By Jon Fox
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — U.S. Senator Hillary Clinton, Democratic White House hopeful, said Saturday if elected she would urge Pakistan to share the security responsibility for it nuclear arsenal with the United States (see GSN, Oct. 16, 2007). “So far as we know right now, the nuclear technology is considered secure, but there isn’t any guarantee, especially given the political turmoil going on inside Pakistan,” the New York lawmaker said during a Democratic debate in New Hampshire. Clinton suggested working with Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf to further ensure the safety of that nation’s nuclear arsenal. “I would try to get Musharraf to share the security responsibility of the nuclear weapons with a delegation from the United States and perhaps Great Britain so that there is some failsafe,” she said. Clinton did not outline how such an arrangement would be managed. Speaking the following day in Islamabad, Foreign Office spokesman Mohammad Sadiq told a state-run news service that Pakistan’s nuclear warheads are entirely secure under the nation’s command and control structure. Sadiq explicitly rejected the former first lady’s proposal. “Regardless of the meaning of Senator Clinton’s remarks, it must be clearly understood that Pakistan alone is, and will be responsible for the security of its strategic assets,” he said. In recent months, nuclear-armed Pakistan has slipped into a state of tumult leading to Musharraf’s declaration of a state of emergency in November. Most recently in December, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, a leader of the political opposition in Pakistan, was assassinated (see GSN, Jan. 4). New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson said during Saturday’s debate that if elected he would simply call for Musharraf to step down. “With Pakistan, here’s an example of a country, a potentially failed nation-state with nuclear weapons,” he said. “What a president must do is have a foreign policy of principles and realism.” Richardson described the situation in Pakistan as the “worst of all worlds,” noting that the United States had given Musharraf $11 billion in aid, yet he has failed to adequately pursue al-Qaeda elements in Pakistani territory and “basically said that he is supreme dictator.” “What I would specifically do as president is I would ask Musharraf to step aside,” Richardson said. Former North Carolina Senator John Edwards also emphasized the situation in Pakistan, suggesting a “violently radical element” in that nation could seize control of the government and its nuclear weapons. One of those weapons could then be turned over to a terrorist organization to be used against the United States or its allies, he said. To address not just Pakistan but the larger issue of nuclear proliferation, Edwards said he would launch a long-term, international initiative to completely eliminate nuclear weapons. “Because that is the only way to make the world safer and securer and to keep America safe,” he said. The Democratic candidates took up the issue of nuclear terrorism and proliferation in their final debate before tomorrow’s New Hampshire primary after prompting from the forum moderator, ABC newscaster Charlie Gibson. Illinois Senator Barack Obama reiterated his position that he would direct the United States to strike against al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in the frontier provinces of Pakistan if “actionable” intelligence existed, even if Pakistan refused to take action. He also said the current administration has failed to pay attention to nuclear nonproliferation strategy — something that “has made us less safe as a consequence.” “It would take about four years for us to lock down the loose nuclear weapons that are still floating out there, and we have not done the job,” said Obama, winner of last week’s Democratic caucuses in Iowa. He criticized the Bush administration for failing to commit together with Russia to further reduce national nuclear stockpiles. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, he said, has “fallen apart under this administration.” “That has weakened our capacity to pressure other countries to give up nuclear technology,” Obama said. Clinton called for an executive branch coordinator to tackle nonproliferation issues. “There has to be a better effort to make sure that every part of the United States government is working together,” she said. Clinton also said not enough has been done to enhance U.S. port security to protect against trafficking of nuclear or radiological materials. “We have not made the kind of commitment that is necessary to protect us from this kind of importation,” she said. The New York senator described a version of deterrence that she believes will help protect the United States against conventional or nuclear terrorism (see GSN Oct. 11, 2007). Following the North Korean nuclear test in 2006, President George W. Bush vowed that any nation that transfers nuclear weapons or material would be held “fully accountable for the consequences of such action” (see GSN Oct. 20, 2006). On Saturday, Clinton suggested that simply offering a “safe haven” to terrorists would be grounds for retaliation. “Part of our message has to be no safe haven,” she said. “You know, deterrence worked during the Cold War in large measure because the United States made it clear to the Soviet Union that there would be massive retaliation. We have to make it clear to those states that would give safe haven to stateless terrorists that would launch a nuclear attack against America that they would also face very heavy retaliation.”
By Elaine M. Grossman
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — U.S. Army officials have learned that their concept for building a hypersonic weapon to hit targets halfway around the globe could raise treaty compliance problems potentially requiring hundreds of millions of dollars to resolve, according to Defense Department sources (see GSN, Dec. 21, 2007). The issue has raised concerns on the part of at least one top U.S. commander, Strategic Command head Gen. Kevin Chilton, according to defense officials. The price tag to develop and buy just 16 Advanced Hypersonic Weapons could exceed $600 million, even before arms control compliance issues are taken into account. Ensuring the Army missile abides by the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty could force program officials to make expensive alterations to plans for building and testing a weapon capable of attacking targets thousands of kilometers away, officials said. Based in Huntsville, Ala., the Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command is developing the hypersonic weapon concept as a conventional alternative to using nuclear arms against critical-but-fleeting targets. Potential targets might include a terrorist enclave discovered in a remote area or a rogue-nation weapon of mass destruction being readied for launch, defense officials have said. However, the service has never allocated its own funds for the technology demonstration project. Rather, the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon is embarking on its third year of development bankrolled by more than $52 million in congressional earmarks. If the munitions program is to comply with the two arms agreements, costs might rise significantly because the Army could be forced to develop, test and build new rockets rather than use existing, off-the-shelf launchers, among other possible changes, officials said. Any substantial price hike, in turn, could jeopardize future congressional largesse, according to Capitol Hill aides. Current plans to use a rocket designed for missile defense on the hypersonic weapon could conflict with arms control treaty mandates, defense sources said. Army officials plan to test-fly — and perhaps ultimately field — the weapon on an Orbital Boost Vehicle developed and built as part of the Pentagon’s Ground-based Midcourse Defense program, according to sources. As it stands, the military can test or employ the Orbital booster without any restrictions under existing arms control agreements that govern the size of the nuclear arsenal and dictate how test flights of offensive missiles are carried out. However, any use of the missile defense booster on an offensive system like the Army’s hypersonic weapon could bring it under the purview of the U.S.-Russian arms treaties, officials said. That would limit the number of sites from which the rocket could be launched and force the United States to notify Russia about hypersonic weapon flight tests. The Pentagon would also have to share experiment data with Moscow. Exactly how much additional cost or burden these restrictions would actually introduce into the Army program remains to be seen. However, once a new “offensive” designation is triggered for the Orbital booster, any other use of the same launcher would become limited by the same treaty restrictions, according to Jack Mendelsohn, a retired Reagan administration arms control negotiator who helped negotiate the START agreement. The limits would also newly apply to the existing effort to use the booster in the U.S. missile defense system, because the launcher will have taken on an alternative, offensive capability, Mendelsohn and others said. That is an outcome the Pentagon would like to avoid, particularly given top-level Bush administration assurances that missile defense interceptors to be fielded in Poland pose no offensive threat to Moscow (see GSN, Dec. 20, 2007). “Whatever you do, you don’t want to get [a booster] captured by the INF Treaty or START Treaty,” one defense official said in an interview this week. “You don’t want to create constraints by using something that is not otherwise [limited] by the treaties.” The Bush administration has abided by the terms of offensive arms control treaties but has largely tried to avoid triggering any new restrictions, the official explained. This official and others agreed to be interviewed for this article on condition of anonymity, because they were not authorized to speak publicly about issues surrounding the hypersonic weapon. Based solely on its technical merits, the Orbital Sciences Corp. rocket might make an attractive booster for the hypersonic weapon because its design was optimized for speed, several sources noted. Army officials aim to capitalize on the velocity of an initial ballistic trajectory to allow the weapon to ultimately glide into its target at Mach 4 speed. Using the ground-based interceptor’s boost vehicle would allow the service to restrict costs by avoiding developing its own fast launcher from scratch, defense sources said. However, if concerns about treaty constraints force the Army to engineer a brand new booster, the hypersonic weapon’s price could grow by some $200 million — a whopping 33 percent hike from its anticipated five-year budget — one defense official estimated. Another problem potentially facing the effort is in identifying a “sounding rocket” that officials could use to conduct initial flight tests on selected technologies under development for the hypersonic missile, according to defense sources. Some sounding rockets that might be of interest — because their speed or flight characteristics roughly mimic the future hypersonic missile — could be unavailable because of INF Treaty limits. That accord bans the United States and Russia from using missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, regardless of whether the payload is conventional or nuclear. START — which includes limits on ground-based ballistic missiles with ranges of more than 5,500 kilometers — remains in force only through December 2009. AHW program officials could, in theory, proceed with plans based on an assumption that START limits would no longer affect the missile as of 2010 and beyond. However, the next U.S. president — taking office in January 2009 — might push to extend the agreement, potentially complicating matters once again for the Army program, officials said (see GSN, Sept. 4, 2007). The Moscow Treaty, negotiated in 2002 by U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin, has each nation reducing its deployed strategic-range nuclear warheads to no more than 2,200 by December 2012. Envisioned as being capable of reaching targets up to 6,000 miles away, the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon falls right on the cusp of the intermediate and strategic treaties’ range limits. Once fielded, if the missile has a slightly shorter-than-advertised range, it could be banned under the INF agreement. Alternatively, at its currently envisioned range, it might be counted against ballistic missile warhead limits under START. Similar to the INF treaty, “the kind of warhead being counted [under START] doesn’t matter as long as the delivery system falls within the range limits” of the agreement, Mendelsohn said. However, the hypersonic weapon might not count under the Moscow Treaty caps, which arguably do not apply to conventional weapons, Mendelsohn said. Much would likely depend on whether or how the next U.S. administration pursues a START extension, he said. The hypersonic weapon’s mixed flight profile — which features both ballistic and glide flight — might offer an exemption under START agreement provisions for ballistic launch vehicles, defense officials said. Mendelsohn was skeptical about that prospect, though, noting that even a purely ballistic trajectory includes an element of glide. In any case, a lingering concern over at the Pentagon is whether the United States might be forced to further cut its nuclear stockpile to make room for the conventionally armed, hypersonic missiles under START, experts said. Still other issues remain. The cruise portion of the hypersonic weapon’s path to its target could introduce overflight issues, defense officials said. Traversing the sovereign airspace of other nations would normally require advance permission that could prove politically thorny or militarily risky to obtain, officials said. The Pentagon’s Compliance Review Group is expected to wrestle with these and other treaty-related issues affecting the Army weapon, once it is further along in its development, according to defense officials. The review group includes representatives from the uniformed military and the Pentagon’s civilian acquisition, legal and policy teams. Its certification of conformity with arms control treaties would typically be required for a weapon system to be built. Army program advocates developing the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon repeatedly asserted in official briefings over the past several months that the missile concept had already won the review group’s approval as “treaty compliant,” defense insiders said. However, Strategic Command chief Chilton challenged that claim during a closed-door meeting with the program manager late last year, Global Security Newswire has learned. The Air Force general said the hypersonic weapon effort as currently envisioned raises potentially serious arms control compliance problems, according to officials familiar with the Nov. 20 briefing, held at the command’s Omaha, Neb., headquarters. While the compliance group has not yet formally reviewed the Army missile concept, staff members informally warned the hypersonic weapon program office early last year about possible treaty obstacles, according to a number of defense officials. Asked about the conflicting claims, a spokesman for the Army Space and Missile Defense Command told GSN this week that following a 2005 briefing, the hypersonic weapon “was deemed acceptable to proceed as a technology demonstrator” by the Compliance Review Group. “However,” the spokesman continued in an e-mailed statement, “if AHW technologies transition to a formal weapon system acquisition program, it will be required to receive a formal review” by the treaty compliance panel. To other defense officials watching the program, Army proponents of the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon may be treading on some thin ice. “This is a program … that has the potential to get some people in trouble,” said one Pentagon official.
The United States has deployed roughly 2,000 nuclear scientists and bomb experts as a final line of defense against nuclear terrorism, the Los Angeles Times reported yesterday (see GSN, Sept. 27, 2007). Since the program’s inception in 2001, the federal government has more than doubled funds for the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Emergency Response Office, which aims to detect, approach and defuse a nuclear weapon or radiological “dirty bomb” before it detonates in a U.S. city. Twenty-six response teams are spread around the country. They have access to aircraft outfitted with radiation sensors to signal the presence of a nuclear or radiological weapon. At major sports events, they inconspicuously slog through crowds with backpacks of equipment to detect highly enriched uranium and plutonium. "After everything else fails, we come in,” said Deborah Wilber, the director of the Emergency Response Office. “I don't believe it is a question of if it will happen. It is a question of when.” If a unit were to discover a weapon, an FBI team would rush to the location from rural Virginia and a team of bomb experts would fly in from an airbase in Albuquerque, where a fueled jet remains on 24-hour alert. The bomb squads would attempt to disable the weapon’s trigger mechanism and then transfer the weapon to the G Tunnel, a 5,000-foot-deep shaft in the Nevada desert. Once the weapon was secured behind steel blast doors at the bottom of the shaft, FBI agents and scientists would attempt to disassemble it while compiling forensic information. Between 500 and 1,000 FBI agents and roughly 1,000 nuclear weapons scientists participate in the effort on a part-time basis. None of the emergency response teams has uncovered a terrorist suspect yet, but one group looked into the background of a homeless person in possession of a radioactive substance they encountered in downtown Las Vegas. In another incident, a police officer’s radiation sensor was set off by a hot dog vendor in New York City who had recently undergone a medical examination. The government is also developing a nuclear forensics system that could be used to identify the nation of origin for nuclear material used in an attack or an attempted bombing. Even if a bomb detonated, such a system could use samples of fallout to allow the United States to identify and potentially retaliate against the weapon’s supplier (see GSN, Oct. 11, 2007). The nuclear forensics program aims to act as a deterrent by encouraging other countries to keep close guard over their nuclear assets, the Times reported. A major report on nuclear forensics is due in February. The study is attempting to determine whether the United States could reliably link a nuclear device to a particular source and convince the world of its accuracy. Jay Davis, a retired weapons scientist involved with the forensics report, said nuclear forensics experts hope they could determine a detonation’s size in one hour, the sophistication of the weapon’s design in six hours, how its fuel was enriched in three days and its supplying nation — “Does this look like a Russian, a Chinese or a Pakistani device, or something we have never seen before?” — in one week. Although the emergency response teams form a final line of defense against such an attack, no one should rely on them to intercept a nuclear device, said Charles Curtis, president of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. Preventing the detonation of such a weapon “is a very, very, very difficult problem, but not impossible,” he said. However, Vahid Majidi, who heads the FBI Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate, expressed more optimism. He said his office’s chance of locating a nuclear weapon in Manhattan would be “quite reasonable” with a 24-hour warning. “When you think of issues only as a technical problem, you only think of technical capability. I am not sitting on my hands waiting for some detector to go off. We will use every asset at our disposal. Technology is a very small portion of what we do,” he said (Ralph Vartabedian, Los Angeles Times, Jan. 6).
U.S. President George W. Bush plans to push for more international pressure against Iran over its nuclear program during his first extended trip to the Middle East this week despite regional doubts left by a U.S. intelligence assessment’s conclusion that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, the Washington Post reported (see GSN, Jan. 3). “Part of the reason I'm going to the Middle East is to make it abundantly clear to nations in that part of the world that we view Iran as a threat, and that the [National Intelligence Estimate] in no way lessens that threat, but in fact clarifies the threat,” Bush told the Israeli newspaper Yediot Ahronot. The intelligence analysis released last month has slowed momentum to step up sanctions and other moves to pressure Iran, which the Bush administration has long suspected of pursuing nuclear weapons. The White House has maintained its position that Iran is interested in acquiring a nuclear arsenal. However, Israel, which considers Iran a threat to its existence, and Arab Sunni nations such as Saudi Arabia that see Iran as an emerging Shiite threat, have interpreted the U.S. intelligence community’s report as a sign that the United States is losing its will to confront the Islamic republic. One high-level administration official said that many powers in the region were “confused” by the estimate. “No Arab regime understands why the United States would publish an intelligence estimate,” the official said. During his eight-day tour, Bush plans to visit Egypt, Israel, the Palestinian territories, Saudi Arabia and several small Gulf states (Abramowitz/Knickmeyer, Washington Post, Jan. 7). Bush is expected to receive a briefing on Israel’s newest intelligence on Iran’s nuclear program and its vulnerabilities, the London Times reported yesterday. Sources said Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak hopes to convince Bush of the feasibility of an Israeli attack against Iranian uranium enrichment facilities if current diplomatic efforts fail to convince Tehran to halt its enrichment program. Israeli intelligence officials have been said to possess “rock solid” indications that Iran restarted nuclear weapons development after halting it in 2003. Israeli officials plan to provide Bush with new details on Iran’s uranium enrichment as well as its development of new nuclear capable missiles, although they fear that leaks could endanger the element of surprise in a potential attack (Uzi Mahnaimi, London Times, Jan. 6). Some Middle Eastern political analysts have said President Bush is not likely during his tour to build up any political backing for military action against Iran, Agence France-Presse reported. “It might not spell the end of Iran as a military power, but (merely) spark Iranian reactions against Gulf states which are more than these countries can take,” said Ayed al-Manna of Kuwait. Anwar Eshki, who leads an independent Saudi think tank, said Israel could attack Iran and “drag the United States” into the conflict. He said a U.S. strike does not appear likely in the immediate future. Mohammed al-Roken of the United Arab Emirates said the Bush administration is probably most interested in “nonmilitary means of putting pressure on Iran” such as economic sanctions (Lydia Georgi, Agence France-Presse/Daily Times, Jan. 6). Meanwhile, Iran’s U.N. ambassador asked the Security Council to end its pursuit of punitive measures against Iran and submit the country’s “nuclear dossier” to the International Atomic Energy Agency, RIA Novosti reported Saturday. “The time has come to end the illegal consideration of Iran's nuclear issue at the Security Council, and send the case back to a relevant technical forum, specifically the International Atomic Energy Agency,” Mohammad Khazaee said, adding that further involvement by the Security Council would undercut the authority of the U.N. nuclear watchdog. Late last month, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said that “since there is no evidence that Iran has deviated from (the peaceful nature of) its nuclear program ... the time has come for the parties dealing with the (Iranian) nuclear issue to make a bold and logical decision and return the matter to the IAEA” (RIA Novosti, Jan. 5). IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei plans to visit Iran next week to address outstanding concerns about the country’s nuclear program, an IAEA spokeswoman said today. (Reuters I, Jan. 7). Iran’s Foreign Ministry said yesterday that the country has expelled a German diplomat for carrying out “nondiplomatic activities,” Reuters reported. An Iranian envoy was expelled from Germany last summer after attempting to obtain systems control equipment from a Bavarian company for Iran’s nuclear program, the German publication Der Spiegel reported last month. Iran’s suspension of a German official might have been a retaliatory gesture for that incident, according to Deutsche Presse-Agentur (Reuters II, Jan. 6).
Indian and international nuclear officials held talks last week but failed to complete an agreement detailing the inspection rules that are required for New Delhi to adopt a nuclear trade deal with the United States, the Calcutta Telegraph reported (see GSN, Jan. 2). The diplomats met Thursday and Friday at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and are expected to reconvene for a fourth round of talks in the third or fourth week of January, according to the Telegraph. The inspections agreement would help pave the way for the trade deal, but Indian leaders are facing a more serious hurdle: domestic opposition from key political supporters. Four Indian communist parties have threatened to withdraw their backing of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s ruling coalition if he tries to implement the nuclear deal. The deal would enable India to purchase U.S. nuclear technology and materials if Delhi agrees to allow the nuclear agency to oversee the nation’s civil nuclear program (Rasheed Kidwai, Calcutta Telegraph, Jan. 6). Both U.S. and Indian officials have expressed a desire to complete the pact before U.S. presidential elections later this year, and one top Indian official Friday cautioned critics not to cripple Singh’s leadership. “Of course, time is running out. But one cannot help it. Either you lose majority, and if a government loses majority nobody is going to have an arrangement with a minority government,” said Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee. “I have not given up” (Times of India, Jan. 5).
The top U.S. negotiator to the six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear program called today for patience following Pyongyang’s disputed claim that it has met a key milestone in its denuclearization process, Reuters reported (see GSN, Jan. 4). The Stalinist regime in October pledged to fully declare its nuclear programs and to disable three key facilities by the end of 2007. Officials from other nations in the six-party talks said Pyongyang missed both deadlines, but North Korea said it supplied a list of its atomic activities in November. The Bush administration quickly rejected that claim. “They were prepared to give a declaration which wasn’t going to be complete and correct and we felt that it was better for them to give us a complete one even if it’s going to be a late one,” U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill said in Tokyo. “We understand that this is always a difficult process, one that is rarely completed on time. So I think we have to have a little sense of patience and perseverance,” he added (Teruaki Ueno, Reuters/Yahoo!News, Jan. 7). “We don’t need a 90 percent declaration; we need a 100 percent declaration,” Hill said. “They have not provided a complete and correct declaration. By that I mean they have not included all of the nuclear programs they have, they have not included all the nuclear facilities they have” (Agence France-Presse I/Spacewar.com, Jan. 7). Hill is scheduled to visit China, Japan, Russia and South Korea this week for talks on North Korea’s nuclear program, Reuters reported. “As far as we know, there was a consultation between North Korea about the nuclear declaration but we have not heard of North Korea submitting the list,” said South Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman Cho Hee-young (Ueno, Reuters, Jan. 7). Officials in Washington maintained their stance that they were still waiting for the declaration, the New York Times reported. “The North Koreans know what’s expected of them and what they rest of the parties are looking for, and that is a full and complete and accurate declaration of their nuclear activity,” said White House spokesman Tony Fratto. “They know that.” Criticism of the missed deadline has been muted because work continues on disabling plants at the Yongbyon nuclear complex, said State Department spokesman Sean McCormack. That could provide information about the nation’s nuclear activities. “We’re breaking new ground here,” he said. “This hasn’t been done before.” Pyongyang indicated Friday that it was slowing the pace of work at Yongbyon because other nations have not met their obligations under the denuclearization agreement. If the process is completed, North Korea would receive 1 million tons of fuel or equivalent assistance, along with security and diplomatic benefits. To date it has received 150,000 tons of oil and 5,010 tons of steel to be used to renovate deteriorating power facilities (Choe/Myers, New York Times, Jan. 5). The standoff over the nuclear declaration, focused largely on whether it includes a suspected uranium enrichment program, could represent a crucial point in the disarmament effort, experts told Agence France-Presse. “Efforts to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear facilities are now at a crossroads due to a dispute over a suspected uranium enrichment program,” said Paik Hak-soon, of the Sejong Institute in Seoul. “Both North Korea and the United States are in a dilemma over how to establish the pattern of action,” he added, saying that Pyongyang would seek “strong incentives” for giving up its nuclear programs. “The statement means that North Korea will not take further action until the United States and other parties reciprocate. They think they have done enough,” Paik said (Agence France-Presse/Spacewar.com, Jan. 5). Meanwhile, U.S. think tanks said that China is prepared to secure North Korean nuclear weapons should the Stalinist state become unstable, the Yonhap News Agency reported. Contingency plans developed in Beijing focus on providing humanitarian care for refugees, peacekeeping, and ensuring the security of nuclear weapons and fissile material, according to the report from the U.S. Institute of Peace and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “If deemed necessary, [People’s Liberation Army] troops would be dispatched into North Korea,” states the report, based on talks with Chinese specialists on North Korea. “Some Chinese experts say explicitly that they favor holding a discussion of stability in North Korea in official channels with the United States, including possible joint responses in support of common objectives, such as securing nuclear weapons and fissile material,” the report says. There is concern among some Chinese experts that Washington might ultimately decide that North Korea could retain some nuclear weapons, the report states. They worry that such a move would undermine relations between Pyongyang and Beijing, which has insisted that its neighbor give up such weapons. “Chinese analysts vividly recall that Washington pressed Beijing to impose great pressure on India after its nuclear test in 1998, but then reversed its position and condoned India’s nuclear program, leaving China hanging out to dry,” the report says (Yonhap News Agency, Jan. 6).
The U.S. Air Force has delayed a key step toward allowing its North Dakota-based strategic bombers to conduct their nuclear mission, the Associated Press reported yesterday. Officials decertified the 5th Bomber Wing at Minot Air Force Base last year after technicians mistakenly loaded six nuclear weapons onto a B-52 bomber that flew the munitions to Barksdale Air Force Base, La. (see GSN, Nov. 8, 2007). The bomber wing’s senior leadership was replaced last year, but a scheduled Jan. 23 inspection has been postponed to give officers more time to institute better nuclear weapon control policies, AP reported (Associated Press/Sioux City Journal, Jan. 6). The delayed review, called a Nuclear Surety Inspection, is supposed to take place every 18 months, the Minot Daily News reported today. The air base also houses 150 Minuteman 3 ICBMs which are set to begin their inspection Jan. 22, although the previous inspection was conducted in May 2005, according to the Daily News. “The Nuclear Surety Inspection is where Air Force Space Command inspectors come out and give us our license to operate,” said top Minuteman officer Col. Marty Whelan, commander of the 91st Space Wing. “They look at our ability to secure, maintain and operate our nuclear deterrence mission” (Eloise Ogden, Minot Daily News, Jan. 7). In November, another wing commander expressed confidence that the nuclear weapon custody failures at Minot would be rectified by the bomber wing’s new commander, Col. Joel Westa. “[Westa] is a superb officer. I worked with him for a year. He has a B-52 background,” said Gen. Douglas Owens, commander of the 36th Wing at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, where Westa served as vice wing commander. “He has all of the leadership skill sets that will put him in great stead to address any issue that might arise at Minot,” Owens added, speaking to a civilian delegation at his base (Greg Webb, Global Security Newswire, Jan. 7).
Mordechai Vanunu, who served 18 years in prison for disclosing Israel’s then-secret nuclear weapons program, has avoided a six-month jail sentence handed down last year for speaking with reporters following his 2004 release, the London Times reported yesterday (see GSN, July 2, 2007). Vanunu is scheduled to appear in court tomorrow to challenge the sentence, which he received for violating the terms of his release by talking to journalists. He has already agreed to complete a community service requirement instead of the original jail sentence, according to his attorney (London Times, Jan. 6).
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