman said. The 1992 U.S. Energy Policy Act set three conditions for export of bomb-grade uranium to any reactor — the facility at the time could not be capable of using low-enriched uranium, it had agreed to make the switch as soon as possible, and the U.S. government was assisting the conversion effort. That legislation contributed to a major decline in U.S. weapon-grade uranium exports, but it was undone by a 2005 bill that eliminated the 13-year-old restrictions, Kuperman said (see GSN, July 29, 2005). Lawmakers in Washington “rolled over” for the Canadian reactor that was reluctant to modify its fuel, he said. “They resisted conversion basically because it was inconvenient. A little bit of cost, but mainly, 'It ain't broke, don't fix it,’” Kuperman said. So Canada ended its LEU conversion plan for the Chalk River site and U.S. exports of highly enriched uranium now appear to be again on the rise, “potentially to continue in perpetuity,” he said. While the later bill made it easier to export highly enriched uranium, the amount actually shipped by the United States has not increased significantly, said Nuclear Regulatory Commission spokesman Dave McIntyre: “It’s just a function of demand.” Specific figures were not immediately available. There are a number of options to address the situation, according to Kuperman, including restoration of the 1992 HEU export regime. The government could also support development of a U.S. technetium production capacity that would involve low-enriched uranium, Kuperman said. Representatives from the University of Missouri and the power-generation firm Babcock & Wilcox indicated at the discussion that their firms could together supply 100 percent of the necessary U.S. supply of technetium 99m. However, both would need some form of help from the government. For the university, it would be up to $40 million in startup costs. The private firm would prefer to handle the capital but would look for assistance on dealing with waste and the regulatory process. Additionally, Congress could establish “preferences” for medical isotopes that are produced through use of low-enriched uranium rather than its weapon-grade counterpart, Kuperman said. That could come through temporary subsidization of LEU processes or through prohibitions on use of HEU-made isotopes if there is an LEU-based alternative. “In the long run I think we won’t have any production of isotopes with HEU, and so we could phase out the subsidy,” Kuperman said. “But In the short run, we should give an advantage to the technology that is not vulnerable to nuclear terrorism.”
North Korea does not appear to have issued an ultimatum regarding its denuclearization pledge in talks last week with the United States, South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan said today (see GSN, Oct. 6). The Japanese-based, regime-friendly Choson Sinbo reported yesterday that U.S. envoy Christopher Hill received an unspecified ultimatum during his trip to Pyongyang, Reuters reported. The newspaper said that failure to reach agreement on the demand could lead North Korea to cut off nuclear diplomacy. “Reports on North Korea having made a very important suggestion or issued an ultimatum seem to be grounded on matters of the past. It is different from what was discussed at Hill’s recent visit, which was a verification protocol,” Yu told South Korean lawmakers. The Bush administration has demanded that Pyongyang accept a plan for verifying North Korea’s nuclear activities and material — including site visits and collection of samples — as the next step in the 2007 agreement in which the Stalinist state agreed to dismantle its nuclear infrastructure. Pyongyang has so far rejected the U.S. proposal and has made moves to restart operations at its Yongbyon nuclear complex, where work had stopped under the denuclearization plan (Herskovitz/Kim, Reuters/Washington Post, Oct. 7). While he did not foresee significant modifications to the U.S. proposal, Yu said he believed that Washington and Pyongyang were being flexible in their stands and “considerably reflecting each other’s position,” the Associated Press reported. North Korea’s suspension of disablement activities at Yongbyon are a “serious obstacle” to the Bush administration’s efforts to resolve the nuclear standoff in its remaining months in office, Yu said (Hyung-Jin Kim, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, Oct. 7). Yu said that verification talks are focused on North Korea’s known plutonium activities, rather than its suspected uranium enrichment effort, Agence France-Presse reported. “Basically speaking, verification should cover all nuclear facilities,” he said. “However, negotiations at this stage are aimed to discuss ways to verify the nuclear declaration made by the North” in June. North Korean officials told Hill that inspection of military sites would be allowed only if the Stalinist state received additional aid, the Yonhap News Agency reported (Agence France-Presse/Spacewar.com, Oct. 7). “This proposal can be interpreted as a deal on additional reparation for additional U.S. demand,” one South Korean diplomatic official told the Korea Herald (Jin Dae-Woong, Korea Herald, Oct. 8).
The United States is not permitting Israel to take military action against Iranian nuclear sites because a strike could provoke retaliation against U.S. forces in Iraq, according to an Israeli television report yesterday (see GSN, Oct. 6). The United States and Israel believe Iran could use elements of its nuclear program to support weapons development, but Iran insists its atomic activities are strictly aimed at civilian energy production. The Israeli report said Jerusalem is beginning to prepare for a nuclear-armed Iran following years of unsuccessful multilateral diplomatic efforts to pressure Tehran into halting its uranium enrichment program, Reuters reported. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has reached some agreement with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert on addressing Iran’s uranium enrichment program during talks in Moscow, according to one Israeli official (Reuters I, Oct. 6). Lavrov yesterday assured Olmert that Russia is dedicated to eliminating potential military applications of Iran’s nuclear program, the Jerusalem Post reported. Olmert urged Lavrov to boost Russian "involvement in the international efforts to prevent Iran from achieving nuclear weapons," according to a representative for the Israeli leader (Jerusalem Post, Oct. 6). Olmert’s trip was aimed at discouraging Moscow from selling armaments to Iran or Syria, but Russia’s state-owned weapons export firm yesterday dismissed Israeli allegations that it intended to sell S-300 air-defense interceptors to either nation, Agence France-Presse reported. "We have no information of this kind," a spokesman for Rosoboronexport said. Israel has reportedly expressed concern that Iran could use the air-defense equipment to defend its nuclear sites in a potential attack (Agence France-Presse I/Spacewar.com, Oct. 6). NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer yesterday expressed doubt that international efforts could prevent Iran from building a nuclear weapon, Reuters reported. "It is a major challenge to prevent Iran from continuing to strive to get the bomb," he told the World Policy Conference meeting in France. "I am not positive about the world being able to stop Iran from fulfilling its ambitions.” Scheffer said it is unlikely that Israel would give up its “supposed nuclear arsenal.” Israel is widely suspected of possessing a nuclear arsenal, but the Middle Eastern state has never formally disclosed its existence. “As we all know, Israel never admits to what it has, but I do not see very many arguments for the Jewish state to abandon its potential," he said (Crispian Balmer, Reuters II, Oct. 6). Iran complained about threats issued by Western powers in a letter submitted yesterday to EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana, AFP reported. "In the letter, [chief Iranian nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili] complains of the attitude of the West and says their approach has harmed the constructive process of negotiations between the two parties," a high-level Iranian official told AFP. According to Iranian state media, the letter states: "In the course of negotiations, pressure instead of reason will not be a resolution." The U.S. State Department confirmed that Jalili had sent a letter to the five permanent U.N. Security Council member nations and Germany, which are handling nuclear diplomacy with Tehran. "We cannot comment publicly on the content of the letter until after we have discussed the letter with our P-5+1 partners," a department spokesman said (Agence France-Presse II/Spacewar.com, Oct. 6).
A nuclear physicist has questioned the feasibility of programs to detect and intercept potential nuclear and radiological weapons materials as they move through U.S. entry points, Congressional Quarterly reported yesterday (see GSN, Sept. 4). The Homeland Security Department could better use its financial, political and scientific resources to end the production, use and storage of highly enriched uranium, a material that can be detonated in a nuclear weapon, said Thomas Cochran of the Natural Resources Defense Council (see related GSN stories, today). The United States is “spending billions of dollars on the technology that can be readily defeated even if there’s a 100 percent chance of the material being scanned in the container,” Cochran told Congressional Quarterly. “I don’t think we’re going to solve the threat problem by pouring more money into advanced methods of detecting radiation coming across the borders because the physics is simply against us with respect to the material that represents by far the greatest threat,” he told the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee during a Sept. 25 hearing. Cochran touted the ability of current technology to detect radiation sources, but warned that “these detectors as well as the newer [Advanced Spectroscopic Portal monitors] do not reliably detect highly enriched uranium. If the threat has the wherewithal to develop an improved nuclear explosive device out of HEU, the same threat would have the wherewithal to defeat those systems almost 100 percent of the time, even if they were guaranteed to be screened.” “The president of the United States should declare and back with the full weight of our diplomacy that the United States seeks — in the interest of and in cooperation of all nations — to achieve a global ban on the civil use of HEU,” Cochran said. “I can think of no civil use of HEU that justifies the risk associated with its use anywhere on the globe.” Richard Wagner, former assistant to the defense secretary agreed on the importance of eliminating highly enriched uranium while defending current radiation detection efforts. "We ought to do everything that the nation and the international community can do to take HEU off the table," Wagner said at the hearing. "We can do both. Sometimes it is posed as either/or. It is not either/or. We have to do both. I also believe that it's going to be awfully hard to take HEU off the table." Vayl Oxford, head of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, said his agency backs an “overall layered strategy” to preventing nuclear terrorism. “We are advocates for helping ensure that we do better jobs overseas with material security.” Eliminating highly enriched uranium internationally is a difficult task, he said. "We need to continue to seek progress overseas where possible," Oxford said. "It's not going to be possible in my mind for the U.S. to mandate that. We've got to continue to work collaboratively with a host of nations — there's over 40 countries that have highly enriched uranium." Oxford added that U.S. radiation sensors could effectively help spot such material. "We believe that a combination of ASP and not necessarily (Cargo Automated Advanced Radiography Systems), but radiography in operations at our ports of entry have a high probability of success against highly enriched uranium," he said. (Daniel Fowler, Congressional Quarterly, Oct. 6).
Russia has warned that the United States threatens to undermine nuclear-weapon deterrence structures if it does not work with Moscow to replace a major nuclear arms reduction treaty, Reuters reported yesterday (see GSN, Sept. 30). The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty limits U.S. and Russian deployments of nuclear warheads and long-range delivery vehicles, but the agreement is set to lapse in 14 months. Moscow has repeatedly complained that Washington does not appear serious about producing a replacement pact. “I believe this is a most dangerous path," Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told the Rossiiskaya Gazeta in an interview slated for publication today. "All this increases instability several times over. Parity in strategic offensive and defensive weapons is being undermined." U.S. President George W. Bush pledged six months ago that his administration would put forward suggestions for a new nuclear-weapon control framework that took Moscow’s concerns into consideration, Lavrov said (see GSN, April 7). "We have been given such promises several times," he said. “We are still waiting." Lavrov said that Russia continues to advocate discussions between the top defense and foreign officials from Moscow and Washington. The last “2+2” talks, held in March, addressed the regulation of strategic weaponry as well as a planned European missile shield (see GSN, March 21). “We are ready to meet again,” Lavrov said (Tatiana Ustinova, Reuters, Oct. 6).
The White House has planned a ceremony tomorrow for President George W. Bush to sign legislation green-lighting a U.S.-Indian nuclear trade deal, the Indo-Asian News Service reported (see GSN, Oct. 6). Both houses of Congress recently approved the deal to enable New Delhi to purchase U.S. nuclear materials and technology for the first time in more than 30 years. To take effect, the deal requires Bush’s signature and his certification that the agreement adheres to U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty obligations, a step that officials said is not in question. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited India on Saturday, evidently hoping to ink the bilateral deal, but was unable to do so without Bush acting first, according to administration officials (Indo-Asian News Service I/Times of India, Oct. 7). Thanks to changes in U.S. and international nuclear trade rules, other nations are also now eligible to sell nuclear technology to India, and Canada should join this group, a trade body has urged. “The newly signed India-U.S. nuclear deal will create 250,000 jobs in America,” said Kam Rathee, head of the Canada-India Business Council. “Canada should also create jobs selling nuclear reactors to India as they did in the past” (Indo-Asian News Service II/Times of India, Oct. 7).
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